Public Relations in a "Jolted" Political Environment: An Exploratory Study of Boundary-Spanning Government Relations Professionals in Maryland by Tuite, Leah Simone
ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: Public Relations in a “Jolted” Political 
Environment: An Exploratory Study of 
Boundary-Spanning Government Relations  
Professionals in Maryland 
 
Leah Simone Tuite, Ph.D., 2006 
 
Dissertation Directed By: Professor Emerita Larissa A. Grunig,  
Department of Communication 
 
This qualitative study examined government relations, an academically 
underexplored specialized form of public relations.  It explored the individual lived 
experiences of boundary-spanning government relations professionals (GRPs), those 
organizational members who manage organizational interdependence with political 
stakeholders, in organizations enduring a major “jolt” (A.D. Meyer, 1982) in the political 
environment.  The jolt in question is the election of Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., in November 
2002, as Maryland’s first Republican governor in nearly four decades.  The study then 
explained the implications of this jolt for GRPs, their work, and their organizations.  
Further, the study considered those experiences and implications in light of whether the 
jolt was perceived as a boon or a bane to an informant’s organization.  
From the conceptual framework built from public relations and organizational 
theories, the study specifically looked at GRPs’ perceptions of the jolt and the political 
environment, organizational worldviews, communication practices, their work activities 
and responsibilities, and organizational political legitimacy.  Active interviews were  
conducted with forty “informants” who functioned as either in-house or for-contract 
GRPs for IRS-designated 501c nonprofit organizations in Maryland.   
Among other findings, the analysis demonstrated the ways in which partisan 
conflict among political stakeholders, a polarized political environment, and changes in 
organizations’ political legitimacy affected in the work-lives of informants.  Of greatest 
concern to them were the jolt’s effects on their networks of social and professional 
contacts  their social circles (Kadushin, 1968).  Social circles were found to be the 
ultimate linchpins to GRPs’ effectiveness and success.  The analysis also revealed that 
dialogue, used in the course of jointly implementing the personal influence and cultural 
interpreter models of public relations, best described both the positive and normative 
practices of government relations.   
This study made significant contributions to the body of knowledge on public 
relations and government relations.  It advanced a positive-normative theory of 
government relations, resolved speculation about why government relations is an 
anomaly to the Excellence theory of public relations (J.E. Grunig, 1992), filled gaps in 
the scholarly literature, and suggested organizational justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) as 
a conceptual framework for understanding symmetry and dialogic processes in 
government relations. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk 
and discourse, but to weigh and consider. 
 Sir Francis Bacon (1597), English philosopher 
The seeds of this study began to take root in the fall of 1998 when I wrote my first 
graduate school research paper (Simone [a.k.a. Tuite], 1999), which explored government 
relations, a specialized form of public relations.  Nurtured by my perspective as a 
doctoral student in public relations, my experiences working for Washington, DC-based 
nonprofit advocacy groups during the congressional Republican “revolution” in the mid 
1990s, and my deep personal interest in politics, those seeds eventually blossomed into 
the dissertation contained in these pages. 
Purpose of the Study 
 
This study’s working premise is that, to remain a relevant actor in its 
environment, an organization must negotiate some degrees of compatibility and civility 
with its environment.  As J.E. Grunig (1997b) put it, organizations and publics (e.g., 
stakeholders in the environment) “may not always agree or have a friendly relationship, 
but they do understand one another — and understanding is a major objective of public 
relations” (p. 242).  This understanding, which I will refer to as organizational-
environmental rapport (“rapport”), is achieved through the efforts of boundary-spanning 
personnel.  Readers of this dissertation should understand that the purpose of this 
dissertation is to explore the experiences of boundary spanners, those organizational 
members who manage organizational-environmental interdependence with rapport as the 
goal, in organizations that are contending with a major “jolt” (A.D. Meyer, 1982) in the 
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political sector of their environment.  Boundary-spanning government relations 
professionals (GRPs) and their individual lived experiences are this study’s units of 
analysis.  More specifically, this dissertation hopes to understand their experiences 
throughout the jolt and the implications of that “sudden and unprecedented event” (p. 
515) on the work they do.  Further, I will consider those experiences and implications in 
light of an organization’s affect toward the jolt, that is whether the organization perceived 
the jolt as a boon or as a bane.  
Readers of this study should also understand that this study aspires to do more 
than describe, or collect facts about (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994), boundary spanners’ 
experiences.  Description is, of course, a necessary building block of explanation and can 
make for insightful, rigorous studies (e.g., O’Leary, 1994).  However, unless a 
descriptive study includes enough significant descriptive inference to qualify as an 
explanatory study, it will lack the theoretical insight required of a doctoral dissertation.  
Marra (1992), who developed a theoretical model of crisis public relations, carefully 
distinguished his explanatory dissertation from purely descriptive research:  
Although it is extremely important for public relations professionals to know what 
to do in a crisis, it is equally important to understand why to do it.  Explanations 
of why something occurs provide more valuable information than do simple 
description.  (p. 5) 
 
Learning what boundary spanners’ experiences are lacks theoretical value, but 
learning why boundary spanners experience environmental jolts and the development and 
maintenance of rapport as they do does have theoretical value.  This is explanation, not 
description.   
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Significance of the Study 
 
My dissertation is, at its heart, a public relations study.  Public relations is a 
discipline simultaneously applied and theoretical.  I contend that this study potentially 
has great applied and theoretical significance and, as such, it should appeal to people 
having those respective interests. 
From an applied standpoint, boundary spanners and other organizational members 
should gain insight into what they could expect to happen when their organizations must 
contend with an environmental jolt.  From a theoretical standpoint, scholars in public 
relations and organizational theory would benefit from the study’s deepened 




The potential for change is looming, expected, and omnipresent in politics.  As  
U.S. President Ronald Reagan once observed, “I think the presidency is an institution 
over which you have temporary custody” (as quoted in Sidey, 1986, para. 4).  In today’s 
fickle political environment, the faces of those who hold elected office, contrary to what 
some proponents of term limits may claim, frequently change from election to election.  
State legislatures have come to expect turnover within their leaderships and general 
memberships (Gurwitt, 2003).   
What is also changing is that increasingly, more of these new faces are 
Republicans.  Republicans occupy more state-level offices now than in the past 50 years.  
Republicans control four more state legislatures than they did before the 2002 elections, 
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whereas Democrats have lost control of two state legislatures in that same time.  The two 
parties split control of 12 states’ bicameral legislatures (Gurwitt, 2003).   
If one visualizes the political “mood” of the United States as a pendulum, the 
pendulum appears to have swung to the right over the past decade or so, when maverick 
Republican Newt Gingrich and others orchestrated the Republican “takeover” of both the 
U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate in 1994.  However, the political mood 
of America eventually and inevitably will swing back to the left.  When it does, the faces 
of politicians will change yet again, as will the letter in the parentheses after their names. 
Although individuals may only have temporary custody over an elected office, 
political parties may have near-permanent custody.  Such was the case for Democrats and 
the U.S. Congress until 1994, just as it was for Democrats and the Office of the Governor 
of Maryland until November 5, 2002.  When a political party that has so dominated the 
political environment of a state for so long, like the Democrats in Maryland, falls out of 
power, people toss around phrases like “sea change” and “political earthquake” like 
confetti on election night.  Those phrases are not hyperbolic. 
A politician’s or political party’s hold on an elected position may be 
impermanent, but some entities in the political environment remain constant: nonprofit 
organizations like charitable organizations, issue advocacy groups, and trade associations.  
These organizations’ existences transcend election nights and they must be prepared to 
handle the long-term aftershocks, whether positive or negative, of election night.  Their 
success or failure, indeed their survival, depends on it.   
Organizations themselves do not negotiate their political environments.  This 
responsibility falls to boundary spanners, people who act as liaisons between 
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organizations and elements in their environment.  Boundary spanners may be public 
relations professionals, lobbyists, spokespeople, executive directors, and even CEOs.  
They function literally on the brink of the organization’s environment, as detectors, 
interpreters, and relaters of environmental changes and other goings-on.  They do so, so 
the organization appropriately can contend with those continual environmental changes 
and goings-on.  This is all done in the name of organizational effectiveness: 
Professionals of diagnosis can make a major contribution to organizational  
effectiveness by helping decision-makers identify the external conditions that 
affect their organization, assess current tactics for managing environmental 
relations, and find ways to take advantage of external changes and improve their 
organization’s competitive position.  (M.I. Harrison, 1994, p. 104) 
 
With government as ubiquitous and powerful as it is, and with the shifting 
political mood in the United States, boundary spanners and those “constant” 
organizations must learn how to contend or otherwise deal with this swing toward the 
conservative end of the political spectrum and that inevitable future swing back.  Beyond 
that, the Republican and Democrat parties are undergoing a redefinition of what it means 
to be a “Republican” or a “Democrat.”  As an erstwhile Democrat candidate for president 
in 2004 repeatedly declared in his stump speeches: “I’m Howard Dean, and I’m here to 
represent the Democratic wing of the Democratic Party” (as quoted in Schieffer, 2003, 
para. 4).  With the line between the two parties often blurred, an elected official’s 
political label can be less important than his or her ideology.  These constant 
organizations, their boundary spanners, and other decision-makers could look to this 
study to inform their attempts to negotiate rapport with  their environment and maintain 
organizational effectiveness.  At a minimum, they could look to this study to gain insight 




There are several theoretically significant aspects of this study.  First, my study 
seeks to make the existing research on boundary spanning more “complete” and holistic.  
Although much has been written about the myriad impacts that the organizational 
environment may have on boundary spanners’ roles, influence, communication, 
behaviors, perception by others, and so forth, nearly all of this research has been 
conducted quantitatively (viz., Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Lauzen & Dozier, 1992; 
Springston & Leichty, 1994).  Finet (1993), whose study incorporated interview and 
survey data, remains an exception.  Qualitative research, which listens to and values 
boundary spanners’ experiences, will contextualize and triangulate the established 
quantitatively developed body of knowledge on boundary spanning.   
My decision to explore boundary spanning using qualitative methods is not meant 
to imply that the extant quantitative research on boundary spanning is of questionable 
validity or otherwise suspect.  Quantitative and qualitative research methods are often 
used in combination.  For instance, a researcher could conduct interviews or focus groups 
to help develop a survey instrument.  A survey instrument could contain open-ended 
items to elicit qualitative responses (e.g., McComas & Tuite, 2004).  Interviews could be 
used to help fill in the gaps or explore interesting data from surveys.   
For example, the Excellence study employed a two-phase research design.  The 
Excellence team administered surveys in Phase 1 and completed 25 organizational case 
studies for Phase 2 (L.A. Grunig, J.E. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002).  This design yielded a 
much more complete and well-rounded understanding of excellence in public relations 
than if only one method had been used.  This comprehensive understanding of a 
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phenomenon, excellence in public relations in the case of the Excellence study, is 
probably the greatest advantage of employing both approaches.  
Quantitative research looks at structure and the existence of relationships between 
variables and seeks answers to questions such as “What?  How much?  How many?”  
Qualitative focuses on understanding the behaviors and processes occurring in a 
phenomenon, seeking answers to “How?” and “Why?” questions.  Quantitative’s breadth 
and qualitative’s depth of knowledge helps to create, again, a comprehensive 
understanding of a phenomenon.  This should hold true even if the methods are used 
asynchronously, such as with my qualitative exploration of boundary spanning after and 
apart from the extant quantitative research.  In explaining the methods “merger” from our 
2004 study, McComas and I noted, “The quantitative data informs the qualitative data 
and vice versa, which arguably causes the spiral of science to move forward at a faster 
rate” (p. 14) than if only one approach is used.   
Second, this study is significant because it will also cast a scholarly light on 
government relations, an academically underexplored specialized public relations 
program.  This is surprising given the importance, if not near omnipotence (Mintzberg, 
1983), of governments in organizational life. Toth (1986) advocated for additional 
qualitative research in public affairs, which for all purposes is another way of saying 
“government relations.”  (Public relations efforts of government agencies are often called 
“public affairs” [J.E. Grunig, 1997b], mainly because federal law prohibits the 
government from engaging in public relations efforts.  Essentially the practical 
differences between the terms “public relations” and “public affairs” are semantic; but in 
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practice outside of government agencies, “public affairs” is usually synonymous with 
“government relations.”) 
Such research into public affairs/government relations, Toth (1986) said, would 
be particularly beneficial to the understanding of “concepts of public relations” (p. 33) 
like boundary spanning.  She cited one study (viz., Ferguson, Weigold, & Gibbs, 1984) 
that, serendipitously, investigated boundary spanning within the context of government.  
After reviewing the public relations literature, I believe her call has not been satisfactorily 
heeded, with these notable exceptions: Johnson’s (1992) thesis on the connection 
between lobbying and public relations in Washington, DC; a study of lobbying in 
Norway (Haug & Koppang, 1997); and the Excellence study, which explored specialized 
public relations programs including government relations (Dozier, L.A. Grunig, & J.E. 
Grunig, 1995; J.E. Grunig, 1992; L.A. Grunig et al., 2002).   
Third, this study represents an attempt to understand, from an individual-level 
perspective, the work lives of boundary-spanning GRPs as they and their organizations 
contend with a jolted political environment.  Granted, as a qualitative study, the results 
would not be generalizable to a population of boundary-spanning GRPs; but the results 
nonetheless may provide theoretical and practical insights into their work during times of 
an environmental jolt and attendant efforts to negotiate rapport between the organization 
and the jolted environment.  The study aspires to contribute to the development of a 
positive theory of boundary spanning in organizations contending with major political 
change.  A positive theory describes and explains actualities and “what people do” (Lave 
& March, 1993, p. 108).  A positive theory may facilitate the understanding of problems 
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(J.E. Grunig & L.A. Grunig, 1992), “coping with reality” (Toth, 1986, p. 30), prediction 
(Lave & March, 1993; Marra, 1992; Toth, 1986), and even control (Marra, 1992).   
Contingent on the data collected and comparisons across organizations’ affects 
toward the jolt, a normative theory may emerge.  Normative theories “give advice” (Lave 
& March, 1993, p. 108); they offer idealized representations of how something should be
done or how someone should behave.  As will be explained in a subsequent section, 
incompatibility between organizations and their sociopolitical environments happens 
frequently and with great effect; disagreements and misunderstanding occur.  In spite of 
the ungeneralizable nature of this qualitative study, boundary spanners could look to the 
positive, and perhaps normative, theory that emerges from the study for guidance when 
facing that nearly inevitable misalignment.  Because problems are unique, so too are their 
solutions — a source of frustration for public relations professionals seeking solutions to 
problems.  Theories provide the insight and direction to help solve problems and alleviate 
professionals’ frustration (J.E. Grunig, 1978). 
It is important to me that what emerges from this study is something that 
professionals realistically could and would understand and learn from.  To me, this is 
imperative given, as I have pointed out, that public relations is a discipline both academic 
and practical.  I would be disappointed in the outcome of this academic endeavor if 
professionals were to find it user unfriendly or “rather abstract and conceptual,” as 
Cornelissen (2000, p. 316) lamented about how professionals generally view academic 
research.  I confronted this first hand several times during my research: Several 
informants gently teased and questioned me about the term “boundary spanner.”  Once I 
would explain the term to them, the inevitable follow-up was “Why not just use 
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“communicator?”  One person told me that he had joked with his colleagues about adding 
“boundary spanner” to his resume.  Unfortunately, one person called to berate me about 
the “ridiculous” title of my dissertation (which I have since changed) and demanded I 
explain each term in the title in detail.  After explaining to him the terms and the purpose 
of my study (which was very clear from the letter he received and on details provided on 
my Web site), he said, “Well, why didn’t you just put it that way in your title?”  
Moreover, this person by profession was a medical doctor, someone who I would have 
thought would be sympathetic to the need to use professional jargon in research.  He 
declined to participate.  Although I was taken aback at his unnecessarily rude inquisition, 
I concluded that he did have a point: A disconnect exists between public relations 
academics and public relations professionals.  This is a consistent refrain I have heard 
voiced at forums such as the annual International Public Relations Research Conference 
sponsored by the Institute for Public Relations. 
 Finally, I identified four voids in the existing literature that my dissertation will 
attempt to begin filling.  One, Springston and Leichty (1994), in their article on boundary 
spanning, called for a “fuller understanding of how public relations practitioners interact 
with publics, and collect and use information about publics” (p. 687), as well as for a 
better understanding of routine boundary-spanning activities.  Two, Jemison’s (1984) 
contention, although dated, that research was needed on factors that affect boundary 
spanners’ influence remains viable.  Three, Werder (2002) said that public relations 
would benefit from additional positive theories. 
 Baum and Rowley (2002) identified the interactions between organizations and 
their sociopolitical environment as “an important conceptual question” (p. 9).  This, the 
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fourth void, requires explanation.  Governments are powerful and ubiquitous, as 
Mintzberg (1983) noted: The government “represent[s] the ultimate legislative authority 
of the society. . . [and] establish[es] the rules—the laws and regulations—within which 
every organization must function” (p. 44).  Within the context of international public 
relations, M. Taylor and Kent (1999) observed the government was some organizations’ 
most important public even in situations not involving direct communication with the 
government.  Citizens elect lawmakers, who in turn appoint officials.  Lawmakers and 
appointed officials hire staff personnel.  These three groups and the legal and regulatory 
frameworks in which they operate and which they also create, implement, and enforce — 
the government — constitute the political environment for the organizations in my study.  
The government is the political environment and the political environment is the 
government.  To recast the observations of M. Taylor and Kent and of Mintzberg, for 
some organizations (such as those in my study) the government is the more than just the 
most important public.  Rather, the government is the most important “environment”; the 
government is the environment.    
 This “environment” is the political environment.  Only recently has research on 
organizations and environments diverted its attention from organizations’ economic and 
technological environments to their sociopolitical, or non-commercial, environments 
(Finet, 1993).  According to Finet, “the sociopolitical world within which organizations 
must operate is changing in some fundamental way, and researchers need to formulate 
new questions to correspond with the reality of a far more complex and turbulent 
sociopolitical environment” (p. 58).  Although her comments are more than a decade old, 
I believe they are still an accurate assessment of current politics.  I believe that my study 
12
will help illuminate this fourth void identified in the literature by exploring boundary 
spanners help organizations engage with stakeholders in dynamic, complex political 
environments.  Any filling of this or the other three voids will contribute to the study’s 
theoretical significance. 
Inclusions and Delimitations 
 
The dissertation process requires strategic decision-making about what to include 
and consider and what not to.  Choices must be made and limits must be set about which 
literatures to draw on and which questions or hypotheses a study will tackle.  The 
temptation to do too much could cause a dissertation to degenerate into the equivalent of 
the Winchester House of San Jose, CA, whose construction continued, without rhyme or 
reason, for nearly forty years. 
Inclusions 
 
As I was cognizant of this temptation, I constructed the study’s theoretical 
framework using only the literature and theories that in my view best address the study’s 
purposes and aspirations.  I included both germinal and contemporary research.  I sought 
information that would inform and explain the problems, opportunities, work activities 
and responsibilities, influence dynamics, organizational processes, and other issues and 
situations potentially experienced by boundary-spanning government relations personnel 
working for nonprofit organizations contending with a jolted political environment.   
 The first major section of the conceptualization chapter explores topics that 
provide context for the rest of the chapter.  These topics include definitional issues in 
public relations (e.g., see J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2000; 
Hazleton & Long, 1988; Heath, 1997; Long & Hazleton, 1987; and Toth, 1986), 
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stakeholders (e.g., see Coombs, 2001; J.E. Grunig & Repper, 1992), and systems theory 
(e.g., see Aldrich & Herker, 1979; Cutlip et al., 2000; Hatch, 1997; Jemison, 1984; 
Terreberry, 1968).  I relied on scholars such as Douglas (1987); Hall (1987); L.K. Lewis, 
Hamel, and Richardson (2001); and Salamon (1995) for the section on nonprofit 
organizations with political interests.  Scholars such as Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976); 
Emery and Trist (1965); Lauzen and Dozier (1992); Robbins (1990); Sutcliffe (2001); 
Terreberry (1968); and Weick (1969, 1979, 1983) helped to frame the section on 
organizational environments. The final section, on foundational and middle-range public 
relations theories, draws on the work of Aldrich (1979); Baum and Rowley (2002); Boyd 
(2000); Finet (1993); J.E. Grunig (1984, 1992, 2001), J.E. and L.A. Grunig (1989); 




Equally as important as declaring the scope of a dissertation is declaring its 
delimitations. These are the questions and areas of inquiry that could be studied but are 
deemed “beyond the scope” of the study.  This study has two major delimitations: One, I 
will consider only organizations having IRS Section 501c nonprofit status that operate in 
Maryland.  I excluded for-profit organizations, such as corporations, as well as all 
organizations operating outside Maryland.  Two, I will consider only the government and 
subordinate media relations efforts of these Maryland nonprofit 501c organizations.  I 
will not consider other public relations programs (such as donor, member, employee, or 




The research design of a study is a plan of operationalization.  I describe how I 
sought the empirical answers to the theory-born questions below.  
Hon (1997, 1998) studied effectiveness in public relations by interviewing more 
than three-dozen public relations professionals.  The richness of her data and the learning 
that richness engendered inspired my choice of qualitative method.  I conducted my 
research through telephone interviews with people who function as boundary-spanning 
GRPs whose salaries are paid by Maryland charitable [501c(3)], issue advocacy 
[501c(4)], and business league [501c(6)] organizations.  
I identified potential participants by analyzing media sources, organizational Web 
sites, and lists obtained from the Maryland Government Relations Association and the 
Maryland State Ethics Commission.  Through an initial three-wave mailing and an 
expanded one-wave mailing to solicit participation, I eventually completed telephone 
interviews with 44 participants, 40 of which were analyzed. This number of interviews 
achieved the “informational sufficiency” (Snow, 1980, p. 103), or requisite levels of 
depth and breadth of information, needed to meet the study’s goals.  I have provided a 
lengthier discussion of the research design in the methods chapter. 
Maryland, My Maryland 
 
In this section, I explain the concept of an environmental “jolt” and my decision 
to use Maryland as a quasi-laboratory. 
What is a “Jolt”? 
 
Two reasons drove my decision to situate this study in, and effectively delimit it 
to, Maryland.  Although I will not have resided there for most of the dissertation process, 
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Maryland was my adopted home state from 1989 to 2003.  During this time I became 
well versed and fascinated, perhaps morbidly so, with its brand of state-level one-party 
politics.  I learned more about the political process in my four-month stint as an intern to 
the Maryland House of Delegates’ Environmental Matters Committee in 1992 than I did 
in myriad government and politics courses I took as an undergraduate student.  After the 
2002 gubernatorial election, Maryland suddenly —and somewhat surprisingly — had a 
brand-new brand of state-level partisan politics.   The state’s political environment had 
been “jolted” and as such became a laboratory rich with learning opportunities for 
scholars in the communication and political science disciplines. 
I have adopted the term “jolt” to describe what happened to Maryland’s political 
environment upon Republican Robert L. Ehrlich’s win over Democrat Kathleen Kennedy 
Townsend in the 2002 race for governor.  I provide a discussion of the jolt in the 
following section.   
First, however, this term requires explication.  A.D. Meyer (1982) examined the 
responses of a group of hospitals to a workers’ strike, an external event that he called an 
“environmental jolt.”  At the outset of this article, he characterized environmental jolts as 
“transient perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impacts on 
organizations are disruptive and potentially inimical. . .  [They] trigger responses that 
reveal how organizations adapt to their environments” (p. 515); but he went no further.  
He did not provide, for example, a definition of “crisis” for comparison, nor did he 
compare examples of jolts and crises.  Some definitions of crisis, such as “an event that is 
an unpredictable, major threat that can have a negative effect on the organization, 
industry, or stakeholders if handled improperly” (Coombs, 1999, p. 2), sound like a jolt’s 
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near doppelganger.  Other definitions for crisis are less so but still jolt-esque, such as “a 
low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is 
characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a 
belief that decisions must be made swiftly” (Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 60). 
A.D. Meyer clarified himself by refining the concept of an environmental jolt in a 
later work (A.D. Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990).  Jolts, readers discovered, are a mild 
form of discontinuous change.  A discontinuous change event is abrupt and, despite its 
limited duration, “transforms fundamental properties or states of the system” (p. 94).  
True discontinuous change could be characterized as a “cataclysmic upheaval” (p. 93), 
such as the fall of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s.  A more recent 
example would be the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  The election of a 
Republican governor in Maryland in 2002 falls short of being a true discontinuous 
change event; any cataclysm it caused certainly is not on par with the fall of the Iron 
Curtain or 9/11.  However, I aver that it did cause enough upheaval to qualify as a mild 
discontinuous change event: a jolt. 
A.D. Meyer provided further insight in the waning lines of his 1982 article.  He 
emphasized that jolts are only potentially jeopardizing to organizations.  Jolts may be 
advantageous to and positively perceived by organizations, as the election of a 
Republican governor likely would be to some nonprofit organizations in Maryland 
included in this study.  For this reason, and because the 2002 gubernatorial election is a 
mild discontinuous change event, “jolt” is a wholly appropriate designation for this study. 
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The “Jolted” Political Environment in Maryland 
 
Maryland, a “microcosm” of politics at the national level (Montgomery, 2002a), 
presented an ideal opportunity for exploring boundary spanning, a quintessential public 
relations concept, within organizations trying to contend with a “jolted” political 
environment.  The jolt that provides the backdrop for this study is the outcome of the 
2002 gubernatorial election.   
Only 66,170 votes, or barely four percent of the 1.7 million votes tallied in the 
2002 Maryland governor’s race, broke down the “Democratic wall of invincibility” 
(Stuckey, 2002, para. 2) that had blocked Republicans from the Free State’s governorship 
for 36 years.  An upstart Republican candidate, Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., had not just broken 
down the wall; he tore it down by beating the once-presumptive winner, Kathleen 
Kennedy Townsend, a scion of the Kennedy political empire.  Not since Spiro Agnew, 
who resigned the governorship in 1969 to become President Richard M. Nixon’s vice 
president, had a Republican governor lived in the Governor’s Mansion in Annapolis. 
 Ehrlich, a four-term Republican congressional representative and a former two-
term member of the Maryland House of Delegates from the suburbs of Baltimore, had 
won in what many long had considered a one-party — specifically, Democrat — state 
(“Two-party State,” 2002).  Giddy excitement over his win emanated from Republican 
political circles: “[Ehrlich’s win in Maryland] is where we’re looking for lessons for 
2004,” exclaimed the Republican Governors Association finance committee chairman (as 
quoted in Montgomery, 2002c, para. 6).  Ehrlich’s Republican congressional colleagues 
greeted him with hearty backslaps, handshakes, and even a standing ovation 
(Montgomery, 2002b).  
18
During his election-night acceptance speech, Ehrlich intoned: “Welcome to 
history!  To Republicans: Our time in the desert is over” (as quoted in Stuckey, 2002, 
para. 8).  To some, a gleeful declaration; to others, ominous.  Although many policy 
issues, such as the legalization of slots, the construction of an Intercounty Connector 
roadway, and tort reform, could be used to illustrate the policy and ideological 
differences between Glendening and Ehrlich, the governors’ differing perspectives on 
land-use management issues is the most illustrative.  As such, it is the one I expound 
upon here. 
 Land-use management issues typically pit environmental interests against 
business interests in a classic, and nearly intractable, debate over nature versus progress.  
From 1994 through 2002, environmental interests in Maryland had a governor who was 
squarely in their corner.  Under the leadership of then-Governor Parris N. Glendening, in 
1997 Maryland became one of about a dozen states to codify comprehensive growth 
management legislation (Brown, 2001; D.R. Porter, 1997).  Maryland’s Smart Growth 
initiatives, dedicated to stopping poorly planned or unplanned development — sprawl — 
have three goals: (1) to support and enhance existing communities, (2) to preserve natural 
resources and agricultural areas, and (3) to save on the costs of new infrastructure 
(Maryland Department of Planning, n.d.). 
 Then in 2002, Republican Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. won the gubernatorial contest.  
Suddenly, business interests had a governor who was firmly in their corner.  Maryland’s 
nationally vaunted Smart Growth policies had lost their greatest champion, leading many 
to wonder what would become of Smart Growth under this new, more business-friendly 
administration.  Ehrlich has since put his own imprimatur on his predecessor’s Smart 
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Growth program by renaming it “Priority Places.”  His office also introduced legislation 
in 2004 to dismantle the state Office of Smart Growth.  The state Department of Planning 
would assume its responsibilities (Nitkin, 2004). 
The governor who had championed “nature” in the nature versus progress debate 
was gone.  Maryland now has a governor who champions progress.  For organizations 
embroiled in this debate, the political environment of the state has changed dramatically.  
Beyond that, this change was not just from one politician to another but from one 
political party (Democrat) to another (Republican) that had not held the governorship 
since the 1960s.   
Thus, for organizations with business and agricultural interests, Ehrlich’s biblical 
reference appropriately captured the magnitude of his win.  For two terms, Ehrlich’s 
predecessor, Glendening, used his office as a bully pulpit to promote environmental 
policies, particularly his anti-sprawl land-use management program, Smart Growth.  
Glendening left office widely considered a national leader on Smart Growth and was 
once even called an “apostle” of Smart Growth (Lambrecht & Martin, 1997).  
Environmental groups worked closely with Glendening throughout his administration, as 
he championed environmental protection and development restriction policies (Biemer, 
2002a). 
Business organizations did not enjoy similarly friendly relationships with the 
Glendening administration.  A partner in one of Annapolis’s top lobbying firms with 
many development and real estate clients noted: “Glendening was pro-environment. . .it’s 
hard to be pro-business as well.  So any business has to be feeling pretty positive about 
Ehrlich’s election.  They’re looking forward to a friendlier environment, an easing of 
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regulations” (as quoted in Becker, 2002, p. B1).  The partner offered this anecdote: His 
firm holds an annual breakfast mixer attended by the firm’s clients and state legislators.  
Glendening never attended this event; Ehrlich, at the time of the article’s writing still the 
governor-elect, had already agreed to be the breakfast’s next guest of honor.  Another 
telling anecdote involves a comment overheard at the Maryland Chamber of Commerce 
soon after Ehrlich’s win: “Do you realize what’s happening?  We are preparing to talk to 
the governor about our needs because he wants to hear from us!  That’s a new 
phenomenon” (as quoted in Becker, 2002, p. B1).  
Immediately after their win, Ehrlich and his lieutenant governor, Michael Steele, 
indicated that their administration would be much more business friendly, or at least more 
sympathetic to business interests.  Steele said: “Now we will always be mindful of 
protecting public safety and the environment.  But we also recognize that the business 
community is the economic engine of this state” (as quoted in Becker, 2002, p. B1).  Pro-
business interests also welcomed Steele’s comments that this administration would be 
reviewing the “state’s overregulated business environment” (Becker, 2002, p. B1), 
specifically Glendening’s anti-sprawl policies and environmental regulations.  As one 
business lobbyist noted: “Wherever there’s change, there’s opportunity.  This is the 
opportune time where we can really mold things” (as quoted in Becker, 2002, p. B1).  
The message from Ehrlich’s camp was clear: Pro-business interests, your time in the 
desert is over. 
Agricultural interests, particularly farmers, also were relieved to have a 
Republican in the governor’s office.  The Glendening administration had enacted a strict 
nutrient-management program to decrease the fertilizer-polluted run-off that was 
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damaging the health of the Chesapeake Bay watershed.  Many farmers found this 
program to be unnecessarily burdensome.  The director of government relations for the 
Maryland Farm Bureau commented: “The farm community is just relieved to have an 
opportunity to participate in the discussions in Annapolis over the next four years.  They 
felt shut out for the past eight years” (as quoted in Biemer, 2002b, para. 3).  Farmers did 
not have to wait very long before Ehrlich’s team welcomed them in from the desert: 
Reconfiguring this nutrient run-off program to ease its burden on farmers, while 
maintaining as many of its environmental gains as possible, was one of Ehrlich’s initial 
priorities (Biemer, 2002b).   
Also at the top of Ehrlich’s priority list was a proposed merger of the Maryland 
departments of natural resources and the environment.  Such a merger was popular 
among pro-business interests, which were hoping for a less restrictive regulatory 
environment.  Not surprisingly, environmental organizations were less enthusiastic about 
this proposal (Montgomery, 2002a).  
Some environmental groups, like the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, remained 
politically neutral during the governor’s race; others, like the Sierra Club, endorsed 
Ehrlich’s opponent, Townsend.  Wariness would aptly describe the overall feeling of 
environmental groups about the Republican becoming governor (Biemer, 2002a).  The 
executive director of 1000 Friends of Maryland, which enjoyed a close relationship with 
the Glendening administration on Smart Growth, expressed trepidation: “There’s a whole 
lot of waiting and seeing right now” (as quoted in Biemer, 2002a, para. 3).  The Maryland 
director of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation was optimistic: 
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Once he’s [Ehrlich] in office, and sees the magnitude of the issues and the  
important economic benefits of the bay, I hope he’ll really come forward and  
step up and be a governor that we can look to later and say, “He was a  
strong environmental governor.” (as quoted in Biemer, 2002a, para. 11) 
 
Although Ehrlich was not sending the message, “To environmental groups: Your 
time in the desert has just begun,” his administration’s pro-business and pro-agriculture 
priorities likely have given environmental groups pause.  Their successes will be defined 
differently in this Republican administration than in the preceding Democrat 
administrations, much as Boris and Krehely (2002) implied: “[Environmental 
organizations’] short-term successes are likely to vary with the political party in power” 
(p. 319).  They also suggested that an organization’s success may be more about 
maintaining environmental strides made in previous years and less about making new 
strides: “A new political administration initially perceived as being more willing to favor 
economic development over environmental preservation may put environmental 
organizations on the defensive to preserve existing gains” (p. 320). 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUALIZATION 
 
All things must change to something new, to something strange. 
 Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1878), American poet 
This study explores the lived experiences of boundary-spanning government 
relations professionals (GRPs) in organizations enduring a major “jolt” (A.D. Meyer, 
1982) in their political environment.  What were their experiences before and after the 
environmental jolt?  Why did they experience the jolt as they did?  What were the 
implications of the jolt for them and the work they do and why?  What can be learned that 
will inform both theory and practice? 
This section builds a theoretical framework for understanding and contextualizing 
these lived experiences, as informants in addressing the above purposes will impart them 
to me.  My use of the word “informants” is deliberate: These people specifically were 
selected for participation in this study so they could relate their first-hand experiences, as 
boundary-spanning GRPs, to me.  This, according to Lindlof (1995), distinguishes them 
from merely being “respondents.” 
I have built the conceptual framework for this study out of the scholarly literature 
on nonprofit organizations with political interests, organizational environments, and 
foundational and middle-range theories in public relations.  Interspersed throughout the 
framework are theory questions, or as they are more commonly known, research 
questions.  I developed these based on the discussions immediately preceding their 
appearances.  Theory questions serve to “generate a research protocol and produce a 
framework for patterns in the analysis of the results of the study” (Plowman, 1996).  I 
have developed the theory questions so I can learn about the individualized, nuanced 
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experiences that my boundary-spanning informants have of what the extant (mostly 
quantitative) research says they should experience.  I present the theory questions again 
en masse at the end of the chapter.   
Although I have incorporated some literature and concepts outside the traditional 
domain of public relations in the conceptual framework, public relations is the ultimate 
context for this study.  Readers should consider everything in the framework within the 
context of public relations; as such it requires explication. 
Public Relations 
 
In this section, I establish a definition of “public relations” as well as identify its 
functional role in organizations (for the purposes of this study).  I also discuss the concept 
of stakeholders and systems theory. 
Defining “Public Relations” 
 
In claiming that public relations suffers, in both academia and practice, from the 
“being all things to all people” syndrome, I find myself in good company: The venerable 
Edward Bernays made a similar diagnosis in a 1992 address to public relations scholars 
(Gonders, 2004).  Public relations academicians have yet to elect a universal, holistic 
definition of “public relations” (Cropp & Pincus, 2001; Hutton 1999, 2001; Ledingham & 
Bruning, 2000b; Stacks, 2002), in spite of the many electable candidates, including: 
• “the management of communication between an organization and its publics (J.E. 
Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 6),   
 
• “the building of relationships and the management of communication between 
organizations and individuals” (Thomsen, 1997, p. 12),   
 
• “the management of credibility” (Stacks, 2002, p. 17), 
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• “the management function that establishes and maintains mutually beneficial 
relationships between an organization and the publics on whom its success or 
failure depends (Cutlip et al., 2000, p. 6), and   
 
• “the distinctive management function which helps establish and maintain mutual 
lines of communication, understanding, acceptance, and cooperation between an 
organization and its publics; involves the management of problems or issues; 
helps management to keep informed on and responsive to public opinion; defines 
and emphasizes the responsibility of management to serve the public interest; 
helps management keep abreast of and effectively utilize change, serving as an 
early warning system to help anticipate trends; and uses research and sound and 
ethical communication techniques as its principal tools.” (Harlow, 1976, p. 36) 
 
Many of these candidates qua definitions acknowledge that public relations 
should be an organizational management function.  They diverge, however, on what 
purpose public relations should serve to the organization.  These purposes include 
reputation management (Hutton, Goodman, J.B. Alexander, & Genest, 2001), 
relationship management (Heath, 2001; Ledingham & Bruning, 2000a), message 
management (IPRA, 1982), conflict resolution (Plowman, Briggs, & Huang, 2001), and 
even marketing communication (Duncan & Caywood, 1996; Hutton, 1996).   
This definitional pluralism provides a public relations researcher the latitude to 
choose the definition that best fits the purpose and framework of a given study.  
Definitions incorporating the concept of organization-environment interdependency most 
befit my dissertation, as this chapter will bear out.  Crable and Vibbert (1986) described 
public relations as an “art of adjusting organizations to environments and environments to 
organizations” (p. 413).  Although vague, their description harkens back to Cutlip and 
Center’s (1952) idea that public relations mediates the interdependencies between 
organizations and stakeholders in the environment.   
For my dissertation, I will use the definition of public relations put forth by 
Hazleton and Long (1988) and Long and Hazleton (1987), a definition endorsed by 
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Wilcox, Cameron, Ault, and Agee (2005).  Readers should understand that I am defining 
public relations as “a communication function of management through which 
organizations adapt, alter, or maintain their environment for the purpose of achieving 
organizational goals” (Long & Hazleton, 1987, p. 6).  I chose this definition above others 
because it is grounded in the language of organizational-environmental interdependence.  
Beyond that, this academic definition similarly captures the idea of adaptation that the 
Public Relations Society of America’s official definition does: “Public relations helps an 
organization and its publics adapt mutually to each other” (Public Relations Society of 
America, n.d).   
Although I have found Long and Hazleton’s (1987) definition useful for 
anchoring my study, some public relations scholars take issue with it (J.E. Grunig, 
personal communication, November 17, 2004).  Their criticisms of this definition likely 
are due to its strong systems theory approach to organizational-environmental 
interdependence (Werder, personal communication, June 10, 2005).  Systems theory, as I 
will discuss in the following section, is frequently criticized for its overly modernist, 
objectivist perspective.  
Justifying “Stakeholders” 
 
Exactly with whom or what in the environment are organizations interdependent?  
Exactly with whom or what in the environment should an organization’s public relations 
professionals engage?  The answer to each of these questions is “stakeholders.”  Because 
many public relations scholars would answer these questions using the term “publics” 
rather than “stakeholders,” I will explain my choice.  I believe governments are better 
understood as stakeholders, for this study’s purposes, than as organizational publics.  Any 
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individual or entity that has a stake in an organization is considered a stakeholder.  A 
stake is an interest, right, claim, or ownership (Clarkson, 1995); it is “anything — 
tangible or intangible, material or immaterial — that one person or group has that is of 
value to another person or group” (Heath, 1997, p. 28).  Stakeholders and organizations 
are interdependent because they are of mutual consequence (J.E. Grunig & Repper, 1992) 
and interdependence necessitates interaction.  Being of mutual consequence does not 
necessarily mean the two parties are of equivalent consequence, however.  For instance, 
even though organizations can influence public policy, governments retain greater and 
ultimate authority in the public policy process (Crable & Vibbert, 1985).  Emshoff and 
Freeman (1979) also made this point, saying stakeholders are, “group[s] whose collective 
behavior can directly affect the organization’s future, but which [are] not under the 
organization’s control” (as cited in J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 297). 
When a stakeholder perceives a consequence as a problem, it evolves into a public 
(J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; J.E. Grunig & Repper, 1992).  Publics coalesce in response to 
perceived problems and organize to confront them.  The term “public” thus does not 
accurately describe the government’s position relative to organizations (for this study’s 
purposes) whereas “stakeholder” does. 
Interdependence with stakeholders must be managed by an organization (Coombs, 
2001) specifically through certain of its members, namely public relations professionals 
and members of the organization’s dominant coalition.  Many researchers prescribe 
engaging in activities that sound much like public relations.  Strategic stakeholders 
should be selected and relationships with them should be nurtured (Metcalfe, 1981); 
stakeholders should be communicated with (Hazleton & Long, 1988; Heath, 1994; L.K. 
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Lewis et al., 2001; Thompson, 1967); research must be conducted to anticipate 
environmental fluctuations (Thompson, 1967); and organizations must be open-minded 
and flexible enough to modify their actions in relation to their stakeholders, which 
populate the environment (Thompson, 1967; Weick, 1977).  White and Dozier (1992), in 
arguing their case that public relations is a strategic management function, said “strategic 
management includes managing exchanges across the organizational boundary to ensure 
that the organization responds to environmental demands and opportunities” (p. 101).  
J.E. Grunig (1991) was more direct: “Public relations helps organizations manage their 
interdependence with publics that interact with the organization as it pursues its goals” 
(p. 264).  J.E. Grunig cited the even-more-direct Gollner (1983, 1984), who defined 
public relations as the management of interdependence (p. 260).   
Specialized professionals in government relations, for example, would manage 
interdependence with specific stakeholders, such as the government.  Hatch (1997) noted 
that lobbyists and government relations programs are frequently used by organizations 
that are attempting to manage their “regulatory dependencies” (p. 80), meaning their 
dependencies on legislative and administrative bodies and regulatory agencies.   
The management of interdependence with organizational stakeholders is an 
integral component of the Excellence theory, which itself explains the excellent 
management of organizational-environmental interdependence.  Before delving into a 
discussion of this dominant metatheory of public relations, I must present a detailed 




Organizations can be studied and understood through many metaphorical models 
(Morgan, 1997; Spicer, 1997).  As many other public relations researchers have done, I 
have decided to follow the advice of W.G. Scott (1961): “The only meaningful way to 
study an organization. . .is as a system” (p. 15).  Further, systems theory is often used to 
frame research on issues management, a subfunction within public relations (Bowen, 
2000; J.E. Grunig & Repper, 1992).  However, as  M. Taylor et al.’s (2003) article 
established, much of this research is published in scholarly journals outside the 
boundaries of the traditional public relations literature (viz., Journal of Public Relations 
Research and Public Relations Review), such as Business Quarterly, California 
Management Review, Canadian Business Review, and Long Range Planning.  
 A biologist pioneered systems theory and as such it has a biological grounding.  
Ludwig von Bertalanffy was also one of the first researchers to realize the theory’s 
theoretical potential in areas such as psychology and the social sciences (ISSS, n.d.).  
Organizations are frequently conceptualized and studied as if they were living organisms 
by using systems theory (e.g., Bivins, 1992; Bowen, 2000; Crable & Vibbert, 1985; 
Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2000; J.E. Grunig, 1992; J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Katz & 
Kahn, 1966; Long & Hazleton, 1987; M. Taylor, Vasquez, & Doorley, 2003).  Systems 
theory considers “organizations as systems of internal relationships and as inhabitants of 
a larger environment in which they operate and on which it depends for resources” 
(Baum & Rowley, 2002, p. 6).   
Likening an organization to an organism is useful for understanding how 
organizations work and achieve goals (Spicer, 1997).  Each organizational subsystem 
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performs a function, defined as “the normal and specific contribution of any bodily part 
of the economy of a living organism” (Gove, 2000).  This biological definition is 
reminiscent of J.E. Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) broad conceptualization of a function as a 
subsystem within a larger system.  These organizational functions — specifically the 
adaptive, production, support-disposal, maintenance, and managerial subsystems — must 
work together for the organization’s survival, much like a living organism needs its 
digestive, respiratory, and circulatory systems (among others) to work together if it is to 
survive.  
Organizations as Open Systems 
 
Organizational boundaries are a key, although unmentioned, part of Baum and 
Rowley’s (2002) definition.  Boundaries are both sentinels and gatekeepers (Jemison, 
1984).  Boundaries demarcate between whom and what are included in the organization 
and whom and what are excluded from the organization (Aldrich & Herker, 1977).  The 
“excluded” comprises the “environment, which is outside the system boundary” 
(Terreberry, 1968, p. 606).   
Not surprisingly, Bertalanffy, in 1956, was the first person to acknowledge just 
how integral the permeability of an organization’s boundary is to its survival (Terreberry, 
1968).  Neither an organism nor an organization will be long for life if it has a closed 
boundary, for having a closed boundary inhibits interaction (in all forms) with the larger 
environment that the organization inhabits.  Having a permeable yet maintained 
boundary, or an “open system,” is advantageous because it allows the organization to 
communicate with its environment, to address external (environmental) factors.  This aids 
in the achievement of organization goals (Spicer, 1997).  Finally, an open systems 
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perspective facilitates answers to Thompson’s (1967) fundamental question: 
“Organizations act, but what determines how and when they will act?” (p. 10).   
This open systems perspective also acknowledges that a symbiosis exists between 
organizations and environments.  Inputs (like resources) come from that environment.  
That same environment consumes the organization’s outputs, which are of course made 
using the environment’s inputs (Bivins, 1992; Emery & Trist, 1965; M.I. Harrison, 1994; 
Terreberry, 1968).  Inputs are transformed into outputs via throughput processes.  An 
organization also requires feedback from its environment so that equilibrium between the 
two is maintained.  This involves communication between the organization and its 
environment (Spicer, 1997), which in turn facilitates the organization’s ability to contend 




Organizations try to reconcile themselves with their environment because they 
aspire toward “homeostasis, or self-stabilization, which spontaneously, or naturally, 
governs the necessary relationships among parts and activities and thereby keeps the 
system viable in the face of disturbances stemming from the environment” (Thompson, 
1967, p. 7).  However, as M.I. Harrison (1994) pointed out, not all organizational 
theorists would agree with Thompson’s contention that organizations seek balance or 
equilibrium.  Yet many theorists, such as Weick (1979), cautioned that an organization’s 
existence depends on the achievement and maintenance of some sort of balance between 
the organization and its environment.   
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Rather than thinking of organizational-environmental interdependence in terms of 
balance, I have opted to conceptualize this general idea as an understanding, which 
connotes the ideas of co-existence, simpatico, and “getting along.”  I call this 
understanding “organizational-environmental rapport.”  For organizations that necessarily 
do not “get along” with stakeholders in their environment, rapport could still be 
developed and maintained even if it only rose to the level of the parties being cordial or 
civil to each other, an achieving of détente.  The existence of rapport between two parties, 
such as an organization and a stakeholder or, as Spradley (1979) advocated, an 
interviewer and interviewee, creates a situation in which conversations occur.  Spradley 
(1979) dealt with the concept of rapport in his suggestions for conducting ethnographic 
interviews.  He described rapport as:  
a harmonious relationship between ethnographer and informant. . . .that  
allows for the free flow of information. . . .[but] does not necessarily mean  
deep friendship or profound intimacy between two people. . . .Rapport can  
exist in the absence of fondness and affection.  (p. 78) 
 
Public relations is the organizational function that helps to manage organizational-
environmental interdependence with the goal of rapport: “Effective public relations helps 
organizations adjust to expectations from the organizational environment (internal and 
external)” (Hon, 1997, p. 5).  It exists on the organization-environment boundary as a 
boundary-spanning function and thus Cutlip et al.’s (2000) placement of it within an 
organization’s adaptive subsystem is logical.  Public relations professionals, as boundary 
spanners, identify relevancies in the organization’s environment and bring information 
about the relevancies — inputs —back into the organization.  They analyze this 
information and explain it to other organizational members so it will be incorporated into 
organizational decision-making; this represents the throughput process.  The organization 
33
then acts toward the environment and the relevancies; this represents outputs.  Then 
public relations detects responses — receives feedback — from the environmental 
relevancies to the organizational outputs, and so the management of interdependence 
continues. 
Fittingly, much theoretical discussion of public relations is predicated on its being 
a boundary-spanning function in an open-systems organization (e.g., Cutlip et al., 2000; 
Dozier et al., 1995; J.E. Grunig, 1992; L.A. Grunig et al., 2002; Hazleton & Long, 1988; 
Pavlik, 1987; Spicer, 1997).  Indeed, Long and Hazleton (1987) advocated systems 
theory as “the way to go” (p. 5) for theorizing in public relations.  Consequently, it is 
difficult to divorce public relations theories, which I will present in the upcoming section 
“Foundational and Middle-Range Public Relations Theories,” from systems theory.  
Before jumping into discussions of two of systems theory’s main elements (viz., 
organizations and environments), I would be remiss if I did not present some criticisms of 
systems theory and other theories that have been floated as alternatives to it. 
Critiques of Systems Theory 
 
Although it remains an important and viable perspective for understanding 
organizations and environments (Sutcliffe, 2001), critics have asserted that its objectivist, 
modernist epistemology handicaps systems theory (Hatch, 1997; Sutcliffe, 2001).  
Modernism assumes that the world exists independently of humans’ ability to know it; 
the world exists as it is.  “Truth” and “Reality” can be known.  With apologies to 
Freudian psychology, it is a “sometimes a cigar is just a cigar” way of knowing and 
understanding the world.  Modernism also presupposes that human beings, and structured 
aggregations of them or “coalitions of individuals” (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 27) such as 
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organizations, think and behave rationally.  As anyone who knows a human being could 
say, “rationality” is not always the correct adjective for describing human (or 
organizational) behavior, thus exposing another flaw in modernist systems theory.  It 
even has been contended that the behavior exhibited by such large corporations as Wal-
Mart and Enron is pathological, even psychopathic, diagnoses normally reserved for 
human behavior (Achbar, Abbott, & Simpson, 2004; Bakan, 2004). 
Many critiques of systems theory involve questions of modernism versus 
postmodernism and objectivism versus subjectivism.  In modernist systems theory, an 
organization’s environment can be known objectively.  That is, all organizational 
members can know it as the same and a well-defined boundary exists between the 
organization and its environment (Sutcliffe, 2001).  The theory offers a relatively simple 
(simplistic?), objective perspective of a “concrete world” (p. 201) that can be universally 
understood (Hatch, 1997).  A variation on this perspective is that things, like 
environments, can be perceived and that perceptions may differ.  But once an 
environment is perceived as it is, it becomes reified and made real, as if it were the 
“objective” environment (Hatch, 1997).  Perceived (i.e., reified) and objective 
environments differ depending on the accuracy of the perceivers (Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Postmodernism disavows the notion that such things as a “concrete” world; 
universal understandings; and permanent, definitive boundaries exist.  This subjectivist 
philosophy counters that knowledge is fragmented, complex, and conflicting because 
every individual interprets and “knows” things and phenomena through his or her 
filtering schemes.  Boundaries are blurred.  All perspectives are considered and 
appreciated.  Weick’s (1979, 1983) enactment theory exemplifies this epistemology.  
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Enacted environments are constructed by organizations (through organizational 
members) through the processes of selective attention and meaning making.  The 
environment is not something external to the organization that is “Real”; the environment 
is created by the organization and thus effectively is part of the organization and vice 
versa.  As with perceived environments, created environments, once reified, effectively 
become objective: “When we enact something, there is little difference between the 
creation and reality” (Hatch, 1997, p. 41).  Hatch clarified her point, noting that the 
reified environment is more likely “objectified” than objective: “It is socially constructed 
in a way that makes it seem objective” (p. 42). 
J.E. Grunig (1997b) is the most prominent public relations scholar to critique 
systems theory, although an open-systems organizational perspective (viz., J.E. Grunig, 
1992; J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984) framed much of his research on public relations and its 
relationship to organizational effectiveness.  In this book chapter (i.e., J.E. Grunig, 
1997b), he zeroed in on the environment in his criticism of systems theory.  Systems 
theory, he argued, fails to operationalize definitively the concept of “environment” and 
further fails to provide insight into how organizations determine which environmental 
elements are strategically important and which of those should be given top priority (p. 
257).  Rather than just criticize, J.E. Grunig offered two alternatives: his own situational 
theory of publics (for a detailed discussion of this important public relations segmentation 
theory, see J.E. Grunig, 1997a) and the strategic constituencies perspective. 
This perspective helps organizations to cull through all of the elements in the 
environment, to determine which ones are the critical for the organization to engage and 
interact with, and to develop and maintain rapport.  These are the strategic constituencies 
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— stakeholders — that represent the greatest opportunities or threats to the organization.  
Figuring out whom or what in the political environment is important, assigning priority to 
them, and interacting with them is well within the purview of organizational boundary 
spanners like GRPs.  Their initial task is to learn of the elements (such as other 
organizations) that constitute the political environment.  
This is a modernist endeavor because these elements exist; they are tangible: An 
executive administration exists, a legislative body exists, a regulatory agency exists, and 
an activist group exists.  The boundary spanners’ subsequent task, which is at least 
equally important, is to make judgments about which elements are important, which ones 
present opportunities or threats, and to what degrees.  This is a subjective endeavor 
because it involves human beings’ perceptions. 
Despite its flaws, systems theory has demonstrated staying power and no 
alternative theory has emerged to warrant dethroning it as the dominant model for 
organizational theory (Sutcliffe, 2001).  As “extreme” as systems theory considers the 
environment (“totally objective”), the way the major alternative at the other end, Weick’s 
(1983) enactment theory, considers the environment (“totally constructed”) is just as 
extreme (Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 203).  Perhaps the staying power of systems theory is 
attributable to the difficulty of understanding concepts in organizational theory such as 
the environment, strategies, and goals without being modernist (Hatch, 1997).  As a 
result, these concepts really cannot be discussed apart from the modernist systems 
perspective. 
In this study, I take a contingency theory approach to the above debate: No one 
epistemological perspective is universally optimal; sometimes the best way of doing or 
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understanding something is situational: It depends.  I believe that the optimal way for 
understanding organizations and environments is to temper modernist systems theory 
with a dose of the postmodernist enactment perspective, a blended approach that even 
Weick (1969, 1979, 2003) likely would agree with (Sutcliffe, 2001).   
Throughout this chapter, readers will see that I have taken such a blended 
approach to my study’s conceptual framework.  For example, based on my reading of 
Sutcliffe (2001, p. 202), I believe that organizations and stakeholders in their political 
environment have distinctly delineated boundaries, boundaries that are reinforced by laws 
related to campaign fundraising and donations, lobbying disclosure regulations, ethics 
rules, and conflict of interest regulations.  This is an objectivist/modernist perspective.  I 
am aware that it could be argued that the boundaries between organizations and the 
government are blurred thanks to, for example, the influence of money in politics and 
cronyism.  Yet, from a purely legal standpoint, organizations and governments remain 
distinct entities.  They can be “known” in a tangible sense.  However, what an 
organization “thinks” about the stakeholders its political environment (e.g., are they 
friendly or unfriendly to the organization’s goals?) is an assessment arising from the 
perceptions and interpretations of organizational perceivers such as boundary-spanning 
GRPs.  This injects an element of Weickian variety subjectivism/postmodernism into my 
conceptual framework. 
 I will now discuss two of the three main elements of systems theory, 
organizations and environments.  I will discuss the third element, boundary spanning, as 
part of the upcoming section on “Foundational and Middle-Range Theories in Public 
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Relations.”   Because my study is delimited to nonprofit organizations with political 
interests, so too is the following discussion of organizations. 
Nonprofit Organizations With Political Interests 
 Some organizations devote themselves to economic production, such as business 
firms; or the creation and distribution of political power, such as government entities; or 
the propagation of culture and education, such as churches (Tompkins, 1982).  A fourth 
type of organizations, integration organizations, exists as well.  These organizations, of 
which interest groups are an example, seek to influence and “adjust conflicts that could 
paralyze society” (p. 165). 
The latter two organizational types (i.e., cultural and educational organizations 
and integration organizations) could qualify as nonprofit organizations (NPOs).  Eadie 
(1997) estimated the existence of 1.5 million NPOs at all levels of U.S. society.  NPOs, 
eponymously, are organizations whose existences are not driven by profit.  No profits 
earned by an NPO can be distributed to private shareholders or individuals (Salamon, 
2002).  In spite of not being driven by profit, the economic importance of NPOs should 
not be underestimated: The nonprofit charitable organizations in southern California 
alone are a $34 billion industry (Manzo & Costello, 2005). 
Researchers have found varying classes of NPOs.  Hall (1987) categorized NPOs 
as those that “perform public tasks delegates to them by the state; provide services for 
which there is a demand that state and for-profit organizations will not fulfill; or 
influence policy in the state, the for-profit sectors, or other nonprofit organizations” (p. 
3).  Salamon (1995) classified four types of NPOS: fundraising intermediary agencies, 
member-serving organizations, public benefit organizations, and religious-purposed 
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organizations.  Douglas (1987) classified three types: those that provide a public benefit 
from private funds, mutual benefit organizations, and political pressure groups.  L.K. 
Lewis et al. (2001) identified three types of NPOs: philanthropic, advocacy, and mutual 
benefit organizations. 
IRS-Designated 501c Organizations 
 
The federal government, in the form of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), also 
categorizes NPOs in Section 501c of the Internal Revenue Code.  I am particularly 
interested in three IRS-designated categories of organizations: charitable organizations, 
social welfare organizations, and business leagues.  These categories correspond with 
L.K. Lewis et al.’s (2001) typology.   
501c(3) Organizations 
 
Charitable organizations, or 501c(3) organizations, are public charities.  They 
“operate exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes” 
(Salamon, 2002, p. 7).  These primarily philanthropic NPOs may also engage in minimal 
levels of political- or legislative-related advocacy, but they risk their tax-exempt status if 
they engage in too much advocacy (IRS, 2004).  There does not appear to be hard or 
official metrics about how much is too much advocacy although the IRS has recently 
stepped up its investigations of the advocacy and political activities of 501c(3) 
organizations (Dalrymple, 2006).  For example, the Petfinder.com Foundation is a 





Advocacy NPOs, or 501c(4) social welfare organizations, seek to “promote 
social, economic, and/or political causes” (L.K. Lewis et al., 2001, p. 8).  According to 
the Web site of the IRS, a 501c(4) organization “must operate primarily to further the 
common good and general welfare of the people of the community (such as by bringing 
about the civic betterment and social improvements” and may primarily do so “by 
seeking legislation germane to the organization’s purposes” (IRS, n.d.b.).  The Humane 
Society of the United States is an example of a 501c(4) organization because it lobbies 
for animal rights and welfare legislation at the federal, state, and local levels.  Donations 
to the Humane Society are not tax-deductible. 
501c(6) Organizations 
 
Professional and trade associations are 501c(6) business league organizations.  
The IRS defined a business league as “an association of persons having some common 
business interest, the purpose of which is to promote such common interest and not to 
engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit,” and may do so by 
lobbying for “legislation germane to the common business interest” (IRS, n.d.a.).  A 
business league organization “provides benefits more or less exclusively for its members” 
(Douglas, 1987, p. 51), who usually share similar professional or livelihood interests.  It 
thus qualifies as a member-serving or mutual benefit organization (L.K. Lewis et al., 
2001).  For example, the American Boarding Kennel Association is the 501c(6) 
organization that represents pet-care service businesses. 
Jenkins (1987) offered yet another typology, one that is rooted in the 
commerciality of an NPO’s interests and to whom benefits will accrue.  An organization 
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with non-commercial, non-economic interests benefiting the collective good is a 
nonprofit organization.  501c(3) and 501c(4) organizations fit this classification.  
Business league organizations (501c[6] organizations), which others have classified as 
NPOs, would not be considered so in Jenkins’ typology.  Benefits from trade associations 
accrue to their members; typically, 501c(6) organizations advocate the overarching 
economic interests of their members, some of whom may be competitors (in the case of 
trade associations [Hatch, 1997]).   However, the policies that trade associations advocate 
may accrue benefits to those outside their memberships — an example of the “free rider” 
situation (Olson, 1965).  The policies that may bring economic improvement for these 
NPOs’ members may positively affect the public good.  For these reasons, Jenkins’ 
typology, although worthy of discussion here, will not be used to frame the study.  The 
overlapping NPO typologies of Hall (1987), L.K. Lewis et al. (2001), and the IRS are 
most worthwhile given my purposes. 
As is often the case when moving from the normative to the positive, NPOs do 
not always neatly fit into one category (Douglas, 1987): “Actual organizations often 
straddle the classes to a greater or lesser extent” (p. 51).  The roles that NPOs potentially 
play might better capture the nature of any one NPO.  An NPO could be a service 
provider; an advocate; a community builder; a value guardian; or a patron of interests 
artistic, cultural, and the like (Salamon, 2002).   
The NPO-as-advocate “giv[es] voice to a wide assortment of social, political, 
environmental, ethnic, and community interests and concerns” (Salamon, 2002, p. 10).  
Further: “[A]dvocacy is a vital traditional role of nonprofit organizations.  Throughout 
U.S. history, individuals have voiced their concerns and worked together in nonprofit 
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associations to shape and reshape the country’s political, economic, and cultural 
landscape” (Boris & Krehely, 2002, p. 299). 
Of particular interest to my study are certain 501c(3) charitable NPOs, 501c(4) 
advocacy NPOs, and 501c(6) membership-serving NPOs.  I will broadly refer to them as 
501c organizations from this point forward.  They all enact the role of advocate, to 
varying degrees, on public policy issues, on behalf of the collective public good or their 
memberships.  U.S. democracy welcomes diverse opinions in the marketplace of ideas, 
and so advocator 501c organizations are integral to the health of that democracy 
(Douglas, 1987).  Jenkins (1987) would classify these as “politically recognized 
advocacy organizations” (p. 298) because they operate within the margins of an 
established political system.  By contrast, “social movement organizations” operate 
outside those margins and thus are much further removed from the political decision-
making structure. 
Tesh (1984) might have considered charitable and advocacy nonprofit 
organizations to be “issue groups” and member-serving organizations to be “interest 
groups.”  To her, issue groups have “open or nonexclusive membership[s] and base their 
appeals for support in terms of ‘moral convictions about the rightness of policies,’” 
whereas interest groups have “narrow economic interests” (as cited in Jenkins, 1987, p. 
296).  Walker (1983) also contrasted nonprofit issue and interest groups.  He found that 
issue advocacy nonprofit organizations  (i.e., 501c[3] and [4]  organizations) frequently 
support public-policy objectives that would result in government expansion.  501c(6) 
member-serving interest groups frequently embrace “more privatistic positions,” 
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opposing such government-expanding policy objectives (as cited in Jenkins, 1987, p. 
298).   
Government Relations in 501c Organizations 
 
Regardless of the classification scheme, public relations is a central — if not the 
central — function of 501c organizations (Mayhew, 1997).  These organizations  engage 
in many specialized public relations programs such as government relations, media 
relations, community relations, employee relations, and board member relations.  
Essentially, a specific public relations program exists for every stakeholder or sector of 
the environment.   
Some stakeholders, such as employees or board members, can be internal.  This 
study’s focus is on an external stakeholder, namely the government.  The government is a 
critical stakeholder of the 501c organizations included in this study.  By virtue of its 
ability to hold sway over these organizations, the government qualifies as a strategic 
constituency of these organizations (L.A. Grunig et al., 1992).  Public relations efforts 
toward the political and legal dimensions of an organization’s environment are 
commonly referred to as government relations, public affairs, or legislative affairs 
programs.  “Government relations” is the term I will use throughout this study.   
Government relations occurs within a public relations context but is limited to an 
organization’s political, social, and public policy interests (Cutlip et al., 2000; Toth, 
1986).  Thus, extrapolating from Long and Hazelton’s (1987) definition of public 
relations, government relations could be defined as “a communication function of 
management through which organizations adapt, alter, or maintain their political 
environment for the purpose of achieving organizational goals.”   This is a much more 
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managerial-minded definition for government relations than that of, for example, top 
public relations firm Burson-Marstellar: Government relations is “a strategic function that 
uses creatively executed tactics to help the company achieve business goals” (as quoted 
in Mack, 1997, p. 123). 
In addition to 501c(3), 501c(4), and 501c(6) organizations, many other 
organizations engage in government relations efforts, including corporations, activist 
groups, and unions (Cutlip et al., 2000; J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984).  This is not 
surprising, given that the ubiquity of government and public policies practically mandates 
that organizations of all varieties engage with stakeholders in their political 
environments.   
Fundraising, donor relations, and member relations are of paramount importance 
to 501c organizations.  These organizations depend on the generosity of individuals and 
institutions to fund their existences and abilities to engage in other types of specialized 
public relations programs.   In spite of their importance to 501c organizations, these 
specialized public relations programs lay beyond the parameters of this study.  This 
study’s interests are delimited to the government relations efforts (and related media 
relations efforts) of 501c organizations.  These are the programmatic efforts of GRPs that 
either directly or indirectly target those stakeholders that comprise a 501c organization’s 
political environment.   
The existence of a 501c organization depends as much on political capital as it 
does on financial capital.  Boris and Krehely (2002) lent further insight into this 
delimitation: “The role of money has grown increasingly important in American politics.  
Yet research has shown that nonprofit public interest organizations have gained more 
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influence in recent years and exert considerable sway in the policy process.  How can this 
be?” (p. 300). 
 The answer may lie in a 501c organization’s non-financial activities.  Although 
many 501c organizations may not have the financial weight to throw around in the 
political process, they have gained weight through clever, elaborate, and professional 
government and media relations efforts.  These organizations routinely conduct 
formalized research and analysis, litigate, lobby, mobilize the “grassroots” and 
“grasstops,” work in coalitions, use technology, and distribute campaign donations 
through political action committees (PACs) — all in addition to the traditional conduits 
for information dissemination and education (Boris & Krehely, 2002; Jenkins, 1987) as 
part of their government relations efforts.  These efforts enable them to register more 
strongly on the public and political agendas to influence public-policy decisions — the 
ultimate mission of these organizations.  Thus, fundraising, donor relations, and member 
relations’ efforts ultimately support a 501c organization’s comprehensive government 
relations efforts directed at stakeholders in the political environment. 
Organizational Environments 
 
But what is an “environment”?  In this section, I aim to answer this question by 
reviewing both classic and contemporary literature on this element of systems theory.  
Terreberry’s (1968) definition of the “environment, which is outside the system 
boundary” (p. 606), is deceptively simple (and modernist) and echoes others’ (i.e., 
Duncan, 1972; Robbins, 1990) definitions.  As J.E. Grunig (1997b) intimated, vague 
definitions like Terreberry’s are less than satisfying.  Environments have multiple facets, 
some real, some created; they have dimension, characteristics, layers, and even texture 
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(Emery & Trist, 1965).  They are complex and affect all aspects of organizational life 
(Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976).   
 This critical concept merits explanation beyond its physical location.  In fact, 
some (viz., Duncan, 1972) reminded readers that an internal environment exists within 
organizations too.  Middleton (1987) offered this more appropriate definition: 
“Environment means all external elements that are salient to the organization as a whole, 
its subunits, or its members in their performance of activities that are organization-related 
but fall outside its authority” (p. 141).   
Robbins (1983), a renowned organizational theorist, offered a similar definition: 
“Those institutions or forces that affect the performance of the organization, but over 
which the organization has little or no direct control” (pp. 142-143).  His definition 
lacked Middleton’s (1987) idea of salience, or prominence and relevance, of certain 
elements.  Robbins (1983, 1990) addressed salience by distinguishing between an 
organization’s general environment, which includes everything outside the organization 
but whose impact or relevance or both is questionable, and its specific environment.  The 
latter, reflective of Middleton’s thinking, is limited to external relevancies that can 
immediately and significantly affect organizational life: “At any given moment, it is the 
part of the environment with which management will be concerned because it is made up 
of those critical constituencies that can positively or negatively influence the 
organization’s effectiveness” (Robbins, 1990, p. 206).  Other researchers (Pearce & 
Robinson, 1982; Thompson, 1967) similarly distinguished between an organization’s 
remote (or general) environment and its task (or specific) environment.   
47
Readers of this study should understand “environment” to be the organization’s 
specific, or task, environment.  Namely, the specific environment of the 501c 
organizations included in this study is their political environment.  It is comprised of 
these critical, strategic constituencies — stakeholders, which is my term of choice — and 
relevancies: elected and appointed government officials, their staffs, and the legal and 
regulatory frameworks in which they operate and which they also create, implement, and 
enforce.  I include media as an organizational stakeholder in the political environment as 
well.  The media arguably may influence citizens’ perceptions of political officials and 
policy issues (Entman, 1993; McCombs & Bell, 1996; McCombs & Shaw, 1972).   
Dimensions of the Environment 
 
The notion that environments have different dimensions appears to have 
originated in Emery and Trist’s (1965) pioneering article.  There must be “something 
more” to organizational-environmental interaction than the process itself, they said.  That 
“something more” is the “causal texture” of the environment: “processes in the 
environment itself which are among the determining conditions for exchanges” (p. 22).   
 Emery and Trist (1965) identified four “ideal” types of causally textured 
environments.  The simplest is the placid-randomized environment, in which “goals and 
noxiants (‘goods’ and ‘bads’) are relatively unchanging themselves and randomly 
distributed” (p. 24).  Schutzenberger (1954) recommended that organizations in this 
environment simply address “goods” and “bads” as they arise (as cited in Emery & Trist, 
1965).  Goals and noxiants are also present in the placid-clustered environment.  
Knowledge about the environment and strategy become critical components of 
organizational engagement with this environment.  
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Even more complex is the disturbed-reactive environment, which is a placid-
clustered environment that includes other, similar organizations.  An organization’s 
strategic actions must reflect that goal attainment is now competitive and that “what it 
knows can also be known by the others” (p. 25).  Interorganizational interaction makes 
this environment dynamic.   
 The most complex environment is the turbulent field. This environmental type is 
dynamic not only from the interorganizational interaction taking place “but also from the 
field itself.  The ‘ground’ is in motion” (Emery & Trist, 1965, p. 26).  The increasingly 
competitive demands of the disturbed-reactive environment and the “deepening 
interdependence between the economic and the other facets of the society” (p. 26) move 
the ground, so to speak.  Every organizational action requires extra consideration and 
analysis: Is this the right action today, even if it will not be tomorrow?  What reaction 
will the action elicit?  Would today's reactions be any different from tomorrow's?   
 Other researchers (Duncan, 1972; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Terreberry, 1968; 
Thompson, 1967) simplified Emery and Trist’s (1965) typology while retaining the spirit 
of causal texture.  Environments, these researchers agreed, vary along two dimensions.  
The simple-complex dimension represents the “number and variety of environmental 
factors that organizations must consider in decision-making” (Rose, 1985, p. 323).  The 
static-dynamic dimension is “the degree to which factors of the decision unit’s internal 
and external environments remains basically the same over time or are in a continual 
process of change” (Duncan, 1972, p. 316).  Crossing these dimensions results in four 
types of environments: static-simple, dynamic-simple, static-complex, and dynamic-
complex. 
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Lauzen and Dozier (1992) translated Duncan’s (1972) two dimensions into the 
language of public relations.  In this language, the simple-complex dimension becomes 
the “range of publics that are of interest or concern to the organization” (Lauzen & 
Dozier, 1992, p. 211).  The static-dynamic dimension becomes “the degree to which 
attitudes, behaviors, and membership of key publics change over a specified period of 
time” (p. 211). 
The Construct of Uncertainty 
 
Duncan (1972) argued that the static-dynamic dimension, the more important of 
the two dimensions, has two subdimensions.  The subdimension of stability-instability is 
the environment’s sameness or changeability, as apparent in his definition of the static-
dynamic dimension.  The other subdimension, frequency- infrequency, is less apparent.  
It is “the frequency with which decision unit members take into consideration new and 
different internal and/or external factors in the decision-making process” (pp. 316-317).  
The levels of stability and frequency determine the actual level of uncertainty in the 
dynamic-complex environment, which already has the most uncertainty of the four 
configurations.  Organizations in environments that are turbulent — meaning agitated and 
tumultuous — must continually contend with uncertainty. 
 The construct of uncertainty is an important one because it is central to 
understanding organizational decision-making and organizational survival.  Uncertainty 
is a function of the stability, complexity, homogeneity, dispersion, consensus, and 
turbulence in the environment (Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Duncan, 1972; 
J.E. Grunig, 1984).  Rose (1985) called it a “form of tension on the organization-
environment linkage” (p. 324).  Uncertainty, in the form of political and social tension, is 
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always a factor between NPOs and governments (DeHoog & Racanska, 2003), an 
observation particularly applicable to this study.  
 Other researchers have added their own ideas to the construct of uncertainty.  For 
Duncan (1972), the lack of critical information about a specific situation; the inability to 
gauge the stakes, or risks, to an organization facing that situation; and the inability to 
judge the odds of the success or failure of decision options are important components of 
uncertainty.  Higher uncertainty seems to correlate with less predictability.  Uncertainty, 
Thompson (1967) said, arises from three sources: “the lack of cause/effect understanding 
in the culture at large,” that “outcomes of organizational action are in part determined by 
the actions of elements of the environment,” and organizational-environmental 
interdependency (p. 159). 
Uncertainty compels an organization to learn about and interact with its 
environment, in a bid to reduce that uncertainty.  This is the strategic reduction of 
uncertainty approach (M. Taylor, Vasquez, & Doorley, 2003).  Since the 1970s, research 
on organizational-environmental interaction has “become fashionable” (Weick, 1977, p. 
267), as evidenced by the numerous researchers on the subject (e.g., see Finet, 1993, for a 
list that includes Aldrich, 1979; Emery & Trist, 1965; Hannan & Freeman, 1978; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; and Thompson, 1967).  This may be partially attributable to 
the blurring of where an organization ends and the environment begins in the open-
systems (think “permeable boundary”) perspective (Baum & Rowley, 2002).  In fact,  
some scholars conceptualized the boundary between an organization and its environment 




Environmental jolts, which cause or compound uncertainty, are also Petri dishes 
for organizational learning (A.D. Meyer, 1982).  As Louisa May Alcott, the famed 19th 
century American writer, once said, “I’m not afraid of storms, for I’m learning to sail my 
ship” (as quoted in J.J. Lewis, 2004).  Her point as applied to this discussion: Through 
environmental turbulence and uncertainty come organizational learning.   
Assuming that knowledge becomes ingrained in the organization’s “brain,” the 
organization will apply that knowledge to change positively the outcome of subsequent 
attempts.  Other organizations may also learn from this organization’s experience, 
because learning springs from both direct and indirect experiences.  Neuroscientists 
recently found that the human brain reacts in the same way whether a person makes a 
mistake him- or herself or watches another person make a mistake (“Study: Brain Sees 
Others’ Mistakes as Own,” 2004), arguably lending scientific support to the truism that 
people can learn from others’ mistakes.  It flows logically that organizations could learn 
perhaps as much from their experiences as from other organizations’ experiences.  
Curiously, however, organizational learning research tends to explore organizations’ 
direct experiences (Baum & Rowley, 2002). 
Subjectivity, Perceptions, and Implicit Associations 
 
Sutcliffe (2001) envisioned environmental uncertainty as a function of the quality 
and quantity of information available about the environment.  This point dovetails nicely 
with Hatch’s (1997) reminder about the role of people in environmental uncertainty: 
“Environments do not feel uncertain, people do” (p. 89).  Organizational boundary 
spanners — people — perceive uncertainty when, for example, the quantity or quality of 
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information about the environment is lacking, thus making it difficult for predictions and 
decisions to be made about goings-on in the environment.  People are uncertain about the 
environment rather than the environment itself being inherently uncertain.  Boundary 
spanners’ perceptions of uncertainty in the environment affect the decisions made by 
organizational decision-makers about the actions appropriate for engaging with this 
environment (Sutcliffe, 2001).  Harris (1997) also studied uncertainty and the influence 
boundary spanners wield.  Boundary spanners’ abilities to effectively manage uncertain 
situations make them influential within the organization, not the sheer existence (or 
perception) of uncertain situations.    
 Dimensions determine the level of environmental uncertainty, so dimensions and 
uncertainty would also be defined through the eyes of organizational personnel (Duncan, 
1972).  Rose (1985) said environmental textures, or dimensions, “exist for organizations 
only as perceived” (p. 323).  Perception is individually subjective because it “is a process 
in which the perceiver constructs reality by performing cognitive operations on cues 
derived from the environment” (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982, p. 552).  Theoretically, the 
number of environments perceived could equal the number of organizational personnel 
who perceive.  It is also possible that not one of these perceptions accurately represents 
the actual, or objective, environment, if such an environment even exists.    
Weick (1969, 1979, 1983) believed that environments are “enacted,” or identified 
and brought to life, by boundary spanners as they purposively select and subjectively 
synthesize information about the environment.  Boundary spanners construct and make 
meaning of environments (Baum & Rowley, 2002), thus making environments “real,” 
through the process of reification.  Organizational members rely on these enactments to 
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make decisions about how to engage with the environment (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; 
White & Dozier, 1992).   
Here is a scenario of how boundary spanners may do this and the implications for 
the organization:  An environmental 501c organization assumes it may achieve great 
success in influencing public policy under a Democrat administration.  Thus, it might set 
relatively lofty legislative goals for itself.  However, under a Republican administration, 
it may downgrade the loftiness of its goals because it would assume that whatever 
constitutes “success” would need to be downgraded.  If readers of this dissertation are 
familiar with Gladwell’s (2005) Blink, implicit association tests, or Harvard University’s 
Project Implicit, the assumption I have used above (that a Democrat administration would 
be friendlier with environmental interests and a Republican administration with business 
interests), probably seems “right.”   
Implicit associations are the connections people quickly and unconsciously make 
“between pairs of ideas that are already related in our minds than we do between pairs of 
idea that are unfamiliar to us” (Gladwell, 2005, p. 77).  In one of the simplest examples in 
his book, Gladwell challenged readers to categorize a list of first names as either male or 
female.  This is easily done with names like John, Bob, Amy, and Holly (he used these 
names and others).  He then proceeded with not-as-simple examples that demonstrated 
that people much more readily associate the “female” with domestic and family concerns 
and the “male” with professional and monetary concerns.   
I was unable to find an implicit association test on the Project Implicit Web site 
(http://implicit.harvard.edu) that specifically dealt with political issues and political 
parties.  I have taken the liberty of creating my own simple implicit association test to 
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show how people, like the readers of this dissertation, quickly and unconsciously make 
assumptions about and positive associations between political issues or interest groups 
and political parties.  Please sort as quickly as possible —without thinking — each of the 




Small business owners 
Oil and gas industry 
Racio-ethnic minorities 
Corporations 
Christian religious groups 
Anti-smoking groups 
Men 
Jewish religious groups 
Small business owners 
Trial lawyers 
Children 
Right to privacy 
Gays and lesbians 







Culture of life 
Hollywood 
 
I suspect that readers were quickly able to sort the items listed in the middle into 
either of the two columns and did so without too much difficulty.  As Gladwell’s (2005) 
subtitle says, people make these categorizations “without thinking.”  These unconscious 
associations — or assumptions — function as heuristic devices, thus sparing humans 
from having to think actively about every last little thing.  For example, I bet that readers 
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likely associated labor unions, Jewish religious groups, and Hollywood with Democrats, 
and the oil and gas industry, tort reform, and the culture of life with Republicans.  My 
point is that the people responsible for trying to make sense of their organizations’ 
political environments also deal with implicit associations and that they likely will make 
associations similar to readers’ associations.   
Thus, it is easy to understand how labor union lobbyists in Maryland would 
likewise associate their union’s interests with “friendly” Democrats.  They would 
instinctively feel trepidation about the union’s chances of enacting collective bargaining 
legislation with a Republican, and presumably unfriendly, governor in office.  
Conversely, lobbyists for a trade association for the oil and gas industry, who associates 
their organization’s interests as more aligned with Republicans than Democrats, might 
have the gut feeling that the organization will be more successful in pushing its political 
agenda with a Republican governor in office than with a Democrat.  These feelings, these 
perceptions, would likely affect the goals set by the organization for the coming 
legislative session and the strategies and actions by which those goals are pursued. 
Sometimes, implicit associations are accurate: In a recent Washington Post article 
about the proliferation of corporate lobbyists in Washington, DC, the director of 
government affairs for a major corporation boasted: “We’re trying to take advantage of 
the fact that Republicans control the House, the Senate, and the White House.  There is 
an opportunity here for business community to make its case and be successful” (as 
quoted in Birnbaum, 2005, p. A1).  Birnbaum also observed that in this Republican-
dominated federal political environment, “all-Republican lobbying firms have boosted 
their rates the most” (p. A1).  Thus, the implicit association that Republicans are more 
56
business-friendly than Democrats is at least substantiated by these and other anecdotes 
sprinkled throughout Birnbaum’s article.  I provided several Maryland-specific anecdotes 
that speak to this in the “Maryland, My Maryland” section of Chapter 1. 
However, implicit associations, although useful and sometimes correct, are 
fallible and sometimes unreliable because they are based on generalizations (perhaps 
grossly so).  They are not unlike stereotypes, which are notoriously and frequently 
incongruent with how things or individual people are.  Remember my example that 
Democrats are associated as being more aligned with environmental issues?  To 
demonstrate just how fallible implicit associations can be, take a guess ― wild or 
educated ― about which of these U.S. presidents is considered to be the “greenest” 
(Sussman & Daynes, 2004): Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, G.H.W. 
Bush, Clinton, or G.W. Bush?  The answer is not found among the four Democrat 
presidents (Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, and Clinton).  The correct answer, almost 
counterintuitively, is Richard M. Nixon, a Republican.  During his administration, he 
endorsed the first Earth Day; established the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Citizens’ Advisory Committee on the Environment, the Environmental Quality Control 
Council, and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration; expanded the 
National Park System; signed amendments to the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act; and enacted the Endangered Species Act, the National 
Environmental Policy Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (Sussman & Daynes, 2004).  All of this “green” happened through the 
signature of President Nixon, whom I daresay the majority of Americans would associate 
with many things, none of which have anything to do with the environment.  I end this 
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diversion by cautioning readers about relying on implicit associations as gospel:  To 
assume is to make an a** out of you and me.  
As the last few paragraphs have illustrated, perceived environments may be  
largely inaccurate representations of the actual environment.  But organizations that 
perceive inaccurately are in good company because no one organization has a monopoly 
on environmental misperception (Starbuck, Greve, & Hedberg, 1978).  Yet Aldrich and 
Pfeffer (1976) advised that environmental misperceptions matter only if the perceptual 
gap is significantly jeopardizing.  When the misperceived differences are critical, 
organizations may say or do the wrong thing, which may have serious implications for 
the organization: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” 
(Thomas, 1949, p. 301).  Nonetheless, Robbins (1990) concluded, “it is the perceived 
environment that counts” (p. 208). 
Aldrich (1979) identified a curious gap in the literature: What causes accurate 
perceptions of the environment and what are the results of such accurate perceptions?  
The literature said that inaccurate perceptions are often attributed to humans’ inherent 
subjectivity (e.g., implicit associations [Gladwell, 2005]) and constraints of the 
organizational system (Aldrich, 1979; Rose, 1985).  My assumption is that accurate 
perceptions may be a function of the quality of the members of one’s social circle and the 
quality of the information that members share and exchange.  I discuss social circles in 
this next section. 
Environments as Interorganizational Networks 
 
Another popular modernist approach to understanding organizational 
environments is as an interorganizational network (Hatch, 1997).  An organization’s 
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environment is comprised of elements, whether conceptualized as and termed 
organizations, strategic constituencies, publics, or stakeholders.  I prefer and continue to 
use the term “stakeholders.”  These stakeholders, which are affected by an organization 
and which also affect the levels of effectiveness and success achieved by that 
organization, form that organization’s environment.  Because of these mutual 
consequences, the organization and its stakeholders are linked to each other and thus 
must interact with each other.  Extrapolating from that, those organizational stakeholders 
would then be linked to and interact with each other (Springston, Keyton, Leichty, & 
Metzger, 1992).  Together, the organization (an element in the environment as well) and 
all of these linked interacting stakeholders form an interorganizational network.  This is a 
useful approach for understanding the communication and actions that occur between, 
and the “reciprocal influence” of, organizations and environments (Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 
221). 
DeHoog and Racanska (2003) examined the interactions and relationships 
between NPOs in Slovakia and the critical stakeholder in their task environment, the 
Slovakian government.  They were interested in how the political and social tensions 
inherent in NPO-government relationships were manifested in this democratizing former 
Eastern-bloc nation.  They found that Slovakian NPOs mitigated this tension by enacting 
Salamon’s (1995) three roles of NPOs.  As opponents, NPOs offered alternative opinions 
and policies. As agents of the state, NPOs provided services and programs on behalf of 
the government.  As partners, NPOs and the government cooperated on services, 
programs, and public policy issues.  DeHoog and Racanska cited communication, 




Organizational-environmental interaction exists because of dependence, as 
postulated by Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependency theory.  An 
organization’s dependence on the environment is a function of both an environmental 
stakeholder’s ability to provide something — an input like information — that the 
organization needs, as well as the organization’s ability to procure that information from 
elsewhere (Thompson, 1967).  Dependence constrains organization’s autonomy and 
increases its vulnerability (Robbins, 1990).  Dependence may also threaten the 
organization’s abilities to survive and succeed (Thompson, 1967).  This theory posits that 
an organization should behave so it becomes less dependent.  Such behaviors may result 
in decreased constraints on its autonomy, decreased vulnerability, and increased abilities 
to survive and succeed.  This “information-flow approach” to resource dependency 
theory illustrates, in a modernist way, how organizations monitor and interpret their 
dynamic-complex environments and then make strategic, fitting decisions (Aldrich, 1979; 
Terreberry, 1968).  Aldrich (1979) also noted organizations put a premium on efforts to 
procure informational inputs given increased environmental dynamism and complexity. 
Organizations thus must mitigate dependency, which is actually interdependency.  
An environmental stakeholder on which an organization depends likely could be another 
organization, one that is reciprocally dependent.  As Tompkins (1982) reminded, “The 
most important part of an organization’s environment is other organizations” (p. 172).  
This point is particularly relevant given this study’s focus on the interdependency 
between Maryland 501c organizations with political interests and stakeholder 
organizations that comprise its political environment, specifically the Office of the 
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Governor of Maryland and the executive- branch agencies and departments under its 
control, and the Maryland General Assembly (i.e., the House of Delegates and Senate). 
Goal Re-Evaluation 
 
Understanding organizational-environmental interdependence is similar to 
understanding interorganizational relationships.  Terreberry (1965) identified four 
approaches for analyzing interorganizational relationships.  Three of these are most 
appropriate for nonturbulent or tranquil environmental conditions, in which 
interdependence and attendant concerns about organizational survival are minimal.   The 
fourth approach, as suggested by Thompson and McEwen (1958), situates 
interorganizational relationships in a context of high organizational-environmental 
interdependence.  This approach “emphasize[s] the interdependence of organizations with 
the larger society and discuss[es] the consequences that this has for goal setting” 
(Terreberry, 1965, p. 605).   
Interdependence may require the organization occasionally to re-evaluate its 
goals, especially given a dynamic environment.  As I have noted, implicit associations 
about stakeholders that constrain or buffet organizational goals may also prompt goal re-
evaluation.  Thompson and McEwen (1958) argued that goal reassessment is “more 
difficult as the ‘product’ of the enterprise becomes less tangible” (p. 24).  This 
observation is particularly relevant given that the “products” of organizations considered 
in this study are changes in public policy.  Public-policy changes exist in the abstract; 
they are intangible, rather than tangible.  Rethinking a goal related to the enactment of an 
environmental law, for example, is arguably more abstruse and challenging than 
rethinking a goal related to the production of widgets. 
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At the end of Chapter 1, I explained the jolt to Maryland’s political environment 
(i.e., the 2002 election of the Republican Ehrlich as the state’s governor).  With that 
serving as the background context, combined with the conceptual framework I have thus 
far constructed in Chapter 2, I present the first set of theory questions: 
TQ1a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their organizations’ perceptions 
of the jolt? 
TQ1b: How did the jolt affect organizations’ perceptions of their political 
environment? 
Foundational and Middle-Range Public Relations Theories 
 
The Excellence theory of public relations, a dominant metatheory of the 
discipline, explains the fundamental characteristics of an excellent — “managerial, 
strategic, symmetrical, diverse, and ethical” — public relations function and its 
contributions to organization effectiveness (L.A. Grunig et al., 2002, p. 306; see also 
Dozier et al., 1995; J.E. Grunig, 1992).  It is both a normative and a positive theory 
because it predicts, describes, and explains public relations practice.  The Excellence 
theory was born of a two-decade long research project sponsored by the International 
Association of Business Communicators’ Research Foundation.  This project entailed 
compiling an extensive literature review (viz., J.E. Grunig, 1992) and conducting 
quantitative and qualitative research with public relations professionals and top-level 
executives in organizations located in the United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom (viz., Dozier et al., 1995; L.A. Grunig et al., 2002).  The research and scholarly 
output of the Excellence team have spawned innumerable research studies and scholarly 
commentary about the Excellence theory (J.E. Grunig, 2001; Sallot, Lyon, Acosta-
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Alzuru, & K.O. Jones, 2003).  It is as if an entire industry based on the Excellence theory 
exists. 
The Excellence study isolated characteristics of public relations programs, public 
relations departments, organizations, and organizational environments that foster the 
excellence of organizations’ public relations endeavors.  Having excellent public 
relations is important, financially and otherwise, because it contributes to organizational 
effectiveness by negotiating rapport between the organization and its internal and 
external stakeholders (L.A. Grunig, J.E. Grunig, & Ehling, 1992).  The full complement 
of Excellence characteristics can be placed into four categories: empowerment of the 
public relations function; communicator roles; models of public relations; and 
organization of the communication function, relationship to other functions, and use of 
consulting firms (L.A. Grunig et al., 2002).  Some of the characteristics found in the 
former three categories (specifically those involving worldviews, symmetry, roles, and 
models) inform this study.  The activities and efforts of government relations programs 
and professionals should not be substantively different from those of public relations 
programs and professionals except in that these activities and efforts would be focused on 
an organization’s stakeholders in the political environment. 
However, I must note that government relations has been found to be a unique 
form of public relations.  It tends not to correlate with some theoretical indicators of 
excellent public relations as other specialized forms of public relations ― such as media, 
employee, or member relations ― do (Dozier, et al., 1995; L.A. Grunig, et al., 2002).  
Researchers on the Excellence project speculated that these weaker correlations may 
occur because the people who head government relations programs often do not have 
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professional backgrounds in public relations and that these programs may operate 
independently from an organization’s comprehensive communication or public relations 
function.  Researchers speculated about another reason for the anomaly of government 
relations, a point that I will revisit later in the paper: the dependence of GRPs on their 
network of contacts in the political environment (Dozier et al., 1995). 
Worldviews in Public Relations 
 
J.E. Grunig and White (1992) offered an entire chapter on worldviews, 
specifically what they are and their implications for public relations thinking and 
practice.  Worldviews are variously described as mindsets, paradigms, perceptual screens, 
epistemological assumptions and beliefs (Magee, 2004), conceptual frameworks, and 
schema that people — or organizations — use to organize and make sense of their reality 
(J.E. Grunig & White, 1992).  Worldviews can also be described as ideologies, 
“relatively coherent sets of beliefs that bind people together and explain their world in 
terms of cause and effect relations” (Beyer, 1981, p. 166). 
The concept of worldviews is the agar of the Excellence theory; the caveat is that 
organizations that embrace symmetrically presupposed worldviews nurture public 
relations excellence.  The possession of a symmetrically presupposed worldview implies 
that that organization is open minded toward and respectful of “others.”  Organizations 
with symmetrically presupposed worldviews appreciate that they have consequences on 
others and vice versa.  The appreciation of such interdependence obliges them to seek 
balance among all parties’ interests, which can be attempted, if not achieved, through 
dialogue and “collaborative advocacy” (Spicer, 1997).   
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A symmetrically presupposed worldview embraces the organization’s existence as 
an open system and understands that rapport between an organization and its environment 
(or rather, stakeholders that comprise its environment) constantly needs to be negotiated.  
Symmetrically presupposed organizations also value innovation, equity, autonomy, 
decentralized management, responsibility to others, conflict resolution, and interest-group 
liberalism (J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & White, 1992).  To contrast, an internal 
orientation, a closed system, efficiency, elitism, conservatism, tradition, and centralized 
authority (J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & White, 1992) mark organizations with 
asymmetrically presupposed worldviews. 
Cultural Topoi 
 
Leichty and Warner (2001) offered the cultural-topoi perspective as a means of 
organizational openness to worldviews different from the organization’s own.  They 
defined a cultural topos as “a systematic line of assumptions and arguments that 
reinforces a preferred pattern of social relationships. [It] emerges out of a core rhetorical 
vision of the way in which the universe is” (p. 62).  In other words, cultural topoi are 
worldviews.  Public relations professionals should “detach” themselves from their 
cultural topoi and those of their organization to optimally mediate organizational-
environmental interdependence.  The concern for detached professionals is that their 
“mixed motives” may cause other organizational members to question the professionals’ 
loyalty (J.E. Grunig & White, 1992).   
An organization possessing a symmetrically presupposed worldview would be 
more amenable to having detached, or “divorced,” public relations professionals than 
would an asymmetrically presupposed organization.  The organization realizes that such a 
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divorce will facilitate the flow of information across the organizational boundary, which 
is ultimately advantageous to the organization (Sriramesh & White, 1992).  A 
professional who is wedded voluntarily or forcibly to organizational topoi, as could be 
expected in organizations with asymmetrically presupposed worldviews, will suffer from 
tunnel vision, an inability to “see” the existence or merits of other extra-organizational 
cultural topoi.  Call it blindness or elitism, in this scenario (or worldview) the 
organization loses valuable inputs from the environment.  It suffers as a result. 
Organizational Ideology 
 
Beyer (1981) argued that organizational ideology influences how an organization 
engages with its environment.  Likewise, A.D. Meyer (1982) suggested that 
organizational ideology is a significant factor in organizations’ amenability to engage.  
He defined organizational ideology as “constellations of shared beliefs that bind values to 
actions” (p. 522).  He found that a hospital workers’ strike less adversely affected 
hospitals with positive organizational ideologies, as seen in the openness of their dealings 
with their environments and members, than hospitals with negative ideologies.  Further, 
these “positive” hospitals demonstrated greater resiliency, or ability to bounce back after 
the strike, than did “negative” hospitals.  His description of a positive organizational 
ideology corresponds to the concept of a symmetrically presupposed organizational 
worldview, whereas a negative ideology corresponds to an asymmetrically presupposed 
organizational worldview.   
Requisite Variety  
 
Weick’s (1979) concept of requisite variety reasoned that if an organization’s 
internal environment reflects the diversity, or variety, of its external environment, it then 
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can engage more effectively with its environment than if the internal environment does 
not reflect external diversity.  Simply put, the organization’s inside should reflect its 
outside, like a microcosm.  In the Excellence theory, the principle of requisite variety is 
usually presented in terms of the gender and racio-ethnicities of an organization’s public 
relations professionals (L.A. Grunig et al., 2002).  The principle of requisite variety could 
be expanded to include cultural topoi.  Organizations would not necessarily need to 
match internally the external variety of worldviews, but they should be respectful of and 
receptive to these different worldviews.  J.E. Grunig (2001) alluded to this when he 
argued for the ethicality of communicating with “morally repugnant” groups (p. 15).  
Successful public relations professionals acknowledge and learn from perspectives and 
topoi that they themselves do not embrace (Springston, Keyton, Leichty, & Metzger, 
1992).  Culbertson (1989) called this “breadth of perspective” (p. 3). 
Manifestations of Worldviews 
 
Worldviews are manifested in several ways throughout organizations, including 
how they communicate with and behave toward those with whom they are 
interdependent.  Here is how the symmetrically presupposed worldview is manifested in 
organizations with excellent public relations.  First, the organizational decision-makers, 
or dominant coalition, will highly value the public relations function as a mechanism for 
managing interdependence (and thus, government relations programs for managing the 
organization’s interdependence with stakeholders in its political environment).  This then 
empowers the function, and its professionals, to be managerial rather than technical.  A 
technical public relations function performs the craft and tactical activities of public 
relations: informal research, writing, editing, special-event planning, and the like.  
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Technicians do the work necessary to implement the communication-related 
organizational decisions and plans made by others.  Decisions they make are of the 
procedural variety at the program or campaign level (Lauzen, 1994).  Nevertheless, the 
value of technicians’ work should not be underestimated because their expertise is 
essential, more so given the presence of managerial expertise, to organizations with 
excellent public relations (L.A. Grunig et al., 2002).   
Managers contemplate, strategize, and participate in these decisions and plans that 
steer the organization.  Organizations with excellent public relations value public 
relations professionals who strategically manage public relations programs, engage in 
formal research and strategic planning, and are either directly or indirectly involved in the 
organization’s decision-making processes (J.E. Grunig, 1992).  They are involved in 
policy decisions at the organizational level and thus have the potential to wield more 
influence within the organization than would their technician counterparts (Lauzen, 
1994).  According to the Excellence theory, these managers may directly report to senior 
management or may participate directly or indirectly in the dominant coalition.  This 
reflects an internal orientation.  They understand the concept of symmetry and its 
application to public relations, which reflects an external orientation.  Having both of 
these orientations results in a public relations professional, nay, manager who is a 
boundary spanner — someone who can mediate between those orientations. 
A worldview is a multifaceted concept.  I try to delimit my use of the term to one 
facet: the symmetry or asymmetry of the thinking, communication, and behavior of 
informants and their organizations.  I rely on the term “cultural topoi” to refer to the other 
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facets of worldviews such as political perspectives, perceptual screens, and ideologies of 
informants (the other facets of worldviews) and organizations. 
An organization’s worldview pervades all aspects of its operations, steeping 
organizational members like boundary spanners in it.  As such, the second set of theory 
questions is about worldviews: 
TQ2a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe the worldviews of their 
organizations? 
TQ2b: How did the jolt affect the worldviews of their organizations?  
Models of Public Relations Practice 
 
Near-encyclopedic amounts of original research, contemplations, and critiques 
have been written about the four original models of public relations practice: press 
agentry/ publicity, public information, two-way asymmetrical, and two-way symmetrical 
(J.E. Grunig, 2001). These four models, which are “simplified representations of the 
world” (Lave & March, 1993, p. 19), form a useful schema for describing and explaining 
the positive and normative practices of public relations (J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984).   
Originally, two variables combined to form the models: the directionality of the 
communication (one-way, flowing outward from the organization to its stakeholders; or 
two-way, flowing between them) and the degree of symmetry (“the degree to which 
collaboration and advocacy described public relations strategy or behavior” [J.E. Grunig, 
2001, p. 29]) or asymmetry (J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984).  J.E. Grunig (2001) evolved the 
models to reflect their four “underlying variables” (p. 29).  The original two variables, 
directionality and symmetry, remain.  The new variables represent the use of mediated 
and interpersonal communication and the ethicality of the public relations practice. 
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Asymmetry and Symmetry 
 
The variable of interest here is the asymmetry or symmetry of an organization’s 
communication.  Asymmetrically presupposed communication attempts to achieve an 
outcome that is desired by and favorable to the organization.  An imbalance that favors 
the organization is the goal.  In this approach, stakeholders are “used” to advance the 
goals of the organization; their input may be solicited but is unlikely to be incorporated 
into the organization’s decision-making process.  Unfortunately, in reality, organizations 
may tend to rely more on asymmetrically presupposed strategies (J. E. Grunig & Hunt, 
1984) when communicating with their stakeholders. 
Symmetrically presupposed communication entails the mutual, balanced 
exchange of information and influence between an organization and its stakeholders.  
From such meaningful and substantive dialogue, the theory postulates that an 
understanding between the parties will emerge.  Out of this understanding, organization-
environmental engagement can be managed.  This falls under the purview of 
organizational public relations professionals, in their managerial-level boundary-spanning 
capacities, and of the dominant coalition, to which the professionals either belong or have 
access.  An example of symmetrically presupposed communication, or dialogue as J.E. 
Grunig (2001) clarified it, would be routinely held meetings between activist groups and 
corporations during which the groups are consulted for their input on issues of mutual 
concern.  
J.E. Grunig (2001) and L.A. Grunig et al. (2002) have put to rest confusion about 
the two-way symmetrical model.  As others have, Murphy (1991) equated this model 
with games of pure cooperation or accommodation; the organization sacrifices its own 
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interests for the sake of stakeholders’ interests.  She posited a mixed-motive model that 
balanced symmetry and asymmetry to reconcile the tension between the interests of an 
organization and those of its stakeholders.  J.E. Grunig asserted that this is in fact how he 
conceptualized the two-way symmetrical model all along, as a blending of asymmetrical 
and symmetrical motivations.  The two-way symmetrical model is a mixed-motive 
model.   
The two-way symmetrical model does involve accommodation to a degree, but in 
the sense that organizations and stakeholders must be willing to entertain and perhaps 
give some ground to other interests beside their own.  The model involves advocacy and 
collaboration, just as Spicer’s (1997) mixed-motive model that he called “collaborative 
advocacy” does.  I will refer to the “two-way symmetrical model” as the “two-way 
symmetrical/mixed-motive model” from this point forward in this dissertation.  I do so to 
reinforce understanding of that this model is indeed a model of mixed-motives, not pure 
accommodation. 
But more than anything, the two-way symmetrical/mixed-motive model is about 
the process (Spicer, 1997), not the outcome, of dialogue (J.E. Grunig, 2001) and 
collaboration (J.E. Grunig & L.A. Grunig, 1992).  In the two-way asymmetrical model, 
organizations influence, even manipulate, stakeholders.  The two-way 
symmetrical/mixed-motive model offers an opportunity for organizations and 
stakeholders to influence each other (in addition to learning about each other and 
exchanging information).  Through boundary spanners, organizations and stakeholders 
can exchange influence, which is “the ability to affect the outcome of decisions” 
(Jemison, 1984, p. 133).   This model gives stakeholders “true” voice; the two-way 
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asymmetrical model gives stakeholders “false” voice; the two one-way models render 
them mute.  It is the process of the two-way symmetrical/mixed-motive model that makes 
it inherently ethical, not that the model leads to ethical outcomes (L.A. Grunig et al., 
2002). 
 The degrees of dynamism and complexity in the political environment determine 
the constraints and uncertainty with which an organization must contend.  In terms of the 
public relations models, constraints affect symmetry whereas uncertainty affects 
directionality (J.E. Grunig, 1984; L.A. Grunig, 1992).   
The constraint-symmetry relationship is curvilinear (J.E. Grunig, 1984). 
Constraints limit the self-determination, or autonomy, of organizations.  In a moderately 
constraining political environment, organizations should be motivated to be more 
symmetrical, to collaborate and engage in dialogue with legislators and other elected 
officials, for example, to show that the organization is or can be “good.”  When facing no 
or few constraints, organizations may rely on asymmetry simply because they can.  They 
can dominate their environment, through asymmetry, because the environment is unable 
to constrain the organizations.  In a highly constraining environment, organizations will 
likewise employ asymmetrically presupposed communication because, since it is already 
so constrained, it neither has anything to lose by doing so, nor anything to gain with 
symmetrically presupposed communication.   
If a goal of a 501c organization is to influence governmental officials to support 
its stances on policy issues, then in a sense these officials constrain the organization’s 
ability to accomplish that goal.  In an environment where the officials favorably consider 
the group, the officials should be receptive to the group’s efforts to effect policy.  
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Moderate constraints exist.  Nevertheless, the organization, employing appropriate, 
symmetrically presupposed advocacy efforts, enjoys a positive relationship with the 
constrainers.  But what if the reception or relationship is less than warm?  What if the 
environment is highly constraining?  Jenkins (1987) implied that organizations would 
resort to asymmetry:  
 If, however, [the 501c organization] advocates interests that are routinely  
 ignored or, worse still, deliberately excluded in centers of political decision- 
making, then the reception will be problematic and the organization may find  
it necessary to use more unconventional tactics.  (p. 298) 
 
Highly constrained organizations may feel backed into a corner; asymmetrically 
presupposed communication strategies are their way of acting out. 
 Uncertainty and directionality enjoy a direct relationship.  As uncertainty 
increases, organizations should increasingly rely on the two two-way models.  As 
uncertainty decreases, the two one-way models would be sufficient (J.E. Grunig, 1984; 
L.A. Grunig, 1992).  This, however, is a particularly myopic strategy for organizations in 
dynamic-complex environments, which are characterized by fluctuating levels of 
uncertainty.  Relying on the two two-way models would serve any organization well, 
regardless of the level of uncertainty in its environment.   
As I have said, because organizational-environmental interdependence exists, an 
organization must address changes in its environment.  This may entail the organization 
itself changing, or adapting; the organization attempting to change, or alter, the 
environment; or attempts to maintain the interdependence as is.  When an organization is 
adapting to its environment, it theoretically will rely on the public information and two-
way symmetrical/mixed-motive models.  These models embrace a symmetrically 
presupposed worldview, as does the notion of adaptation to an extent.  Alteration is an 
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attempt to control or manipulate the environment to change to befit the organization, 
clearly reflective of an asymmetrically presupposed worldview.  Fittingly, alteration 
endeavors likely will employ the press agentry and two-way asymmetrical models (J.E. 
Grunig, 1984; L.A. Grunig, 1992).  Regardless of the type of organizational change, 
Lauzen and Dozier (1992) added that dynamic, complex environments require the two 
two-way models of public relations. 
Unfortunately, it is not so simple as matching models to environments.  J.E. 
Grunig and L.A. Grunig (1989) contended that organizations might employ 
individualistic public relations strategies, rather than a one-model-fits-all public relations 
strategy.  Different stakeholders (i.e., legislators, journalists, or activist groups) or 
different programs (i.e., government relations, media relations, or community relations) 
may require different models of public relations (Lauzen & Dozier, 1992).  The Grunigs’ 
research explained Lauzen and Dozier’s (1992) finding of the  “consistent but weak” (p. 
211) relationship between the organization’s environment and the model of public 
relations it practiced.  Organizations were likely practicing more than one model of 
public relations because of their numerous and differentiated stakeholders.   
Two Other Models of Public Relations Practice    
 
Two variations of the original four models were initially found overseas (J.E. 
Grunig, L.A. Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang, & Lyra, 1995) and then in the United States 
(J.E. Grunig, 2001; Johnson, 1992; Simone [a.k.a Tuite], 1999).  J.E. Grunig’s (2001) re-
envisioning of the original models should not affect the legitimacy of these variations.   
The cultural interpreter model describes how some organizations hire public 
relations professionals who are part of or otherwise familiar with a nation or a culture 
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(and its language, customs, mores, and the like) as organizational “ambassadors.”  The 
cultural interpreter model embodies Weick’s (1979) concept of requisite variety.    
Simone (a.k.a. Tuite, 1999) agreed with others (e.g., Mack, 1997; Wexler, 1989) 
who found Washington, DC, to be a unique microculture.  It is a political village, located 
“inside the Beltway,” whose citizens have their own language and rules about gossip and 
are somewhat xenophobic about those from “outside the Beltway.”  That government 
relations programs often are exceptions to the “rule” of the Excellence theory has been 
attributed to GRPs’ reliance on their network of contacts.  The personal influence model 
describes how a professional’s personal and professional network of contacts  his or 
her social circle (Kadushin, 1968)  is integral to an organization’s public relations 
efforts.     
Simone (a.k.a. Tuite, 1999) found anecdotally that these two models, as practiced 
in politics and government relations in Washington, DC, are used in tandem.  The 
previous jobs of that study’s participants acculturated them to the culture of the village 
that is Washington, DC, and facilitated their relationships with its citizens.  These 
participants in fact were fully assimilated citizens. 
The personal influence model relates back to the earlier discussion of 
organizational dependency.  Organizational interdependency is managed not by 
organizations but by people.  Hatch (1997) suggested using interpersonal relationships 
between members of an organization and members of stakeholder organizations as one 
method for managing interdependency. 
The links between these interacting stakeholders “represent channels through 
which resources, information, opportunities, and influence flow” (Hatch, 1997, p. 65).  
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Hatch used the term “channels” in its literal sense.  But channels in the figurative sense 
are the people, namely boundary spanners, who function as the intermediaries of 
resources, information, opportunities, and influence among the stakeholders in an 
interorganizational network.  These people communicate.  How these people from 
different organizations in the network communicate with each other affects the linkages 
among their organizations (Manev & Stevenson, 2001).  Of course, this communication 
in the “interindividual” network occurs within the context of their organizations’ 
relationship as well (Manev & Stevenson, 2001). 
 Once again, it is important to not become ensnared in the anthropomorphization 
trap: Organizations do not perceive, communicate, make decisions, or act.  Organizations 
are comprised of people — boundary spanners — who do.  Likewise, the environment is 
comprised of other organizations, which of course are themselves comprised of people.  
So ultimately, when scholars and I write of organizations and environments, we are 
writing about people.  
With the foundation of an interorganizational network built on the information 
flow and communication between boundary-spanning individuals at different 
organizations, that interindividual network could be understood as a social circle.  
Weedman (1992) used the concept of social circles to study the communication channels 
between boundary spanners.  Her definition of a social circle, “a set of individuals 
connected to one another by some form of social choice” (p. 258), drew from the work of 
social network theorist Charles Kadushin.  According to Kadushin (1968), in a social 
circle: 
• The interaction and connections between individuals in the circle can be direct or 
indirect (i.e., through a third party or mutual friend), and 
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• Circle members have something in common, such as a political interest. 
Kadushin (1968) emphasized the informal nature of the social circle.  Social 
circles do not have “clear leaders. . .clearly defined goals. . .definite rules for interaction. 
. .[or] distinct criteria for membership” (p. 692).  Presumably members of work-related 
social circles discuss their jobs and thus share and exchange knowledge and insights.  
Once information is introduced into the network, it may be communicated grapevine-
style around the network: Person A shares a tidbit with Person B, who passes that 
information on to persons C and D, and so on throughout the network.  Weedman (1992) 
said the significance of social circles lies in this assumption, that one member’s 
information and intelligence can be communicated and transferred throughout the 
network.  This assumption also underlies the importance and power of communicating 
through informal channels — people from different organizations who are linked through 
a social circle.  Manev and Stevenson (2001) concurred: “Some of the external work ties 
through which business communication flows can be quite stable and lasting, and they 
are often critical for the organization, such as relationships with. . .a government agency” 
(p. 187). 
It may seem simpler to examine interorganizational networks as refracted through 
an interindividual level, social-circle perspective than as refracted through an 
organizational-level perspective.  But simpler it may not be; relationships among human 
beings represent “the highest level of systems complexity” (Bivins, 1992, p. 366; Borden, 
1985, as cited in Bivins, 1992). 
Based on the preceding discussion of the models of public relations practice, I 
offer this set of theory questions: 
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TQ3a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their communication practices 
with their organizations’ political stakeholders? 
TQ3b: How did the jolt affect their communication practices with their 
organizations’ political stakeholders?  
Boundary Spanning  
Public affairs, which I have established as a synonym for government relations (a 
specialized form of public relations), is a boundary-spanning function (Toth, 1986) 
between the organization and its political environment and stakeholders.  Springston and 
Leichty (1994) noted that “those who work with publics” (p. 697) are boundary spanners.  
Nevertheless, transitive arguments do not need to be employed to assert confidently that 
public relations is a boundary-spanning function.  Many theorists and researchers 
conclude as much (Everett, 1993; J.E. Grunig, 1991; J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; L.A. 
Grunig, 1987; Mayhew, 1997; Newsom, A. Scott, & Turk, 1989).   
This study maintains that public relations is the function through which an 
organization engages with strategic stakeholders in its environment, to achieve some 
degree of rapport between the organization and those stakeholders.  Gollner (1983, 1984, 
as cited in J.E. Grunig, 1991) averred that public relations is the management of 
interdependence.  If both of these assertions are sound, which I believe they are, then 
clearly boundary spanners and boundary spanning must have the utmost centrality for 
organizations.  Researchers have agreed, as these quotes demonstrate: 
• Boundary spanning is the key “set of activities involved with organization-
environment interaction” (Jemison, 1984, p. 133). 
 
• Boundary spanning “helps the organization to manage its relationship with groups 
in the environment (J.E. Grunig, 1991, p. 259).   
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• Boundary spanners “operate at the periphery or boundary of the organization, 
performing organizational-relevant tasks and relating the organization to elements 
outside it” (Leifer & Delbecq, 1978, pp. 40-41).   
 
• Boundary spanners act as liaisons between and link organizations and 
environments (Aiken & Hage, 1972, as cited in Jemison, 1984). 
 
• Boundary spanners are the organization’s “points of contact with the 
environment” (Aldrich, 1979, p. 251).   
 
By some of these definitions, organizational members such as sales 
representatives, human resources professionals, customer service representatives, 
members of the board of directors (Russ, Galang, & Ferris, 1998), and receptionists fulfill 
the boundary-spanning function.  Even my husband, an officer who is the U.S. Navy’s 
liaison to a defense contractor for shipbuilding projects and who by trade and education is 
an engineer, is a boundary spanner.  For my purposes, boundary spanners are GRPs who 
“frequently interact with the organization’s [political] environment and who gather, 
select, and relay information to the organization’s decision-makers” (White & Dozier, 
1992, p. 93).  Practically speaking, this includes in-house GRPs, those organizational 
members with government relations-specific boundary-spanning responsibilities, and for-
contract GRPs who engage in government relations activities on an organizational 
client’s behalf. 
Simply put, boundary spanning facilitates organizational engagement for the 
purposes of rapport with stakeholders.  It involves monitoring the environment for 
changes, problems, and opportunities; managing information flow between the 
organization and the environment; and counseling the organization about how best to 
negotiate and achieve goals in that environment (Cyert & March, 1963; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1978; March & Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967).  More poetically, boundary 
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spanning is “a window out of the corporation through which management can monitor 
external change, and simultaneously a window in which society can affect corporate 
policy” (Post, 1980, p. 23, as quoted in Toth, 1986, p. 29).  
 Post’s (1980) description implies a balanced dialogue exists between the 
organization and its environment.  Tompkins (1982) embraced a more monologic 
perspective on boundary spanning, focusing on its role in message production and 
dissemination for an organization’s external communication efforts. 
 I had expected to find, given its centrality to public relations, much more research 
on boundary spanning in the public relations literature than I did.  One reason for this 
may be that so many researchers (e.g., Huang, 2004; Lauzen, 1994; Lauzen & Dozier, 
1994; Philbin, 2005; Wyatt, S.S. Smith, & Andsager, 1996) treat boundary spanning in 
public relations as a foregone conclusion.  Perhaps public relations scholars believe the 
discipline can safely move beyond studying boundary spanning, especially when there 
are so many other important topics that demand scholars’ attention (e.g., a general theory 
of public relations, a global theory of public relations, ethical issues in public relations, 
and the measurement of public relations outcomes and effectiveness).  Or it may be a 
question of what else could public relations researchers realistically add to the concept.   
However, I was heartened to discover that boundary spanning has been heavily 
researched in other disciplines.  I found several more-or-less-recent articles in peer-
reviewed journals outside of the “traditional” public relations journals that delved into 
this concept (e.g., Liesbeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer, 1996 [in Organization 
Science]; Lysonski & Woodside, 1989 [in Journal of Product Management Innovation]; 
Manev & Stevenson, 2001 [in Journal of Business Communication]; Rao & Sivakumar, 
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1999 [in Organization Science]; and Weedman, 1992 [in Journal of the American Society 
for Information Science]). 
 Hazleton and Long (1988) noted that the “effective public relations practitioner 
specializes in interpreting the environment and its various publics for the employer or 
client” (p. 79).  Professionals then “work with management to develop strategic plans of 
organizational change and responsiveness” (Cutlip et al., 2000, p. 220).  Both of these 
quotes describe a great deal of what boundary spanning entails.  Katz and Kahn (1966), 
by contrast, argued that public relations was inadequate for engaging in boundary-
spanning activities.  Their reasoning, however, is flawed: They equated public relations 
with institutional advertising, which I have established public relations is not.  Despite 
Katz and Kahn’s objections, for my purposes, the public relations function is the ideal 
and logical “home” for the boundary-spanning activities of an organization, as I have 
herein presented them.   
The Two Modes of Boundary Spanning   
 
Public relations personnel have multifaceted job descriptions, but boundary 
spanning may be the single-most important facet in terms of organizational survival and 
success.  This is because boundary spanners’ main two modes are to represent the 
organization to the external environment and to gather and process information from the 
external environment (Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Jemison, 1984; Springston 
& Leichty, 1994).  More specifically, Adams (1980) elaborated on the activities boundary 
spanners may engage in: to transact and filter inputs and outputs, to search for and collect 
information, to represent the organization to external audiences, and to obtain 
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information to help buffer the organization from external threats (as quoted in Finet, 
1993, p. 42).  
 The two modes, as well as Adams’ (1980) list of activities, suggest an imbalance: 
that boundary-spanning activities are conducted for the organization’s benefit.  This is 
not the case; because in the course of external representation and information processing, 
boundary spanning can also benefit an organization’s stakeholders as it “conveys 
information and influence between the constituent group and outside groups and vice 
versa” (Springston & Leichty, 1994, p. 697). 
When in the external-representation mode, boundary spanners engage in 
organizational engagement activities.  These activities arise out of the organization’s 
decision-making process, which is informed by the boundary spanners’ information 
processing.  Rose (1985) made two observations about boundary spanning in this mode: 
Its purpose is “to effect strategies and compromises that maintain the autonomy of the 
organization with respect to the environment” (p. 323) and it involves interaction (e.g., 
manipulation and collaboration) with environmental elements.   
 Responsibilities of boundary spanners, in the external-representation mode, 
include maintaining the organization’s image and political legitimacy (Aldrich, 1979).  
Katz and Kahn (1966) also suggested that supportive functions on an organization’s 
boundary should cultivate external support and legitimacy for the organization.  Image 
maintenance relies on influence and persuasion to increase the organization’s visibility 
and enhance its reputation.  Boundary spanners “try to make an organization visible by 
influencing the behavior of groups in ways that benefit the organization, without 
bargaining or negotiating with the target” (p. 254).  
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Maintaining political legitimacy requires that boundary spanners mediate the 
power dynamics and influence between the organization and stakeholders, as well as 
broker information (Aldrich & Herker, 1977).  Aldrich and Herker presented 
organizational image as the representation of the organization that organizational 
members transmit into the environment.1 The goal of such transmissions is to enhance 
the organization’s visibility in the environment, presumably in a positive light, in turn 
enhancing the organization’s “social legitimacy” (p. 221).   
 When in the second mode of information processing, boundary spanners first face 
outward to the environment.  They monitor the environment by selecting and collecting 
relevant information and other knowledge subsidies.  They “flow” information into the 
organization.  Organizations cannot possibly make sense of all the information in their 
environments.  Boundary spanners defend against information overload by focusing on 
what is relevant; in doing so, they decrease, or “absorb” uncertainty (Aldrich, 1979, p. 
251).  Boundary spanners decide what is relevant  based on myriad factors.  Such factors 
may include their a priori theories and beliefs (Starbuck, 1976); cultural topoi; 
professional experience and instinct; recognition of the degree of the threat to the 
organization (Leichty & Warner, 2001) and, conversely, the degree of the opportunity for 
the organization; one’s cognitive-processing abilities (Rose, 1985); and implicit 
associations (Gladwell, 2005).  Starbuck (1976) also credited the role of cognitive 
 
1 J.E. Grunig and White (1992) suggested that public relations scholars should avoid using the term 
“image,” because its overly broad application by professionals has rendered the concept confusing and 
ultimately meaningless.  Scholars instead should use a more precise term, such as “reputation” or 
“impression.”  Indeed, many do (viz., Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2001; Ihlen, 2002).  Heath (1997) used the 
terms “image” and “reputation” interchangeably throughout his book to mean “the attitude key publics hold 
regarding the company or other organization” (p. 197).  The concept of “reputation” thus appears to be a 
suitable substitute for what Aldrich and Herker (1977) conceptualized as “organizational image.” 
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dissonance theory in boundary spanners’ efforts to combat information overload, noting 
that a boundary spanner “tends to learn what he already believed” (p. 1080).   
 Boundary spanners then face inward to the organization, evaluating, interpreting, 
translating, and summarizing this information so it will be useful and usable to the 
organization (Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich & Herker, 1977).  This continual process assures the 
flow of fresh information about the environment and stakeholders into the organization’s 
decision-making process.  This is important because 
 It is through the reports of boundary agents that other organizational members  
 acquire their knowledge, perceptions, and evaluations of organizational  
 environments.  It is through the vigilance of boundary agents that the  
 organization is able to monitor and screen important happenings in the  
 environment. (Organ, 1971, p. 74) 
 
This is a variation on the information-flow approach to understanding organizational 
environments, as I discussed in the earlier section titled “Organizational Environments.” 
 This overview of the activities that boundary spanners engage in has not yet done 
justice to the information-processing mode.  In this mode their potential to influence 
becomes clear (Aldrich, 1979).  Influence is “the ability to affect the outcome of 
decisions” (Jemison, 1984, p. 133).  I believe that such influence is a function of 
perception and subjectivity and of activities related to environmental scanning.  As such, 
I explore these subjects in detail as follows. 
 Boundary spanners are in a unique, and perhaps enviable, position in that they are 
information brokers.  Information itself has power and it makes those who have 
information powerful.  In environments rife with uncertainty, boundary spanners absorb 
uncertainty (Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich & Herker, 1977).  Their collecting and interpreting of 
information serves to make uncertain situations less so.  As I wrote earlier, boundary 
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spanners derive influence from their ability to effectively manage uncertainty, not from 
the existence or perception of uncertainty (Harris, 1997). 
As information brokers, boundary spanners carefully attend to the environment 
for information that is relevant to the organization.  Although sometimes they may need 
to sleuth around for information, boundary spanners are exposed to large amounts of 
information “by virtue of their strategic position” (Aldrich, 1979, p. 249) and also from 
their membership in social circles.  Here is where boundary spanners can first exercise 
influence: by selectively attending to or ignoring certain information.  From a practical 
standpoint, such screening helps combat information overload.   
 Boundary spanners simultaneously imbue this screened information with 
meaning.  They must make inferences about what this raw information, not always neatly 
packaged as quantifiable facts, means.  They must contextualize this information in terms 
of the organization’s goals, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (Starbuck, 
Greve, & Hedberg, 1978).  Here is where boundary spanners can also exercise influence: 
This contextualization process subjectifies, or biases, the information.  This information 
then must be condensed, translated, and constituted so that other organizational members 
can understand and use it. 
Agenda setting and framing, two complementary, classic concepts from the 
media-effects literature, which lend insight into the “power” of the media, parallel the 
above two points.  In the same way that the media agenda-set and frame issues for the 
public’s consumption, boundary spanners agenda-set and frame information about the 
environment and stakeholders for the consumption of other organizational members.  I 
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have provided an overview of agenda setting and framing to inform the on-going 
discussion about boundary spanning. 
The media establish the public’s agenda when they select or privilege certain 
stories (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).  These are the issues, by virtue of the media’s 
sanctioning, to which the public then pays attention.  The media increase the public’s 
awareness of issues and events.  Agenda setting is the “transmission of object salience” 
(McCombs & Estrada, 1997, p. 240).  Relatedly, framing is the “transmission of attribute 
salience” (p. 240); it is the selection, neglect, emphasis, or de-emphasis of certain 
attributes of an issue.  Framing may represent innocent attempts to increase audience 
appeal (e.g., focusing on conflict or controversy) or to distill complex issues for a lay 
audience.  Facts may be omitted, contextual material may be sacrificed, and 
oversimplification and inaccuracies may occur because of framing (Gunter, Kinderlerer, 
& Beyleveld, 1999; Richards & King, 2000).  Alternatively, framing less innocently may 
be a function of a journalist’s ideological leanings (Graber, 1989).   
Most allegations of media bias can be traced to how the media framed news 
stories and issues (Tuggle, 1998; Willis, 1991).  M. Harrison (1985) in fact argued that 
the news is inherently biased: The media cannot present every fact or piece of 
information about an issue (i.e., framing) or present all possible issues (i.e., agenda 
setting).  Is media bias an unpleasant fact that the public should just accept?  Indeed, 
journalists have acknowledged that, despite journalistic ideals and commitments to 
objectivity, objectivity or unbiased reporting may be humanly unattainable (Durham, 
1998; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1972). 
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What the boundary spanner has sensed, selected, interpreted, and “packaged” as 
important — organizational intelligence — will likewise be considered important by 
other organizational members (Aldrich, 1979; Weick, 1983).  This is what agenda setting 
and framing theories, as applied to boundary spanning, would postulate.  As Aldrich and 
Herker (1977) observed about organizational intelligence, “Once created, intelligence 
tends to be accepted” (p. 227), especially as, for various reasons, it is not always feasible 
for other organizational members to verify or triangulate information (Aldrich, 1979; 
Pearce & Robinson, 1982).  This is the responsibility of boundary spanners and other 
organizational members expect them to meet their responsibilities.  When trying to gain 
an understanding of the political environment, which would result from organizational 
intelligence, “it is many times the case that subjective or judgmental approaches may be 
the only practical methods” for doing so (Pearce & Robinson, 1982, p. 147).  This 
amounts to a resignation-tinged acknowledgement that bias in boundary spanning is an 
unpleasant fact, a case of satisficing. 
 Alternatively, such acceptance may suggest that trust exists between boundary 
spanners and organizational members, but even that may not necessarily be the case.  The 
Excellence theory of public relations postulated that a diverse public relations staff 
contributes to an organization’s excellent public relations (J.E. Grunig, 1992).  According 
to Weick’s (1979) principle of requisite variety, the diversity of an organization’s 
stakeholders (located in the environment) should be “matched” in the public relations 
department (L.A. Grunig et al., 2002).  An organizational public relations professional 
who is also a “member” of one of the organization’s stakeholder groups ostensibly will 
be a better boundary spanner between the organization and that stakeholder group than a 
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“non-member” of that group (Dozier et al., 1995).  As discussed in the “Worldviews” 
subsection of this chapter, diversity is typically thought of in terms of the gender or racio-
ethnicity of the public relations professional.  I have offered the possibility that, as 
applied to public relations, requisite variety could be expanded to include cultural topoi: 
Receptivity to and respect for, if not a “matching” of, the diversity of extra-organizational 
worldviews should emanate from the organization via its public relations professionals.  
A public relations professional who is receptive and respectful of or matches a 
stakeholder’s cultural topoi will better understand its concerns and communicate those 
concerns back inside the organization than a professional who is not.  However, this 
simpatico or intimacy may cast doubt on that professional’s loyalty to the organization 
(Aldrich & Herker, 1977; White & Dozier, 1992), thus casting doubt on the veracity of 
the organizational intelligence.   
 Having boundary spanners who “get” and enjoy rapport with their organizations’ 
stakeholders is important enough that organizations should overcome their tendencies to 
hire familiar or safely reliable management personnel (Aldrich, 1979).  For instance, 
given Maryland’s suddenly Republican executive branch, a Democrat-leaning 501c 
organization should think twice before hiring GRPs with Democrat résumés.  A wiser, 
although perhaps uncomfortable, choice may be to hire Republican GRPs to act as 
liaisons with that Republican stakeholder.  To wit, a Washington Post article about top-
level executive turnover at national interest groups observed: 
 Even without being coerced, many groups have lately chosen Republicans as  
 their new chieftains.  They reason that it only makes sense to hire a high-level  
 Republican to  communicate with decision-makers when both the Congress  
 and the executive branch are controlled by that party.  But given what could  
 be a hair-breadth-close election this year, a big question remains: Will  
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lobbying groups continue the pattern of hiring Republicans or will they hedge  
 their bets by turning to Democrats? (Birnbaum & Edsall, 2004, p. A1) 
 
Discussions of requisite variety and organizational loyalty aside, an organization 
relies on boundary spanners’ intelligence about stakeholders and the environment to 
make decisions, develop strategies, and take action.  Boundary spanners might seem 
relatively innocuous when in fact they, through their informational inputs, potentially 
wield a great amount of organizational influence.  The organization uses their inputs to 
make decisions about how to engage with stakeholders in a turbulent environment and to 
develop or maintain organizational-environmental rapport.  The organization’s decision-
makers depend on boundary spanners and their inputs.  Dependence begets influence.  
Greater environmental dynamism and complexity also increase this dependency on, and 
thus the influence of, boundary spanners in an organization’s strategic decision-making 
processes (Hambrick, 1981a; Jemison, 1984).  These are the processes in which 
organizational members deliberate and make decisions about the issues most critically 
relevant to the organization (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976).  The increased 
visibility boundary spanners enjoy in organizations with dynamic environments (Aldrich, 
1979; Thompson, 1967) could increase their influence. 
 Boundary spanning is an important function in organizational decision-making 
(Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Finet, 1993; Jemison, 1984; Leifer & Delbecq, 1978; 
Thompson, 1967).  Jemison (1984) investigated the influence of boundary spanners in 
strategic decision-making at 15 organizations from three industries.  He found that 
boundary spanning explained 60% of the variance in influence in these organizations’ 
strategic decisions.   
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The Process of Boundary Spanning 
 
That boundary spanners possess any influence is because of the informational 
inputs, or organizational intelligence, that they contribute to the organization.  
Organizational intelligence is much more than just raw data; it is created.  The process by 
which organizational intelligence is created — gathered, interpreted, and made 
meaningful to other organizational members — represents most of what boundary 
spanners do in their primary mode of information processing.  The process requires 
explication. 
 Boundary spanners, in their “unique perch at the boundaries of their organization” 
(Lauzen, 1995b, p. 188), must first gather information from the environment.  I disagree 
with Krippendorf and Eleey’s (1986) observation about how boundary spanners go about 
this: “Any organization can do no better than the feedback it receives from its 
environment” (p. 14).  In fact, organizations can do better.  Receiving feedback is passive 
and reactive (J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984).  To optimize their unique perch, boundary 
spanners must engage in much more active and proactive research activities: They must 
engage in environmental scanning.   
Environmental scanning entails seeking information about groups and other 
organizations, trends, events, ways of thinking, and the like that would be relevant and 
useful for the organization to know (Lauzen, 1995b).  Boundary spanners would seek 
information on political players, those “persons who create law or ordinance that 
prescribes which actions are rewardable or punishable” (Heath, 1997, p. 28).  Boundary 
spanners could also use both informal research methods, such as routinely conversing 
with members of one’s social circles, and formal research methods, such as public 
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opinion polling.  Pearce and Robinson (1982) recommended gathering both quantitative 
and qualitative data to balance and strengthen the eventual analysis of the data.   
 Information about stakeholders and the environment is collected in two main 
ways.  Boundary spanners gather much information about the environment via automatic 
scanning, “a direct perceptual process of which people are not aware” (Kielser & Sproull, 
1982, p. 555).  This is the on-going, un- or semi-conscious processing of information in 
which all humans engage.  People encode and decode, selectively attend and listen, and 
make inferences and associations (even implicit ones) among people, traits, timing, 
events, and the like.  This is unintentional learning.  
Boundary spanners also engage in directed searches.  These are research 
endeavors that are intentional and of which the boundary spanner is aware.  They are 
conscious learning efforts to address specific purposes and goals. 
 Environmental scanning is a continuous process.  The demand for environmental 
scanning and uncertainty enjoy a circular relationship.  An organization in an 
environment fraught with uncertainty needs much information about the dynamism and 
complexity that bred the uncertainty (Emery & Trist, 1965; Hazleton & Long, 1988; 
Lauzen & Dozier, 1992).  Researchers (e.g., Stoffels, 1994; Lauzen & Dozier, 1992) have 
argued that this would decrease uncertainty, which is “the lack of information about 
future events so that alternatives and their outcomes are unpredictable” (Hickson, 
Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971, p. 219).  Environmental scanning may 
decrease uncertainty about one environmental problem.  But in the course of doing so, a 
boundary spanner may stumble upon information about another potential problem of 
which the organization had theretofore been unaware.  In learning how to resolve one 
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problem, the spanner may discover a new problem.  Discovery requires more research 
(Hazleton & Long, 1988) to generate more information about that problem, and so on.  
Hence, environmental scanning is self-perpetuating. 
 Environmental scanning is part of a “cognitive process” (Dutton, 1993, p. 339) 
whose objectives are to understand and make sense of the organization’s environment.  
These objectives expedite the organization’s goal of optimizing and maximizing strategic 
engagement with its environment.  The information gleaned from environmental 
scanning awakens boundary spanners to emerging and on-going relevancies in the 
organization’s environment.  Relevancies either may positively or negatively affect the 
organization.   
Environments abound with opportunities for organizations, yet boundary spanners 
tend to focus on problems in their organizations’ environments (Jackson & Dutton, 
1988).  Boundary spanners should pay attention to cooperative, positive opportunities and 
relationships much as they pay attention to sources of conflict (Aldrich, 1979).  Boundary 
spanners should analyze and incorporate all relevancies into the organization’s strategic 
decision-making process so that the organization can address those relevancies.  Pearce 
and Robinson (1982) suggested that organizations should attend to these specific possible 
relevancies when their political environments undergo change: any policy changes and 
implications thereof for the organization; potential for goal achievement (or failure) of 
the new administration and implications thereof for the organization; “friendliness” of the 
administration to the organization; and the existence of political risks, constraints, and 
support for the organization.  Information about any of these relevancies will reduce 
uncertainty. 
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Lauzen (1995a) also examined the idea of cultural blindspots in this cognitive 
process.  Cultural blindspots emerge when organizations are oblivious (intentionally or 
not) to new relevancies, are unwilling to create new categories for new relevancies, or are 
too accustomed to doing things their way or the “old” way.  The environment progresses 
but the organization does not, unable to “see” because it is trapped in an asymmetrically 
presupposed worldview. 
 Boundary spanners also examine the past to inform and guide the organization’s 
future (Lauzen, 1995a), reflecting a symmetrically presupposed worldview.  Relatedly, 
Zabriskie and Huellmantel (1991) said that a boundary spanner’s ability to think 
strategically (as opposed to routinely) comes from knowing how to analyze information 
learned through his or her relationships with external environmental actors (i.e., other 
members of his or her social circle network); deducing threats and opportunities; being 
prepared to contend with them; developing plans that address them; and having a 
forward-looking orientation.  Further discussion of boundary spanners and environmental 
scanning will be illuminated by a discussion of  professional roles in public relations. 
Boundary Spanners as Technicians or Managers? 
 
Copious amounts of research have affirmed a two-role typology of the work 
activities and responsibilities of public relations professionals (Dozier & Broom, 1995).  
Communication technicians perform the craft and tactical activities of public relations: 
informal research, writing, editing, special-event planning, and the like.  Communication 
managers engage in formal research and strategic planning and are either directly or 
indirectly involved in the organization’s decision-making process. 
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The research stream on this theory has strongly flowed for a quarter century 
(Pasadeos, Renfro, & Hanily, 1999; Sallot et al., 2003), thus pre- and post-dating the 
inception of the Excellence theory.  Roles theory is an important middle-range theory that 
has been incorporated into the Excellence theory.  The stream started with Broom and 
G.D. Smith (1979), who explored the workplace activities and responsibilities of public 
relations professionals.  An initial four-role typology of their activities emerged: Public 
relations professionals may take on the role of the communication technician, the expert 
prescriber, the problem-solving process facilitator (PSPF), or the communication 
facilitator.  This typology was eventually collapsed into the two-role typology of the 
communication technician and communication manager (Dozier & Broom, 1995) 
because the latter three original roles all involved managerial activities and were highly 
intercorrelated (Broom, 1982; Dozier, 1983). 
Studies of role enactment have suggested that professionals often may enact the 
manager and technician roles concurrently (e.g., Broom & Dozier, 1986).  Although 
professionals may progress from being technicians to managers, they necessarily may not 
cease engaging in technician activities.   
Broom and G.D. Smith’s (1979) three original managerial roles are interesting 
facets of what is now the catch-all role of manager.  As such, I overview them here. 
The expert prescriber is the person upon whom an organization depends for advice and 
leadership on government relations matters (for example).  The organization looks so 
intently at the expert prescriber on government relations matters that it may cede 
decision-making responsibility for those matters to him or her, thus diminishing the 
organization’s active involvement in them (Dozier, 1992).  As Dozier explained, “The 
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expert prescribes and management obeys” (p. 329).  This subrole is associated with 
asymmetrically presupposed communication practices (J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984) and 
thus in turn an asymmetrically presupposed worldview. 
That a practitioner is regarded as knowledgeable and experienced is also implicit 
in the other two managerial roles, the PSPF and communication facilitator.  The PSPF 
engages in many of the same activities that an expert prescriber does.  However, the 
PSPF counsels organizational decision-makers in ways so they engage in addressing 
government relations matters.  Like the names of the other two manager roles, the name 
of third role, “communication facilitator,” doubles as its definition.  The communication 
facilitator facilitates communication between an organization and its stakeholders.  Ergo, 
the communication facilitator is a boundary spanner.  But so are expert prescribers and 
PSPFs.  They are all boundary spanners, individuals whose lived work experiences are 
this study’s unit of analysis.  Boundary spanning thus is obviously an important part of 
the work activities and responsibilities of a managerial-level public relations professional 
or GRP.    
Lauzen (1995b) implied that environmental scanning was in the technician’s 
purview, noting, “Environmental scanning is an information gathering process and is not 
in and of itself strategic” (p. 190).  Information gathered in this process is “raw” and 
needs “processing” before it could be used for strategic organizational purposes.  White 
and Dozier (1992) agreed that the environmental-scanning process is a technician-level 
activity.  Stoffels (1994) disagreed, as did Hambrick (1981b), who characterized 
environmental scanning as a managerial activity.  I consider the environmental-scanning 
process, in terms of collecting information, to be a technician-level activity.  But that 
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does not mean boundary spanners are technicians.  They are responsible for the creation 
and packaging of organizational intelligence.  They are responsible for its incorporation 
into decisions so the organizations decides smartly about how to engage and have rapport 
with stakeholders.  These are managerial-level activities.  After all, it is “managers [who] 
align organizational and environmental forces to a desired state of congruence” 
(Smircich, 1983, p. 227).  I prefer to think of this desired state as less about congruence 
and more about rapport. 
Several studies have found that boundary spanners do meaningfully participate in 
an organization’s strategic decision-making (Jemison, 1984), and thus “information about 
relations with priority publics gets factored into organizational decisions, policies, and 
actions” (Broom & Dozier, 1986, p. 42).  A.D. Meyer (1982) found that hospitals that 
more closely and broadly monitored their environments anticipated a potential 
environmental jolt (in his study’s case, a hospital workers’ strike) earlier than hospitals 
that did not.  Additionally, these hospitals were better prepared for the jolt because, 
thanks to their boundary-spanning personnel, they anticipated the occurrence of the jolt.   
Boundary spanners are both environmental scanners (technicians) and sense-
makers (managers).  As sense-makers, they construct meaning by interpreting relevancies 
and their implications for the organization (Dunford & D. Jones, 2000).  Once again, 
perception acts as a “spoiler” of reality.  Does meaning arise from the relevancies 
themselves, or do the boundary spanners give them meaning (perhaps a more appropriate 
label for boundary spanners would be sense-givers)?  The degree to which a relevancy is 
perceived as positive or negative may depend more on the “state” of the perceiver than on 
the reality of the relevancy (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982).  The state of the perceiver is a 
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function of cultural topoi, life experiences, work experiences, gut instincts, cultural biases 
(Leichty & Warner, 2001), cognitive-processing abilities (Rose, 1985), and demographic 
and psychographic profiles, among other factors. 
 Boundary spanners’ opportunities to participate and their influence in decision-
making increase given turbulent environments (Emery & Trist, 1965; Kiesler & Sproull, 
1982; Leblebici & Salancik, 1981; White & Dozier, 1992).  Environmental uncertainty 
and the ability to address it appropriately (through the possession and leverage of 
organizational intelligence) ultimately determine the influence boundary spanners wield 
in an organization (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Crozier, 1964; Hickson et al., 1971; Lauzen 
& Dozier, 1992).  Public relations researchers (Dozier, 1992; L.A. Grunig et al., 2002; 
Lauzen & Dozier, 1992) have similarly found that high levels of environmental 
uncertainty drive the organization’s need for the enactment of the public relations 
manager role.   
Boundary Spanners as Entrepreneurs  
 
Dynamism and complexity also spur organizations and their boundary spanners 
toward entrepreneurism.  Entrepreneurism’s traditional business roots are reflected in this 
definition: “the organizing and catalytic effort responsible for bringing about new 
economic activity (new goods and services) or the provisions of these products in some 
innovative way” (Young, 1987, p. 168).   
 Organizational engagement with a placid, simple environment, or an environment 
with patterned fluctuations, may be historical and rote and reflect a long-term perspective 
(Thompson, 1967).  Dynamic, complex environments do not allow organizations and 
boundary spanners such luxury; there is no such thing as “business as usual.”  Long-
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range planning may not be possible in a constantly changing environment filled with new 
and unique environmental contingencies: “So long as the environment of the firm is 
unstable — and predictably unstable — the heart of the theory [of the firm] must be the 
process of short-run adaptive reactions” (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 100).  Is it possible for 
organizations to “forecast. . .the future by extrapolation of a noncomparable past?” 
(Terreberry, 1968, p. 595).   
 Do noncomparable events call for noncomparable measures?  The literature on 
entrepreneurism answers in the affirmative.  These new measures are born of 
organizational entrepreneurism, which itself is often born of a “serious — often 
environmentally related — organizational problem” (Young, 1987, p. 168).  Young 
argued that entrepreneurism is imperative if organizations are to engage successfully with 
their dynamic-complex environments.  Entrepreneurism helps organizations to step out of 
their comfort zones to engage effectively with environments where, again, there may be 
no such thing as business as usual.  Entrepreneurism breeds innovative “products or 
practices that are new to the organization adopting them” (Aldrich, 1979, p. 98).  A 
symmetrically presupposed worldview embraces innovation (J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. 
Grunig & White, 1992).  Thus the existence of entrepreneurism in organizational thought 
and action likely reflects a symmetrically presupposed organizational worldview. 
 Making the spirit of entrepreneurism tangible is a responsibility well within the 
purview of managerial-level boundary spanners.  They introduce diverse informational 
inputs from the environment into the organization, fueling creative and innovative 
thought and action (Aldrich, 1979; Terreberry, 1968; Weedman, 1992).  Schwartzberg 
(1983), in an atheoretical article, suggested that creativity is a common personality trait 
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of public relations professionals. Boundary spanners aid organizations in “the 
construction of new meanings about the organization in relation to its environment” 
(White & Dozier, 1992, p. 99), that is, new worldviews and cultural topoi. 
 Entrepreneurism also makes an organization flexible (Weick, 1979).  Upon 
realizing that the old rules no longer can or should apply in a dynamic-complex 
environment, an organization “must retain a sufficient pool of novel actions” (p. 215) in 
its engagement toolbox.  An organization that would disavow flexibility to the point of 
being rigid — stubbornly embracing conservatism — in its dealings with such an 
environment is a foolish organization, as this fable from Aesop gently moralizes: 
 An oak that grew on the bank of a river was uprooted by a severe gale of  
 wind, and thrown across the stream.  It fell among some reeds growing by the  
 water, and said to them, “How is it that you, who are so frail and slender, have  
 managed to weather the storm, whereas I, with all my strength, have been torn  
 up by the roots and hurled into the river?”  “You were stubborn,” came the  
 reply, “and fought against the storm, which proved stronger than you: but we  
 bow and yield to every breeze, and thus the gale passed harmlessly over our  
 heads.” (V.S.V. Jones, n.d., p. 36) 
 
However, Weick (1979) cautioned that overly flexible organizations — reeds — 
risk eroding their identities.  If an organization is constantly bending to its environment, 
for what is it willing to stand firm?  What does that organization stand for?  
Organizations must be flexible (Pearce & Robinson, 1982), but they also must maintain a 
modicum of resoluteness (Weick, 1979).  Thus, organizations must temper flexibility 
with a dose of resoluteness — difficult to accomplish, but necessary for survival.  An 
organization should also be able to contend rapidly with environmental fluctuations 
(Aldrich, 1979).  The moral: An organization must be an oak-reed hybrid to survive and 
thrive in its environment.    
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Boundary Spanners as Buffers 
 
Thompson (1967) offered yet another way of thinking about how organizations 
engage with their environments through boundary spanners.  Organizational-
environmental interdependency entails the organization ceding some control to its 
environment.  Thompson argued that organizations would try to regain some of that 
control through the “maneuvering device” of buffering (p. 20).   
Buffering cushions an organization from environmental fluctuations by, among 
other ways, stockpiling raw materials or conducting preventative maintenance 
(Thompson, 1967).  In another context, having two months’ worth of rent saved provides 
a buffer for an individual who has become unemployed.  Buffering provides a safety net 
for an organization (or an individual) should its environment drastically or unexpectedly 
change — become jolted.   
Buffering as a protective cushion for the organization is similar to Cyert and 
March’s (1963) concept of organizational slack.  Slack functions as a cushion for 
absorbing environmental fluctuations (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & March, 1963; A.D. 
Meyer, 1982).  It enhances the organization’s stability and survivability: “By providing a 
pool of emergency resources, it permits aspirations to be maintained and achieved during 
relatively bad times” (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 38).  Cyert and March argued that slack 
just “happens”; it is not the result of purposeful, deliberate efforts.  Thompson (1967) 
explained buffering as a purposeful, deliberate conscious effort to absorb environmental 
fluctuations.  Regardless of their geneses, slack and buffering are mechanisms for 
organizations to steel themselves against punches from the environment (Aldrich & 
Pfeffer, 1976).   
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Hatch’s (1997) more recent take on buffering nearly equates it with boundary 
spanning.  The difference is that buffering involves raw materials and resources whereas 
boundary spanning involves information.  Boundary spanners, through stockpiling 
information and intelligence and absorbing and reducing environmental uncertainty, 
serve as organizational buffers to the environment.  They “run interference” with the 
environment for other organizational members and functions.  Their buffering efforts 
allow the organization to operate with less worry about environmental conditions.  
 Refining Cyert and March’s (1963) treatment of slack, Bourgeois (1981) offered a 
much more expansive perspective of the concept.  Slack strengthens an organization’s 
ability to contend with environmental jolts and contributes to organizational 
effectiveness.  It acts as not only a buffer in the sense presented by Cyert and March and 
Thompson (1967).  Slack may help reconcile organizational-environmental conflict.  
Slack, as the extra resources beyond what the organization minimally or routinely 
requires, encourages innovative thinking and entrepreneurism (Bourgeois, 1981).  
Further, slack acts like a “shot of courage”: It encourages organizations to pursue 
opportunities present in the environment.  Bourgeois concluded that slack’s “presence 
allows an organization to interact or compete in its environment more boldly” (p. 35).   
Simply put, slack provides organizations with the room to fail.  They can take 
chances on experimenting with new ideas or products because if the experiment fails, the 
organization has only spent slack, or extra, resources — not its necessary lifeblood 
resources.  In toto, slack affects how organizations engage with their environments 
(Bourgeois, 1981; A.D. Meyer, 1982). 
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Bourgeois (1981) believed that successful organizations amass slack.  Slack is a 
happy byproduct of success.  Although the success may have been “planned,” the slack 
was not; it “happened.”  Acknowledging the “slack-is-unplanned” perspective, Bourgeois 
speculated that slack should be planned.  He found evidence, albeit anecdotal, of planned 
slack. 
A.D. Meyer (1982) viewed slack as a mechanism for absorbing shock, facilitating 
adaptation, and “foster[ing] organizational learning” (p. 522).  Slack provides the room 
for an organization to attempt new strategies or products.  Success or failure logically 
flows from this; the organization will gain knowledge, or learn, from this experience.   
 Slack, however, is not always a boon for organizations.  With too much slack, 
Bourgeois (1981) cautioned, organizations become lazy.  They may experience a false 
sense of security toward environmental fluctuations or have a “rest on our laurels” 
attitude if they have copious amounts of insulation or room to fail.  Instead of optimizing, 
these organizations will merely satisfice. 
Although so far I have considered slack and buffers to be equivalent concepts, 
Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, and Tansik (1988) thought otherwise.  Particularly relevant for 
this study is this distinction: “Slack resources are physical entities such as cash, people, 
nonobsolete inventory, machine capacity, and so forth.  Other buffers, such as preventive 
maintenance, future contracts, sales smoothing, and so forth, are more intangible systems 
and procedures” (p. 603).  I will now use their semantic choice of “buffer” because it 
represents intangibilities while still capturing the essence of the concept of organizational 
“insulation.” 
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For organizations like 501c organizations that deal with intangibles (e.g. changes 
in public policy and public opinion), what forms would organizational buffers take?  
Buffers in such organizations might be incarnated as positive relationships with their 
publics (Bruning, 2002; Bruning & Ledingham, 2000; Coombs, 2001; Ledingham, 2003; 
Ledingham & Bruning, 1998), positive organizational reputation (Heath, 1997), and 
stores of political capital (Lopez, 2002).  All of these could be accrued deliberately or 
through happenstance, nurtured and grown.  Given an environmental jolt, an organization 
could expend or even exhaust all of these during engagement efforts, as this observation 
about former U.S. President Bill Clinton illustrates: “Whatever demons caused him to 
dally with [Monica] Lewinsky, the results were clear.  Bill Clinton’s second term was 
spent on minor domestic policy initiatives, as he had to spend all of his political capital 
just to stay in office [emphasis added]” (Kamarck, 2004, para. 7).   
Based on the preceding discussion the work activities and responsibilities, and the 
corresponding professional roles in public relations, of boundary spanners, I offer the 
following set of theory questions:  
TQ4a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their work activities and 
responsibilities? 
TQ4b: How did the jolt affect their work activities and responsibilities?  
Organizational Legitimacy in Public Relations 
 
The concept of legitimacy, an implicit part of the Excellence theory, is directly 
related to the concept of stakeholders.  Legitimacy enjoys a rich tradition in public 
relations research, particularly in crisis communication and reputation studies (Boyd, 
2000).  A legitimate organization is one that critical stakeholders perceive as responsible 
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and needed and that has engendered their “good will and approval” (Boyd, 2000, p. 344).  
It is one that conforms to society’s generally accepted normative “rules,” expectations, 
and values (Baum & Rowley, 2002; J.W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; W.R. Scott, 1987).  
Finet (1993) said that legitimacy “involves the perceptions of important societal interests 
that organizational practices are socially and politically appropriate” (p. 37).  Harris 
(1997) even observed, “Legitimacy cannot be defined independently of values” (p. 313).   
External stakeholders confer legitimacy on an organization (Finet, 1993; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978).  When the rules, norms, and expectations of an organization’s 
“society” — its environment — change, so too must the organization if it is to retain its 
legitimacy.  An organization risks its legitimacy if an external stakeholder views the 
organization as inappropriate or out of step given the conditions of the environment.  
Krippendorf and Eleey (1986) noted that 501c organizations “received public support for 
their work only to the extent that citizens believe their supportive participation is 
worthwhile” (p. 14).  Legitimacy is, in a sense, an operating license the public gives to an 
organization, renewable based on continued stakeholder sanction and “good” 
organizational behavior.  Political legitimacy is the operating license from political 
stakeholders. 
In the vernacular of public relations theory, political status may be understood as 
the degree of legitimacy conferred upon the 501c organization by critical stakeholders, 
namely political ones.  Political status is also understood as the “distance” between a 
501c organization and the political decision-making structure (Roy, 1981).  The more 
proximal a 501c organization is to the corridors of political power — located well within 
the margins of a political system — the more political clout it presumably has.  With 
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more clout, the more effective that 501c organization presumably will be in “the act of 
pleading for or against a cause, as well as supporting or recommending a position . . . 
[the] active espousal of a position, a point of view, or a course of action” (Boris & 
Krehely, 2002, p. 301) to an “institutional elite” (Jenkins, 1987, p. 297) — a stakeholder.  
Jenkins cautioned that advocating a specific legislative action is conceptually different 
from securing enactment of that bill and overseeing its implementation once it becomes 
law. 
An organization’s legitimacy is more at risk in a turbulent organizational 
environment than a calm one (Finet, 1993).  However, that legitimacy can help calm that 
turbulent environment:   
 Relatively unquestioning legitimacy is the functional equivalent of the  
 minimally turbulent environment.  The stability that results from these non- 
 turbulent sociopolitical environmental conditions is reflected in specific  
 organizational benefits such as a diminished need to defend the organization  
 from potentially costly social and political challenges.  (p. 40) 
 
Delegitimacy has the opposite effect; environmental turbulence increases when 
stakeholders negatively perceive the organization (Finet, 1993).   
Logically then, an organization perceived as legitimate likely also has a positive 
reputation and vice versa (Boyd, 2000).  An organization’s reputation is in part an 
outgrowth of the quality of the relationships it has with its stakeholder and non-
stakeholder groups (J.E. Grunig & Hung, 2002; Hutton et al., 2001) and the external 
representation efforts of organizational boundary spanners. 
Although boundary spanners seem to be influential vis-à-vis organizational 
legitimacy, Finet (1993) believed her study was the first to examine the effects of 
boundary spanning on legitimacy.  That many organizations’ environments are 
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increasingly dynamic and complex may have profound implications for both 
organizational legitimacy and boundary spanning.  Finet specifically investigated whether 
the external perceptions of organizational boundary spanners’ messages and behaviors 
(both direct and indirect) were related to external perceptions of organizational 
legitimacy.  She found that they are related to each other: 
 Boundary spanning might actually count among the most important variables  
 that potentially influence organizational legitimacy.  Put another way, these  
 results imply that boundary spanning is too important a communication  
 activity, in terms of its consequences for organizational legitimacy, to fail to 
 perform well. (p. 59) 
 
Based on this discussion of organizational legitimacy within the context of public 
relations, I offer this final set of theory questions: 
TQ5a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their political stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the legitimacy of their organizations? 
TQ5b: How did the jolt affect the political stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the boundary-spanning GRPs’ organizations?   
Thus concludes my presentation of the conceptual framework for this study, 
which I have attempted to relate to the particulars of the study: boundary-spanning GRPs 
working on behalf of 501c organizations operating in Maryland’s “jolted” political 
environment.  I began with the ultimate context for the study, public relations.  Within the 
conceptual framework built from literature on 501c organizations, environments, and 
foundational and middle-range theories of public relations, I delved into topics such 
government relations, open systems theory, dimensions of organizational environments, 
worldviews, boundary spanning, and other theories and concepts integral to this study.  In 




Research questions (or as I refer to them, “theory questions,” a choice I explain 
shortly) emerge from a study’s conceptualization.  The difference between a study that is 
excellent and one that is subpar lies in part in the quality of its theory questions.  If a 
researcher does not ask appropriate research questions, even a study with a well-
developed and articulate conceptualization will stumble.  In theory, research questions 
should provide a cohesive route for “moving” a study from its overall purpose to the 
gathering of data.  In reality, this has led to confusion about the nature of research 
questions versus interview questions (Wengraf, 2001).   
 Wengraf (2001) developed a four-level tree diagram to alleviate the confusion.  
At the top of the tree diagram is the study’s overall research purpose.  The study’s central 
research questions, which guide the study, grow out of the overall research purpose.  
These research questions act as fertile ground for theory questions.  Interview questions 
sprout from each theory question.  Interview questions are posed to the study’s 
participants to elicit data that address the theory questions; they operationalize the theory 
questions.  The interview question should reflect “the language of the interviewee” (p. 
62).  Conversely, research and theory questions, which “govern” the development of the 
interview questions, should reflect the “theory language of the research community” (p. 
62).    
 Other qualitative research experts (e.g., Locke, Spirduso, & Silverman, 1993; 
Marshall & Rossman, 1999) equated “research questions” with Wengraf’s (2001) “theory 
questions.”  Wengraf, however, would have equated their research questions with his 
central research questions.   Yet he and Marshall and Rossman agreed on this point: The 
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research purpose and (central) research questions drive the formulation of the study’s 
conceptualization.  Wengraf developed this idea, implying that the conceptualization then 
drives theory questions, which in turn drive interview questions.  This study’s textual 
version of Wengraf’s (2001) tree diagram is presented below:  
 My overall research purpose is to learn of the experiences of boundary spanners, 
those organizational members who manage organizational-environmental 
interdependence with the goal of developing and maintaining rapport, in organizations 
enduring a major “jolt” (A.D. Meyer, 1982) in their political environment.  To reiterate, 
the organizations under consideration are 501c organizations operating in Maryland.  The 
environment is the political environment of the organizations.  The jolt is the election of 
Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., in November 2002, as Maryland’s first Republican governor in 
nearly four decades.  The study is predicated on the working assumption that boundary 
spanners were of crucial significance to organizations throughout and after the jolt, 
regardless of whether their organizations welcomed the jolt or not.  
 The central research questions that guide this study are: 
• In what ways have the jolt and subsequent changes in the political environment in 
Maryland affected boundary-spanning GRPs and the work they do?   
 
• Why did the jolt affect them as it did? 
• What can be learned from their experiences that informs the theory and practice 
of the specialized form of public relations, government relations? 
 
Based on the conceptualization, which is driven by the study’s purpose and 
central research questions, I will explore the following five sets of theory questions:  
TQ1a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their organizations’ perceptions of the  
jolt? 
TQ1b: How did the jolt affect organizations’ perceptions of their political environment? 
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TQ2a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe the worldviews of their organizations? 
TQ2b: How did the jolt affect the worldviews of their organizations? 
TQ3a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their communication practices with  
their organizations’ political stakeholders? 
TQ3b: How did the jolt affect their communication practices with their organizations’  
political stakeholders? 
TQ4a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their work activities and  
responsibilities? 
TQ4b: How did the jolt affect their work activities and responsibilities? 
TQ5a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their political stakeholders’  
perceptions of the legitimacy of their organizations? 
TQ5b: How did the jolt affect the political stakeholders’ perceptions of the legitimacy of  
the boundary-spanning GRPs’ organizations?   
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
 
Research is formalized curiosity.  It is poking and prying with a purpose. 
 Zora Neale Hurston (1942), American writer and anthropologist 
The Qualitative Genre and Rationale 
 
A professor of rhetorical criticism, in whose class I was a student, counseled us to 
let our method of rhetorical analysis arise from the text.  Translation: The text should 
drive the method used to analyze it; a method of analysis should not be imposed on the 
text.  The same is true when considering qualitative or quantitative inquiry.  A study’s 
methodology should depend on its overall research purpose and central research 
questions (Poggenpoel, Myburgh, & Van Der Linde, 2001).   
This study’s research purpose is to learn of and explore the experiences of 
boundary spanners, those organizational members who manage organizational-
environmental interdependence, in organizations enduring a major “jolt” (A.D. Meyer, 
1982) in their political environment.  Its central research questions are: 
• In what ways have the jolt and subsequent changes in the political environment in 
Maryland affected boundary-spanning GRPs and the work they do? 
 
• Why did the jolt affect them as it did? 
 
• What can be learned from their experiences that informs the theory and practice 
of the specialized form of public relations, government relations? 
 
This study’s research purpose and central research questions oblige investigation 
with qualitative research methods.  Qualitative inquiry seeks understanding of a 
phenomenon through those who have experienced it: “Qualitative researchers want those 
who are studied to speak for themselves, to provide their perspectives in words and other 
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actions” (Hughes, n.d.).  What were their experiences of that phenomenon?  What 
meanings did they make of it?  Why those experiences and those meanings? 
As such, qualitative inquiry applies a constructivist perspective to research.  By 
applying such an emic, or insider, perspective, “reality” and “truth” are understood to be 
individualized and constructed.  An external, objective “reality” or “truth” cannot be 
captured and asserted as “universal,” because such a universal reality or universal truth 
does not exist.  What “reality” and “truth” are are matters of individual perspective.  
Thus, the goal of qualitative inquiry is idiographic knowledge, which personalized, 
subjective knowledge.   
 This study, as I have envisioned it, required qualitative inquiry of individual lived 
experience (Marshall & Rossman, 1999).  Individual lived experience is one of Marshall 
and Rossman’s three genres, or “nuanced traditions” (p. 60), of qualitative research.  
Case studies and microanalyses, respectively, are the best methods of inquiry for the 
other genres, society and culture and language and communication.  Interviews are best 
for studies of individual lived experience because their “primary strategy is to capture the 
deep meaning of experience in [individuals’] own words” (p. 61).  Interviews are 
advantageous when a researcher’s “concern is with establishing common patterns of 
themes between particular types of respondents” (Warren, 2002, p. 85), as my concerns 
are.  My goals are for individuals to describe richly their experiences of the same 
phenomenon and to explore any meaningful similarities — or differences — in those 
experiences.   
To accomplish these goals, I originally proposed conducting active, 
semistructured interviews with 12 to 15 informants.  To achieve the depth I sought, I 
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anticipated conducting two 60- to 90-minute telephone interviews with each informant.  
This was not meant to be, as I explain below. 
A New and Improved Research Design 
 
Legendary football coach Tom Landry said: “Setting a goal is not the main thing.  
It is deciding how you will go about achieving it and staying with that plan” (1975, as 
quoted in “Winners Don’t Quit,” 2005).  With my apologies to Landry for co-opting his 
inspiriting words, by mid-January 2005, I came to realize that my plan (i.e., my 
dissertation research design) for achieving my goal (i.e., earning a doctorate) was not a 
plan I should stay with.  With the permission of my committee, I changed my dissertation 
research design to address the challenges that I had faced in the initial weeks of 
conducting my research.  Below details the chronology of events that led me to change 
my design. 
Once I rose to candidacy in mid-November 2004, I submitted my research 
application to the University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) and conducted four 
successful, albeit tedious, pretest interviews.  The IRB approved my application on 
December 13, 2004.  Upon learning that the IRB approved my application, the 
Department of Communication released official departmental letterhead and envelopes to 
me for my solicitation mailing.  This mailing was dropped on December 22, 2004, to 63 
potential participants.  I also sent the mailing to two friends who live in the Annapolis 
and Baltimore areas to check on the receipt of the letters and the speed of their delivery.  
Each mail package contained a personalized introduction letter (Appendix A); an 
informed consent form (Appendix B); and a postage-paid, pre-addressed envelope for 
returning the form to me.  I included a handwritten postscript on each letter, 
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acknowledging I understood how hectic the 2005 legislative session would be for that 
person but was hopeful that he or she would consider participating in my project.   
My two friends reported receiving their letters approximately on December 28, 
2004.  I also installed a counter on my project Web site 
(http://www.geocities.com/simoneterp/LSTwebsite.html; no longer operational) to keep 
track of the number of visitors to the site.  I “wrote off” the week between Christmas and 
New Year’s Day, assuming that many people take off from work at this time.   
 On December 29, 2004, I received an e-mail from one person who had received 
my mailing.  She declined to participate because she was not involved in government 
relations, as I had thought.  She gently pointed out that asking people to participate in two 
long phone interviews was unrealistic and asked me to call her for suggestions.  Although 
she believed my study was interesting (and believed that other people would as well), she 
thought I would have better luck getting people to participate in my project if asked them 
for one approximately 60-minute interview, with the opportunity for follow up.  She also 
recommended two potential participants.  I considered her concerns legitimate and 
appreciated her suggestions, but I was optimistic about recruiting participants with my 
original research design intact.  
Several days into 2005, when day after day the counter on my Web site would 
uptick by just one — from my daily visit to check the counter — I began to worry: I am 
throwing a party and no one is showing up.  On January 7, 2005, I received this e-mail 
message:  “Thanks for inviting me to participate in your study.  I must apologize. . . the 
next few months are going to be extremely hectic and I just don't know how I'd find the 
time for the interviews. Sorry.  Good luck with finding others and with the analysis.”  
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This person’s message confirmed my suspicions to explain the lack of participation or 
even curiosity about my study. 
Eventually, one person did agree to participate (and used the Web site to access 
the on-line scheduler).  We had a productive 90-minute phone interview on January 10, 
2005.  This person was insightful, chatty, and forthcoming — a perfect informant.  We 
also covered everything I had intended to in this one interview, using the original 
interview protocol that was amended after the pretests.  He suggested moving beyond the 
Smart Growth/Priority Places issue.  He believed that I could learn much from people 
who worked for nonprofit organizations, unions, and trade associations in Maryland 
involved in other issues.  Case in point: He had shown his wife, a government relations 
professional for a state teachers’ group, my letter.  He told me that she would be eager to 
speak with me about how transitioning from years of Democrats in the governor’s office 
to a Republican had affected her and her organization. 
On January 12, 2005, the Maryland legislative session began.  On January 17, 
2005, a person called me to decline.  She explained that her organization strictly 
interprets its 501c(3) tax-exempt nonprofit status and does not engage in any activities 
that could even remotely qualify as political advocacy.  Her board instructed her not to 
participate.  However, she too believed that my study was interesting and recommended 
someone for me to contact.  She suggested that I consider two changes to facilitate 
participation: One, scale back my request from two interviews to one interview and two, 
change the timing of the study.  She pointed out that the legislative session was the 
busiest, indeed worst, time of year for the people I would like to participate in my study.  
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She thought that people would be more willing and available to talk to me once they had 
the time — that is after the legislative session adjourned April 11, 2005. 
I conducted an interview with another person on January 20, 2005.  He could fit 
only one interview in his schedule but did instruct me to call or e-mail him to follow up.  
As of the end of January, I had scheduled two more interviews but they were not to take 
place until early May.  In late January, I persuaded the president of the Annapolis/Anne 
Arundel County Chapter of the Public Relations Society of America to distribute flyers 
about my study at its next chapter meeting.  The president of the Maryland chapter agreed 
to publicize the study in the chapter’s next newsletter as well. 
Although I was buoyed by the two interviews I had conducted, the scheduling of 
two others, and people’s helpful suggestions and good wishes, by the end of January I 
was disappointed with the lack of progress.  I realized that I would not be able to finish 
and defend this project during the spring 2005 semester as I had hoped.  I also knew that 
if I ever was to finish this project, I must change the research design. 
On January 29, 2005, I sought approval from my dissertation advisory committee 
to change my research design.  By February 8, 2005, all committee members had 
approved my request to make these changes: 
WHAT: One 60- to 90-minute telephone interview, with the opportunity for  
 follow-up 
 
Rationale: I deduced that asking people to commit to two long interviews likely  
was one of  the two major problems with my study.  To participate in any study is  
an imposition on one’s time; what I asked people to do appeared to be  
participation-prohibitive.  I learned from the pretest and actual interviews that I  
could rein in the scope of the study without sacrificing its scholarly nature.  I  
could ask fewer questions, thus decreasing the length of time I would need to  
speak with my informants.  (My prospectus included 17 theory questions; my 
dissertation was scaled back to include five sets of theory questions.)  I figured  
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that asking people to participate in only one interview would increase the  
attractiveness of participation. 
 
WHO:  20 to 25 (or more if needed) GRPs working directly for or on behalf of  
501c(3), 501c(4), and 501c(6) organizations operating in Maryland 
 
Rationale: The length and number of interviews enjoy an inverse relationship of  
sorts (Warren, 2002).  If I conduct shorter interviews, I then would need to 
conduct more interviews overall.  Given the standards set by earlier University of 
Maryland dissertations (i.e., Hon, 1992), my qualitative interviewing experiences 
(e.g., Tuite [a.k.a. Simone] & McComas, 2003), and Warren’s (2002) guidelines, 
I proposed to interview 20 to 25 informants to achieve informational sufficiency 
for my study. (If after interviewing 20 to 25 people informational sufficiency has 
not been achieved, I would continue to conduct interviews.)  This then required an 
expansion of the pool of potential informants.  Rather than limiting this pool to 
boundary-spanning personnel in 501c organizations involved in the Maryland 
Smart Growth/Priority Places issue, I solicited the participation of boundary 
spanners in Maryland 501c organizations who engage in political advocacy on a 
variety of issues.  
 
WHEN: Interviews would be conducted as soon as committee approval was  
secured and would continue until information sufficiency was reached 
 
Rationale: As several people pointed out to me, the timing of this study was 
 problematic.  Asking GRPs for interviews during the 90-day Maryland legislative  
session was the second of the two major problems with the original research  
design.  Although I thought going into the study that asking GRPs for their time  
during their bread-and-butter time of year might be a challenge, I did not 
anticipate it being the obstacle to participation it evidently was.  It was akin to 
asking a certified public accountant for three hours of time in the middle of 
income tax season.  I forged ahead with this schedule in an attempt to finish the 
doctoral program by the end of the spring 2005 semester, which also coincided 
with the retirement of my dissertation advisor, Dr. Larissa A. Grunig, and of one 
of my committee members, Dr. James E. Grunig.  Both of them received emeriti 
status, which allowed them to continue serving in their capacities on my (and 
others’) committee.  This, as well as having the latitude to solicit participation 
after the Maryland legislature ended in mid-April 2005, allowed me to set 
December 2005 as my new graduation goal.2
Once I secured committee approval to change my research design, I immediately 
edited my project Web site to reflect the changes.  On February 9, 2005, I sent out a 
 
2 I set December 2005 as my new graduation goal after revising the research design but before I was 
affected by Hurricane Katrina.  I explain how that situation pushed by graduation date back to May 2006 
later in this chapter. 
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second solicitation mailing to my original pool of potential participants (Group 1).  This 
mailing included a personalized letter, acknowledging the problems with the initial 
parameters of participation and asking for one 60- to 90-minute interview (with the 
opportunity for follow-up) that could be conducted after the legislative session ended, if 
preferred (Appendix C).  I asked those who wanted to postpone their interview until after 
the session ended to use an enclosed response device.  I would then contact them after the 
legislative session ended to schedule an interview.  I directed those who wanted to 
schedule an interview in the short term to my Web site and the on-line interview 
scheduler.  I also included a printout of my Web site in this mailing, thus turning the Web 
site into a “push” technology rather than a “pull” technology (I am not able to include this 
printout as an appendix because I took down the Web site in mid-August and lost all hard 
and electronic copies of it during Hurricane Katrina).  I included the informed consent 
form and a postage-paid, pre-addressed envelope that could be used to return the timing 
preference response device and informed consent form to me.  On April 21, 2005, I sent 
out a last appeal to Group 1 on a 8.5-inch by 5.5-inch yellow card stock postcard 
(Appendix D). 
Ultimately, I sent a three-wave mailing to Group 1, which included 63 people.  
Dillman’s (1977) Total Design Method (TDM) for mailed questionnaire design and data 
collection inspired this multi-wave solicitation procedure.  TDM’s reliance on multiple 
waves of mailings is one reason why this method consistently yields survey response 
rates in the 70% range (Dillman, 2000), a statistic that enticed me to use TDM.  My 
positive response rate was not quite that good: The positive response rate for Group 1 
was 19% (12 people out of 63).  Four people contacted me to decline participation, but 
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ultimately 12 others agreed to participate and ten of them completed interviews with me.  
The last postcard mailing, which dropped after the legislative session ended, generated 
most of these interviews.  These ten interviews were transcribed and used in the analysis. 
 On May 3 and 4, 2005, I sent out an initial mailing to in-house government 
relations and public relations professionals and for-contract lobbyists (Group 2) working 
directly for or on behalf of Maryland 501c organizations.  This mailing contained a two-
page letter (Appendix E), an informed consent form, a printout of my project Web site, a 
“please contact me” form, and a postage-paid return envelope.  The please contact me 
form was for individuals to alert me that they wanted me to contact them about arranging 
for an interview rather than self-scheduling their interviews through the project Web site.   
 I sent only one mailing to Group 2, which included 403 in-house professionals 
and 125 for-contract lobbyists, because of the overwhelmingly positive response this 
mailing generated.  I had anticipated sending out a second mailing to this group; given 
the sheer number of people who agreed to interviews, this was not necessary.  I purposely 
chose to send this mailing to an overly large number of people out of fear of a low 
response rate.  Seven people contacted me to decline for various reasons and I declined 
interviews with 37 people.  I eventually conducted interviews with 34 people from Group 
2, of which 30 interviews were transcribed and used in the analysis, and 10 people from 
Group 1.   
Although I had reached informational sufficiency by about the 25th interview, I 
continued to conduct interviews because of the variety of organizations that people 
worked for.  The positive response rate for Group 2 (69 out of 528) was 13.1%.  The 
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positive response rate for my overall solicitation efforts was 13.7% (81 positive responses 
from both groups’ mailings out of 591 people contacted). 
I turned down 37 people (all of whom were members of Group 2) who wanted to 
participate, e-mailing them this message:  
I just received your paperwork indicating your interest in participating in 
my dissertation project; thank you for responding to my call for participants.  As 
it (happily) turns out, my project now suffers from an embarrassment of riches: 
Many more people responded to my mailing than I had *ever* imagined would. 
 
Consequently, as much as I truly do appreciate your willingness to be 
interviewed for the project, I already have more than enough interviews 
completed and scheduled to make my project solidly dissertation "worthy." 
 
Once the project is completed sometime in the fall, I will be sure to send 
you a copy of the executive summary of my dissertation.  Thanks so much! 




I chose to turn down many of the people I did because they responded to my 
mailings after I had completed or scheduled many interviews.  After I had completed a 
number of interviews, I did begin to turn down some potential informants because they 
declined to have their interviews audiotaped.  Beyond that, I did not “cherry-pick” whom 
to interview; the 44 GRPs I interviewed were the first 44 people who contacted me to 
participate.  
 Why did so many people respond to my call for participants?  I have several 
theories.  The first has to do with the timing of the call.  People received the Group 2 
mailing after the session ended, during the early summer lull, when presumably they had 
an hour or so to spare.  The second has to do with my study’s topic touching a nerve.  The 
2005 legislative session was widely considered by my informants to be one of the most 
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bitterly partisan and contentious sessions in recent and not-so-recent memory.  I suspect 
that my study provided an opportunity for people to vent some steam.  The third has to do 
with the tone and verbiage of the letters included in this Group 2 mailing.  These 
introductory letters had a much friendlier and less academic tone than did the original 
solicitation letter sent to Group 1.  (I did lighten up the tone and language contained in 
the second and third mailings to Group 1, in an attempt, along with the changes that 
obviously eased the burden of participation, to encourage participation.)   
Because I have done some professional work writing copy for and developing 
direct mail packages, I am particularly proud of the mailings that I developed for this 
project.  They read and looked impressive; they communicated, “She is serious and 
means business.”  One informant complimented me, saying 
It’s a really interesting project.  I think you did tap into something and to your  
 credit what you sent to folks was good material.  It piqued your interest and  
 showed that you had some passion behind this.  People responded to that. 
 
I estimate that I spent several hundred dollars on postage for all of the groups’ 
mailings.  Each piece of the first and second Group 1 mailings needed a regular 37-cent 
stamp plus another regular stamp on the return envelope.  Each piece of the third Group 1 
mailing required a regular stamp (37 cents).  Postage for all those mailings totaled 
$116.55.  Each piece of the Group 2 mailing needed 60 cents of postage plus a regular 
stamp on the return envelope, or 97 cents of postage for each of the 528 pieces, or 
$512.16.  The total postage costs were $628.71.  The per-completed-usable-interview 
cost of postage was $15.72 (40 interviews and $628.71 worth of postage).  Other sizeable 
expenses included copying, ink jet cartridges for my printer, business reply envelopes, 
paper, transcription machines, audiotapes, labels, long-distance phone calls, a monthly 
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contract for the on-line scheduler, and — of course — tuition.  I was willing to spend 
whatever money was necessary to get enough people to participate so I could finish the 
project. 
The Research Strategy: Qualitative Interviews 
 
Whether a researcher executes long, in-depth, elite, ethnographic, or 
phenomenological interviews, he or she is executing qualitative interviews.  Conversation 
grounds qualitative interviews, where two engaged parties, the interviewer and informant, 
dynamically interact to extract and mine informants’ perspectives and perceptions of 
reality (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002; Warren, 2002).   
The major purpose of qualitative interviews is “to discern meaningful patterns 
within thick description” (Warren, 2002, p. 87).  Qualitative interviews are “active” 
interviews (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995).  Active qualitative interviews have a 
semistructured, or semistandardized (Berg, 2001), quality to them, in that the interview 
does not strictly adhere to a regimented question-and-answer format.  Active interviews 
are “social interactions” (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 3), recursive encounters that 
participants simultaneously extract meaning from and imbue with meaning.  Active 
qualitative interviews thus exemplify the transactional model of human communication.  
The interviewer and the informant synchronously encode and decode verbal and 
nonverbal messages throughout the active interview (Berko, Wolvin, & Wolvin, 2001).  I 
conducted the interviews as conversations rather than interrogations or the administration 
of the survey.    
As could be inferred from the preceding discussion about qualitative, 
semistructured interviews, by virtue of the interviews’ active, conversational nature, a 
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researcher is a fully engaged participant.  Warren (2002) characterized the qualitative 
interview as “a kind of guided conversation” (p. 85).  Conversations unfold as people 
communicate.  This requires the active participation of the interviewer, through asking 
questions, attentively listening, encouraging the flow of the conversation, and otherwise 
guiding the interview.  Participants in interviews qua conversations jointly construct 
meanings made during the talk session (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995).  I will discuss the 
ethical issues raised in this last point in a subsequent section (“Veracity”). 
Shuy’s (2002) observation that “When one person is the designated question 
asker, the power of the interaction clearly falls to that person” (p. 542) illustrates that the 
balance of power is tipped in the favor of interviewers in an interview situation.  
However, Shuy said that face-to-face interviews offer a more balanced power dynamic 
than do telephone interviews, because of the contextual naturalness of face-to-face 
interviews.  Telephones set up a “superior-subordinate relationship” (p. 542).  
Nevertheless, as I will note shortly, save nonverbal communication, contextual 
naturalness can be achieved during telephone interviews, which would then minimize the 
power imbalance between the interviewer and informant.   
In contrast to Shuy’s (2002) thinking, I believe that the power balance between 
the informants in the study and me as the interviewer favored the informants.  Without 
their participation, I would neither be able to complete this dissertation nor my doctoral 
degree.  Benefits (beyond receiving an executive summary of my findings and perhaps 
winning a $100 American Express gift card) may only accrue to informants indirectly, 
whereas benefits will accrue to me directly.  I need them more than they need me.  By 
122
participating in the study, they granted me a tremendous kindness, for which I am 
indebted.   
Also in contrast to Shuy’s (2002) thinking, informants wield a great amount of 
power in a semistructured, active interview.  Informants may reveal information that 
takes interview conversations in an unexpected direction, one that the interviewer had not 
prepared for.  Interviewers typically rely on open-ended questions, which grant 
informants freedom in how they answer those questions.  For example, I started off each 
interview by asking informants to tell me about their professional background and how 
they wound up working for their organization.  Several informants used this question as a 
springboard to tell me about their life stories, stories that were filled with asides and 
tangents.  Although it was sometimes difficult, perhaps even inefficient (but always 
interesting), to have ceded power to informants like this in qualitative interviews, this 
was necessary in keeping with the spirit and intent of qualitative inquiry.  I truly wanted 
to learn of and from my informants’ experiences, so I extended to them the freedom to 
tell me their experiences: “Qualitative researchers only gain control of their projects by 
first allowing themselves to lose it” (Kleinman, Copp, & Henderson, 1992, as cited in 
Kleinman & Copp, 1993, p. 3).  
The Interview Protocol 
 
In a semistructured active interview, the interviewer relies on an interview 
protocol that contains the pre-determined questions that should “guide” an interview and 
should form the basis of each interview in the study (Dunford & D. Jones, 2000; Patton, 
1990).  An interview protocol is useful to keep an interviewer “on track” in any one 
semistructured active interview, which is a “largely improvisatory” (Wengraf, 2001, p. 
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202) exercise, and across a set of such interviews (Patton, 1990).  An interviewer can 
refer to the interview protocol to provide a systematic and focused framework for an 
interview rather than being bound to it.  The role of the interview protocol in a 
semistructured active interview is analogous to the role of the speech outline in an 
extemporaneous speech (as taught in basic public speaking courses at the University of 
Maryland and the University of South Alabama).  My original interview protocol (which 
I had tested in my pretest interviews) was extensive because it was to guide me through 
two 60- to 90-minutes interviews with each informant.  The interview protocol I wound 
up relying on for my one-hour long or so interviews was less extensive but appropriate 
given the shortened length of the interviews and their conversational nature.  See 
Appendix F. 
Warren (2002) cautioned, and I know this to be the case from my experiences as 
an interviewer, that an interviewer must be flexible and attentive.  Diverge from the 
interview protocol if necessary, carefully listen to what an informant is telling — or not 
telling — “you.”  However, as one would come back to his or her speech outline when 
giving an extemporaneous speech, come back to the interview protocol in the interview. 
Just as the phrasing of items in a survey instrument design is crucial (Sudman & 
Bradburn, 1983), the phrasing of questions in an interview guide is no less crucial.  
Interview questions should operationalize theory questions, linking the theoretical to 
informants’ “reality” (Wengraf, 2001).  At a basic level, an interviewer can do that by 
phrasing interview questions in the informants’ language, or “idiolect” (Berg, 2001; 
Wengraf, 2001, p. 64).  For example, I never used the term “boundary spanner” in the 
interviews.  This term, as I explained earlier, was something several people had 
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questioned, even teased, me about.  Rather, I would use more familiar, everyday 
vernacular such as “communicator,” “representative,” “bridge,” or “liaison” to convey 
what I meant instead of “boundary spanner.” 
Interview questions typically should be open ended to allow informants to 
expound on their experiences.  Open-ended questions should not constrain or presuppose 
informants’ answers: “The truly open-ended question allows the person being 
interviewed to select from among that person’s full repertoire of possible responses” 
(Patton, 1990, p. 296).  Examples of open-ended questions that, if carefully worded, grant 
informants’ access to their full repertoires include Spradley’s (1979) grand tour questions 
and Patton’s (1990) experience/behavior questions, opinion/values questions, feeling 
questions, knowledge questions, and sensory questions.  For example, I asked informants, 
“Tell me about what you do in your job as director of government relations (for 
example).”  This typically generated long, detailed answers, replete with anecdotes, into 
which I could interject probe questions.   
Wengraf (2001) noted that an interviewer occasionally might find it necessary to 
ask closed-ended questions or questions that yield dichotomous answers.  Interviewers 
should be sure to probe or otherwise follow-up on informants’ answers to these questions.  
Sometimes, toward the end of an interview, if an informant had not commented about 
the, for example, grassroots activities of the organization, I would ask him or her, “Does 
your organization engage in any grassroots activities?”  This is phrased as a “yes” or “no” 
question.  Sometimes, an informant would just respond “yes” or “no” and then I would 
have to ask follow up questions (i.e. “What’s your involvement with those activities?” or 
“Why doesn’t your organization do grassroots activities?”).  More frequently, however, 
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when I asked a closed-ended question, the informant would respond with an answer far 
beyond “yes” or “no.” 
Asking too many questions may cause informants to suffer from interview 
“fatigue” or to feel as if they have been subjected to an interrogation.  Interviewers can 
keep the interview conversation flowing by using prompts; statements; silence; filler 
responses; probes; follow-up questions; and other natural, improvised verbal and non-
verbal interventions (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002; Holstein & Gubrium, 1995; Warren, 
2002; Wengraf, 2001).  These are all natural components of everyday conversation and 
thus of conversation-styled interviews.  I relied on all of these conventions during the 44 
conversation-styled interviews, with the exception of non-verbal interventions.  
Telephones, which I used to conduct the interviews, hamper non-verbal communication, 
such as facial expressions and gestures. 
Pretesting 
 
Qualitative research designs should and likely will evolve as research is 
conducted; a fixed research design in qualitative inquiry is “both impossible and 
inappropriate” (Patton, 1990, p. 51).  Assuming that design changes will occur, 
conducting a pretest study is an efficacious way to minimize changes that will likely be 
needed as the research is on-going.  A pretest can reveal the flaws and kinks in the 
research design in advance of the conduct of the actual research, thus allowing a 
researcher to enter the field with a more appropriate research design.  King et al. (1994) 
considered pretesting a necessary step in research projects involving qualitative 
interviews.   
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Rather than jumping into the study “cold,” I developed a pretest to evaluate the 
internal validity of the questions (Are my questions asking what I have designed them to 
ask?) that comprised the original interview guide.  This pretest was designed to also 
assess my abilities as an interviewer, the process of interviewing by telephone, and the 
time needed to complete an interview.   
I conducted mock interviews with two acquaintances in the first half of December 
2004.  They are GRPs who worked for Washington, DC-based 501c(4) organizations in 
late 1994 and 1995.  These dates are significant because during this timeframe the 
Republican Party, during the 1994 mid-term election, won majority control of both 
chambers of the U.S. Congress.  Over the years, the Republican Party had periodically 
controlled the Senate.  What truly jolted the nation’s political environment in 1994 was 
that the Republicans had taken over the U.S. House of Representatives for the first time 
since 1954, a jolt similar to the jolt that occurred in Maryland in 2002.   
As boundary-spanning GRPs who worked for 501c(4) organizations during a 
major environmental jolt, my acquaintances met nearly all the criteria I had established 
for my study’s potential informants.  Glesne (1999) recommended pretesting “with 
people as close to the realities of the situation as possible” (p. 38), if not people from the 
actual sample.  I preferred to “reserve” my sample for the study rather than tap into this 
pool of people for the pretest, in retrospect a smart move given my initial difficulties in 
securing participation.  I was confident that because my acquaintances closely “resemble” 
my study’s potential informants, my pretest interviews with acquaintances fairly 
represented real interviews with my study’s informants.   
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I used these practice interviews to detect any problems with my research design, 
problems that I resolved before going into the field.  As readers know now, my research 
design changed significantly after going into the field; and my pretest interviews had 
nothing to do with the changes.  However, my pretest interviews were helpful in deciding 
what areas of the study I could rein in.  After I changed my research design, I eliminated 
exploring the notions of loyalty and distance between boundary spanners and their 
organizations.  I also decided to explore some narrower topics (e.g., entrepreneurism and 
buffering) within the context of broader topics (e.g., boundary spanning) rather than as 
stand-alone topics. 
I conducted the practice interviews as if they were real interviews for my study 
(Berg, 2001), from engaging in small talk and other social niceties to audiotaping the 
interviews.  There was one difference: At the end of the interview sessions, I asked my 
acquaintances to e-mail me with their opinions of the quality and quantity of questions I 
asked, my interviewing skills, the length of the interview, the overall interview process, 
and the like.  I also asked them to make recommendations on how I could improve on 
these points.  I thought that they would feel more comfortable about being honest with 
their opinions by telling me in a less personal way — e-mail — than on the phone.  I then 
reviewed the tapes to assess the interviews on these same points, as well as whether the 
questions I asked elicited the kind of data I had anticipated and whether my 
acquaintances’ answers offered the depth needed for my research to be credible and 
meaningful.   
These peer- and self-evaluations were helpful as I determined whether some 
theory questions should be eliminated from the study (effectively constricting the scope 
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of the study, as I had to do when the research design changed), whether the interview 
guide required a complete overhaul or just fine-tuning, and whether I needed to adjust the 
interviews’ logistical considerations or my interviewing approach.  The time and labor I 
expended conducting the pretest was a wise investment in my study (Berg, 2001) and in 
the study’s achievement of Lincoln and Guba (1985)’s four “canons of quality” (Marshall 
& Rossman, 1999, p. 191): truth-value, applicability, consistency, and neutrality. 
The four interviews I conducted with my two acquaintances went well.  Each 
interview was long, as had been expected (between 60 and 90 minutes).  They bordered 
on tedious and toward the end of each interview, I did think they began to resemble 
interrogations.  My feelings were confirmed after I listened to the tapes of the four 
interviews.  However, the questions I asked were eliciting the kind of answers they were 
designed to.  I also found that not every question on the protocol needed to be asked 
because many of my acquaintances’ answers spoke to more than one question.   
Interviewing by Telephone 
 
Although only a few studies have compared the relative merits of in-person and 
telephone interviews in academia, the extant studies have found that face-to-face 
qualitative interviews generally are more advantageous (Shuy, 2002).  The advantages of 
face-to-face interviews include better response rates, increased accuracy of responses, 
lower interviewer workload, slower-paced interviews, greater “contextual naturalness,” 
better ability to handle complex issues, responses that are more thoughtful, greater 
likelihood of self-generated answers, and a greater balance of power between the 
interviewer and informant (pp. 541-543).  There are some advantages to telephone 
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interviews (e.g., greater efficiency and standardization of questions) but they appear to be 
limited to survey interview or polling situations. 
Shuy (2002) attributed the increased accuracy of responses to the contextual 
naturalness of a face-to-face situation.  A face-to-face interview “compels more small 
talk, politeness routines, joking, nonverbal communication, and asides” (p. 541).  
However, as I know from my interviewing experiences, it is possible to compel all of 
these things, nonverbal communication excepted, during a telephone interview. 
Among the most significant advantages of conducting interviews face to face is 
that they are conducted in the physical presence of both parties: Informants convey 
meaning through their nonverbal communication behaviors such as facial expressions, 
eye movement, gestures, and body language, meaning otherwise lost in non-face-to-face 
interview situations.  Further, by not “being there” during the actual interview, an 
interviewer may lose additional meaning that could be derived, for example, from the 
informants’ physical environment.  In one of my first interview experiences as a graduate 
student, the informant’s cluttered desk and office reinforced her verbal messages to me.    
Shuy (2002) offered criteria that a researcher could use to decide if in-person or 
telephone interviews are more appropriate for a study.  His criteria included the type of 
interview (i.e., survey or qualitative), the complexity of the issues and questions, and the 
need for contextual naturalness.  A researcher’s final choice will affect the quality and 
type of information gathered in the interviews, Shuy cautioned, so the researcher should 
choose carefully.  Although several of Shuy’s criteria should have encouraged me to 
conduct face-to-face interviews, and despite my knowing the advantages offered by face-
to-face interviews, one of Shuy’s criteria trumped all other considerations: “The 
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economic, time, and location constraints of the project” (p. 539).  At the time of data 
collection (i.e., January through June 2005), I did not reside in Maryland, the area where 
the informants are located.  Thus to collect the data I had to conduct the interviews by 
telephone from my then-home in Mississippi.  In fact, Berg (2001) believed that when a 
researcher faces geographical issues such as this, collecting qualitative data by telephone 
is the logical method.  I grant that telephone interviewing is not an ideal method; but 
given the circumstance, it was the only feasible, reasonable method.  I continue to be 
grateful that my committee acknowledged this to be the case.  I believe that conducting 
my interviews by telephone was an effective way to collect the data.  Further, I do not 
believe that my data are of lesser quality because they were collected by telephone rather 
than in person. 
Ethical Considerations 
 
Ethical issues abound in all forms of research, more obviously in clinical trials for 
a new pharmaceutical product, less obviously in relatively innocuous qualitative 
interviews about people’s experiences of a phenomenon.  Yet ethical issues, regardless of 
their obviousness, do abound and researchers must carefully address them.  For this 
study, I have considered several of the ethical issues discussed in Patton (1990); Fine, 
Weis, Weseen, and Wong (2000); and graduate courses in qualitative methods and 
research design that I took. 
Promises 
 
Patton (1990) cautioned against making promises that cannot be kept.  I did not 
falsely promise anything to my informants, in the form of benefits that might accrue to 
them or to their profession, in exchange for their participation in my study.  I did not 
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deceive them into thinking that this study is anything other than as I presented it in the 
introductory solicitation letters and the Web site I designed about the study.  Although 
this study, as I have discussed in the introduction, does have applied significance, its 
purpose is basic research, to contribute to the body of knowledge in public relations.  Its 
purpose is not action research intended to effect social change (Greenwood & Levin, 
2000).   
I made two promises to my informants that I of course intend to keep.  The first 
promise was that I would send a copy of an executive summary of the study soon after I 
have successfully presented it.  This offer was made in the informed consent form (which 
I will discuss shortly) and again at the end of the interview.  (People whom I turned down 
for interviews will also receive a copy of the executive summary.)  The second promise I 
made was designed to encourage participation in my study and to thank those who did.  I 
promised to enter the names of all informants who complete an interview with me into a 
drawing for a $100 American Express gift card.  Once I have finished the executive 
summary, I will write each informant’s name on a slip of paper, crumple all of the slips, 
and place them in a bowl.  My husband will then draw one slip of paper from the bowl; 
this person is the winner of the gift card.  When I mail the executive summaries, I will 
also notify everyone in the drawing of the results (without revealing the winner’s 
identity) and send the gift card to the winning informant. 
Risks and Confidentiality Considerations 
 
I did not foresee that this study would subject my informants to psychological 
stress, legal liability, ostracism by others for participating in this study, or political 
repercussions (Patton, 1990).  As it turned out, I was right.  However, an informant’s 
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agreement for the interview to be audiotaped may present a minimal risk in that there 
exists the chance, albeit slight, for his or her identity to become known.  An audiotape 
and its corresponding transcript are a trail of evidence that could lead back to the 
informant.  However, as is standard practice, only I have access to the interview 
audiotapes, my interview notes, and transcripts.  
I made two copies of each interview tape and my notes.  I expected that these 
copies would provide me with two layers of protection (and peace of mind) against the 
loss or destruction of the data I have collected.  I had all originals and copies of the data 
in a locked, fireproof filing cabinet in my home office.  However, Hurricane Katrina 
flooded my home on August 29, 2005, with about six feet of brackish water.  I recovered 
all of the tapes but could not salvage them.  I had evacuated with electronic and hard 
copies of the interview transcripts and notes, and these (along with drafts of this 
manuscript) were intact.  As the American Psychological Association recommends, I will 
destroy all of the remaining intact data (i.e., written notes, transcriptions, and the like) 
five years after the completion of my dissertation. 
I assured, indeed promised, my informants that I will do everything in my power 
so their identities will remain confidential.  I was only able to offer them confidentiality; 
because as the informed consent form explained, I will know their identities and thus will 
have the ability to link answers to individual informants.  Anonymity is not possible 
because by participating in this study, informants revealed their identities to me.   
In all work emerging from this study, I revealed neither the identities of 
informants nor their organizations, unless I had received permission to do so.  I did quote 
informants for illustrative purposes as part of the dissertation.  Direct quotations — which 
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offer raw, deep, richly illuminating insight from informants (Patton, 1990) — enhanced 
the “human presence” in the study.  I redacted any information in quotations that might 
have revealed the identity of informants or their organizations.  Further, I attributed 
quotations using non-specific identifying information. 
Informed Consent 
 
Before a person participates in almost any research project, he or she must give 
his or her informed consent to participate.  By giving informed consent, a person 
acknowledges full understanding of what he or she is “getting into” by participating in a 
study.  A person indicates informed consent by reading and signing an “informed consent 
form.”  This form, which the University’s Institutional Review Board requires, clearly 
and honestly describes the study’s purposes and procedures, risks and benefits to 
participants, participants’ rights, and considerations of confidentiality.   Please see 
Appendix B for this form. 
Veracity 
 
Fontana and Frey (2000) said “veracity of the reports made by researchers” was 
another ethical issue for qualitative interviewing: Is a researcher’s rendering of a 
phenomenon “true” to the informants’ experiences of that phenomenon?  Fontana and 
Frey’s concerns about veracity are related to the idea of reflexivity in qualitative research.   
Reflexivity 
 
Qualitative inquiry endeavors to discover subjective knowledge.  The goal is to 
learn of informants’ knowledge of a phenomenon, but to accomplish this researchers 
must be aware of and acknowledge their own “subjective lenses” (Glesne, 1999, p. 176) 
toward that phenomenon — by being reflexive.  To ignore the need to be reflexive is 
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unethical and antithetical to what qualitative research is all about.  When researchers 
“out” themselves in this way, they provide the information that consumers of research 
need to disentangle “the researcher” from the informants’ perspectives of the 
phenomenon under investigation.  Reflexivity also provides consumers of research with 
insight into why a researcher interpreted the informants’ perspectives as he or she did.  
The guiding principle I abide by when conducting qualitative research is this: It is 
not my perspective of a phenomenon that is of ultimate interest; what is of interest are the 
informants’ perspectives of a phenomenon.  I am the research instrument for collecting, 
analyzing, and interpreting the data.  Yet being a qualitative researcher is more than just 
being the flesh-and-blood equivalent of a survey questionnaire.  Being a qualitative 
researcher is about giving “voice” to and making meaning of informants’ experiences and 
perspectives.  If someone were interested in my perspective of a phenomenon, then he or 
she should solicit my participation in a qualitative study.  (In fact, one informant invited 
me to participate in a qualitative study.  I participated in her study in November 2005.) 
Not revealing my subjective lenses with regard to this study would both diminish 
my informants’ contributions and cast doubt on the veracity of the study. Thus, I heed 
Maxwell’s (1996) exhortation that researchers be cognizant of their motivations and the 
implications thereof for the research project.  Awareness is enough because “attempting 
to purge yourself of personal goals and concerns is neither possible nor necessary” (p. 
16).  
First, I have undertaken this research project not because boundary-spanning 
GRPs in 501c organizations are an oppressed people or because shifts in political parties’ 
control of elected offices are eroding the foundations of U.S. democracy.  Although I 
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would like to say that altruism is the driving force behind this research project, I cannot.  
It is driven by self-interest: I undertook this research project because I am pursuing a 
doctorate, which requires the completion of a dissertation that contributes to the theory 
and practice of public relations.   
Second, I voted against Ehrlich in the 2002 gubernatorial election.  Although 
Ehrlich’s election played a role in the development of this study, my views regarding his 
election did not play any role in the execution of the research or the data analysis.  I know 
that if I am to achieve my goal of completing a methodologically sound and veracious 
dissertation, I must compartmentalize my opinions.  I believe that I am a mature-enough 
researcher to know better than to “enter the field with preconceptions that prevent [me] 
from allowed those studied to ‘tell it as they see it’” (Denzin, 1978, p. 10). 
Coder Reliability 
 
When two or more researchers analyze the same qualitative data, they form a 
system of checks and balances.  This system minimizes any one researcher’s “presence” 
in the interpretation of the data and “ensures that naturally arising categories are used 
rather than those a particular researcher might hope to locate —regardless of whether the 
categories really exist” (Berg, 2001, p. 104).  In studies where only one researcher 
analyzes qualitative data, such as with this study, that system of checks and balances does 
not exist.  How can consumers of my study trust my analysis and interpretation of the 
data given my research “monopoly” of the data? 
Consumers can trust me as a researcher, and the veracity of my study, because I 
have been openly reflexive.  I cannot guarantee that my open reflexivity provides the 
equal protections against bias  conscious or otherwise  as would having more than 
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one coder review the data.   Yet I have strived to make readers privy to my subjectivities, 
motivations, and biases as they may relate to this study, in an earlier section.  Further, 
Lincoln and Guba’s (1985)’s four canons of “qualitative confirmation” — truth-value, 
applicability, consistency, and neutrality — guided my analysis and interpretation of the 
data.  Qualitative confirmation (S.I. Miller & Fredericks, 1994) addresses the question of 
“How can we make a case that qualitative data or findings warrant the inferences about 
the topics we are studying?” (McLean, Myers, Smillie, & Vaillancourt, 1997, “Abstract” 
section, para. 1).  Truth-value represents the idea that a depiction of a phenomenon, for 
example, being studied is in fact a faithful or trustworthy depiction of it (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985): Is the depiction credible?  Findings about a phenomenon have credibility if 
those with direct experience of that phenomenon considered a description or 
interpretation of it accurate or reflective of their experience, or that those without direct 
experience could recognize that phenomenon.  
Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) second canon is applicability: Could a study’s 
findings “fit” other contexts?  Could the findings be “transferred” to bring meaning to or 
illuminate other situations?  Applicability does not entail generalizability, however: 
“External validity is never the hallmark of qualitative research.  Rich responses and 
opportunity for fresh discovery are key” (Hon, 1997, p. 9). 
Consistency is the third canon.  If Researcher B discovered similar findings in his 
or her own qualitative study when adhering to the research design and thought processes 
of Researcher A’s earlier study, then A’s study has a high degree of consistency.  The 
consistency of A’s study reinforces its trustworthiness. 
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The final canon is neutrality, the spirit of which is captured by the notion of 
confirmability in qualitative inquiry.  Would others draw the same conclusions as the 
original researcher did when looking at the same qualitative data?  If the answer is 
affirmative, then the original researcher was successful in minimizing his or her own 
biases and subjectivities when drawing conclusions; the study has confirmability. 
Population Sample 
 
Before Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.’s assumption of the governorship of Maryland in 
January 2003, the state’s last Republican governor had been Spiro Agnew.  Agnew took 
office in 1967 but resigned in 1969 to become President Richard M. Nixon’s vice 
president.  They were re-elected in 1972.  Agnew resigned from the vice presidency in 
1973 because of financial improprieties dating to his time as Maryland governor (Crystal, 
1996). 
In the years bookended by the Republicans Agnew and Ehrlich, a succession of 
Democrat governors helmed the state: Marvin Mandel (1969 to 1977), Blair Lee III (1977 
to 1979), Harry Hughes (1979 to 1987), William Donald Schaefer (1987 to 1995), and 
Parris N. Glendening (1995 to 2003) (“Maryland at a Glance,” 2003).  As a long-time 
strongly one-party (meaning Democrat) state (“Two-Party State,” 2003), to say that 
Ehrlich’s election as governor (beating the two-term Democrat Lt. Governor Kathleen 
Kennedy Townsend) “jolted” Maryland’s political environment would not be an 
exaggeration.  As such, Maryland offered a unique, contemporary “laboratory” for 
exploring the implications of low-level cataclysmic change on players in a political 
environment. 
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Maryland’s political environment teems with boundary spanners.  Elected and 
appointed officials, their aides, committee staffers, executive department bureaucrats, and 
for-contract and in-house government relations professionals function as boundary 
spanners, as many others do, in political environments.  The question of “Whom does one 
interview?” (Warren, 2002, p. 87) requires a two-part answer.   
The first part of my answer is that ultimately, I am interested in the individual 
lived experiences of boundary-spanning GRPs at certain “player” organizations.  These 
are organizational members whose work activity involves one or both of the two modes 
of boundary-spanning: information processing and external representation.  I envisaged 
that these are the people, the “informants,” who would participate in this study.  These 
individuals and their work experiences are also the units of analysis for the study.  
Lindlof (1995) and Holstein and Gubrium (1995) suggested this nomenclature (i.e., 
“informants”) for referring to participants in interview-based studies.  Other researchers 
use appellations such as “interviewee” (Gaddis, 2001) and “participant” (L.A. Grunig et 
al., 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 1994).  For Holstein and Gubrium (1995), these 
terminological differences represent more than semantic differences.  To them, the 
differences in terminology represent differences in perspective.  They referred to 
“respondents” as “passive vessels” throughout their book.  Yet Hon (1998) and Warren 
(2002), both experienced qualitative interviewers, used the terms “respondents” and 
“participants,” when surely neither considered the individuals in their studies to be 
“passive vessels.”   Warren viewed these individuals as “meaning makers” (p. 83). 
 However, I chose to follow Lindlof (1995) by referring to the individuals included 
in this study as “informants.”  According to Holstein and Gubrium (1995), the term 
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“informants” has evolved throughout its use in ethnographic studies.  More than merely 
describing or telling researchers about their culture, informants also interpret their culture 
for researchers.  Given both this evolution and the constructivist nature of qualitative 
inquiry, the term “informants” is apropos.  I also believe this term better recognizes these 
individuals’ roles in and contributions to this study than would “interviewee,” 
“participant,” or “respondent.”  
The second part of my answer is that many “player” organizations exist in 
Maryland’s political environment that could have been selected as the study’s population.  
I first compressed this range to nonprofit organizations, specifically 501c(3), 501c(4), and 
501c(6) organizations, operating in Maryland.  These are organizations for which the 
political environment is paramount and whose existences transcend elections and a 
political party’s control of powerful offices.  Although the same points could be made 
about for-profit corporations, their “business” is business and profit.  I am interested in 
501c groups because their “business” is to effect changes in public policy and public 
opinion, either directly or indirectly for what they perceive as the greater good.   
 In a bow to my personal interest in land-use management policy, I had originally 
compressed the range of potential 501c organizations to those with environmental, 
business, or agricultural interests having stakes in the Smart Growth policies championed 
by former Maryland Governor Glendening.  His Smart Growth policies were intended to 
act as a litmus test to determine the affect of these organizations toward the current 
Republican governor’s ascendance to power.  That is, did they view a Republican’s 
ascendance to power as a boon or as a bane?  The point of this is to compare the 
experiences of boundary-spanning GRPs at “boon” and “bane” organizations.  As I 
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discussed earlier in this section, I eventually decompressed the range of 501c 
organizations eligible for my study.  I solicited participation from boundary-spanning 
GRPs at numerous 501(c)3, 501(c)4, and 501(c)6 organizations operating in Maryland on 
a variety of issues and interests.    
I employed a stratified purposeful sampling strategy (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
Such a strategy “illustrates subgroups [and] facilitates comparisons” (p. 28).  My 
rationale for using this sampling strategy reflects that of Dunford and D. Jones (2000).  
Their study included participants who worked for industries that were affected for better 
or for worse by the jolt of “extensive deregulation” (p. 1210).  My study seeks to include 
informants who work for 501c organizations that were affected for better or for worse by 
the jolt of Ehrlich’s election. 
 To determine an initial stratified purposeful sample, I reviewed mass media 
coverage of the former governor’s Smart Growth policies, Web sites of organizations 
surmised to have a stake in the issue, and Web sites about the Smart Growth issue that 
operated independently of any Maryland 501c organization.  My Group 1 sample 
included 63 potential informants at 34 organizations.  I compiled the expanded stratified 
purposeful sample (Group 2) from the membership directory found on the Web site of the 
Maryland Government Relations Association (http://www.mgra.org; Although the list 
was publicly available, I did request and receive permission from MGRA’s president to 
contact its members).  I included only MGRA members employed by 501c organizations.  
I also used the list of registered lobbyists obtained from the Web site of Maryland State 
Ethics Commission (http://ethics.state.gov.md.us) to compile my Group 2 mailing 
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database.  I included in the mailing database only lobbyists who were registered to lobby 
for 501c organizations. 
 A researcher uses a theoretical sampling strategy when he or she “seeks out 
respondents who seem likely to epitomize the analytic criteria in which he or she is 
interested” (Warren, 2002, p. 87).  A stratified purposeful sample, used in this study, is an 
example of this strategy.   
In her dissertation, Hon (1992) interviewed nearly three dozen public relations 
professionals.  Plowman (1995) conducted 23 interviews for his dissertation; more 
recently, Hung (2002) interviewed 40 public relations professionals for her dissertation.  
Despite the range in the number of interviews conducted for each of these University of 
Maryland dissertations, each researcher conducted enough interviews presumably to 
achieve the “informational sufficiency” (Snow, 1980, p. 103) needed to answer their 
research questions.  When a researcher ascertains high levels of “taken for grantedness” 
and “theoretical saturation” in the information elicited through his or her interviews, and 
experiences a “heightened confidence” (p. 104) about that information, informational 
sufficiency has been achieved.    
Warren (2002) noted that there are “norms,” but no strict rules about how many 
interviews should be conducted for a nonethnographic qualitative study.  She did offer 
this helpful guideline: A publishable study should include 20 to 30 interviews.    
As I have previously noted, I estimated that I achieved informational sufficiency 
by about the 25th interview.  However, I continued interviewing, 44 interviews total, 
because the people I was interviewing represented such a variety of 501c organizations 
and interests.  I included 40 of these interviews in my analysis.  I believe capturing so 
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many perspectives, beyond what was sufficient for the study, was a worthwhile 
expenditure of my time.  Non-specific information about each informant’s professional 
background, title, and organization is provided in Appendix G.  I have not included the 
length of time informants have served in their various positions.  Given the unusually 
long tenures of some informants in their jobs, compounded by the “small town” 
atmosphere of Annapolis, someone could easily determine the identities of these 
informants.  Suffice it to say that all of the informants’ tenures pre-date the 2002 
gubernatorial election.  Thus they all are qualified to comment on the effects of the jolt of 
Ehrlich’s election on their work lives.  
I neither transcribed nor included in the analysis interviews with four informants.  
Although their interviews were insightful, none of these informants had worked long 
enough in their current positions (or generally in government relations for or on behalf of 
501c organizations operating in Maryland) to have experienced the jolt of the 2002 
gubernatorial election.   
Data Collection and Management 
 
Interview data that I collected are my interview notes and audiotapes.  Only two 
informants declined to have their interviews audiotaped.  For those two non-audiotaped 
interviews, I took more detailed notes than those taken during audiotaped interviews.   
Audiotaping 
 
Patton (1990) offered this rationale for audiotaping interviews: “It all comes to 
naught if the interviewer fails to capture the actual words of the person being 
interviewed. . .There is no substitute for these data” (p. 347).  My informants’ words are 
my study’s raw data; to not have audiotaped my informants’ words was to risk losing 
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these data.  Without these data, this study would have been toast.  I turned down many 
people willing to participate because they had indicated they did not want their interviews 
audiotaped.  I had the luxury of being able to turn down people for this reason because 
there were so many other people willing to participate and be audiotaped.  I decided to 
interview the two people who did not want to be audiotaped because of the prestige of 
their organizations. 
I found that the most efficacious method for audiotaping telephone interviews was 
to use the speakerphone feature on the telephone and a high-quality audiotape recorder.  
There are devices that allow for direct audiotaping from a telephone into a recording 
device; I have found that these devices are troublesome and unreliable.  My primary 
recording device was a combination recorder/transcription machine.  I also used a 
secondary recording device, a basic audiotape recorder, to audiotape the interviews.  I 
have audiotaped many telephone interviews previous to this study without technical 
problems and did not have any technical difficulties with this study.  Once I confirmed 
the informant’s decision regarding the audiotaping of the interview, I placed him or her 
on speakerphone and then hit the record buttons.  An ancillary benefit of using the 
speakerphone feature is that note-taking was much easier when both of my hands were 
“free” than when one hand was holding the telephone receiver.  
The shortest of the 40 analyzed interviews lasted 42 minutes, the longest 96 
minutes.  The average length of those interviews was 61 minutes.  I spent about 41 hours 
conducting analyzable interviews for this study (61 minutes x 40 interviews ÷ 60
minutes).  I conducted the first interview on January 10, 2005, and the last on June 24, 
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2005.  I conducted two interviews in January, one in February, one in April, 21 in May, 
and 15 in June. 
Preparing the Raw Data 
 
I interviewed 44 people, two of whom declined audiotaping but did grant in 
writing their consent to be interviewed.  For these two informants’ interviews, I took 
copious notes, which I later typed.  I did not transcribe the audiotapes from four 
interviews because the informants had not professionally experienced the 2002 
gubernatorial election.  I transcribed audiotapes from the 38 recorded interviews using a 
transcription machine.  The transcripts were typed, double spaced, and paginated.  I typed 
my handwritten notes from each interview into their corresponding places in the 
interview transcript.   
Wengraf (2001) discussed the “debate” of whether selective or complete 
transcription is better; I know qualitative researchers in the Department of 
Communication at the University of Maryland carry on this debate as well.  All the  
interview transcriptions I had done previous to this study were complete, or verbatim, 
transcription.  In spite of the disadvantages of complete transcription, such as the labor 
intensity and time commitment, I feel more comfortable and confident in managing the 
interview data this way.  Yes, transcribing 38 interviews was an extremely time-
consuming — but worthwhile — process.  I believe that I have a deeper understanding of 
the data having done the transcription myself rather than if I had hired others to help me.   
I preferred to do complete transcription for three reasons.  First, it includes the 
pauses, asides, and my parenthetical interjections about the informants’ tone of voice and 
nonverbal communication, and the like.  This results in a “closer” representation of the 
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actual interview than does selective transcription (Wengraf, 2001).  Second, I would have 
been unsure of what information to selectively transcribe until listening to all of the 
interviews.  Then I would have had to go back and listen to each interview tape again to 
do the selective transcription.  To me, this would have wasted time and seems biased 
toward auditory learners.  I am a visual learner: I need to see the representation of the 
data before I can truly begin analyzing it.  Third, I agree with Patton (1990) that complete 
transcriptions are “the most desirable data to obtain” (p. 349).  Complete transcription, in 
my opinion, better suited my strengths as a researcher and the contingencies of the study.    
Coding, Reducing, and Organizing the Data 
 
I had to code, reduce, and organize 40 interviews’ worth of raw data before I 
could enter the data-transformation stage of the research process.  Here is how I 
originally envisioned the process of coding, “the process of breaking down, examining, 
conceptualizing, and categorizing data” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 61): 
1. I will code the transcripts with an a priori coding scheme. (Some categories will 
be “content specific,” meaning they emerged from the study’s conceptualization 
[Schwandt, 1997]).  Some content-specific categories will represent what 
boundary spanners should be experiencing — according to the extant (mostly 
quantitative) research —  as their organizations experience an environmental jolt 
and subsequent dealings with that changed environment.  Other content-specific 
categories will represent the opposite of what the literature suggests boundary 
spanners should be experiencing.  The “noncontent-specific” categories emerge 
from “common sense reasoning” (Schwandt, 1997, p. 16) about what I could 
expect to find in the data.  These categories should be useful for coding data that 
speak to the perceptions, opinions, and affects of informants.  
 
2. I will re-examine thoroughly the transcripts to let an a posteriori coding scheme 
emerge.  As opposed to the a priori categories that emerge from the study’s 
conceptualization and my reasonable expectations, the “a posteriori context-
sensitive” categories emerge from the transcripts (Schwandt, 1997), the 
informants’ voices themselves in typewritten form.  This is an inductive endeavor.  
I then will code the transcripts using this scheme. 
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Although a posteriori coding is a hallmark of grounded theory, which I am 
not doing for this study, I anticipate that such coding would be useful for two 
reasons: One, I will not be able to, in advance of collecting the data, divine an 
exhaustive list of categories for the data. Two, a posteriori coding allows the 
meanings of coding categories of all varieties to evolve as the data transformation 
process moves forward (Schwandt, 1997).   
 
Below is the true story of how I coded, reduced, and organized 40 interviews-
worth of data into manageable, “Leah-friendly” units: 
 I purchased a large multipack of differently colored highlighter markers.  I then 
typed up a checklist of the five sets of theory questions and printed 40 copies of it.  I 
stapled a checklist to the front cover of the each informant’s folder, which contained the 
transcript, notes, and other information.  I then methodically and repeatedly read through 
the hard copy of each informant’s interview transcript (which included the notes I took 
during the interview) to refamiliarize myself with the data.   
Next, for each theory question, I developed a list of indicators, an a priori coding 
scheme.  These indicators were the kinds of information I knew look for in the transcripts 
that would answer or be relevant to each theory question.  This served to operationalize 
the theory questions’ concepts.  For example, one set of theory questions was “How do 
boundary-spanning GRPs describe the worldviews of their organizations?  How did the 
jolt affect the worldviews of their organizations?”   
I will use this concept to illustrate my coding process.  A worldview is a concept 
difficult, but not impossible, to operationalize, as Babbie (1989) said “prejudice” is.  
Further, the term “worldview” is not a word that most people, such as my informants, use 
in everyday language.  I had to determine what kinds of information would be in the 
transcripts that would make tangible the concept of worldview, information that indicated 
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the presence of some sort of overarching perspective or mindset about an organization’s 
relationship to the environment and how that relationship and the environment “worked.”   
I coded the data that informed the worldview theory question using utterances that 
espoused the values associated with symmetrically and asymmetrically presupposed 
worldviews.  For example, for symmetrical value of responsibility to others, I looked for 
utterances that spoke to the organization’s willingness to interact with other organizations 
and stakeholders and consider their viewpoints.  These utterances focused around the 
organization’s involvement (as accomplished by the informant) in coalitions and whether 
these coalitions were comprised of “strange bedfellows.”  If an informant described being 
involved in these activities, or a willingness to should such opportunities arise, I coded 
that as indicating symmetrical values.  Conversely, if an informant described declining 
such activities or being opposed to organizational involvement in those activities, I coded 
that as indicating asymmetrical values.  I also looked for data that would contextualize 
these codings.  For example, were partisan considerations a factor in their involvement 
(or lack thereof)?   
The symmetrical value of decentralized management (and its asymmetrical 
counterpart of centralized management) would be realized in the data as the participatory 
nature of the organization’s internal decision-making process and an informant’s 
involvement.  I coded these values based on an informant’s description of interactions 
with the organization’s decision-making body and how this body arrived at decisions.  I 
also coded these values based on the informant’s activities and responsibilities within the 
decision-making process, as well as his or her position within the organization.   
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I coded the symmetrical value of autonomy (and its asymmetrical counterpart of 
control) based on the degree of self-management an informant had in the conduct of his 
or her work.  Who did an informant answer to, how frequently, and on what sort of 
matters?   
The coding of utterances related to achieving organizational self-interest and 
engaging in dialogue was tricky.  I coded informants’ utterances related to the desire to 
further organizational self-interest as indicating asymmetrical values.  I coded utterances 
related to engaging in dialogue as indicating symmetrical values.  But informants 
generally spoke of furthering organizational self-interest (an asymmetrical value) through 
engaging in dialogue (a symmetrical value) with critical stakeholders.  That much of 
these data overlapped was evident from the overlap of the two colors I used to code these 
utterances. 
Coding also served to reduce the data, distill them to their essence.  In qualitative 
inquiry, reducing the data is essentially an exercise in “framing” (a concept I discussed in 
Chapter 2), the process by which boundary spanners cull through available information 
and package that selected information for the consumption of other organizational 
members.  Framing involves the selection, neglect, emphasis, or de-emphasis of certain 
information — exactly what data reduction should entail (Wolcott, 1994). 
Next, armed with a colored highlighter marker assigned to that theory question, I 
combed each transcript, guided by my indicators, and underlined or bracketed off all the 
information related to that theory question.  I frequently found that after going through a 
few transcripts that I had to expand my indicators for that theory question, an example of 
a posteriori coding.  I also frequently noticed recurring themes in informants’ answers, 
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such as semantic and metaphor choices, that could not be readily categorized into a 
theory question.  I kept track of these themes, too.   
I eventually reviewed each transcript at least five times, once for each theory 
question.  Some of the transcripts had so many ribbons and brackets of color that they 
resembled Jackson Pollack paintings.  Is using colored highlighter markers a primitive 
way of coding and organizing data?  Perhaps.  Is this an embarrassingly simplistic, even 
juvenile, way to do things at the doctoral dissertation level?  Perhaps.  However, as I have 
mentioned I am a visual learner; so for me this was an appropriate and effective method 
to the madness (or is it madness to the method?) of coding, reducing, and organizing a 
huge amount of data.  I believe my coding process was essentially the same as the coding 
process used by Hon (1992) for her dissertation: “I then assembled the findings by 
grouping individual statements under the research question for which each utterance 
seemed most relevant” (p. 147).  I did what she did: grouped statements into categories. 
Transformation 
 
At this point, I began the “most difficult” and “most creative” phase of the study: 
data analysis (Berg, 2001, p. 102), or as Wolcott (1994) equivalently called it, 
“transformation.”  I did not rely on qualitative data analysis software (e.g., Atlas, NVivo, 
or The Ethnograph) during this phase.  I am a bit of a Luddite in many aspects of my life, 
including that of being an analyst and interpreter of qualitative data.  I am confident in 
relying on the capabilities of Microsoft Word and Excel to help my qualitative data 
“crunching” because of my familiarity with these programs and their intuitive simplicity.  
Instead, I relied on “index sheets” (Berg, 2001).   
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For each theory question, I copied and pasted all the color-coded data from the 
transcripts into one document.  All the data relevant to that theory question, categorized 
by informant, was contained in one document, rather than being spread across 40 
transcripts.  Data that were highlighted by multiple colors in the transcripts indicated that 
they informed more than one theory question.  I compiled index sheets for these data as 
well, which was useful for exploring connections among the topics of the theory 
questions (such as perceptions of the jolt and legitimacy).  These index sheets were 
printed on legal-sized paper, thus leaving me with a wide column to jot down my notes 
and thoughts during the transformation phase.  I needed every last bit of blank space in 
those wide columns and in the margins of the index sheets.   
Data transformation is the metamorphic process by which qualitative researchers 
turn the raw materials they have collected — data — into a finished product to be 
consumed by other researchers and interested parties.   Cooking offers a useful analogy: 
A chef would not serve the ingredients of a cake — flour, sugar, and eggs — to guests.  A 
chef serves his or her guests the actual cake — the transformed flour, sugar, and eggs.  
The chef transforms by mixing, baking, and decorating, whereas the qualitative 
researcher transforms through the description, analysis, and interpretation (Wolcott, 
1994).  During this phase, I embarked on a macroanalytical and speculative endeavor, 
“transcend[ing] factual data and cautious data and begin[ning] to probe into what is to be 
made of them” (Wolcott, 1994, p. 36).   
Description answers a study’s basic “what” questions (Wolcott, 1994; Patton, 
1990).  Description offers a depiction of a something — a phenomenon, event, or 
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experience — as informants impart it to the researcher.  The researcher’s role vis-à-vis 
this information is as a messenger, not as an interpreter or pundit.   
Many researchers present these answers using “thick description” (Geertz, 
1973b), a concept of which Geertz’s (1973a) richly detailed observation of a cockfight in 
Bali is an exemplar.  Patton (1990) advocated using thick description, noting that it helps 
readers make their own sense of answers.  I am reminded here of Fox News’ sometimes-
questionable claim qua slogan: “We report, you decide.”  
Wolcott (1994) was less enamored of the use of thick description, worrying that 
thick description would lead to an unnecessary level of detail because “there is no 
consensus on what exactly constitutes ‘thick description’” (p. 14).  Researchers in the 
description phase of data transformation should be concerned with the “development of 
the narrative or presentational account” (p. 17); they need to tell stories, stories that must 
be told well.   
With interpretation, the responsibility for “explaining the findings. . .attaching 
significance to particular results, and putting patterns into an analytic framework” 
(Patton, 1990, p. 375) falls to the researcher, not the consumer.  Wolcott (1994) 
differentiated “analysis” from “interpretation.”  Analysis answers the “why” questions 
whereas interpretation answers the “but what does it all mean” and “so what” questions.  
Wolcott did not use the term “analysis” in its broad, common meaning in qualitative 
research; he reserved the term “transformation” for that.  Analysis, as Wolcott meant it, is 
“the systematic procedures followed in order to identify essential features and 
relationships” (p. 24) in the data.  He suggested several plans-of-attack for reaching 
"analytical affirmability" (p. 24), including identifying patterns and themes in the data; 
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doing comparisons; and “crunching” the data by, for example, content analysis or 
discourse analysis.   
Chapter 4 contains the results of my description and analysis efforts.  I let the 
informants tell their stories, to an extent letting consumers make their own sense of 
informants’ lived experiences.  But I also analyze their experiences and provide 
theoretical context by relating their experiences back to the conceptual framework of 
Chapter 2.  In Chapter 5, I analyze my analysis from Chapter 4 and interpret the results of 
that “deeper” analysis.  In doing so, I explain and derive theoretical and applied 
significance from informants’ experiences. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
There are no facts, only interpretations. 
 Friedrich Nietzsche (1887), German philosopher 
This chapter describes and analyzes the data collected from the interviews to 
answer the study’s first central research question (In what ways have the jolt and 
subsequent changes in the political environment in Maryland affected boundary-spanning 
GRPs and the work they do?).  As the researcher, I obviously have taken an active role in 
reducing and classifying these data.  To help ensure that the informants are speaking for 
themselves — and to minimize my voice — I have included many verbatim utterances.  
This study is, after all, designed to capture informants’ individual lived experiences of 
being boundary-spanning government relations professionals (GRPs) for organizations 
negotiating a jolt in the political environment and, for lack of a better term, its 
aftershocks.   
Given the number (40) of informants included in this study, I believe that 
assigning a unique identifying number or pseudonym to each of them would be 
confusing.  Rather, I attribute utterances to in-house GRP informants with generic forms 
of their real job titles and which type of 501c organization they work for.  Utterances of 
informants who are for-contract GRPs are attributed as such.  I opted not to use 
informants’ real job titles because many of them were specific-sounding enough to 
potentially reveal the identities of informants or their organizations (or clients) or both.  I 
have tried to provide at least one utterance from each informant per theory question.  I 
was careful to not rely too heavily on the utterances from only a handful of informants in 
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my analysis.  Appendix G provides more information about informants and their 
organizations (albeit non-specific information, to guard against potential identification). 
Another clarification is necessary: In-house GRPs work for organizations whereas 
for-contract GRPs work for clients.  Rather than repeatedly making this distinction 
throughout the text, phrases such as  “informants and their organizations” should be 
understood as “informants and their organizations and clients.”    
And a final clarification before turning to the results of the theory questions: 
Although it is unusual to quantify trends in a qualitative study, I do so here to 
demonstrate the results of my purposeful stratified sampling strategy.  My goal for this 
strategy was to secure participation from some informants with varied perceptions of 
Ehrlich’s election.  Did they perceive the election of a Republican governor as a positive 
or negative event?  Would the loss of a Democrat in the governor’s office be perceived as 
positive or negative from an organizational point of view?  Were they and their fellow 
organizational members excited, disappointed, nonplussed, hopeful, or indifferent to the 
prospect of an incoming Republican administration?  Including both negative- and 
positive-minded informants in the analysis helped me highlight and contextualize 
differences in the data (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  As serendipity would have it, of the 
40 informants, 17 perceived Ehrlich’s election to be a boon to their organizations and 17 
perceived it to be a bane.  Six informants expressed neutral feelings toward Ehrlich’s 
election as it related to their organizations.  Further theoretical explanation of my boon-
bane-neutral assessments are provided in the results for Theory Question 1.  Readers will 
see that I apply these characterizations to informants throughout this chapter to put their 
perceptions and utterances into appropriate context. 
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Theory Question 1: Perceptions of the Jolt and How It Affected Annapolis 
TQ1a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their organizations’  
perceptions of the jolt? 
There was a balance between informants who perceived Ehrlich’s election as  
a boon for their organizations and those who perceived it as a bane.  Their  
perceptions predominantly were based on implicit associations about the  
relative “friendliness” of political parties toward their organizations’  
interests and issues. 
TQ1b: How did the jolt affect organizations’ perceptions of their political  
environment?  
 
The jolt ratcheted up the existing dynamism and complexity in the relatively stable 
Annapolitan political environment so that Annapolis became a turbulent field rife 
with uncertainty.  Informants perceived politics as an asymmetrical game of 
competition. 
In November 2002, the outcome of the Maryland gubernatorial election jolted the 
state’s political environment.  Republican congressman Robert H. Ehrlich, Jr. beat 
Democrat Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, the two-term lieutenant governor under 
Glendening.  Congressman Ehrlich became Governor Ehrlich in January 2003; he is the 
state’s first Republican governor since Spiro Agnew in 1969.  I provided details about 
this jolt in a section (“The ‘Jolted’ Political Environment in Maryland”) of Chapter 1. 
However, in the course of conducting and analyzing the interviews, I realized my 
Chapter 1 “backgrounder” on the jolt was inadequate.  There was way more going on in 
Annapolis related to Ehrlich’s election than I had committed to paper.  I realized the 
necessity of having informants explain what was really going on in Annapolis, from a 
first-hand (first-perceived?) perspective, beyond what I already had described.  It is the 
only way to provide thorough, “accurate” context for the informants’ individual lived 
experiences of working in Annapolis before, during, and after the jolt as well as for 
understanding the results of the other theory questions (in this chapter) and their 
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implications (as presented in “Chapter 5: Discussion”).  Thus, this section contains much 
in-depth atheoretical background information about the jolt.  I have related this 
information back to the conceptual framework from Chapter 2 that corresponds to this 
theory question (“Organizational Environments”). 
I tried and rejected numerous organizational structures for this section before 
deciding to bundle the findings for theory questions 1a and 1b.  I believe that this 
structure optimizes the section’s readability while minimizing redundancy. 
Dimensions of the Environment 
Organizational environments vary along two main dimensions.  The first 
dimension is the static-dynamic dimension, which describes “the degree to which 
environmental factors remain basically the same over time or are in a process of continual 
change” (Duncan, 1972, p. 36).  Lauzen and Dozier (1992) translated this dimension to a 
public relations context: It is “the degree to which attitudes, behaviors, and membership 
of key publics change over a specified period of time” (p. 211).  The second is the 
simple-complex dimension, which is “the number and variety of environmental factors 
that organizations must consider in decision-making” (Rose, 1985, p. 323).  Within a 
public relations context, this dimension becomes “the range of publics that are of interest 
or concern to the organization” (Lauzen & Dozier, 1992, p. 211).   
Increased Dynamism and Complexity 
 
Based on my analysis, I believe that had the informants — boon, bane, and 
neutral — used this theoretical language, they would have described the pre-jolt 
environment as dynamic-complex.  One would be hard-pressed to find any political 
environment in the United States that is anything less than dynamic-complex.  If nothing 
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else, regular election cycles cause enough continual change to keep these environments in 
a state of flux.   
However, in so far as a political environment could ever be simple-static, the pre-
jolt environment in Annapolis was simple-static compared with the dynamism and 
complexity of the post-jolt political environment in Annapolis.   There was a high degree 
of change in the attitudes, behaviors, and membership of political stakeholders — 
dynamism — during the jolt’s timeframe.  The jolt also expanded the range of political 
stakeholders of interest and concern to the informants’ 501c organization.  This 
dramatically increased the complexity in the Annapolitan political environment. 
Ehrlich’s election wrought a political environment that became, as a for-contract 
GRP put it, “more partisan, more acrimonious, more confrontational” since Ehrlich’s 
election than in earlier years.  That partisanship escalated throughout his term.  This 
assessment was universally held by the informants, regardless of whether they perceived 
the jolt as a boon, bane, or neutrally. 
Informants portrayed Annapolis’s political environment before Ehrlich as a 
friendly place where the political divide was not so personal, public, and seemingly 
intractable as it is now (notwithstanding the infamous years-long feud between former 
Democrat governor and current state comptroller, William “Donald” Schaefer, and 
Glendening).  One for-contract GRP reminisced: “I do know that you had personality and 
policy conflicts in the past that were every bit as bitter.  But they managed to get beyond 
them.” 
Annapolis, since Ehrlich’s election, has evolved (perhaps “devolved” is more 
apropos, depending on one’s point of view) to be like Capitol Hill. . .and informants did 
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not mean that as a compliment.  Many informants echoed one for-contract GRP’s 
sentiment about the partisanship in Annapolis: It “is just as nasty as anything that’s going 
on over on Capitol Hill.  And we’ve never had to experience that here.”  Several of them 
wondered if Ehrlich, who had come to Congress during the 1994 mid-term election cycle 
that put the Republicans in charge of both chambers, had brought what an in-house GRP 
for a 501c(6) organization called, “cut-throat Capitol Hill politics to Annapolis.”  The 
department director of another 501c(6) organization, who neutrally viewed Ehrlich’s 
election, said of him: Ehrlich has a “streak of partisanship a mile long.  If you’re on the 
wrong side of the aisle, you won’t get anything from him. . .He’s very aware of what’s 
going on politically with any organization he’s working with.”  
From these comments readers can begin to get a flavor of the Annapolitan 
political environment: 
• An executive director of a 501c(6) organization: “There’s all this backbiting and it 
has become just an ugly, ugly place.” 
 
• A for-contract GRP: “The problem is there is too much testosterone in Annapolis 
right now.  There’s just too much marking turf.”   
 
• A for-contract GRP: “It just gets petty.  You don’t see the Democrats hanging out 
with the Republicans late night at the bar on Monday night after session, not like 
they used to.  They go to different places.  There’s not a real camaraderie 
anymore.” 
 
• A department director for a 501c(6) organization: “It’s gotten fairly nasty.  The 
Republicans and Democrats alike have gotten difficult to deal with and the way 
they interact with each other and the governor’s office has been pretty shrill, 
pretty belligerent.  Republicans have been shrill and belligerent; Democrats have 
been shrill and belligerent.” 
 
• The department director of a 501c(6) organization: “It’s gotten to be partisan.  
Each side has what I call, ‘They got their wolf up.’  They went from being a 
puppy to being a wolf!  So they’ve got their big bark up.” 
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What could have happened to the town where, as the assistant executive director 
of a 501c(6) organization recalled, a member of the Republican leadership and the 
Democrat chair of a powerful committee once happily “time shared” a staffer?  Over the 
next few pages, as informants describe what has happened to the political environment of 
Annapolis, I provide theoretical context. 
“The Ground Itself Is in Motion” 
 
But labeling the post-jolt political environment in Annapolis as dynamic-complex 
does not do justice to informants’ descriptions of what Annapolis has become.  Post-jolt 
Annapolis, as informants described it to me, qualifies as a “turbulent field.”  The amounts 
of dynamism and complexity in the environment are so high — the environment is so 
jolted — that “the ground itself is in motion” (Emery & Trist, 1965, p. 26).  A turbulent 
field is characterized by increased competition between increased numbers of 
organizations and stakeholders in the environment.   This means more factors must be 
included in an organization’s political calculus than in a non-turbulent field (e.g., a 
simple-static environment).  This turbulent field is the most challenging type of 
environment.  The turbulent field of Annapolis challenged informants because they were 
the organizational boundary spanners responsible for the “communication function of 
management through which organizations adapt, alter, or maintain their [political] 
environment for the purpose of achieving organizational goals” (Long & Hazleton, 1987, 
p. 6). 
The dynamism and complexity in post-jolt Annapolis, which are to such levels 
that “the ground itself is in motion,” cannot be attributed solely to the jolt.  This is 
contrary to my working assumption as I began this study.  Yes, Ehrlich’s election was the 
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genesis of the partisanship, informants told me.  But it is insufficient for explaining the 
devolution of Annapolis into the maelstrom of partisanship it has become.  Indeed, one 
for-contract GRP noted, “Don’t think that the level of conflict that you have had over the 
past three years was the inevitable outcome of a Republican being elected.”     
Annapolis is a turbulent field not just because a Republican governor was elected 
after so many years of Democrat governors.  It is because of personalities.  It is because 
of the difficulties of sharing power (for Democrats) and elation at finally having some 
power in the state government (for Republicans).  It is because of  efforts to recapture 
(for Democrats) or retain (for Republicans) the governorship in 2006.  It is because of the 
manipulation of issues and the budget process to the advantage of one’s political party 
and to the detriment of one’s political opponent.  These are just some of the factors that 
challenge informants and that require informants and their organizations to account for 
them in their decision-making and actions. 
Ehrlich’s election unleashed unprecedented environmental complexity, in terms 
of “the range of publics that are of interest or concern to the organization” (Lauzen & 
Dozier, 1992, p. 6).  It also affected the “membership of key publics” (p. 6), which is a 
factor in environmental dynamism.  Informants said that it is no longer just Democrats 
who matter in the political calculus; everyone matters.  Whereas previously informants 
may have bypassed engaging with Republican lawmakers, because of political trends 
over the past few years coupled with Ehrlich’s election, they no longer can afford to do 
so.  Although Maryland remains an overwhelmingly Democrat (i.e., blue) state, over the 
years Western Maryland and the Eastern Shore have been trending red (i.e., Republican).  
Republicans have been defeating the conservative (in terms of fiscal and even social 
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matters) Democrats from these areas, thus allowing the Republican Party to make inroads 
in the General Assembly.  The heavily populated areas in Maryland, such as Prince 
George’s and Montgomery counties, and Baltimore City, remain deeply blue.  These red 
inroads have encouraged Republicans in the blue General Assembly.  As the president of 
a 501c(6) organization noted, “They finally have a voice in state government.”  The 
election of Ehrlich emboldened them even more, as the department director of another 
501c(6) organization explained: 
Republicans clearly believe that their star is in the ascendancy, that they’re  
going to continue to build their numbers in the General Assembly, that they’re  
going to hold the governor’s office in 2006, that their fortunes have reversed.  
They don’t think that the Ehrlich administration’s election in 2002 was an  
aberration.  They think it’s the beginning of a trend. . .That’s what they think  
and that’s how they act these days. 
Since Ehrlich’s election, as the department director of a 501c(6) organization 
explained: “The difference now in the playing field is that they’re all players, every one 
of them is a player.  And you’ve got to analyze so many more pieces of the chess game.”  
So there are Democrat and Republican chess pieces on the turbulent “chessboard.” 
Dynamism is also a factor of  the “degree to which attitudes [and] behaviors of 
key publics change over a specified period of time” (Lauzen & Dozier, 1992, p. 6). 
Informants cited an embittered Democrat Party, which is hungry to reclaim the 
governorship in 2006, as contributing to the turbulent chessboard of Annapolis.  The 
Democrats have experienced great difficulty with, one, accepting that their party lost the 
governorship, and, two, that this entails sharing power with Republicans.  The department 
director of a 501c(6) organization recounted attending a Democrat fundraiser a couple of 
years ago and the impression the Democrats’ rhetoric left on him: “And the rhetoric was, 
the Democrats look at this state as theirs.  It was almost proprietary.  They were very 
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offended that they lost when they felt that they shouldn’t have lost.”  Democrats no 
longer call all of the shots, as the president of a 501c(6) organization noted.   
However, no informants expressed any surprise at the outcome of the  
election. . .disappointment or anticipation, perhaps, but never surprise.  As politically 
savvy insiders, privy to the campaigns’ internal poll results, gossip, and unconventional 
wisdom, even informants working for organizations that officially endorsed Kathleen 
Kennedy Townsend were not surprised when she lost the 2002 gubernatorial election.  
The conventional wisdom, as voiced by the executive director of a 501c(6) organization, 
had been it was her election to lose:  “She’s got it.  We’re a state that’s always elected 
Democrats; she’s a Kennedy!”  Around Annapolis, although people considered her a nice 
person, they did not regard her as a particularly effective lieutenant governor or strong 
campaigner.  This informant continued, “I think the Democrats realize now, many of us 
realized it years ago or when the 2002 election was going on that they had the weakest 
candidate ever and that there was no way she was gonna win.”  Some Democrat-leaning 
informants believed that in a strange way this thinking probably helps their party 
rationalize the 2002 loss and gives them hope of reclaiming the governorship in 2006. 
 However, to reclaim the governorship in 2006, Democrats also want to make sure 
that Ehrlich does not have a strong record to run on, further compounding the turbulence 
on the chessboard.  As a for-contract GRP observed: “They couldn’t get used to the fact 
that the governor wasn’t a Democrat anymore. . . So they’ve set out on a four-year plan 
that [Ehrlich] must fail to make sure the next governor will be one of theirs.”  The 
executive director of a 501c(6) organization added, “They will do anything and 
everything to put this governor on the spot and make him veto anything and everything 
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that is ‘feel good.’”  The Democrats are trying hard to checkmate Ehrlich’s “king”; they 
want that Republican piece off the chessboard and replaced with a Democrat king. 
This attitude is manifested in numerous ways in Annapolis.  Many informants 
observed that the General Assembly passes legislation designed to publicly and 
politically embarrass the governor, to put him in the political hot seat, and to prevent him 
from getting a “win.”  The committee chair of a 501c(4) organization said, “Democrats 
are raising issues knowing that they aren’t really going to change policy but it might 
make a good headline when the governor says something bad about this thing that’s 
popular.”  He said this is reciprocal: “Republicans are raising issues because they know it 
will be uncomfortable for the Democratic leadership to reject them.”   
Evidence of “rally ‘round the party” also is found in the changing role of the party 
caucuses in the General Assembly.  Informants noted that in the pre-Ehrlich era, the party 
caucuses met infrequently and were largely ceremonial.  Now the caucuses meet much 
more frequently and on the Democrat side even are involved in “telling the [committee] 
chairmen what to do,” according to the president of a 501c(6) organization.  Committee 
chairs traditionally have had a tremendous degree of autonomy.  Whereas informants 
previously once may have overlooked engaging with party caucuses, they have become 
“environmental factors that organizations must consider in decision-making” (Rose, 
1985, p. 323).  Ehrlich’s election put party caucuses on the chessboard.  On an 
organizational level, this served to increase the range of relevant stakeholders that an 
organization needed to factor into its political calculus.  On an environmental level, this 
served to increase the complexity in the political environment, as per Lauzen and 
Dozier’s (1992) simple-complex dimension.     
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So, too, do a breed of activist groups new to Maryland.  According to the 
president of a 501c(6) organization: “Ehrlich’s election spawned these progressive 
advocacy groups. . .These groups can only survive where there are Republicans.  But now 
Maryland’s a competitive state and they really thrive as being anti-Republican.  They’re 
something new we’ve had to deal with.”  They merit their own pieces on the chessboard, 
further exacerbating its turbulence. 
Since Ehrlich’s election, the political environment of Annapolis has become 
crowded with more stakeholders and competing organizations; it is more complex.  Since 
Ehrlich’s election, the attitudes and behaviors of stakeholders and others have changed, 
making the environment more dynamic.  The changes in the dynamism and complexity of 
this political environment have effected a fundamental change in the “personality” of 
Annapolis.  After all, a jolt “transforms fundamental properties of states of the system” 
(A.D. Meyer et al., 1990, p. 94).  Before Ehrlich, Democrats and Republicans were 
engaged in a friendly “gentlemen’s” game of chess.  Since Ehrlich, they have been 
engaged in an unfriendly, zero-sum game of chess, as the informants illustrated.  All 
agreed this turbulent field, this turbulent chessboard, has presented many challenges for 
them as boundary-spanning GRPs.  Even those who perceived the jolt as a boon for their 
organizations expressed this.  One for-contract GRP observed: “The function of what we 
do as lobbyists has had to grow because of all the complexity and competition there is 
here now.  The marketplace of ideas in Annapolis has expanded.”  And all informants 
agreed, most with disappointment and frustration, that politics in Annapolis likely would 
never again be a friendly game of chess.  As the department director of another 501c(6) 
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organization lamented: “Once that partisanship exists, I’m not sure if you could ever get 
rid of it.  The genie is out of the bottle.”   
Interorganizational Networks 
 Stakeholders, which comprise an organization’s environment, are linked to each 
other and the organization to form an interorganizational network (Hatch, 1997).  But 
stakeholders and organizations are comprised of people who function as the links 
between them in the network.  Information flows among these boundary spanners (Hatch, 
1997), information organizations need to make strategic and appropriate decisions about 
how to communicate and act (Aldrich, 1979; Terreberry, 1968).  I offered the possibility, 
in Chapter 2, that because stakeholders and organizations are comprised of people, the 
flow of information among them should be looked at as occurring though an 
“interindividual” network rather than an interorganizational network, as if the network 
were a social circle.   
Although there are advantages to applying an interindividual perspective to 
interorganizational networks, doing so is fraught with the challenges posed by 
relationships among human beings.  Those relationships represent “the highest level of 
systems complexity” (Bivins, 1992, p. 366; Borden [1985], as cited in Bivins, 1992), as 
became evident when I followed informants’ suggestions to look at the relationships 
among the three major players in the state government (i.e., the governor, speaker of the 
House of Delegates, and president of the Senate).   
But informants did not mean the institutions; they meant the people: Ehrlich, 
Michael E. Busch, and Thomas V. “Mike” Miller, Jr., respectively.  The department 
director of a 501c(6) organization noted about the jolted environment of Annapolis: “It’s 
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not just about partisanship; it’s also about the personality and the DNA of the big players.  
Unless you get to know these three guys, it’s hard to really get a feel for what’s 
happening here.”    
I have already introduced Ehrlich; this is an opportune time to introduce the other 
“two guys,” Busch and Miller.  Busch became speaker of the House of Delegates in 2003, 
after 16 years in the House.  He presides over a chamber with 98 Democrats and 43 
Republicans.  He was elected speaker after the former speaker, Casper R. Taylor, Jr., the 
House’s presiding officer throughout the Glendening administration, was narrowly 
defeated in 2002. 
Miller has presided over the Senate since 1987.  He was elected to the House of 
Delegates in 1971 and his constituents promoted him to the Senate in 1975.  No other 
Maryland Senate president has served longer; he is the longest-serving Senate president 
in the country (Maryland Democratic Party, 2005).  The Democrat Party overwhelmingly 
dominates the Senate, as in the House: 33 Democrats to 14 Republicans. 
These three politicians are mutual stakeholders as well as stakeholders of the 
informants and their organizations.  They are all members of the same expansive social 
circle.  The relationship among these three politicians is complicated, as the informants 
illustrated, and that has compounded the initial jolt of Ehrlich’s election.  Their 
relationship illustrates the effect that dysfunction in the interindividual network can have.  
Information flowed between these individuals (and their staff members); but flowing 
information does not mean necessarily that a dialogue is occurring or that conflicts are 
being resolved.  Information exchange does not lead always to information processing. 
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According to several informants, Miller and Busch, in spite of their shared party 
affiliation, do not share a relationship nearly so positive as Miller and Taylor (the former 
speaker) did.  The assistant executive director of a 501c(6) organization vividly called the 
relationship between the presiding officers a “bloodletting”: “Mike Busch and Mike 
Miller are always at each other’s throats.”  Ehrlich and Miller did not start off positively 
in 2003 when the Senate refused to confirm Lynn Buehle, the governor’s nominee for 
secretary of the Maryland Department of the Environment.  By all accounts, this was 
unheard of: The confirmation processes of cabinet secretaries are normally considered 
formalities.  Informants who mentioned this, including one for-contract GRP, roundly 
perceived it as a “slap in the face on Day 1” from Miller to Ehrlich.   
The issue of legalizing slot machines in Maryland has strained the relationship 
between Ehrlich and Busch.  Ehrlich campaigned on the idea of allowing slots in 
Maryland as a means to raise state revenues without having to raise taxes.  Ehrlich was 
elected during a major budget crisis in the state.  To compound this budget crisis, in the 
last legislative session of his administration (2002), Glendening and the General 
Assembly agreed to a plan that mandated increased funding for public education in the 
state.  But the Thornton Commission’s educational funding plan did not provide a 
mechanism for the state to raise funds to do so.  The state had effectively imposed an 
unfunded mandate on itself and did so in the middle of a budget crisis.   
Ehrlich came into office and inherited both a worsening budget crisis and a 
mandate to implement the unfunded Thornton Commission plan.  Ehrlich has steadfastly 
refused to entertain anything but slots to increase state revenues.  The department director 
of a 501c(6) organization believed that, “The whole budgetary crisis and the slots issue, 
168
actually they’re one and the same quite frankly.”  As much as Ehrlich advocates allowing 
slots in the state, Busch opposes them.  So they have been split over slots, as well as 
several other issues.  As one for-contract GRP described the split: “They are at a 
stalemate [on slots] and they have beat each other about the head until they’re woozy.”  
Slots even affected the work of informants whose organizations had nothing to do 
with slots, thus even adding yet another factor in the political calculus of “bystander” 
organizations.  The department director of a 501c(6) organization said slots “spills over 
into other things and they become more partisan when they really shouldn’t be.”  Several 
informants intimated that if it were a Democrat governor who wanted slots (Glendening 
was anti-slots), Marylanders already would be pulling the levers of one-armed bandits all 
over the state. 
Ehrlich, Busch, and Miller, as mutual stakeholders, are interdependent.  As much 
as they might not like it, they have to engage with each other (if nothing else, to fully 
discharge their responsibilities as elected leaders of the state).  Their rapport may barely 
rise to the level of civility (as Ehrlich charged in his 2005 State of the State address 
[Mosk, 2005]).  They are individuals linked in an interorganizational network and a 
social circle.  They cannot not communicate.  Unfortunately, the content and flow of their 
communication are marked by dysfunction.  Because these mutual stakeholders are 
stakeholders of my informants’ organizations, their dysfunction permeates the political 




The natural tensions between 501c organizations and governments make political 
environments inherently uncertain (DeHoog & Racanska, 2003).  Uncertainty is a 
function of the available quantity of quality information (Sutcliffe, 2001).  In a political 
context, for example, this is a function of a 501c organization’s ability to obtain sufficient 
high-quality information from political stakeholders about a policy issue.  Lacking such 
information, boundary-spanning GRPs may have difficulty gauging the stakes of that 
issue and the odds of success or failure of organizational plans vis-à-vis that issue.  
Abounding uncertainty prompts these organizations to engage with political stakeholders 
through their boundary-spanning GRPs to reduce the uncertainty.  This is the strategic-
reduction-of-uncertainty approach (M. Taylor et al., 2003).   
Political environments are rife with uncertainty; a political environment like 
Annapolis that is a turbulent field is even more uncertain.  But as Hatch (1997) reminded, 
“Environments do not feel uncertain; people do” (p. 89).  The people in my study, the 
informants, felt uncertain about Ehrlich aides who were new to Annapolis and thus did 
not belong to the informants’ social circles.  They felt uncertain along Lauzen and 
Dozier’s (1992) simple-complex dimension.  Informants also felt uncertain because the 
partisanship in the first-time-in-a-generation two-party government made things 
unpredictable and volatile.  They felt uncertain along Lauzen and Dozier’s (1992) static-
dynamic dimension.  “Expect the unexpected” could have been the professional motto for 
any one of my study’s informants. 
170
Uncertainty, Dysfunctional Communication, and Social Circles 
 
The Ehrlich administration brought tremendous personnel changes throughout 
executive-branch departments and agencies (these changes, as mentioned earlier, are 
being investigated by the state).  This compounded environmental complexity because of 
the changes in “membership of key publics” (Lauzen & Dozier, 1992, p. 6).  Because the 
Democrats had been dominant for so long, many of the new people were unknown 
entities to the Annapolis community of GRPs.  They thought: “Who are these new 
people?  What do they know about their subject area and the Annapolis ‘system?’  Can 
we work with them?  What policy changes will they try to effect that will affect my 
organization?”  The GRP community was faced with the uncertainty that comes with 
making the transition from an administration of the dominant political party to one of a 
minority party that had been out of power for decades.   
Dynamism may be a factor of the complexity in the environment. The staff factor 
exacerbated the partisan environment of Annapolis.  Informants pointed to Ehrlich’s staff 
as a major contributing factor in the changed atmosphere of Annapolis pre- and post-
Ehrlich’s election.  All of these informants — boon, bane, and neutral, and regardless of 
what they thought of Glendening — gave his legislative and senior staffs high marks.  A 
department director for a 501c(6) organization (a boon informant) called Glendening’s 
legislative staff “phenomenal.”  The president of a 501c(6) organization summed up 
informants’ compliments: “Glendening had a very competent, very strong and responsive 
staff, senior staff in particular.”  Ehrlich’s legislative team uniformly received low marks.  
The department director for a 501c(6) organization assessed the Ehrlich staff situation: 
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“I’m hoping that other people have pointed this out to you because a lot of us talk about it 
down here.  There is a piece missing administratively.”   
My analysis revealed that informants believed the “missing piece” was one or a 
combination of the following: that there was only a thin pool of Republican staff talent in 
a heavily Democrat state, that his staff people were not effective cultural interpreters, and 
they had a penchant for being closed-lipped.  I discuss each of these in turn below. 
The Democrats had controlled the executive branch of Maryland for more than a 
generation.  Thus Democrat governors had a wide, deep talent pool from which to pick 
staff.  Many people in this Democrat pool had been preparing to work on the Second 
Floor — the Annapolitan slang for the governor’s office (located on the second floor of 
the State House) — throughout their careers.  They had risen through the ranks.  The 
result was, according to the president of a 501c(6) organization, “The folks in the 
Glendening administration were deeper in their field, more expert, more substantive.”   
When Ehrlich came into office, he did not have a similar talent pool of Republicans with 
executive-level experience or credentials.  Without a significant Republican talent pool in 
Annapolis, the Republican governor-elect was forced to look elsewhere for talented 
people. 
Ehrlich turned to the familiar: the Judiciary Committee in the House of Delegates, 
his committee when he was a delegate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and Congress, 
where he had served since 1994.  Three senior members of the governor’s Legislative and 
Policy Office (LPO) served on or for the Judiciary Committee.  According to several 
informants, the Judiciary Committee’s approach to legislation is different than other 
committees.  It frequently focuses on killing, not passing, bills.  The senior vice-president 
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of a 501c(6) organization said, “The committee is always in the mode of saying ‘no.’”  
As such, people affiliated with this committee are not trained to go out, sell issues, and 
develop good public policy.  Rather, the culture of this committee is such that people are 
trained, as the informant characterized it, to “nitpick and find problems.”  The vice 
president of a 501c(6) organization said: “It’s a very different skill set.  They don’t have 
the skills needed to get things passed.”   
Informants differentiated between knowing people and the ins-and-outs of 
Annapolis and being an effective lobbyist, which is essentially what LPO staff members 
should be.  A for-contract GRP elaborated: “Just because you understand what’s going on 
in the legislature doesn’t make you a lobbyist.  There are skills that lobbyists bring to the 
job.”  He listed some of these skills: “You’ve got to get into people’s heads and get them 
to trust you.  You’ve got to make arguments and convince people to vote for things that 
sometimes they don’t want to.  You’ve got to find their soft spots.” 
Ehrlich also tapped people from Capitol Hill to work on the Second Floor in his 
LPO.  Informants traced a panoply of problems to his Hill people.  These aides were 
almost exclusively not members of informants’ social circles; they were outsiders.  Social 
circles represent opportunities for the sharing and exchange of critical information that 
reduces uncertainty and that facilitates organizational decision-making (Aldrich, 1979; 
Terreberry, 1968).  I hypothesized in Chapter 2 that the information shared among 
members of a social circle (who all know and presumably like and trust each other) may 
be of higher quality than information gained from other sources.  Higher quality 
information may result in more accurate perceptions of the environment and situations, 
which in turn may result in smarter organizational engagement and better rapport with 
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stakeholders.  Dealing with stakeholders who are not within a boundary spanner’s social 
circle may have significant ramifications for the organization.   
Considerations of social circles aside, informants said that the information did not 
flow easily or at all from these aides.  Dysfunctional though the communication among 
Ehrlich, Busch, and Miller often was, at least they communicated.  I believe  that the ex-
Hill aides in Ehrlich’s LPO were not functioning adeptly as boundary spanners between 
their organization (viz., the LPO) and its stakeholders (e.g., my informants’ organizations 
and executive-branch agencies).  This compromises the abilities of boundary-spanning 
GRPs to do their jobs, further compounding the environmental dynamism, complexity, 
turbulence, and uncertainty with which they must contend. 
Informants gave the ex-Hill aides credit for knowing how to run a congressional 
office but questioned their skills for establishing a new administration.  The department 
director of a 501c(6) organization concluded, “They just don’t know the state 
government.”  First, at the federal level, things are often accomplished through the 
interactions between congressional and executive-branch aides.  Not so in Annapolis, 
according to this same informant: “It’s the individual member you really talk to down 
here; you actually work with the member as opposed to staff.”  Second — and this may 
seem trivial but it is not — many of Ehrlich’s legislative aides did not use the “right” 
lingo.  They were not fluent in “Annapolis-ese” as the executive director of a 
501c(3)/501c(4) organization said: 
There was a joke among us because they kept referring to the State House as the 
Hill, which is DC jargon.  There’s no hill where the State House sits.  These guys 
would say, “Oh, I’ve got to go to the Hill,” and we’re thinking: “Well, no.  It’s 
actually called the State House.” 
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Third, the Capitol Hill people did not know the inner workings of Annapolis.  
They were not familiar with Annapolis’s laidback style; they did not know the people.  
Before readers think that informants were being unduly harsh on a bunch of new folks in 
the throes of acclimating themselves to Annapolis, it bears mentioning that even the most 
frustrated informants cut Ehrlich’s legislative team some slack.  Annapolis’s community 
of GRPs had chalked up the 2003 legislative session, the Ehrlich administration’s first, 
as, in the words of a department director for a 501c(6) organization, a “break-in period.”   
But as time has progressed, many in this community have grown increasingly 
frustrated because they do not yet see that these Ehrlich aides are seriously attempting to 
get to know them or the Annapolitan system.  These people are the critical stakeholders 
of interest and concern to organizations.  An organization cannot incorporate them into its 
political calculus (as it should) if communication with them is nonexistent or 
dysfunctional.  This exacerbates environmental complexity and uncertainty.  This vice 
president of a 501c(6) organization found the aides gave the impression that they 
“thought of themselves as separate and apart in many ways.”   They were outsiders — 
something they were likely aware of — but never gave any visible signs that they were 
interested in becoming insiders and becoming part of established Annapolis social circles.  
She said: “People joke that his legislative staff never venture out of their offices.  You’d 
rarely see them walking around talking to people.  They stayed in their offices and when 
they did come out, they’d only talk among themselves.”  A for-contract lobbyist 
concurred with her: “These guys don’t get out of their offices.  You’ve got to be out in 
the hallway talking to people, out having a drink or doing stuff with them, getting to 
them.  And they don’t do that.”  These are lost opportunities for information flow. 
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The consensus among informants was that members of the governor’s LPO were 
reticent to engage with others.  Some informants shrugged this off, figuring this was the 
inevitable outcome of a staff that was less sophisticated and less responsive than should 
be expected at the executive-branch level.  Several informants recounted different 
examples of situations where representatives from two executive-branch departments 
would show up at the same bill hearing, only to discover that they were testifying on 
opposing sides. The administration’s right and left hands will only know what the other is 
doing vis-à-vis the General Assembly if the LPO staffers are boundary spanning and 
communicating effectively.   
However, knowing that many people on Ehrlich’s legislative team hailed from 
Capitol Hill, I surmised that there is more to their reticence than ineptness.  I worked in 
the highly charged partisan atmosphere of Washington, DC, politics for Republican-
leaning 501c(4) organizations during the 1990s.  In that atmosphere, with a Republican-
controlled Congress and Democrat President Clinton in office, politics became a zero-
sum game.  My employers were not always amenable to being forthcoming about our 
activities; we did not want to “show our hand” or expose a weakness.  Loyalty was 
golden and disloyalty was unforgivable.  We behaved as if we were under siege.   
And my experiences were from outside Capitol Hill, looking in.  I would imagine 
that people on the inside of Capitol Hill would have had similar, but heightened, 
experiences.  Thus, I repeatedly nodded my head when an executive director of a 
501c(3)/501c(4) organization observed, “The administration holds their cards very close 
to their chest, very close to their chest,” when a for-contract GRP said, “Compromise 
becomes totally a dirty word and it really is thought of as capitulation,” and again when a 
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senior vice-president of a 501c(6) organization lamented: “They don’t reach out and try 
to talk to people or welcome people to come in and talk to them.  It’s always a hassle.”  
These symptoms of a partisanship-induced siege mentality may indicate an 
asymmetrically presupposed worldview. This mentality registers as a factor within 
Lauzen and Dozier’s (1992) static-dynamic dimension.  I will revisit the Ehrlich’s 
administration seeming asymmetrical presuppositions in my analyses of subsequent 
theory questions. 
Again, all the informants who believed Ehrlich’s LPO staff to be a major 
contributing factor in the changed atmosphere of Annapolis pre- and post-Ehrlich’s 
election agreed on certain points.  Their agreement transcended their perceptions of his 
election as a boon or a bane.  Members of Ehrlich’s LPO staff, from a procedural 
standpoint, after three legislative sessions, appears to have a better feel for what they are 
doing.  However, his staff remains much more frustrating to deal with than the staffs of 
previous governors.  I believe informants’ frustration stems from his staff’s inability or 
refusal to function as boundary spanners, even though that how this staff should function 
(normatively and positively) and has functioned traditionally.  Of course, I am getting 
only the informants’ perspectives; but that is what this study was designed to do.  Ehrlich 
is exceedingly loyal to his people and continues to be so in the face of private and public 
criticism of his staff’s effectiveness.  Boon informants lamented that his strong sense of 
loyalty to his aides, although admirable, was detrimental to his political agenda and 
ambitions (and presumably, their organizations’ political fortunes as well). 
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Uncertainty and Partisanship 
 
The attitudes and behaviors of organizations’ critical stakeholders (e.g., 
Democrats and Republicans) changed dramatically after the jolt, increasing 
environmental dynamism and uncertainty (Lauzen & Dozier, 1992).  Informants 
described a partisanship in Annapolis that caused people and issues to be more 
unpredictable and volatile than before the jolt.  This further contributed to their 
uncertainty about stakeholders and the political environment.  The partisanship caused 
people and issues to be more unpredictable and volatile since the jolt than before.  
Several informants spoke of being caught off guard when bills that were thought to be 
going nowhere unexpectedly gained momentum.  As the department director for a 
501c(6) organization (who was a neutral informant) explained: 
What in our judgment is a bad bill may suddenly start flying through the 
legislature because somebody could use it for political gain.  With shenanigans 
like that we get caught in the crossfire.  That makes the landscape a lot tougher to 
work through. 
 
In some cases, an issue just comes out of nowhere, as seen in this anecdote from a 
senior vice-president of a 501c(6) organization: 
The volatility is much more heightened in terms of people going off on the 
partisan bent on anything.  You might think something’s simple and then  
suddenly it’s huge for no reason.  There was a bill that we had worked on all  
interim with the Department of Health.  On the last day of session some  
Republican wanted to amend it to regulate abortion clinics.  The bill gets sent  
back to committee and it dies.  It was instantaneous.  On the last day of session.   
So it’s stuff like that that can flair up and you never see it coming.  Shit just  
happens. 
 
Uncertainty and Organizational Learning 
 
As per the strategic-reduction-of-uncertainty approach, perceived environmental 
uncertainty compels organizational engagement with stakeholders.  Environmental jolts, 
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which cause or compound uncertainty, place even greater urgency on organizational 
engagement.  Organizations, through their boundary spanners, obtain the critical 
information needed for strategic decision-making.  Some of that critical information may 
come in the form of “lessons learned” from the experiences of other organizations.  
Research has found that people are as aware of others’ mistakes as their own mistakes 
(“Study: Brain Sees Others’ Mistakes as Their Own,” 2004).  Organizations, which are 
comprised of people, thus also are aware of and can learn from others’ mistakes and 
experiences, as my informants indicated.  Further, the lessons informants learned from 
these indirect experiences helped to reduce the uncertainty they perceived about how to 
engage with their critical stakeholder, the Ehrlich administration. 
Before I illustrate my findings about organizational learning, Maryland’s budget 
process needs to be explained.  Like party caucuses, this is another environmental factor 
(Duncan, 1972; Rose, 1985) that organizations had to consider with renewed significance 
after Ehrlich’s election.  Additionally, many informants cited this process also as a factor 
in the escalating partisanship in Annapolis, which in turn ramps up the turbulence in this 
already turbulent field. 
The governor holds most of the state’s purse-strings because of the state’s 
“executive-dominated model of budgeting” (Maryland League of Women Voters, 2004).  
The governor submits the state’s operating budget to the General Assembly.  The General 
Assembly only can reduce or make conditions on the appropriations.  The General 
Assembly cannot add to the budget or move money around; essentially its members have 
little latitude or leverage to reshape the state’s operating budget.  To the General 
Assembly’s advantage is that once it is done making its albeit limited changes to the 
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budget, the budget immediately goes into effect.  The governor does not sign the budget 
but presumably, again because of the restrictions placed on the legislature, the budget still 
largely reflects the governor’s priorities.   
Maryland is the only state with the budgeting power so greatly tipped in the 
governor’s favor.  As such the governor of Maryland is considered to be the most 
powerful governor in the country (Maryland League of Women Voters, 2004, para. 5).  
Several informants, such as the department director of a 501c(6) organization, mentioned 
this to me: “This idea that nothing can get in unless you say it gets in; it’s a huge 
investment of power in the chief executive in Maryland.”  The state director of a 501c(4) 
organization discussed the implications of the governor’s budget power on the Baltimore 
City legislative delegation.  Even though the delegation is strongly Democrat and 
progressive minded, it often must support Ehrlich because of the governor’s budget 
power.  The informant explained: “Baltimore City is dependent on some financial 
assistance from the state and so the delegation needs to be on the governor’s good side.  
He uses that quite a bit.” 
Many informants expressed this recurring theme: that to accomplish his objectives 
the governor would “lean on” people and organizations so they would see things his way 
and that dissent would be at their peril.  Several bane informants, such as this department 
director for a 501c(4) organization, mentioned that they were “wary about tangling with 
this governor because of his budget power.”   One neutral informant, a department 
director who described her 501c(6) organization as “aggressively nonpartisan,” was 
careful to always look over her shoulder: “Nowadays making an off-handed comment 
about a Republican legislator can come back to haunt you.  If it got back to the 
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[governor’s office], it’d be the kiss of death.  They don’t forget.”  A for-contract GRP 
corroborated this department director’s fears, saying: “You have to be careful about what 
you say, so much more so. . .You have to be very careful you don’t get quoted in the 
wrong context as being disloyal or whatever.”   
Several informants acknowledged being wary of criticizing or questioning the 
Ehrlich administration, either directly or publicly, because they did not want their 
organizations to be subjected to retaliation.  This retaliation factor is yet another “new” 
environmental factor organizations must take into account (Duncan, 1972; Rose, 1985).  
The executive director of a 501c(3)/501c(4) organization said: “If you say ‘That’s a bad 
idea,’ they ask, ‘What’s going on?’ We can’t have that relationship with the governor 
severed.  We do need to continue working with him.  So it’s a fine line.” 
Even some boon informants found themselves in sticky situations with the Ehrlich 
administration.  As much as Republicans are implicitly associated as allies of “business,” 
Republicans reciprocally see business as their ally.  This can be problematic, as the 
president of a 501c(6) organization explained: “With a Republican governor like Ehrlich, 
he expects our support even more.  It’s just assumed we’ll be ‘there’ for them.  
Sometimes we’re not because the issue’s just not of interest.  So that makes it a bit more 
difficult.”  
Why does this culture of fear seem to exist?  In addition to the governor’s budget 
power, the answer is because there are several well-publicized examples of people and 
organizations that have run afoul of the Ehrlich administration and have paid a price for 
doing so.  Example 1: The General Assembly has had to convene a probe of questionable 
firings of many long-time state employees.  Many Democrats have alleged that the 
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firings, which they believe went far beyond the normal firings that occur when a new 
administration takes office, were part of a systematic program to “purge state agencies of 
Democrats deep in the bureaucracy” (Nitkin, 2005, para. 1).  These employees’ presumed 
transgression: being Democrats.  Example 2: The governor has banned all state 
employees from communicating with two journalists from the Baltimore Sun. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit upheld his ban, which the newspaper had challenged 
on First Amendment grounds, on February 15, 2006 (Mosk & Wagner, 2006).  The 
journalists’ presumed transgression: writing articles critical of the Ehrlich administration.  
(Ehrlich said the ban was “about accountability to the public, and it’s about responsibility 
with respect to reporting the facts” [as quoted in Mosk & Wagner, 2006, p. B3]).  
Example 3: Several informants mentioned that they knew of organizations that have been 
ignored since the start of the administration and that the governor has sniped at publicly.  
The organizations’ presumed transgression: endorsing Kathleen Kennedy Townsend for 
governor in the 2002 election.  Example 4: Informants pointed out that the administration 
has shunned other organizations that had once enjoyed excellent relations with the 
governor.  One organization watched as the funding for a historically fully funded bond 
initiative it supported was taken away.  These organizations’ presumed transgression: 
dissension when the governor expected their support. 
Informants wanted to find neither themselves nor their organizations on Ehrlich’s 
“persona non grata” list, given his status as a critical stakeholder.  They were aware of 
how the Ehrlich administration treated some of its stakeholders and did not like what they 
saw.  They learned lessons from the negative experiences of others.  This critical 
information was internalized and helped to modify their organizations’ and their 
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decision-making and behaviors.  Organizational learning research tends to explore 
organizations’ direct experiences (Baum & Rowley, 2002), but it is clear from my 
informants’ experiences that organizations can learn from indirect experiences as well.  I 
found this to be the case in Simone ([a.k.a. Tuite] 2003).  Further, public relations 
educators could attest to the power of public relations case studies as teaching tools in the 
classroom.  Similarly, public relations professionals could attest to the power of crisis 
management case studies, both good (e.g., Johnson and Johnson and the Tylenol crisis) 
and bad (e.g., Exxon and the Valdez crisis), as tools for real-world organizational 
learning. 
Uncertainty and Subjectivity, Perceptions, and Implicit Associations 
 
Here I revisit the boon-bane-neutral breakdown of informants’ descriptions of 
how their organizations perceived Ehrlich’s election.  I discussed this breakdown briefly 
in the introduction to Chapter 4 to illustrate my pleasantly unexpected success at 
achieving a purposeful stratified sample of informants.  This discussion is more 
atheoretical in nature than theoretical but I do provide theoretical context where 
appropriate.   
 I have so far contextualized my findings in this section with objectivist (or 
modernist) concepts such as interdependency, interorganizational networks, information-
flow approach to resource dependency theory, and the strategic reduction of uncertainty 
approach.  But, following the blended approach I took in Chapter 2, the context for this 
subsection’s findings are subjectivist (or postmodernist) approaches such as Weick’s 
(1969, 1979, 2002) enactment theory.  Organizational perceivers, in this case boundary-
spanning GRPs, “enact” and bring life to political environments based on their 
183
perceptions of it.  They see the environment in a certain way (remember, environments 
are not uncertain; people feel uncertain about the environment [Hatch, 1997]), and try to 
make sense of it for themselves and other organizational members.  The organization uses 
this perceived and reified information in its decision-making about how to engage with 
the environment.  Thus what an organization “thinks” about the stakeholders its political 
environment (e.g., are they friendly or unfriendly to the organization’s goals?) is an 
assessment arising from the perceptions and interpretations of boundary-spanning GRPs.   
I wanted to learn how organizations, through their organizational perceivers, 
thought of Ehrlich’s election.  Not “how” as in process, but how as in “What did they 
think?”  This information would allow me to situate an informant’s data into the context 
of whether Ehrlich’s election was a positive event (boon), a negative event (bane), or 
neither (neutral) to the organization.  Although the tendency is to think of jolts in terms of 
how they may jeopardize organizations, they may be advantageous as well (A.D. Meyer, 
1982). 
I did not specifically ask informants, “Do you think that your organization 
perceived Governor Ehrlich’s election as a boon or a bane?”  It seemed too jarring a 
question.  Rather, I examined this question based on what informants said or implied 
about previous and current administrations’ friendliness toward the parochial interests of 
their organizations, the appearance or disappearance of certain issues from the political 
agenda, the waxing or waning importance of certain issues on the political agenda, 
informants’ personal political ideologies and leanings, organizations’ political ideologies 
and leanings, and informants’ interpersonal networks.  These were perceptual prisms 
through which I believed, based on my research, informants would reasonably refract 
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Ehrlich’s election and its impact on the Annapolitan political environment.  Informants 
did indeed refract Ehrlich’s election through all of these prisms, but I found that 
informants relied on implicit associations (Gladwell, 2005) as their primary prism. 
As I discussed at the top of this chapter, my purposeful stratified sample yielded 
17 boon, 17 bane, and six neutral informants.  I believe that much of this 17-to-17 split 
was based on informants’ implicit associations of what interests Republicans are friendly 
toward versus what interests Democrats are friendly toward.   
The boon informants were both in-house and for-contract GRPs for 
stereotypically “Republican friendly” industries and interests: 501c organizations 
representing businesses of all sizes and the housing and development, extraction, medical 
and health care, agriculture, and animal husbandry industries.  These informants all 
perceived Ehrlich and his administration as being sympathetic or empathetic to their 
interests.  As the executive director of one 501c(6) organization put it, “Ehrlich’s come in 
and has taken a more business-friendly approach to environmental issues.”  There was 
empirical evidence of his friendliness.  The department director of a 501c(6) organization 
remembered that even as a candidate Ehrlich said, “‘Agriculture will have a seat at my 
table.’”  After he was elected, Ehrlich followed through on his promise: “They had this 
huge nutrient management summit on the Eastern Shore and invited all the agricultural 
folks to tear down the program.  To say what was wrong with it, what was right with it, 
what would you do different.” 
The previous governor, Glendening, had been perceived as unfriendly by the 
housing and development industry because they believed his nationally recognized Smart 
Growth program was a front for “no growth.”  The department director of a 501c(6) 
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organization explained that Glendening used Smart Growth more for environmental ends 
rather than to strategically target development to combat sprawl.  This informant 
recounted that he and his industry colleagues were worried that the environmentalists 
would slowly put up obstacles to building in areas where development was supposed to 
go.  This is exactly what they perceived happened. 
From the perspective of informants with agricultural and animal husbandry 
interests, represented in this paragraph by the executive director of a 501c(6) 
organization, Glendening was viewed as someone who “downright wanted to put us out 
of business” and whose departments of environment and natural resources “were always 
attacking us.”  He and another informant in this industry, the executive director of 
another 501c(6) organization, offered as Exhibit A Glendening’s nutrient management 
program.  This program was enacted in the wake of the 1997 pfisteria crisis that affected 
the Chesapeake Bay watershed.  The latter executive director said: “It wasn’t a farmer-
friendly plan because the government just implemented it.  They did not request or 
receive adequate input from the very people they were trying to regulate.  That was 
Glendening’s legacy.” 
The bane informants tended to hail from 501c organizations whose parochial 
interests involved the environment, education (both public and higher), and the legal 
profession.  These informants’ perceptions of the two governors were wholly opposite 
from the boon informants.  The committee chair for a 501c(4) organization 
acknowledged that Glendening, a Democrat, was “much more open to our perspective.”  
The board member of a 501c(3)/501c(4) organization found: “There was a lot of 
communication back and forth between us and Glendening’s staff on Smart Growth. . 
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.And he made the legislation happen.”  Conversely, a for-contract GRP saw Ehrlich as 
someone “who didn’t seem at all interested in higher education as one of his priorities.”  
Higher education was one of Glendening’s priorities.   
The outright appearance or disappearance and waxing or waning importance of 
issues on the political agenda with the Ehrlich administration also factored in my analysis 
of whether an organization perceived the Ehrlich election as a boon or a bane.  
Glendening was adamantly against legalizing slot machines in Maryland and building the 
Intercounty Connector, a new thoroughfare designed to connect interstates 95 and 270 
through Howard and Montgomery counties.  Ehrlich is an equally adamant proponent of 
both.  For organizations that were in sync with Glendening on these issues, Ehrlich’s 
election was a bane, as this co-chair of a 501c(4) organization intimated: “Before [the 
election] we knew that even if a [issue] bill passed, Glendening would veto it.  Now we 
don’t have that luxury.”  For those that supported those issues, the outcome of the 
election was a boon.  Ehrlich firmly opposes increasing the state sales tax, thus removing 
this as an option for responding to the budget crisis he inherited upon taking office.  
Organizations opposed to increasing the sales tax were heartened by Ehrlich’s opposition 
and viewed his election as a boon.  The department director of a 501c(6) organization 
recalled: “The sales tax to us is like the third rail on the Metro. . .But the governor came 
up right up front and said, ‘No sales tax increase.’  So we were very happy with that.”  
When the governor removes an option for increasing state revenues from the table 
(i.e., increasing the sales tax) and his preferred method of raising revenues (i.e., slots) is 
bogged down in a partisan quagmire, the reality is that the state’s budget must be 
trimmed.  Sometimes funds are diverted from some programs to others, robbing Peter to 
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pay Paul so to speak.  Decisions about what programs to divert money to and from 
largely reflect the priorities of the administration in power.  The department director of a 
501c(3) organization suspected that the Ehrlich administration’s rationale for continuing 
to divert funds from a much-needed environmental program to other budget priorities was 
simply, “‘We can put off dealing with [the environmental issue] for a couple of years.’”   
Other informants noted that two of Glendening’s priority issues were the 
environment and higher education.  Although Ehrlich obviously cannot ignore issues of 
such import, the consensus is that these are not two of his top priorities.  As such, 501c 
organizations involved in these issues no longer have an ardent supporter like Glendening 
to champion their interests.  These issues have waned on the agenda of the state’s chief 
political executive. 
Interestingly, both boon and bane informants accused these two governors of 
inventing issues for political gain.  A few boon informants, including this executive 
director of a 501c(6) organization, believed that Glendening manipulated the pfisteria 
scare in the Bay into a “political issue.”  This informant suggested Glendening did so 
because “he needed a re-election issue,” and further, he accused Glendening’s pfisteria 
action commission of being “a sham; it was not based on science because you couldn’t do 
anything scientifically valid in two months.”  From his and other like-minded informants’ 
perspectives, it was political grandstanding that had some memorably gross news footage 
(e.g., dead fish whose skins looked like they had been eaten away by acid) that allowed 
Glendening to cement his image as a pollution-intolerant champion of the environment.   
A couple of bane informants marveled at the coincidence of a Republican 
governor taking office and the sudden appearance of a medical malpractice (or liability, 
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depending on one’s semantic frame) insurance crisis in Maryland.  As one informant, the 
committee chair of a 501c(6) organization, noted, “Our belief is that Ehrlich really didn’t 
want a solution; he just wanted the problem.  It was more fun to have the so-called 
problem.  There wasn’t really a crisis at all.”  He and his like-minded colleagues 
believed, “As long as we have a Republican governor, this issue is a live grenade.” 
I was not able to ascertain the gubernatorial preference of six informants and their 
organizations.  The political affiliation of the governor seemed not to matter to them, 
personally or professionally, or their organizations.  The department director of a 501c(6) 
organization noted that his organization’s interests could be “spun” to appeal to both 
Democrats and Republicans.  The president and CEO of a 501c(3) organization, whose 
organization’s issues one would implicitly associate with Democrats, noted: 
I don’t see Democrats as being any more helpful to our positions than 
Republicans in the generic sense.  Neither of them has a naturally helpful position 
on the issues that are important to us. . . .Whether [the governor] is a Republican 
or Democrat doesn’t make much difference.  They’re all defending their particular 
constellation of economic activities and doctrines.  There are some differences but 
they’re around the edge mostly.   
 
Neutral and boon informants did point out that wholesale political change such 
the election of Ehrlich — regardless of the party affiliations of the winner and loser — 
creates many opportunities, mainly because of the massive turnover in personnel.  The 
changes in membership of key stakeholders (a factor in Lauzen and Dozier’s [1992] 
static-dynamic dimension) created dynamism, which in turn created positive 
opportunities.  More extensive personnel turnover will occur when making the transition 
from the governor of one party to another party, as compared with going from Democrat 
governor to another Democrat.  First, extensive turnover puts GRPs on a more equal 
footing with each other.  As the department director of a 501c(6) organization explained, 
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“To a degree, everyone is starting over; everybody was kind of starting from scratch,” in 
getting to know the new people throughout the executive branch.  Second, as the 
department director for a 501c(6) explained about the extensive turnover that came with 
Ehrlich: 
Actually it put a few extra cards in our hand.  When you have massive turnover in  
the executive branch, there’s some opportunity for centralized decisions to filter  
down.  That’s sometimes tougher to do that when you’re in Year 6 of an  
administration. . .You know it’s tougher sometimes for all those incremental  
changes in policy seats of power.  It’s sometimes tougher for a centralized  
decision to sort of permeate in the same way it can when folks are just hitting the  
ground. 
 
No informant perceived Ehrlich’s election as an absolute boon or an absolute 
bane.  Many informants from both camps tempered their initial perceptions of Ehrlich’s 
election after he took office, the 2003 legislative session began, and the “honeymoon” 
ended.  The fantasy (or nightmare) is never so good (or bad) as the reality.  I present an 
example from each camp.   
A president and CEO of a 501c(6) organization, representing the boon camp, said: 
We “thought we’d have greater access and greater sense of being on the same 
wavelength.  That sense is often there but their words are unmatched by action.”  
Representing the other camp is the committee chair of a 501c(4) organization.  He 
described the situation in which his organization has counterintuitively, yet pleasantly, 
found itself.  When Glendening was in office, his fellow Democrats in the General 
Assembly sometimes did not want to tackle bold environmental legislation that might put 
the governor in a difficult spot.  The General Assembly, with a Republican governor in 
office, no longer shows such restraint.  His organization has seen unexpected positive 
movement on issues (an example of favorable unpredictability in the environment), 
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which he attributes to the Democrats desire to: “put Governor Ehrlich in the hot box. . . 
.We’ve been much more successful in getting our bills passed in the legislature because 
the Democrats want to embarrass the Republican governor to show what a lousy 
governor he is.”  This informant even joked his organization may campaign for Ehrlich’s 
reelection if only to keep up forward momentum on environmental issues.   
But this contention can backfire.  A for-contract GRP recounted an anecdote 
about an Ehrlich bill that would have provided a small tax break for veterans of the 
Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts.  It was a publicly popular idea that would not have cost 
much money.  On the last day of the 2005 session, the Democrat-controlled General 
Assembly killed this bill — again, a bill that originated from the Republican governor’s 
office.  The explanation given was that this bill needed some work and that it would be 
brought back in 2006 as House Bill 1 and Senate Bill 1.  Insiders’ conventional wisdom 
was that the bill was so good that the Democrat-controlled General Assembly did not 
want to let the Republican governor score political points from it. 
Even informants who perceived Ehrlich’s election as a bane were able to look 
beyond their organizations’ parochial interests to appreciate that his election heralded an 
era of greater oversight and a return of checks and balances.  A government in which 
power is divided between the two parties makes for more effective government. . .or so 
the theory goes.  The state director of a 501c(4) organization said: “I think 26 years or 
whatever it was of one-party domination wasn’t necessarily good for Maryland.  The 
Democrats got lazy and now they are having to demonstrate what they stand for, which is 
a good thing.”   
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But such are the perils when one political party controls both the executive and 
legislative branches of government.  President George W. Bush, a Republican who has 
been in office for nearly one and one-half terms, has yet (at this writing in early 2006) to 
veto a bill sent to his desk by the Republican-controlled Congress (Burek, 2005).  Several 
informants suspected that the former one-party situation in Maryland’s government had 
led to, in the words of a department director of a 501c(6) organization, “sketchy 
legislation getting rubberstamped.”  The executive director of a 501c(6) organization 
observed that if the General Assembly passed a bill, Glendening’s signature was a “fait 
accompli.”   
I found, as strongly as Ehrlich’s election was viewed as a boon or as a bane, that 
in all cases, his election has not turned out to be so good or so bad as the informants 
initially perceived.  In spite of the disappointment with the reality of the Ehrlich era that 
some boon informants experienced (to date), not one wished for a different outcome for 
of the 2002 gubernatorial election.  And despite the inadvertent successes that some bane 
informants had enjoyed, not one wished for the same outcome of the 2002 gubernatorial 
election.   
Goal Re-Evaluation 
 As seen in this preceding subsection, implicit associations about stakeholders may 
cause organizations to re-evaluate their goals and, relatedly, their expectations of what 
could be realistically achieved.  Some organizations may expand the scope and number of 
goals; others may scale back.  Dynamism and complexity in the environment and 
interdependency will also spur goal re-evaluation (M.I. Harrison, 1994; Emery & Trist, 
1965; Terreberry, 1968).  As I will discuss in the ensuing sections of Chapter 4, most 
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organizations’ government relations communication strategies and activities had been 
affected to some degree by the jolt.  Strategies and activities are the means to an end; 
goals are the end.  If the means change, would the end change too?  And further, did 
expectations of what the organizations could accomplish, or what the informants could 
accomplish for the organizations, change? 
An organization’s legislative goals likely shift from year to year for myriad 
reasons.  I mean “re-evaluation” in the sense that an organization pushed for a bill under 
Ehrlich that they would not have under Glendening and vice versa.  In the case of the 
informants who described that the jolt affected their organizational goals, goals were 
changed by “dialing it back” or “kicking it up a notch.”  This reflects re-evaluation at the 
level of program goals and objectives (Cutlip et al., 2000).  The jolt and its aftershocks 
did not affect the “raison d’être” — typically outlined in mission statements — of any of 
the informants’ organizations.  This was even true for one 501c(4) organization, whose 
worldview, political legitimacy, and communication practices were changed by the jolt.  
The co-chair vowed that in spite of the jolt and all it had wrought for her organization, 
“Our goal has not changed: to keep [this situation] from happening in Maryland.” 
 I found evidence for changing expectations and government relations program 
goals, in positive and negative directions.  As I had expected, the direction of change was 
associated with whether the jolt was a boon or a bane to the organization. 
 Social circles are a factor in whether and how organizational goals change.  One 
for-contract GRP said he had a difficult relationship with Glendening but an excellent 
relationship with Ehrlich.  To have this boon informant tell it, he and Ehrlich and Mrs. 
Ehrlich are close friends.  (I did not try to corroborate his claim.)  He called his positive 
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relationship with Ehrlich a “huge addition and resource to the things I do.”  His long-time 
clients know of this relationship and so, according to this informant, once Ehrlich took 
office, “Their expectations of what I could do for them increased.”  This is related to the 
personal influence model of public relations practice.  I discuss many more findings 
related to this model in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
 Implicit associations about the friendliness of political parties toward certain 
issues are another factor.  A for-contract GRP, a boon informant, said that several of his 
501c(6) clients with business interests increased their expectations once Ehrlich was 
elected: “They fully expected us to be able to avoid [certain anti-business issue bills] 
from going anywhere.  So far we’ve been able to deliver.”  He believed that Ehrlich and 
emboldened Republican members of the General Assembly were integral to his 
successful meeting of the client’s increased expectations.  Another for-contract GRP 
concurred: “My business clients certainly expected that life was going to be easier for 
them once Ehrlich came into office.  Their goals have reflected that.”  He then added, 
with a laugh, “But clients always expect you to get them what they want regardless of 
who the governor is!”  The vice president of a 501c(6) organization said her members’ 
expectations about what could be accomplished grew under Ehrlich because he was seen 
as “somebody who would give us a fair shake.”  Conversely, a boon informant, a 
president, remarked that even with a governor who is perceived as business friendly, his 
organization neither significantly changed nor expanded its goals by pursuing proactive 
legislation to help the members: “The members don’t seek to get a lot out of the 
government.  I sometimes jokingly say we’re ‘dedicated to the preservation of the status 
quo’; we’re pretty defensive.”   
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A governor’s legislative priorities are yet another factor.  An executive director, a 
bane informant, admitted that with Ehrlich in office, his 501c(6) organization has: “dialed 
back what we think the organization can accomplish.  The possibilities are lessened.”   
Another bane informant, the state director of a 501c(4) organization, said: “We have to 
fight harder to pass anything.  The bar is higher.”  When I asked him to clarify this, he 
explained that his organization had to work harder with Ehrlich as governor (compared 
with Glendening or another Democrat) to achieve the same legislative result.   
These two bane informants work for organizations that advocate issues not at the 
top of Ehrlich’s priority list.  As such, their organizations’ political legitimacy has also 
been affected negatively by the jolt.  They were politically savvy enough to realize this 
and dialed back their organizational goals much like how their organizational legitimacy 
(as they perceived the Ehrlich administration conferred on them) had been dialed back.   
Another informant, a for-contract GRP, recounted how he dealt with a client 
whose political legitimacy was negatively affected by the jolt but whose legislative goals 
increased regardless: “Their expectations were somewhat unrealistic given who the 
governor was.  I had to educate them about what was doable and what wasn’t.”  This 
client organization lacked political savvy, but it at least had enough to realize that it 
needed a for-contract GRP.  A department director expressed exasperation that he always 
cannot dissuade the members of his 501c(6) organization’s board of directors from 
adopting “some fairly futile legislative agendas.  They have unrealistic expectations.”  He 
attributed their unrealistic expectations to low levels of political savvy. 
Several informants characterized members of their organizational decision-
making bodies (i.e., a legislative or executive committee) or clients as very politically 
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savvy.  I noticed that these same informants all said that the jolt did not affect the 
members’ (or clients’) expectations of what could be accomplished legislatively.  The 
department director of a 501c(6) organization complimented her members, saying: “They 
have a really good grasp of the political process.  That gives them a pretty realistic sense 
as far as what we have to deal with at the state level.”   
Whether they perceived Ehrlich’s election in 2002 as a boon, a bane, or neither, 
the study’s 40 informants must engage with stakeholders in what they all agreed is a 
political environment that is more dynamic, complex, turbulent, and uncertain than 
before.  To tweak yet again Long and Hazleton’s (1987) definition of public relations, 
which I have adopted for this study, because of the jolt of Ehrlich’s election, informants 
are responsible for “a communication function of management through which 
organizations adapt, alter, or maintain their [dynamic, complex, turbulent, and uncertain 
political] environment for the purpose of organizational goals” (p. 6).  There are more 
environmental factors and new stakeholders to consider.  The membership, attitudes, and 
behaviors of key stakeholders have changed; indeed the personality of Annapolis has 
changed.   
But these adjectives I used to describe the political environment are my academic 
words, not theirs.  Using plain English, they would say “partisan.”  But as the informants 
have illustrated in this section, partisanship makes for a dynamic, complex, turbulent, and 
uncertain political environment.  In retrospect, I also should have asked informants, 
“Please describe in one word your feelings about working in Annapolis’s current political 
environment.”  I am confident that informants overwhelmingly would have answered, 
“Frustrating.”  The palpable frustration they voiced during the interviews is difficult to 
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capture on these pages.  They expressed frustration from their organizations’ parochial 
perspectives and from their personal perspectives as taxpaying citizens of Maryland.  As 
the department director of a 501c(6) organization, resigned to the new status quo of the 
Annapolitan political environment, said: “A lot of things just don’t happen because of the 
other conflicts and the partisanship.”    
Theory Question 5: Perceptions of Organizations’ Political Legitimacy 
 The results for theory questions 2, 3, and 4 follow the results for Theory Question 
5, which I am presenting out of numerical order.  Discussing the topic of organizational 
legitimacy within the “Foundational and Middle-Range Theories of Public Relations” 
section made sense for the purposes of constructing the study’s conceptual framework.  
However, for the purposes of this chapter, it makes more sense to present the results for 
Theory Question 5 immediately following the results for Theory Question 1, as if it were 
the second theory question, rather than at the end of the chapter.  In the data-
transformation phase, I noticed that much of the same data informed both of these theory 
questions.  I believe that this is because how an informant perceived the jolt as a boon or 
bane for the organization reflects the degree of political legitimacy the informant believed 
the Ehrlich administration would confer on it.  Further, I believe that to fully grasp my 
analyses for theory questions 2, 3, and 4, readers need “foundational” knowledge about 
informants’ perceptions of their organizations’ political legitimacy, as well as informants’ 
perceptions of the jolt and its affect on the political environment of Annapolis. 
Theory Question 5a 
TQ5a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their political stakeholders’  
perceptions of the legitimacy of their organizations? 
 
197
Informants operationalized organizational legitimacy as political status.  I found 
that congruency of values between an organization and a political stakeholder 
was the major determinant of the organization’s political status.  Congruency of 
values translated to high political status, which translated to inclusion and 
meaningful participation in unofficial and official dialogic and decision-making 
opportunities with the political stakeholder.  The converse was true for values-
incongruent, and thus low political status, organizations. 
One of the main principles of public relations taught in undergraduate courses is 
to know the audience.  One-message-fits-all-audiences strategies do not work. Effective 
communication is predicated on knowing the audience’s opinions of the communication 
professional (as an individual), the organization, and its viewpoints before 
communicating with the audience.  This knowledge may influence, for instance, the 
content and frame of the messages the organization communicates to that audience to 
how the organization communicates those messages.  The principle of knowing one’s 
audience is essentially what Theory Question 5a explored: What did informants believe 
that elected officials and their staffs thought about their organizations in terms of their 
organizations’ political legitimacy?   
Legitimacy is an implicit and important aspect of public relations because 
organizations and stakeholders are interdependent and thus are of mutual consequence 
(J.E. Grunig & Repper, 1992).  Organizational legitimacy is a salient aspect of this 
interdependence, which boundary spanners, as public relations functionaries, are 
responsible for managing (Cutlip et al., 2000; J.E. Grunig, 1992).  Thus organizational 
legitimacy looms largely in boundary spanners’ work activities and responsibilities.  
Stakeholders are of consequence to organizations because they confer legitimacy 
on organizations (Finet, 1993; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Extrapolating from that, 
political stakeholders confer political legitimacy on organizations. Political stakeholders 
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confer legitimacy for many reasons, including their perceptions that the organization is 
responsible and needed and that it conforms to societal norms, expectations, and values 
(Baum & Rowley, 2002; J.W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; W.R. Scott, 1987).  Politics is 
competition of values, making Harris’s (1997) assertion that, “Legitimacy cannot be 
defined independently of values” (p. 313) particularly applicable to discussions of 
political legitimacy.   
Boundary-spanning GRPs’ engagement with political stakeholders will influence 
the political legitimacy conferred on their organizations and, circularly, an organization’s 
political legitimacy will influence the engagement between boundary-spanning GRPs and 
political stakeholders.  In practical terms, what a GRP believes stakeholders think of the 
organization will influence how the GRP does his or her job.  This theory question looks 
at the first part of that last sentence (“what a GRP believes stakeholders think of the 
organization”; other theory questions (e.g., “Theory Question 4: Boundary Spanning”) 
address the last part of that sentence (“how the GRP does his or her job”).  In Chapter 5 
(“Discussion”), I will interpret the findings of this theory question within the context of 
the findings for the other theory questions. 
Legitimacy as Political Status 
 
My analysis determined that informants operationalized the academic concept of 
legitimacy as their organizations’ political status, that is whether or not they were in the 
good graces of and had clout with the governor and other political powers-that-be.  
Informants discussed their organizations’ political status in terms of the degree and 
quality of access to the governor and the Second Floor and of inclusion in (or exclusion 
from) the policy-making processes of the state government.  Their understanding of 
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political status reflects Roy’s (1981) conceptualization of political legitimacy as the 
“distance” between a 501c organization and political stakeholders cum decision-makers.  
The closer to the corridors of power an organization (or a person) is, the higher its 
political status (i.e., political legitimacy).  Further, with higher political status comes 
greater access and inclusion; with lower political status comes less access and inclusion, 
perhaps even exclusion.  Thus, legitimacy (i.e., status) directly affects boundary 
spanners’ abilities to manage organizational interdependence with stakeholders (J.E. 
Grunig & Repper, 1992). 
Clues From Stakeholders About Organizations’ Political Status 
 
Interdependence with stakeholders may have positive consequences, which will 
affect the work lives of boundary spanners, for organizations.  Organizations with high 
political status will have an easier time than lower-status organizations engaging with 
political stakeholders for advocative, educational, and information-sharing purposes 
(Boris & Krehely, 2002).  Informants who believed that political stakeholders accorded 
their organizations high political status found this to be the case.  They spoke of the ease 
of interacting with members of the governor, his staff, and executive department officials.  
The president of a 501c(6) organization described how members of the Glendening 
administration welcomed their often last-minute visits: “Many times we’d call the 
Secretary of Planning or Smart Growth and say: ‘We’re in the statehouse right now; are 
you guys available?’ And the response was always ‘Absolutely.’ And they’d spend an 
hour with us.”  Interestingly, the Glendening administration conferred high status on this 
organization even though they often clashed on policy.  In fact, this informant considered 
Ehrlich’s election a boon for his organization. 
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Being actively sought out and listened to by the Ehrlich administration also led 
informants to conclude their organizations had high political status.  A for-contract GRP 
noted that his input, on behalf of his 501c(6) client, was sought out by Ehrlich 
administration officials: “The Secretary of Health wanted to talk to us and so we spent an 
hour and a half this morning on the phone with him.”  A president believed that the 
Ehrlich administration accorded his 501c(6) organization high political status because, 
“Ehrlich is aware of our positions and our stances and our needs and is empathetic to 
them.”  A senior vice-president said that, “Ehrlich would single us out in a crowd,” as 
evidence that he accorded her 501c(6) organization in high status. 
 Interdependence with stakeholders may have negative consequences, which will 
affect the work lives of boundary spanners, for other organizations. Political 
stakeholders’ dislike of organizations also provided informants with clues about their 
organizations’ low political status.  A state director is sure that the Ehrlich administration 
accords his 501c(4) organization low status.  This informant said, “Ehrlich has fought 
against our right to exist,” even while a member of Congress.  Other informants believed 
that Glendening accorded their organizations low status because of what they perceived 
as his disdain for their industry.  The executive director of a 501c(6) organization 
explained: “Glendening wanted to put us out of business; he had no use for us.  His 
administration put forth policies that had the very real potential of driving the industry 
from Maryland.”  
Some informants asserted that the Glendening administration excluded their 
organizations from the policy-making processes.  This minimized the consequences — 
influence — their organizations had for this stakeholder.  Interdependence is about 
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mutual consequences (J.E. Grunig & Repper, 1992).  When consequences are not mutual, 
the organization may become dependent on the stakeholder.  Then the organization 
becomes vulnerable and without “voice” in the stakeholder’s decision-making and 
thought processes.  This increases turbulence and uncertainty for the organization.   
Informants interpreted such exclusion as the administration’s low regard for their 
organizations.  An executive director said the Glendening administration “neither 
requested nor received adequate input from the people they were trying to regulate,” 
specifically her 501c(6) organization and its sister organizations.  The Glendening 
administration would not allow these organizations to be “proximal” (Roy, 1981).  It kept 
them at a distance from the political decision-making structure.  Intentional distancing 
solely could be a function of these organizations’ political legitimacy.  Or it could be a 
function of factors such as the Glendening administration’s worldview and political 
considerations surrounding the issue in question. 
The Ehrlich administration similarly has excluded other informants’ 
organizations.  An assistant executive director believed the Ehrlich administration’s low 
regard for her 501c(6) organization has resulted in decreased inclusion in the state’s 
policy-making process: “Glendening would seek our opinion on appointments to the state 
[executive agency].  With Ehrlich, we have obviously lost that role.”  The department 
director of that same organization described how the Ehrlich administration excluded it 
from a major executive-level commission.  She believed the snub was no mere oversight: 
The Ehrlich administration invited four members of her organization to sit on this 
commission, members who “we’ve never even heard of before.”  They are not in 
leadership positions in the organization.  Yet by including these members on the 
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commission, the Ehrlich administration undercut this organization’s argument that it had 
been excluded: “Ehrlich can negate our charge of saying that we were not asked to 
participate.”  The assistant executive director also described how her organization’s 
counterparts in other states have been useful in campaigns to legalize slot machines, a 
cornerstone of Ehrlich’s legislative agenda: “When the governor of Florida wanted slots, 
what tipped the scale was that [our counterpart organization] got full tilt behind it.”  
Ehrlich has asked neither directly nor indirectly for her organization’s help on slots, in 
spite of three difficult, unsuccessful years trying to push slots forward.  This to her was 
the biggest clue about just how low Ehrlich regards her organization. 
For some organizations, no inference is necessary to figure out that the Ehrlich 
administration accords them low political status.  No gray area exists about an 
organization’s political status when, as the vice president of a 501c(6) organization 
recounted, “One of Ehrlich’s legislative people was standing outside and as I said 
‘Hello,’ he told me, ‘Don’t write, don’t call, don’t visit.’”  The Ehrlich administration 
initially conferred a great amount of political legitimacy on her organization.  They 
collaborated like “partners in crime” on a major legislative initiative.  But her 
organization defined “meaningful” reform on this issue differently than the 
administration and it quickly fell from favor.  It became politically illegitimate 
persona non grata  to the Ehrlich administration: “In his view, we weren’t with him.  
That wasn’t a good thing, we didn’t stick by him. . .We couldn’t be with him 100% on 
this, so we were no longer seen as a loyal supporter.”  A political stakeholder confers 
political legitimacy on organizations that engender its “good will and approval” (Boyd, 
2000, p. 344).  This organization no longer engendered the good will and approval of the 
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Ehrlich administration; that they had shared values was not enough.  It lost its political 
legitimacy (in the administration’s eyes) and as a result, its access and inclusion.   
Two informants from another 501c(6) organization reported a somewhat similar 
experience.  They explicitly were instructed to not contact the Ehrlich campaign and, 
later on, his administration.  The department director recalled, “After we endorsed his 
opponent, Ehrlich made it very clear to us that we were on his ‘Do Not Call list,’ as in 
don’t even bother to call.”  Unlike the first organization, Ehrlich already held this 
organization in low regard.  Other informants mentioned that if an organization was not 
“with” the Ehrlich administration on an issue, then the Ehrlich administration saw that 
organization as being against the Ehrlich administration.  Such an organization would be 
reduced to a “persona non grata” with the Ehrlich administration.   
Other informants and organizations were persona non grata during the Glendening 
administration.  As a for-contact GRP explained: “Glendening and I openly hated each 
other.  Everybody knew we hated each other.  So for eight years I wasn’t in the mansion 
and I wasn’t on the Second Floor.” 
Informants’ Perceptions of Their Organizations’ Political Status 
 
Informants also had definite ideas of what they thought their organizations’ 
political status was, not just what they thought political stakeholders thought.  As the 
department director of a 501c(6) organization noted, the access an organization had to the 
corridors of political power “depends on your profile.”  By profile he meant whether an 
organization was a big player (i.e., high status and much clout) or not-so-big player (i.e., 
low status and little clout) in Annapolis.  Informants for not-so-big players matter-of-
factly avowed their organizations’ status as such.  For instance, they made comments 
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including, “We’re not one of the movers and shakers in Annapolis” (a department 
director of a 501c[6] organization), “We don’t really register on the political scene” (the 
executive director of a 501c[6] organization), and “We’re not really seen as a player” (a 
regional director for a 501c[3] organization).  A department director for a 501c(6) 
organization noted, “We’re not a large powerful organization,” adding, “But a lot of 
times we’re in with big players.”   
Informants at big-player organizations were also adept at assessing their high 
political status, as seen in these comments:  
• An assistant executive director for a 501c(6) organization: “We are the 800-pound 
gorilla in the state for our issues.  There’s no organized group or even coalition of 
groups that I would say is comparable to us.  We’re pretty hard to ignore.” 
 
• The department director for a 501c(6) organization: “We do have a pretty fair 
amount of clout in Annapolis.” 
 
• The executive director of a 501c(3)/501c(4) organization: “Fortunately our 
organization’s recognition is high in Maryland so when I say [my name] from 
[organization’s name], it resonates with people.  We have a fair amount of respect 
from people so it’s not hard to gain access.” 
 
• The department director for a 501c(6) organization: “We are a pretty prominent 
organization in Annapolis.”   
 
• The department director for a 501c(6) organization: “We have polling that shows 
that our organization’s recommendation of a candidate positively affects one-third 
of the undecided vote.” 
 
• The senior vice-president of a 501c(6) organization: “I work for one of the bigger 
names in town.” 
 
I noticed that informants provided comments about their organizations’ status as 
big players as background information, for purposes of context.  They commented in a 
throwaway “Oh, by the way” style.  Informants at not-so-big-player organizations alerted 
me to their organizations’ status as such much differently.  It was as if they wanted me to 
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know that they were not suffering from any delusions about where their organizations fit 
into the pecking order in Annapolis.  
Where Does Political Legitimacy Come From? 
 
If political legitimacy begets organizational access to political stakeholders and 
inclusion in policy-making processes, what makes an organization politically legitimate?  
To phrase this question another way, on what criteria do stakeholders confer legitimacy?
My analysis of the interview data determined that an organization’s political legitimacy 
was a function of several factors.  I discuss them below. 
Grassroots and grasstops activities affect an organization’s political legitimacy.  (I 
discussed these activities in detail in “Theory Question 3: Models of Public Relations 
Practice.”)  An organization’s use of rank-and-file (“grassrooters”) and VIP 
(“grasstoppers”) members to contact elected officials or to provide testimony resonates 
loudly with elected officials.  The executive director of a 501c(6) organization explained, 
“There’s nothing more compelling than somebody who actually has to do the job, who’s 
actually going to have to deal with the impact of the bill that’s under discussion.”   
These activities also demonstrate that an organization and its positions have 
supporters who are willing to make their association with the organization publicly 
known.  Krippendorf and Eleey (1986) explained that organizations “receive public 
support for their work only to the extent that citizens believe their supportive 
participation is worthwhile” (p. 14).  This is a twist on agenda-setting and implied third-
party endorsement theories: Lawmakers may think, “If my voting constituents think this 
organization and its opinions are legitimate, then perhaps so should I.”   
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Hearing from constituents may even provide lawmakers with the rationale to 
explain their votes or positions.  As a for-contract GRP explained, “We understand the 
power that grassroots activities have to either give a legislator cover to make a tough vote 
or to educate that legislator about what his constituents think.”  This engenders a positive 
connection — good will — between an organization and lawmakers, thus increasing the 
regard the elected official has for the organization. 
Working in coalitions also affects an organization’s political legitimacy.  
Informants at not-so-big player organizations mentioned actively seeking out 
opportunities to work with some more prominent and powerful organizations  the big 
players.  Big-player organizations transfer some of their own political legitimacy to not-
so-big player organizations when they work together.  When a not-so-big-player 
organization collaborates (or participates in a coalition) with a big-player organization, 
this implies that the big-player organization considers the not-so-big-player organization 
to be politically legitimate, with something positive to add to the political equation.  
Again, in a twist on agenda-setting and implied third-party endorsement theories, other 
political stakeholders may follow the big-player organizations’ lead of considering the 
not-so-big players organization to be politically legitimate.   
This is explained by applying Krippendorf and Eleey’s (1986) support “principle” 
to organizations instead of public citizens: Organization A will support Organization B 
only if B is worthy of A’s support (or if supporting B is worth A’s while).  Big-player 
organizations will not squander their own political legitimacy working with (and thereby 
transferring legitimacy to) unworthy not-so-big-player organizations.   
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Informants at some organizations, typically big players, noted that other 
organizations frequently sought to collaborate with them.  The department director of a 
501c(6) organization said, “We’re a frequently demanded coalition partner as you might 
imagine.”  A senior vice-president of a 501c(6) organization joked about the burdens of 
being popular: “Other organizations generally come to us to work together.  I don’t need 
to seek out any more meetings to go to.  I have enough.  We’re invited to get involved in 
lots of different things, some odd things too.”   
The clout or prominence in the community of an organization’s members, 
meaning either people (as with an issue advocacy group) or organizations (as with a trade 
association), may affect that organization’s political legitimacy.  A department director 
for a 501c(6) organization said of his members: “They’re active in their communities; 
they’re often involved in many volunteer endeavors, from volunteer fire departments to 
PTAs to civic associations.  These are natural things for them to do and it’s one of the big 
reasons we’re so effective.”  A department director pointed to the voting habits of her 
501c(6) organization’s members as a factor in its political legitimacy:  “Our polling 
shows that about almost 90% of our members are registered voters and about 85 to 88% 
of those people vote.  They’re a huge, huge bloc.”  The senior vice-president of a 501c(6) 
organization said: “[My member companies] are really huge employers in almost every 
community.  So that brings them and us some clout.”                                                                                                                                 
Some informants indicated that donating to campaigns and having a PAC 
enhanced their organizations’ political legitimacy.  Note that I wrote “enhanced”; no 
informants alluded to money enabling their organizations to go from persona non grata to 
best buddies with any political stakeholder.  But money does help bridge the distance 
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between an organization and political stakeholders; it gets the organization closer to the 
corridors where political decisions are made.  To wit, the executive director of a 501c(6) 
admitted, “When we spread our PAC money around we’re essentially buying access to 
legislators and candidates.”  The executive director of another 501c(6) organization said 
that having a PAC “helped with getting introduced to a lot of people who must have 
thought, ‘Hey, he must have some money coming with him.’”  A for-contract GRP said: 
“Donating to campaigns gets you recognition and access.  It gets you the opportunity to 
tell your story.”   
But not always, according to the committee chair of a 501c(6) organization.  His 
organization’s “fairly healthy PAC” donates to only the candidates it endorses; it does not 
hedge its bets by donating to all candidates.  During the 2002 gubernatorial campaign, the 
PAC donated to the Townsend campaign.  However, some members of his organization 
supported Ehrlich and personally donated to his campaign.  The informant tells this 
cautionary tale: “They said, ‘He’s a good guy; he’s not against us.’  They tried to 
communicate with him after the election and got nowhere.  So you had people who’d 
donated $10,000 to him and couldn’t get their calls returned.”  Money could not bridge 
the values-gap Ehrlich perceived between himself and the 501c(6) organization to which 
these donors belonged. 
Non-financial subsidies also contribute to organizations’ political legitimacy.  
Informants believed that conducting research and fielding questions from elected officials 
and their aides enhanced their organizations’ political legitimacy.  A department director 
believed that his 501c(4) organization’s functioning as a “clearinghouse” for information 
about his industry sector positively enhanced its political legitimacy.  A department 
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director believed that elected officials sought his 501c(6) organization’s help because of 
its already high degree of political legitimacy: Political stakeholders “know who we are 
so we end up fielding lots of inquiries about [industry] issues.  Our phone is the one that 
rings for the most part.  It helps policy makers in understanding issues that would affect 
us.”  Helping out policy makers enhances the organization’s political legitimacy, which 
causes policy makers to ring the organization’s phone when they need information, which 
further enhances the organization’s political legitimacy, in an upward spiral. 
Providing information subsidies and functioning as an expert source for the media 
also enhance political legitimacy.  The media, as “objective” third-party purveyors of 
information to the public, privilege the issues and viewpoints they cover.  According to 
agenda-setting theory, media attention of an issue ostensibly begets public attention, 
which ostensibly begets politicians’ attention (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).   The 
committee chair for a 501c(6) organization recounted how he became the go-to person 
for information and quotes on an issue for several Baltimore Sun reporters.  He believed 
the media coverage enhanced not only his personal political legitimacy, but also that of 
his organization and its viewpoints.  A member of the board of directors attributed her 
501c(3)/501c(4) organization’s ability to minimize its decreased political legitimacy 
under the Ehrlich’s administration to the frequent media appearances of the 
organization’s media-savvy executive director.  One president and CEO practiced media 
advocacy (e.g., see Wallack et al., 1993) to draw public and political attention to his 
501c(3) organization’s issues.  He believed that the media attention contributed to the 
political legitimacy of his organization and its viewpoints. 
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Informants from nonpartisan organizations believed that nonpartisanship 
enhances their organization’s political legitimacy in the two-party political situation in 
Annapolis.  As Harris (1997) said, “Legitimacy cannot be defined independent of values” 
(p. 313).  Legitimacy is a function of similar values.  A nonpartisan organization, which 
transcends value-laden politics, may have “buffered” its political legitimacy against the 
values conflicts that embroil partisan (and bipartisan) organizations and political 
stakeholders. 
Some politicians likely feel more comfortable working with organizations they 
perceive as nonpartisan than those perceived as partisan.  The higher their comfort level 
with an organization, the more political legitimacy they confer on it.  The department 
director of a nonpartisan 501c(6) organization said: “Officials are much more 
comfortable in working with an organization that has no political baggage if you will.  
They can feel free to like us.  All of them regardless of party can like us and there’s no 
downside to it.”    
Of course, politicians may feel most comfortable working with organizations that 
openly subscribe to a similar political perspective.  Such politicians confer great political 
legitimacy on these organizations because of their shared values.  But there are dangers 
because other political stakeholders may withdraw political legitimacy from these 
partisan organizations.  The department director of a 501c(6) organization observed: 
“Some organizations are pegged as obviously Republican especially now with a 
Republican governor.  I watch them struggle with a completely Democrat-controlled 
General Assembly because of this.  Their pieces of good legislation never go anywhere.”  
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As this remark implies, when members of one political party perceive an 
organization as close to the other party, the organization is seen as a “stalking horse” for 
the other party, as the executive director of a 501c(6) organization labeled it.  This may 
diminish an organization’s political legitimacy, as has happened with this informant’s 
organization.  He said: “The Republicans are leery of us but that’s paranoia.  My 
organization is nonpartisan.”  His organization may be nonpartisan, but some political 
stakeholders perceive it as partisan.  It is their perception that counts.  A president 
observed that his 501c(6) organization is often in sync with Ehrlich, which is beneficial 
yet challenging: “There are a lot of challenges for us right now to not be seen so much as 
in Ehrlich’s pocket.  And that means maybe not being with him or even opposing him in 
the future.”  This, he added, will continually challenge his organization, and presumably 
others, given that Democrats will continue to dominate the General Assembly for the 
“foreseeable future.” 
 Focus also affects an organization’s political legitimacy.  An organization does 
not want to become overexposed and seen as weighing in on every last little issue.  I call 
this the “Gloria Allred syndrome,” after the omnipresent media-savvy attorney who has a 
penchant for becoming involved in issues as varied as the Scott Peterson murder trial to 
Michael Jackson’s parental fitness to the Kobe Bryant rape allegations.  Some believe 
that her involvement in so many issues dilutes her legitimacy and effectiveness (Sanello, 
1998).   
Focusing on the bills that are immediately relevant to an organization enhances an 
organization’s political legitimacy.  If an organization weighs in on everything, does what 
that organization “say” carry any weight?  Probably not, as the executive director of a 
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501c(3)/501c(4) organization noted: “If we start using our voice on every single bill, then 
we’re less powerful when we speak.  So we are a bit judicious about what we work on.”  
The executive director of a 501c(6) organization concurred: “If you start making 
comments on every bill and the legislators keep hearing from you on every bill, you’re 
going to lose your credibility.  We want to focus only on the bills affecting our specific 
industry.”  No organization wants to suffer from the Gloria Allred syndrome.   
Involvement in too many issues also may stretch an organization’s resources, thus 
diluting its effectiveness that way.  It becomes “distracting and then we’re pulled in 12 
directions at once.  We just don’t have the resources for that,” according to the executive 
director of a 501c(6) organization with limited resources.  But another informant, the 
president of a 501c(6) organization long on clout but short on staff, stressed: “We have 
never failed to take a position on an issue or get involved because of a lack of manpower.  
We get it done.” 
Boundary-Spanning GRPs’ Personal Legitimacy 
 
By far the major factor affecting an organization’s political legitimacy was the 
personal legitimacy of informants.  Boundary spanning influences organizational 
legitimacy and in fact may be “among the most important variables that potentially affect 
organizational legitimacy” (Finet, 1993, p. 59).  It stands to reason that boundary-
spanning GRPs influence an organization’s political legitimacy.  Boundary-spanning 
GRPs are responsible for maintaining an organization’s political legitimacy (Aldrich, 
1979).  They do this through their external representation efforts on the organization’s 
behalf (Aldrich & Herker, 1977), which are enhanced (or diminished) by their personal 
political legitimacy.  Their personal legitimacy was very much a salient aspect of their 
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professional lives.  Although I never directly addressed this subject in the interview, I 
nevertheless collected much data about it.  Informants attributed their personal legitimacy 
to a combination of factors such as: 
• Longevity in Annapolis:  
o A for-contract GRP: “I got established as a lobbyist pretty quickly because 
I’ve been around Annapolis so long.”   
 
o The president of a 501c(6) organization: “I’ve been here for 30 legislative 
sessions, so I’ve seen it all and know pretty much everyone.” 
 
• Personal experiences: 
o The department director of 501c(4) organization: “I came out of the industry, 
my in-laws were in the business. . . I started getting very active in the 
[organization] and wound up eventually being a volunteer lobbyist almost full 
time.  That’s how I got to where I am today.” 
 
• Professional backgrounds: 
o A senior vice-president of a 501c(6) organization: “I was a bill drafter and 
committee counsel focusing primarily on [the issue] for several years.” 
 
o The president and CEO of a 501c(3) organization: “I’d worked in community 
organizing and service on [the issue] for more than 30 years before making 
the jump into advocacy work.”   
 
• Social circles:  
o A for-contact GRP: “Actually I’m very close with both Mike Busch and Bob 
Ehrlich.  They are both at my home a number of times a year.  We’ve stayed 
close with them and their spouses.” 
 
Being a former appointed or elected official also enhances one’s personal political 
legitimacy, party affiliation notwithstanding.  One former state senator, now a for-
contract GRP, observed: “I’m still viewed as a former colleague.  Even the newer folks 
are aware that I spent a number of years on their side of the desk.  So they understand me 
better and I understand them better.”  This mutual understanding is one reason why so 
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many former lawmakers make the transition to government relations work.  This 
revolving door phenomenon is not limited to Annapolis.  Birnbaum (2005) noted the 
“fevered” bidding of Washington, DC, lobby shops and 501c(6) organizations for former 
members of Congress and White House officials. 
Not all informants could trace their political legitimacy to the factors I have just 
discussed.  Some reported relying on other people to help them get established in 
Annapolis.  In doing so, these other people imparted some of their own political 
legitimacy to them (like big-player organizations do for not-so-big player organizations).  
Introductions serve as de facto vouchers for the positive attributes of the person being 
introduced.  The thought process here is: “I already know and trust Person A; Person A 
knows and trusts Person B, whom I do not know.  Perhaps I will take Person A’s 
vouching about Person B.”  The political world does not have a monopoly on this thought 
process.  Implied and implicit third-party endorsement can be found in every aspect of 
human relations, from obtaining employment to dating.   
“Other people” sometimes meant for-contract GRPs.  A senior vice-president 
recalled how her 501c(6) organization hired outside GRPs to help her acclimate to her 
new job.  She said: “They’d keep their ears to the ground for me.  They’d give me advice 
and talk to people for me, but they weren’t the ‘out front’ people. They were comfortable 
with that.  I had to establish my own credibility.”  The executive director of a 501c(6) 
organization said: “Legislators knew [for-contract GRP’s name].  He’d introduce me 
around to legislators I didn’t know.  I got to know them thanks to his introductions.  That 
helped to make a big difference in my recognition factor with legislators.”  Many for-
contract GRPs knew that clients hired them because of their personal legitimacy.  As one 
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for-contract GRP with great personal legitimacy said: “The clients hire me because I am a 
known and respected quantity.  I confer my credibility to them.  It’s my relationships and 
access that they’re buying and utilizing.”   
Some informants relied on their in-house colleagues to help get them established 
in Annapolis.  One department director at a 501c(6) organization said that the colleague 
who hired her devoted much effort during her first legislative session to introducing her 
to people.  His efforts enhanced her legitimacy to the point where she stood on her own 
during the next legislative session.  The executive director of a 501c(3)/501c(4) 
organization attributed her political legitimacy to the efforts of other directors in the 
organization: “They were great tutors along the way, mentors I should say.  They helped 
me learn the trade as I went along.”  Another informant, the vice president of a 501c(6) 
organization, relied on the wisdom of a colleague’s well-connected relative: “She really 
helped me learn how to navigate Annapolis and meet people, the right people.  She taught 
me about getting important information to them and networking with my peers.  And then 
eventually I was good all on my own.” 
 Informants also believed that honesty enhances their legitimacy and their 
organizations in turn.  The associate director of a 501c(6) organization said: “As any 
good advocate wants to do, I want to put our position out with honesty.  That gets me 
respect and my organization respect.”  A department director of a 501c(6) organization 
concurred: “So you tell everybody up front what you’re doing.  If you’re honest with 
them then you really won’t have a problem with the politics of it.  They know you’re 
doing what you have to do to represent your constituency.” 
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Informants also attributed their legitimacy to being reasonable.  Being overly 
emotional or strident or a gadfly detracts from one’s political legitimacy and the 
organization’s in turn.  When I worked in grassroots outreach, I always told my 
employers’ grassroots members to be agreeable, respectful, and calm when dealing with 
elected officials and their staff.  The adage of, “You’ll catch more flies with honey than 
vinegar,” is an adage for a good reason: It is true.  As a for-contract GRP observed about 
the behavior of another for-contract GRP: “I’ve seen him testifying at bill hearings 
yelling at legislators telling them they’re wrong, on behalf of his clients.  What kind of 
representation is that?  Being unreasonable probably doesn’t help the client’s cause too 
much.”  Another for-contract GRP believed that his clients’ political legitimacy was 
enhanced by his “reasonable manner”: “I’m not an adamant ‘my way or the highway’ sort 
of guy.  I’ve always dealt with politicians and their aides in a very reasonable manner and 
I think that this helps.”  Another informant, an executive director of a 501c(6) 
organization, joked: “I have been accused of having a high opinion of my opinion.  So I 
try to rein myself in so I don’t alienate any more people than I have to.” 
Theory Question 5b 
TQ5b: How did the jolt affect the political stakeholders’ perceptions of the  
legitimacy of the boundary-spanning GRPs’ organizations? 
The jolt negligibly affected the political legitimacy of neutral organizations; this 
was unsurprising given that these organizations were strictly nonpartisan in 
reality and perception.  The jolt significantly affected the political legitimacy of 
boon and bane organizations, organizations that were partisan either in reality or 
perception.  Ehrlich and his predecessor, Glendening, held opposite stances on 
many issues; they did not have congruent values.  What was a values-congruent 
organization for Glendening was a values-incongruent organization for Ehrlich 
and vice versa.  Many organizations saw their political status invert because of 
the transition from the Democrat Glendening to the Republican Ehrlich.  Further, 
expectations about potential changes to an organization’s political legitimacy 
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factored into informant’s assessment of whether the jolt portended good or ill for 
the organization. 
 
I will discuss the other major factor affecting an organization’s political 
legitimacy within the context of Theory Question 5b.  Political stakeholders perceive 
some issues and some opinions ― and thus some organizations ― as more legitimate 
than others.  Again, I believe this comes down to values.  A person’s values are reflected 
in the issues he or she cares about and believes to be important.  These then are the issues 
to which the person devotes effort, time, and money, and on which the person runs for 
elected office.  A stakeholder is more likely to allow values-congruent organizations to 
have consequences (i.e., influence) on it than values-incongruent organizations.  Values-
congruency facilitates normative interdependence between organizations and 
stakeholders. 
Political Stakeholders’ Values and Priorities 
 
My analysis determined that an organization’s political legitimacy changed 
depending on a governor’s priorities.  This was as the literature on organizational 
legitimacy suggested (Baum & Rowley, 2002; J.W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; W.R. Scott, 
1987).  Priorities reflect one’s values and values are an important component of 
legitimacy (Harris, 1997).  A governor, or any elected official, will confer greater 
political legitimacy on organizations that share his or her values than those that do not.  
Glendening and Ehrlich had different priorities and values and thus with the jolt of 
Ehrlich’s election, the political legitimacy of some organizations grew whereas others’ 
political legitimacy withered.  This obviously has tremendous implications for the work 
activities and responsibilities of boundary spanners. 
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Glendening’s priority issues included Smart Growth, public and higher education, 
and environmental protection.  This was to the delight of some informants, such as the 
committee chair of a 501c(4) organization, who said: “Compared to Ehrlich, Glendening 
was much more open to the environmental perspective.  He was focused on it.”  This was 
likewise to the chagrin of others, such as the executive director of a 501c(6) organization 
who observed: “Glendening got his marching orders from the environmental groups.”   
Glendening and Ehrlich differed on health care as a priority.  According to the 
senior vice-president of a 501c(6) organization, “Glendening’s office just wasn’t as 
engaged as this governor’s office is on health care.”  Another informant, a vice president 
of a 501c(6) organization concurred, saying: “Glendening wasn’t a health care guy.  I 
don’t want to say he didn’t care about health care, but health care wasn’t on his radar 
screen.  With Ehrlich it is.”   
Glendening and Ehrlich parted ways on other issues.  Glendening opposed 
legalizing slots and constructing the Intercounty Connector, both of which Ehrlich 
strongly supports.  Ehrlich has also pledged to not increase the state sales tax, an action 
Glendening never ruled out. 
The Impact of Turbulence on Legitimacy 
 
Finet (1993) noted that environmental turbulence threatens an organization’s 
legitimacy.  In a turbulent field like Annapolis, the political environment endured a jolt 
and now is characterized by higher levels of dynamism, complexity, and uncertainty than 
before the jolt.  An organization cannot take its organizational legitimacy for granted in 
such a political environment; there are new political stakeholders — with different values 
and priorities than the “old” stakeholders — who now confer or withhold legitimacy. 
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For example, pro-environment, pro-public education, and anti-slots organizations 
enjoyed greater political legitimacy under Glendening than under Ehrlich because these 
issues better reflected Glendening’s interests and values.  Losing legitimacy further 
exacerbates environmental turbulence (Finet, 1993).  Being delegitimized increases the 
distance between an organization and the political stakeholders who occupy the corridors 
of power, as this member of the board of directors of a 501c(3)/501c(4) organization 
noted: “I know the [issue] groups don’t feel that they have nearly as much room at the 
table with this current administration as they did with Glendening.”  According to a co-
chair, the political legitimacy of her 501c(4) organization changed dramatically with the 
jolt of Ehrlich’s election: “Our relationship with the governor’s office went from very 
much a two-way street to a one-way street.  The Ehrlich people don’t even bother to pay 
us lip service.”   
Turbulence may also have positive implications for organizations: If the 
turbulence benefits stakeholders that share an organization’s values, the turbulence may 
improve an organization’s fortunes.  An organization’s increased legitimacy helps to 
calm turbulence in its environment (Finet, 1993); it moves organizations closer to the 
political stakeholders who wield decision-making power.  Agricultural, retail, and pro-
slots organizations have enjoyed greater political legitimacy with Ehrlich in office than 
when Glendening was governor.  The turbulence improved their fortunes.  The executive 
director of a 501c(6) organization said that under the Glendening administration, the 
agriculture industry was neither well received nor invited to participate in policy 
decisions affecting it.  But soon after his election, Ehrlich told this informant and other 
agriculture representatives that they would “have a seat at my table.”  The president of a 
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501c(6) organization said, “I will say that our philosophy about [the issue] is listened to 
more readily with Ehrlich than during the last administration.”  Another informant, the 
president and CEO of a 501c(6) organization, concurred: “There’s a greater sense of 
being on the same wavelength with Ehrlich than with Glendening.” 
Theory Question 2: Worldviews 
I now resume discussion of the theory questions in numerical order.  One popular 
argument countering the notion of objectivity in journalism or social scientific research is 
that an objective human being is a logical impossibility.  Human beings engage in these 
endeavors and thus objectivity in journalism or social scientific research cannot exist.  
Humans are subjective creatures.  A combination of nature and nurture sees to that.  That 
collection of subjectivities comprises what I refer to as a “worldview.”  A person’s 
worldview influences how he or she perceives and engages with the world, his or her 
environment.  Understanding what a person’s worldview is gives clues about what makes 
that person “tick,” why he or she thinks and acts as he or she does.   
Organizations, as aggregations of humans, also have worldviews.  Not all humans 
who aggregate into an organization will possess the same worldview, but the organization 
will adopt and enact one dominant worldview that guides  and facilitates or hinders 
its perceptions of and engagement with the environment.  The organization’s worldview 
is infused throughout its behaviors and communication. 
Per the public relations literature (e.g., J.E. Grunig, 1992), organizations possess 
symmetrically presupposed and asymmetrically presupposed worldviews.  I reiterate here 
what I discussed in Chapter 2 (in the “Worldviews in Public Relations” section).  An 
organization that possesses a symmetrically presupposed worldview is open minded 
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toward and respectful of “others.”  Symmetrically presupposed organizations appreciate 
that they have consequences on others and vice versa.  The appreciation of such 
interdependence obliges them to seek balance among all parties’ interests, which can be 
attempted, if not achieved, through dialogue and collaboration.  A symmetrically 
presupposed worldview enables the organization to embrace its existence as an open 
system and understand that rapport between it and its environment (or rather, 
stakeholders that comprise its environment) constantly needs to be negotiated.  
Symmetrically presupposed organizations also value innovation, equity, autonomy, 
decentralized management, responsibility to others, conflict resolution, and interest-group 
liberalism (J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & White, 1992).  They are concerned with 
their interests but also the interests of others; their motivations are mixed. By contrast, an 
internal orientation, a closed system, efficiency, elitism, conservatism, tradition, and 
centralized authority (J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & White, 1992) mark organizations 
with asymmetrically presupposed worldviews.  These organizations focus on their own 
interests. 
These worldviews are not mutually exclusive.  An organization’s worldview can 
reflect both symmetrical and asymmetrical values.  Thus I will write of an organization’s 
worldview as “defaulting toward symmetry” or “being symmetrically presupposed,” to 
convey that the worldview was a mix of symmetry and asymmetry, but more of the 
former than the latter. 
Following the distinctions I made in the section of Chapter 2 that corresponds to 
Theory Question 2 (“Worldviews in Public Relations), I have delimited my use of the 
term “worldview” to the symmetry or asymmetry of the thinking, communication, and 
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behaviors of informants and organization.  I use the term “cultural topoi” to refer to other 
facets of worldviews, such as the political perspectives, perceptual screens, and 
ideologies of informants and organizations. 
Theory Question 2a 
An organization would not announce on its Web site, “We have a symmetrical (or 
asymmetrical) worldview.”  The organization’s worldview is manifested in many ways 
and through these manifestations the presuppositions of an organization’s worldview can 
be determined.  To answer Theory Question 2a (How do boundary-spanning GRPs 
describe the worldviews of their organizations?), I analyzed the interview data for 
manifestations of an organizational worldview, such as the organization’s willingness to 
meaningfully entertain, perhaps even incorporate, the perspectives of “others” in the 
decision-making process; to delegate authority; to encourage autonomy; to embrace 
innovation and risk; and to engage in dialogue.  From these indicators I could distill the 
degrees of symmetry and asymmetry in the organization’s worldview. 
I never explicitly asked informants, “How would you describe your organization’s 
worldview?”  Yet clues abounded in the interview data about how informants would have 
answered had I asked that.  I originally grouped the interview data into categories such as 
the ability to see multiple perspectives, accept an unfavorable outcome, and give credit to 
an opposing perspective (or person); the collaborative nature of the decision-making 
process for the organization’s (or client’s) government relations efforts; the 
organization’s record of seeking outside input and taking chances on new ideas and 
activities; and the organization’s involvement with unusual coalition partners.  Woven 
throughout these categories were two overarching themes: an organization’s willingness 
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to cede some control over its decisions and activities (as related to government relations 
efforts and as realized through the thoughts and actions of informants and other 
organizational members) and the degree of dexterity exhibited in organizational thought 
and actions (as related to government relations efforts and as realized through the 
thoughts and actions of informants and other organizational members).   
My short answer to this theory question is: 
Organizations held symmetrically presupposed worldviews.  That is, the  
organizations’ worldviews were more symmetrical than asymmetrical.  Further,  
the organizations’ two most critical stakeholders in the political environment  
(viz., the Democrats who controlled the General Assembly and the Republicans  
who controlled the Office of the Governor) held asymmetrically presupposed  
worldviews. 
 
My long answer follows. 
Willingness to Cede Control 
 
Organizations gain control over themselves by first giving up some control (J.E. 
Grunig & White, 1992).  Worldviews influence how organizations engage with strategic 
stakeholders in their environments (Beyer, 1981), and their amenability to doing so (A.D. 
Meyer, 1982).  Excellent organizations, whose worldviews tend toward symmetry, 
embrace active engagement (J.E. Grunig, 1992).  Active engagement requires the 
organization to be open, and even vulnerable, to “others” and their informational inputs 
and perspectives.  When an organization lets others “in,” it is ceding some control over 
itself to those others.  (Doing this may seem altruistic, but there is a degree of self-interest 
at play here too.)  Ceding control is indicative of a symmetrically presupposed 
worldview. 
 Two obvious ways that organizations cede control to external “others” is through 
member outreach and coalitions.  As the state director for a 501c(4) organization said: 
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“There are four main ways to build support for your policies: grassroots outreach, 
coalitions, direct advocacy, and media.  And every one of those is essential.”  I deal here 
with the first two. 
The interview data showed that all informants’ organizations engaged in member 
outreach activities (I discuss these grassroots and grasstops activities in detail in the 
results section for Theory Question 3.)  Houston (2006) wrote: “‘Grassroots’ are not inert 
plant life; they are people, citizens, voters” (para. 14). Rather than having the 
organization’s GRP communicate with elected officials, an organization’s external 
members (i.e., donors to charitable and issue advocacy organizations or owners and 
employees of companies that belong to an industry trade association) communicate 
directly with the elected officials.  This eliminates the GRP as “middle man.”  The goal 
of grassroots outreach activities (such as letter-writing and phone-call campaigns) is for 
rank-and-file external members to leverage their positions as constituents of targeted 
elected officials to an organization’s advantage.  The state director of a 501c(4)’s 
organization description of his organization’s grassroots efforts typifies other 
organizations: “We want our members to communicate with their legislators, through 
phone calls, emails, or written letters.  We’ll go to every member we have in that district 
and ask, ‘Please make a phone call now.’” 
Organizations also encouraged their “grassrooters” to go beyond standard in-
session activities, as the executive director of a 501c(6) organization described: “We 
encourage our members, these people who have an understanding of the legislative 
process, in the off-session period to talk to their legislators in their home offices or even 
invite them to their [company] functions.”  The department director of a 501c(6) 
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organization suggested to his members that they purchase tickets (using their personal 
money) to elected officials’ fundraising events for visibility and networking purposes.    
Informants uniformly embraced the idea of pushing their grassrooters to make 
connections and get “out there.”  Encouraging autonomy is a symmetrical value (J.E. 
Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & White, 1992).  This also demonstrates a willingness and 
ability to cede control.  The vice president of a 501c(6) organization attested: “We want 
all of our members to know their legislators well enough that legislators are calling them, 
rather than them calling their legislators for something.  That’s the kind of relationship 
we want our folks to have.”  One for-contract GRP was confident about his relationships 
with legislators.  He was not worried about his clients becoming known around 
Annapolis, perhaps outshining him: “A lot of clients I want their faces to become known 
as well. . .I want public officials to know their names and faces and make an 
identification with my client and who they are.”  
One informant’s willingness to cede control to his organization’s grassrooters 
surprised me.  Here is why:  Early on in the interview, this executive director of a 501c(6) 
organization avowed himself as a strongly partisan Democrat who neither could nor 
wanted to appreciate the Republican political perspective.  He also alluded to his 
members’ diverse political views and the growing number of Republican members.  He 
was happily wedded to his own cultural topos about politics and seemed to let that drive 
his direct engagement activities with the organization’s political stakeholders.  (A cultural 
topos is the “systematic line of assumptions and arguments that reinforces a preferred 
pattern of social relationships” [Leichty & Warner, 2001, p. 61]).  His personal 
worldview seemed to embrace the past and tradition, which is an asymmetrical value 
226
(J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & White, 1992).  So I was caught off guard when toward 
the end of the interview, he mentioned his efforts to modernize his organization’s 
informal grassroots outreach program.  He was encouraging the grassrooters’ autonomy.  
He acknowledged that as much as he could not function as an open system, the 
organization had to.  These are symmetrical values (J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & 
White, 1992).  Even though he appeared unable on a personal level to appreciate the 
Republican perspective, he was eager for his grassrooters  Republicans and Democrats 
alike  to engage with lawmakers on behalf of the organization.  Political pragmatism 
trumped his partisan tunnel vision: He was willing to cede control over his organization’s 
“message” to messengers who necessarily did not share his political ideology.  Nor did he 
want to lose the valuable informational inputs that may have come from engaging with 
Republican political stakeholders.  These stakeholders he could not bring himself to 
engage with, but he could bring himself to encourage his grassrooters to engage with 
them. 
Informants also reported that their organizations attempted to mobilize the 
grasstops, those external members who have been identified as key contacts for elected 
officials.  Grassrooters are matched to their elected officials by zip code whereas 
grasstoppers are usually identified by inventorying which political VIPs they know and 
how well.  The department director for a 501c(6) organization explained, “We’re careful 
in our political work to make sure that for every elected official that we identify a 
member or group of members in our association that are key contacts for given 
legislators.”  The grasstoppers leverage their renown, connections, or rapport with elected 
officials to the organization’s advantage.   
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Informants also described using members of their organizations (or clients’ 
employees) to testify at bill hearings.  They can offer their personal experiences and 
professional expertise as relevant to a bill.  The typical process, as a department director 
of a 501c(6) organization explained, is, “I’ll usually make an opening remark and then 
say, ‘They [the organization’s members] are here to tell you their own stories.’”  This is 
considered richer testimony than testimony from the organization’s in-house or for-
contract GRP, as the president of a 501c(6) organization noted: “The less testimony I can 
give and the more that my members can give, the better off we are.  Obviously I’m a 
lobbyist; they know I’m a lobbyist.  The legislators know I get paid to speak to them.” 
The senior vice-president of a 501c(6) organization was less enthusiastic about 
the value of member testimony: “We used to have members testify but now I think it’s 
better if I testify.  I’m quicker, more succinct, and can handle things better.  I’ve got the 
credibility and don’t need that member ‘crutch.’”  She thought it was more important for 
the organization’s members to directly contact their elected officials, unless the 
organization needed “some kind of show” at a hearing.  She also noted that bill hearings 
are “crazy”:  “You don’t know when your bill will be called; testimony could be limited 
to one minute.  How do you tell a CEO that he’s got to sit around for eight hours because 
you don’t know when he’ll be called?” 
Several informants cited the difficulties of motivating grassrooters and 
grasstoppers about the political process, including disappointment with the partisan 
political environment in Annapolis, members’ lack of time, and the notoriously difficult 
parking situation in Annapolis.  Part of the allure of belonging to a 501c organization is 
that it works on behalf of members; members delegate their own involvement in the 
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political process to it.  A president of a 501c(6) organization said that some of his 
organization’s members have expressed this to him: “My members have never been eager 
to come to Annapolis.  They say, ‘That’s why we hire you.’”  He told me how he 
responds to them: “‘There are certain things where you have a lot more credibility than I 
do.  I don’t [work in the industry] all day like you do.’”   
Credibility is why organizations use member outreach activities as part of their 
government relations programs, despite the risks to organizations.  When grassroot and 
grasstop members engage with officials, they engage as organizational representatives.  
However, they are not under the organization’s control.  Organizations have to trade off 
credibility with control.  Members may easily deviate from the organization’s message or 
talking points.  This is known as going “off message.”  As the co-chair for a 501c(4) 
organization explained, the Ehrlich administration consistently dismisses the 
organization’s position on an issue by saying, “Well, we understand and respect their 
religious objections to [the issue]  
but. . .”  She insisted that such dismissals are exactly why her organization never injects 
religion into the debate.  Although she encouraged the organization’s members to contact 
their elected officials and be visible in their communities, she discouraged them from 
bringing up the issue’s religious or moral aspects.  The organization requested 
grassrooters only mention these aspects when addressing a religious organization and 
then only if asked.  But all this informant can do is ask the grassrooters to abide by these 
rules.  The organization cannot control, or censor, what its grassrooters say in the field.   
Another problem with grassroots outreach is that members may not heed the 
organization’s calls to action, as the executive director of a 501c(6) organization 
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observed: “I can only ask and I do ask.  But I don’t have a sense of how many people 
listen to me.  Thankfully I have a handful that are very active and can make a difference.”  
Conversely, when people are paid to communicate with elected officials, as in-house and 
for-contract GRPs are, they follow through with the communication. 
What an organization loses in message control by using grassroots members it 
gains in credibility, which goes back to J.E. Grunig and White’s (1992) observation that 
organizations gain control by first giving up some control.  The act or strategy of giving 
up of some control is motivated both by symmetrical values and self-interest, which is an 
asymmetrical value.  From a “real-world” perspective, this is why organizational 
worldviews cannot be exclusively symmetrical or asymmetrical: mixed motives are 
almost unavoidable. 
Elected officials want to hear what their constituents have to say, especially 
constituents who are motivated enough to contact them.  The reasoning is that someone 
who is motivated enough to write a letter or make a phone call is a “likely voter.”  Thus, 
an elected official and his or her staff are wise to listen to what that grassrooter  a
voting constituent  has to say.  Such contact is considered more genuine and credible 
than contact from a paid GRP (either in-house or for-contract) to an elected official.   
I teach my undergraduate public relations students about controlled and 
uncontrolled information.  Examples of controlled information are paid advertisements 
and organizational Web sites.  Organizations control the content, placement, and timing 
of these information conduits.  These conduits carry favorable messages about the 
organization.  Consumers, simultaneously savvy and cynical, may perceive the messages 
as self-serving.  Neither these information conduits nor their messages are considered 
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highly credible.  To combat this, media relations professionals use conduits such as press 
releases and other information subsidies for the media.  As conduits carrying 
uncontrolled information, they ostensibly have more credibility. Once a press release is 
distributed, a media relations professional has little to no control over it: no control over 
if and when a journalist ever writes an article based on that press release, no control over 
where in the journalist’s publication the article would appear, and no editorial control 
over the content or tone of the article.   
Charron (1989) said that journalists have “veto power” in the media relations 
game because “they determine the fate of the message” (p. 50).  The organization has no 
control over the form of any news coverage that a press release may generate.  But the 
upside is that any news coverage that press release does generate may be perceived as 
more credible than an advertisement.  This credibility may be stem from the implied 
third-party endorsement effect of media (which, although a tidy theory, has fallen into 
disfavor), and people’s favorable perceptions of the news and unfavorable perceptions of 
advertising (Hallahan, 1999).  
Media relations professionals often reconcile maintaining control over messages 
while maximizing the perceived credibility of sources and messages by using a mixture 
of uncontrolled and controlled information conduits.  GRPs confront a similar dilemma:  
Member outreach offers less control but more credibility whereas direct advocacy offers 
more control but less credibility.  GRPs reconcile this by frequently pairing member 
outreach and direct advocacy activities.   
Coalitions are another way organizations cede control to others.  Coalitions form 
when two or more organizations collaborate on a common goal.  Sometimes a group of 
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friendly competitors, such as “sister” environmental or business 501c(4) organizations, 
may band together to speak with one voice on an issue.  Sometimes coalitions are 
comprised of “strange bedfellows,” organizations that otherwise have nothing in 
commonthey may even oppose each other on some issues but whose interests may 
converge on an issue.   
Trade associations (501c[6] organizations) are themselves coalitions of 
competitor organizations in an industry.  They pool their resources to present a united 
front.  A member organization of a trade association has chosen to not go it alone in the 
political environment in favor of ceding some control over its own destiny for the sake of 
the greater good of the industry.  They trade off some of their autonomy to the trade 
association as a way to furthering their self-interests via the association.  This also 
represents these organizations’ acknowledgments that they exist as open systems and 
they have responsibilities to others in its industry.  These are symmetrical values (J.E. 
Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & White, 1992).  An executive director of a 501(6) 
organization alluded to this: “There is a leap of faith when you join a trade association 
that the association is going to work in the best interests of the industry and of your own 
company.”  Thus trade associations, which are comprised of member organizations that 
are amenable to ceding control, are the products of the symmetrically presupposed 
worldviews of their member organizations. 
The interview data showed that informants’ organizations worked in coalitions in 
some capacity.  Several informants described their organizations’ involvement in 
formally organized coalitions that included sister organizations.  A state director said that 
the members of a coalition his 501c(4) organization is part of constantly share 
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information at and outside of the regular meetings.  Informants from sister organizations 
shared his positive assessment of this coalition. 
Informants reported that their organizations worked with other organizations in 
loosely organized coalitions.  The executive director of a 501c(6) organization described 
her organization’s collaboration with other industry trade associations: “It doesn’t go 
over well to go against your ‘sisters’ and be an outlier.  What affects one usually affects 
us all.  We try to go in the same direction with the same message but we’re not in 
complete lockstep.”  A department director described how her 501c(6) organization and 
its sister organization worked together in a “tight” coalition about half of the time.  
Although it was rare for her organization to work against its sister, not so with other 
members of the expanded version of this coalition: “Sometimes we’ll bring in [other 
organizations] to expand our coalition.  And as often as we’re together with [those other 
organizations] the other half of the time we’re opposing them.”  Her statement 
exemplifies the clichéd political truism of “no permanent friends, no permanent 
enemies.”  I will discuss this truism in an upcoming subsection. 
I asked informants to relate their organizations’ experiences with another clichéd 
political truism, “Politics makes for strange bedfellows.”  What the department director 
of a 501c(6) organization described in the preceding paragraph only hints at what strange 
bedfellows truly are.  Strange bedfellows are former speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Newt Gingrich and U.S. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton.  They 
announced their joint efforts on health care legislation at a 2005 press conference 
(Milbank, 2005).  Then there are world famous rock star-cum-political activist Bono and 
former U.S. Senator Jesse Helms, whose strange bedfellow-ship was forged over 
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concerns about the AIDS epidemic in Africa (Hocking, 2005).  Collaborating with 
strange bedfellows indicates not only a willingness to forego some organizational 
autonomy, but a responsibility to others, an acknowledgement of being an open system, 
and desire for conflict resolution.  These are all symmetrical values (J.E. Grunig, 1989; 
J.E. Grunig & White, 1992).   
Did my informants’ organizations ever work with strange bedfellows?  My 
interview data showed they did, even on a regular basis, and in fact were proud of this.  
Some seemed to delight in the shock value of strange bedfellows.  A department director 
for a 501c(6) organization said: “There was this one coalition; people just looked in 
shock.  It was the first time they ever saw [the pro-issue] interests and [the anti-issue] 
people on the same piece of legislation!  People were just scratching their heads.”  
Beyond a coalition’s shock value and its standard advantages (e.g., pooled resources and 
strength in numbers), a coalition of strange bedfellows offers enhanced credibility.  The 
president and CEO of a 501c(6) organization found that coalitions with the usual suspects 
did not surprise anyone, but showing up at “a hearing arm in arm with [strange 
bedfellows], people go: ‘Whoa!  Something’s different!’  And the credibility factor is 
enhanced considerably.”  Again, organizations will cede some control over their destinies 
when there is a likely and significant return on investment (ROI), such as enhanced 
credibility, that furthers their self-interest. 
Were organizations that had not collaborated with strange bedfellows in coalitions 
open to the possibility?  Based on some informants’ direct answers and the general 
outreach efforts of organizations, I believe that all but two organizations would 
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collaborate with strange bedfellows if the situation called for it.  I will discuss the 
exceptions first. 
Strong partisanship negatively affected the scope of an organization’s outreach 
efforts and thus its amenability to working with strange bedfellows.  I again offer the 
experiences of the strong partisan Democrat executive director of a 501c(6) organization 
(whose encouragement of member outreach activities surprised me).  He was one of two 
informants who did not describe personally engaging in any organizational outreach 
efforts that crossed partisan lines.  He summed up his organization’s outreach efforts: “So 
I guess now all I do is work with the Democrats because they’re in power [in the General 
Assembly].”  Further, he summarily dismissed the notion of his reaching out and getting 
involved in bipartisan efforts.  When asked if he would be willing to participate in an 
executive branch-level bipartisan commission relevant to his organization, he replied, 
“No, I believe that it has a politically motivated and skewed view of [the issue] and I 
really don’t have any desire to be involved with them.”   His organization’s worldview 
cannot help but be affected by his stridently partisan cultural topos that he de facto 
imposes on it.  In fact, his cultural topos was the main reason why I judged the 
organization’s worldview to be the least symmetrically presupposed of them all.  The 
result of having an asymmetrically presupposed worldview (and resulting asymmetrically 
presupposed communication and behaviors) is that his organization depends on, and 
remains in the shadow of, sister organizations that reach out across political party lines.  
However, the worldview was asymmetrically presupposed, not purely asymmetrical.  
That the organization engaged in member outreach efforts suggested symmetrical values.  
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I could not resist asking this informant about an as-yet hypothetical jolt: What 
would you and your organization do if Republicans controlled the General Assembly?  
He said with a laugh, “Suicide is one of my first thoughts!” and then continued more 
seriously: “If the Republicans were to come into power [in the General Assembly] we 
would just have to fight and fight and fight.  Maybe try to get a higher visibility on issues 
and our work.”  Although this hypothetical jolt would prompt him to engage more with 
strategic political stakeholders, the engagement would be confrontational, not 
collaborative.  The former is an asymmetrical engagement strategy; the latter is 
symmetrical.   
In discussing their outreach efforts, informants routinely used the words 
“bipartisan” and “nonpartisan.”  The terms should not be used interchangeably, although 
they often are.  The best way I can illustrate how informants parsed the differences 
between the terms is this:  A bipartisan organization would donate money (not 
necessarily equal amounts) to the Republican and Democrat candidates for an elected 
office whereas a nonpartisan organization would donate to neither candidate. 
Many informants’ organizations subscribed to bipartisanship.  Informants were 
well aware of party affiliations and which political party they and their organizations 
were perceived as being friendlier with.  As such, bipartisan informants took care to reach 
out and collaborate with officials who belonged to the “other” party.  As the department 
director for a 501c(4) organization explained: “We try to secure Republican sponsors as 
well as Democrats; we just don’t get a lot of takers.  It’s always good to have at least 
some sponsors from both parties, if it’s possible.”  A for-contract GRP also spoke of 
reaching across party lines: “I’ve alluded to my clients’ sympathies for Republicans, but I 
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still have to have meaningful relationships with Democrats.  One client actively 
participates in Republican politics but we make sure he’s seen as supporting the 
[Democrat] leadership in the legislature.”  Given the political environment in Annapolis, 
none of the informants wanted their organizations labeled, or worse boxed in, as 
“Democrat” or “Republican.”  As I discussed in the findings for Theory Question 5, some 
organizations did get boxed in, which presented challenges for their informants and other 
boundary-spanning personnel. 
Nonpartisanship helped informants and their organizations transcend the partisan 
fray, up to a point.  It seems to be a way for them to resolve conflict, or rather, to pre-
emptively avert becoming embroiled in the partisan conflicts in Annapolis.3 According 
to a department director, she and her 501c(6) organization are better off being 
nonpartisan: “It’s the best of both worlds. We don’t have a PAC, we don’t attend 
fundraisers, we don’t take people out for meals.  We enjoy the benefits of not taking 
sides.  Taking sides can come back to haunt you.”  Nearly all the informants touched on 
this, that taking sides, being labeled, or being seen as in someone’s pocket caused trouble.  
(I explore this theme with greater detail later in this chapter.)  Informants’ comments 
about taking sides included:  
• A for-contract GRP: “It gets little tricky dealing with both sides but you have to 
be able to do it.”  
 
• An associate director of a 501c(6) organization: “A legislator may not agree with 
us, but it’s very important that they don’t sense that we’ve got a political agenda 
with respect to we’re favoring Republicans or Democrats.”  
 
• A department director of a 501(6) organization: “You have to be aware of the way 
the political winds shift here or you won’t be successful.  We do sometimes find 
ourselves with feet on both sides of the fence.”   
 
3 501c(3) organizations, by definition and by law, must be nonpartisan (IRS, 2004). 
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One informant, whose personal politics leaned left but whose organization and 
coalition partners leaned right, described a situation that sounded like he was “in the 
closet,” pretending to lean right so he would not be “outed” as a left-leaner: “Our 
coalitions are thick with conservatives.  I just shut my mouth and do my job. . .I’ll go 
meet with Democrats.  Nobody’s picked up on that.  I’ve explained it away as, ‘Hey, we 
work with him on other issues.’” 
Nonpartisans see elected officials as just that  elected officials  and without 
party labels.  A for-contract GRP said: “It doesn’t matter to me whether they’re a 
Republican or a Democrat or what have you.  They’re a legislator and I’m a lobbyist.  I 
see them as legislators and I don’t make any distinction Democrat or Republican.”  They 
also see their clients as just clients, as a for-contract GRP said: “I don’t represent 
Republican clients or Democrat clients.  I represent clients.  I’ve got some bleeding hearts 
and some smokestack industries.  I try to be nonpartisan and my client list is all over the 
board.”  A member of the board of directors marveled at the ability of her 
501c(3)/501c(4) organization’s in-house GRP to get along with everybody regardless of 
party affiliation: “I guess lobbyists think they can work with anybody.”  A department 
director of a 501c(6) organization declared: “I try to make friends on both sides of the 
aisle.  I just want to be buddies with everybody just in case.” 
Informants described the ways they reached out to stakeholders in the political 
environment on behalf of their organizations.  The ROI of outreach was realized in the 
increased visibility of informant and the organization, stronger connections, and better 
intelligence-gathering.  The additional ROI was the increased flow of quality information 
that would positively contribute to organizational decision-making (Aldrich, 1979; 
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Terreberry, 1968).  Outreach is motivated by self-interest, an asymmetrical value, but it 
also is motivated by the symmetrical values of acknowledging their functioning as an 
open system and responsibilities to others (J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & White, 
1992).  Informants recounted attending meetings of non-coalition collaborators, as the 
executive director of a 501c(6) organization) reported: “I’d attend the public meetings of 
the [region of Maryland] delegation, just to hear what’s going on.  Most of the people I 
knew anyway but it was important to be there, to be seen, to show an interest.”  
Sometimes the ROI was unexpected: A department director stumbled upon an unfounded 
malicious rumor about her 501c(3) organization while attending the meeting of a 
community group “just to hear what they’re saying.”  
Outreach has asymmetrical and symmetrical motivations.  Informants also 
reported attending routine executive-branch agency meetings during both the Glendening 
and Ehrlich administrations.  The ROI for attending these meetings was not clear; yet 
informants continued to attend unproductive meetings, all in the name of outreach.  
Doing so testified that these organizations were committed to functioning as an open 
system, a symmetrical value (J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & White, 1992), and being 
interdependent with these stakeholders.  But doing so also testified that organizations 
were not going to give up on trying to be of consequence, to have influence and true 
voice, to these stakeholders.  They were not going to give up on trying to further their 
self-interests.  The state director of a 501c(4) organization critiqued the quarterly 
executive-branch agency meeting he attends: “We have these stiff meetings where there’s 
an exchange of information. . .I don’t know how productive they are, though.  I don’t 
know how much they’ll really lead to but I’m glad to be a part of them anyway.” 
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Informants expressed similar sentiments about their participation in state-level 
task forces.  The advantage most often realized is not that their recommendations are 
implemented but that participation in them, as a department director said, “expands your 
base.”  The interactions between his 501c(6) organization and an opposition group 
warmed up because of their involvement in a task force.  The president of a 501c(3) 
organization laughed when I asked him about participating in task forces.  When 
prompted, he explained: “They make big recommendations about whatever the issue is, 
but they’re rarely implemented.  So the actual benefits are difficult to discern except for 
the relationships you make with the other people who serve.”  
 Many legislators live in downtown Annapolis hotels during the 90-day legislative 
session.  Many GRPs follow suit, as this for-contract GRP noted: “Many lobbyists stay at 
hotels, too.  I stay at [hotel’s name] and every morning and evening I’m with a whole 
group of legislators that I can talk to.  You can’t help but talk to them.” 
 Socializing is a major component of informants’ outreach efforts.  One for-
contract GRP joked: “Once every blue moon I actually eat a meal by myself.  Not many 
meals but I do.  That’s why I get so fat!”  Another for-contract GRP noted that being 
personable and extroverted is helpful.  A good GRP, he said, needs to be out and about: 
“Just being around, it’s so hands-on down here that it just lends itself to happening.  
You’re around; they’re around.”   
 I would describe one informant’s efforts to reach out as near pathological, but in a 
good sense.  Whatever he is doing works because this for-contract GRP is effective and 
successful.  He either belongs to or attends meetings of organizations that are “breeding 
grounds” for future state-level elected officials.  He is active in charity organizations and 
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political campaigns.  His outreach efforts are non-stop; as he told me, they are 
“24/7/365.”  I encourage readers to read this block quote for its illumination of the 
workings of this informant’s mind: 
For years, I’ve been networking and getting to know people all over the state. 
Maryland is a small, manageable state.  It’s one where you can run into people.  I 
give time and attention to people from the beginning.  They may be an intern or a 
staff aide.  That state trooper on the detail you meet could be the superintendent of  
the state police someday; you don’t know.  As you go through life, you keep up 
the relationships.  They’re genuine, not “user” relationships.  And maybe 
someday these people who I’ve known from the beginning become a senator or 
delegate or key staffer in the governor’s office. So when people come onto the 
scene, I know them to some extent and don’t have to start off “cold.” 
 
I can attest to the veracity of his claims.  For Valentine’s Day in 1992, this 
informant sent boxes of good-quality chocolates to every intern (including me) and 
secretary in the Maryland General Assembly and governor’s office.  (I belatedly thanked 
him for his gift during the interview.)   
Nothing in the interview data about organizations’ outreach efforts caused me to 
suspect that these efforts were motivated purely by organizational self-interest.  Of course 
such asymmetrical values were part of organizations’ motivations, but so were 
symmetrical values. A president expressed pride in his 501c(6) organization’s 
collaboration with an opponent organization: “It’s had a significant payoff.  They know 
we’re not evil and we don’t think they’re stupid.  Their ED [executive director] and I 
often run things by each other now.  Everybody’s better off when it’s a two-way street.”  
This reflects the organization’s genuine desire to build bridges and expose itself to 
others’ perspectives; it reflects the organization’s symmetrically presupposed worldview.  
But building bridges and having a breadth of perspectives, although commendable and 
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useful by-products of engagement, were not organizational ends; they were means to 
organizational ends: furthering its self-interest. 
The executive director of a 501c(6) organization appreciated that the behavior of 
other organizations became more symmetrically presupposed after Ehrlich’s election: 
“We’ve had more positive contact with [organization] in the past couple years than ever 
before.  We have a working relationship now whereas before that wouldn’t have 
happened.  So they’ve changed; maybe they realize that we’re not the enemy.”  He did 
wonder, however, if these groups would “go back to their old habits” if a Democrat is 
elected in the 2006 election.  
Informants’ semantic and phrasing choices corroborated my analysis that their 
outreach efforts were symmetrically motivated, but again, my analysis is that their 
symmetrical motivations were means to organizations’ ends.  The executive director of a 
501c(6) organization spoke of  “having a dialogue” with people who did not agree with 
him philosophically.  A department director of a 501c(4) organization spoke of “building 
bridges” to the executive branch.  A department director of a 501c(6) organization said 
his dialogic engagement with an executive-branch agency involved conflict resolution: 
“Usually things are very cooperative and collegial.  We’ll negotiate with them when we 
have a problem with the way they’re doing things or vice versa.”  The president of a 
501c(6) organization pointed out, “We as an industry can be part of the solution and not 
part of the problem if we work together.”  A for-contract GRP alluded to searching for a 
happy medium as a way to resolve conflict: “You’ve got to find a combination of issues 
that can make the legislators happy and keep your client from going down the tubes at the 
same time.”   
242
The interview data revealed an unexpected theme related to symmetry: Informants 
professed disappointment and frustration over situations where they perceived lawmakers 
and staff to be disingenuous, uncommunicative, secretive, purposely unproductive, 
biased, closed minded, strident, dogmatic, partisan, and even mean.  I have interpreted 
their distaste for asymmetrically presupposed behaviors and attitudes in the processes that 
are means for furthering organizational self-interest as a preference for symmetrically 
presupposed behaviors and attitudes.  Arguably, an expressed or implied preference for 
symmetry means that an informant (and its organization) likely has a symmetrically 
presupposed worldview.  Research on personality self-evaluation finds that the 
personality traits that people like in themselves are often the same traits they like to see in 
others (Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002).   
Several informants were on the receiving end of asymmetrically presupposed 
behaviors emanating from the Glendening administration, and they did not appreciate it.  
Some resented the Glendening administration’s perceived intentional exclusion of their 
industries’ input from policies that affected them.  The executive director of a 501c(6) 
organization voiced this resentment, saying, “His administration’s treatment of our 
industry didn’t go over very well.”   Others found both Glendening (as a person) and his 
administration to be close-minded and dismissive.  The president and CEO of a 501c(3) 
organization, whose personal political sympathies lie with Democrats but who viewed 
Ehrlich’s election neutrally, said that Glendening and his staff refused to “entertain any 
discussions” of a social program before or after its funding was eliminated.  To contrast, 
Ehrlich and his staff’s open-minded behavior heartened this same informant: They “met 
with us, listened to us, and eventually acted to restore the program.  Even with all the 
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budget problems in the state, they’ve never even considered re-eliminating it.”  This 
informant appreciated that his organization’s symmetrically presupposed efforts toward 
political stakeholders were reciprocally met. 
Counter to this compliment, the interview data were rife with complaints about 
the asymmetrically presupposed behavior of Ehrlich and his staff.  A co-chair lamented 
her 501c(4) organization’s “one-way relationship” with the Ehrlich administration.  The 
executive director of a 501c(3)/501c(4) organization observed of the Ehrlich 
administration: “They’re high maintenance. . .There’s just not that two-way relationship 
and other lobbyists would say the same thing.  It’s a difficult way to work.  They require 
a lot of work.”  A senior vice-president of a 501c(6) organization faulted the Ehrlich 
administration for not being more upfront: “Ehrlich never tells anybody he’s against them 
until it’s over.  I just don’t think they know how to communicate about things.”   
Based on these and other statements from informants, informants perceived that 
the Ehrlich administration did not seem to acknowledge its interdependence with many of 
its critical stakeholders.  It did not acknowledge that it should exist in Annapolis as an 
open system.  It also seemed to value centralized authority.  These are all asymmetrical 
values (J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & Repper, 1992). 
Informants also expressed sentiments (not directed at the Glendening or Ehrlich 
administration) that indicated a preference for symmetrically presupposed behavior and 
attitudes.  The associate director of a 501c(6) organization appreciated dealing with 
people who could, for example, “make an argument from their slant, but they’ll still tell 
you the truth.  And if you ever need to get information from someone, those are the 
people to go to.” 
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“Breadth of Perspective” in Organizational Decision-Making 
 
As I noted in Chapter 2, GRPs and their organizations have much to gain from 
engaging with stakeholders that hold cultural topoi different from their own (Leichty & 
Warner, 2001; Springston et al., 1992).  This “breadth of perspective” (Culbertson, 1989, 
p. 3) contributes to the effectiveness and success of both GRPs and their organizations.  
Seeking breadth of perspective demonstrates that an organization has a responsibility to 
others and to appreciate and consider their interests.  Engaging in meaningful dialogue 
takes commitment, time, and hard work.  These symmetrical values may undermine the 
asymmetrical value of efficiency, the organization’s ability to forge ahead without 
outside “interference.”  Opting for dialogue over efficiency is an indication that the 
organization is symmetrically motivated.  But again, organizations are not motivated by 
pure altruism; they want a return on their investment.  Organizations may opt for 
dialogue, thereby sacrificing efficiency, to ultimate gain efficiency. 
The members of one department director’s 501c(6) organization were a diverse 
lot.  The same issue might benefit some members but harm others.  Before the 
organization takes an official position on such an issue, the informant and his government 
relations colleagues mediate among the members.  He reported that more often than not, 
after some give and take, consensus about what to do would be achieved.  Informants 
from other 501c(6) organization organizations described similar situations. 
 When an organization’s outreach activities are symmetrically motivated, as 
almost all of my informants indicated was the case, the organization is interested in 
seeking input from extra-organizational others.  I believe I have sufficiently covered this 
theme already.  But what about the willingness and follow-through to bring other internal 
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perspectives into the organization’s decision-making processes?  In these next 
paragraphs, I present the informants’ stories, in their words, about the participatory nature 
of and their role in those processes, as well as the degree of autonomy they enjoyed.  
These stories are evidence that organizations do understand the concept of giving 
something up to get something in the end (J.E. Grunig & White 1992).  They chose the 
symmetrical values of decentralized management, responsibility to others, conflict 
resolution, and autonomy over the efficiency that centralized authority offers. 
 Organizations typically had at least one formal decision-making body — such as a 
board of directors, an executive committee, or a legislative committee or council — that 
was responsible for government relations-related decisions.  Informants universally were 
integral members of these bodies.  This was true for in-house and for-contract GRPs.  
GRPs are organizational liaisons to the outside and for them to be included in 
organizational decision-making indicates a symmetrically presupposed worldview (J.E. 
Grunig, 1992).   
 A president and CEO’s description of his 501c(6) organization’s decision-making 
process as “highly consultative” describes the process of nearly all of the other 
organizations as well.  The organizations’ decision-making processes followed a basic 
pattern.  The informant was responsible for identifying and analyzing a relevant bill.  He 
or she would then make recommendations about the organization’s position and possible 
action strategies.  Once the organizational body decided how to proceed, the informant 
would execute organizational strategies.  The board of directors or executive or 
legislative committee would leave implementation up to the professionals.   
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The legislative director of a 501c(6) organization explained his organization’s 
process.  He and the legislative committee would meet several times during the 
legislative session to discuss the bills he deemed relevant, sometimes upwards of 60 bills 
per meeting.  The committee would vote on the organization’s positions and then would 
turn everything over to him: “I tell them about the bill and they vote.  I’ll admit that I lean 
on them for the position I think is best for the organization. . .Then I go get the job done.”    
Members of the legislative council of one 501c(6) organization had more say 
about what is relevant.  Although the senior vice-president described this organization as 
“staff driven to a large degree,” many times the members of the legislative council would 
put their imprimatur on her government relations work plan: “I’ll put a draft proactive 
work plan in front of them and say, ‘We need to focus on these ten things.’  And they’ll 
tweak this list usually by adding not subtracting things.”  The legislative council left it to 
her and her colleagues to execute the work plan.   
A president described his understanding with his 501c(6) organization’s 
legislative committee: “The committee determines our position on a bill.  I’ll advise them 
but they’ll often ignore me.  They make the decisions on issues but they never tell me 
how to lobby.  The members have always honored that.”  One for-contract GRP’s 
experiences with his clients typified that of other for-contract GRPs: “We’ll give them 
our recommendations and jointly talk through positions and strategy.  If they okay it, we 
go implement it.  But they don’t say, ‘Go talk to Delegate So-and-So about this.’”   
One variation of this pattern had the decision-making bodies dictating the 
strategies.  But it was up to the informants to figure out the how, who, what, where, and 
when of implementing the plan.  The legislative director of a 501c(6) organization 
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described this pattern: “They’ll either follow our recommendation or send us in a 
different direction.  They chart our course and then we carry out their wishes in terms of 
us delivering testimony, going to hearings, and so forth.”   
 The 501c(3) organization of one president and CEO said the principle of 
participatory decision-making guides all aspects of organizational life: “We believe that 
democracy ought to be part of the workplace.  We’ve created very complicated 
mechanisms to include people in making the decisions that impact their work and our 
organization.”  All of the organization’s employees, not just the members of the board of 
directors, have a say about the organization’s decisions on government relations (and 
everything else).  This is important, given that another guiding principle of the 
organization integrates service and advocacy into the work of every employee.  Thus 
employees of this symmetrically presupposed organization have a say in the decisions 
about the government relations strategies that they are expected to put into action.   
I found that the most democratic organization was a 501c(6) organization whose 
entire membership controls what issues to focus on and what positions to take.  The 
assistant executive director explained: “As our policy-making body, our members can 
virtually pass any kind of policy they want.  And then this association would have to 
support it.”  The members do look to this informant and her colleagues for information 
about issues, but not recommendations.  When I expressed surprise at this, she responded: 
“This is a very democratic organization, one of the most representative that you’ll find 
anywhere.  We would never go to the members and say, ‘We think this is what you 
should do.’ Nope!”  She explained that the members do not enjoy much professional 
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autonomy and so they take full advantage of exercising control within their professional 
association.   
Most other organizations seemed to be participatory democracies as well, but to 
nowhere near the degree of the two organizations just profiled.  Informants revealed they 
sought input from organizational members who were not employees or involved with 
legislative or executive committees.  Some informants said that their organizations would 
survey members about legislative issues and invite them to submit ideas for the 
organization’s legislative agenda.  The executive director of a 501c(6) organization said 
he regularly meets with members, “to listen to them so we can come up with an agenda 
that resonates with them.” 
This 501c(6) organization’s sense of democracy filters down into the government 
relations department.  The department director explained how she and a team of in-house 
GRPs develop and execute the strategies on the positions decided by the organization’s 
membership.  She and her team routinely collaborated: “Whenever there’s a decision or a 
strategy to be made, we’ll convene even if it’s on a stairwell or marching around the State 
House and off we go with whatever decision we’ve made.”  But what she was most proud 
of was the diversity of her team: “Each one of these people is very, very different and 
offers a different perspective and different talent.  So when we work together and make 
decisions as a group, frankly we’re hard to beat.” 
Also on the point of including diverse viewpoints in decision-making, several 
informants noted that their trade associations took great care to ensure that all members 
are represented fairly on government relations decision-making bodies.  A department 
director said there are two types of members in his trade association.  Each controls half 
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of the seats on the legislative committee so “they have an equal voice.”  They have 
chosen the symmetrical value of equity over the asymmetrical value of efficiency.  An 
executive director admitted that his 501c(6) organization’s board of directors was so large 
that it was nearly unworkable.  But he said that was the inevitable outcome of making 
sure that all sectors of the industry had input on government relations and other 
organizational matters.  These are examples of Weick’s (1979) concept of requisite 
variety within the organization.  The  organizations’ decision-making bodies are designed 
to be microcosms that reflect the organizations’ general membership.  This adds to these 
bodies’ breadth of perspective. 
Two informants’ descriptions of their organizations’ decision-making processes 
deviated from the basic pattern.  One 501c(4) organization organization’s members were 
small in number but great in dedication.  The co-chair reported that she and the other co-
chair were the organizational decision-makers.  She said, “We are a top-down 
organization in most respects,” but she pointed out that they welcomed new ideas.  They 
valued centralized authority over dececentralized authority, but they also embraced the 
symmetrical values of responsibility to others and autonomy.  They encouraged people to 
come up with ideas for the organization but requested that they take responsibility for 
implementing those ideas.  However, she and her co-chair ultimately decided the 
direction and activities of the organization. 
The general decision-making process at a department director’s 501c(3)/ 501c(4) 
organization has changed in recent years, because of a situation unrelated to Ehrlich’s 
election.  The process was more layered than before, which increased the centralization 
of the process and impinged on the autonomy of this informant and his immediate 
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colleagues.  However, his organization frequently worked through a formal coalition 
comprised of sister organizations.  He said approval for the organization’s participation in 
the coalition had to be “run pretty high up the flagpole.”  Because the approval 
functioned like a “blanket” approval for the coalition’s activities, he does not need to 
seek organizational approval for every coalition activity.  The initial approval was 
sufficient and having secured that has restored some of his autonomy. 
It was evident from descriptions of their organization’s decision-making 
processes that all informants enjoyed great, but varying, degrees of autonomy in their 
jobs.  They were wholly responsible for making small yet important decisions related to 
communication and tactical strategies.  For example, if the legislative committee’s 
decision required them to mount a grassroots campaign, the informants had the autonomy 
to decide if it would be a letter or telephone campaign and which legislators would be 
targeted.  Informants wrote their own testimony and decided how and whom to lobby.   
Legislative committees also functioned autonomously, but this depended on the 
time of year.  When the Maryland legislature was out of session and there was some 
luxury of time, informants worked with their organizations’ legislative committees to 
develop strategic plans for the next legislative session.  Another organizational body, 
such as a board of directors or executive committee, might need to approve this plan.  
Alternatively, the board of directors and the legislative committee might work together to 
develop and approve a work plan, as the department director of a 501c(6) organization 
explained: “The legislative committee sets the legislative agenda.  They can either make 
recommendations to the board or they can take some of the board’s recommendations and 
hammer them into a legislative agenda.  Usually a little bit of both happens.”   
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In the fast pace of the 90-day legislative session, there is no luxury of time.  Thus 
during the legislative session, most organizations ceded control to informants and 
legislative committees to make on-the-spot decisions about, for example, what position to 
take on a bill dropped in the hopper on the 23rd day of session and what actions to take. 
The committee chair of a 501c(4) organization and the committee chair of a 
501c(6) organization held organizational positions that allowed them a great deal of 
autonomy but which also entailed great responsibility.  Like all of the informants, both 
were members of their organizations’ dominant coalitions on government relations 
matters.  I am singling out these informants because they were volunteers.  They were 
grassroots members of their organizations who paid organizational employees  
considered fellow, albeit unpaid, employees.  They performed functions for their 
organizations that other organizations employed in-house or for-contract GRPs to do.  
Both informants mentioned that the efforts of other unpaid  and equally dedicated 
members who function as staff were indispensable to their organizations’ smooth 
operations.  Clearly, these two organizations are comfortable in ceding control.   
Hiring a for-contract GRP is also indicative of an organization that is comfortable 
with ceding control.  Such an organization realizes that it cannot accomplish its political 
goals without the benefit of outside counsel.  To make progress toward its goals, the 
organization has to turn itself over to someone who can make and direct progress for it.  
To gain control, the organization must first cede control.  As I have presented here, 
organizations do so willingly and in a variety of ways. 
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Evidence of a “Dexterous” Mind 
 
The willingness to cede control to others is evidence of the existence of what I 
have termed a “dexterous” mind.  This was the second theme woven throughout the 
original data-coding categories.  A person (or organization) who possesses a dexterous 
mind has the mental agility to carefully consider and appreciate multiple perspectives, 
cultural topoi, and the concept of requisite variety.  A dexterous mind is open, flexible, 
and nimble; and I believe indicates a symmetrically presupposed worldview.   
The opposite of dexterous mind is one that is leaden.  Its thinking is absolutist and 
entrenched.  “Unsophisticated” is an antonym for dexterous but it does not describe 
accurately any of my informants or their organizations.  An antonym that does accurately 
describe some of them is “doctrinaire.”   
Only a few informants espoused doctrinaire thoughts about people and issues.  
Their organizations’ engagement with stakeholders in the political environment reflected 
their doctrinaire thinking.  But did the informants and their organizations remain 
doctrinaire given the jolt of Ehrlich’s election?  I will address this in a subsequent 
section.  But first I will discuss my finding that nearly all of the informants possessed 
high degrees of dexterous thinking, which was reflected in their organizations’ 
engagement with the political environment.  I already have presented much evidence 
about the appreciation for multiple perspectives of informants and their organizations as 
related to outreach, participatory decision-making processes, and autonomy.  I present 
here interview data that illuminate the dexterous-mind theme in other ways. 
Reaching out, seeking input, collaborating on decisions:  All of these indicate an 
appreciation of multiple perspectives.  A dexterous mind perceives and interprets the 
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world in shades of gray, indicative of the symmetrical value of responsibility to others.  A 
doctrinaire mind perceives and interprets the world in black and white.  As the president 
of a 501c(6) organization (who had a dexterous mind) self-deprecated: “I realized that 
there’s no one right answer to anything.  So the larger issues I recognize as issues about 
which I only have partial information.  I don’t proselytize so much anymore.”   
Sometimes shades of gray required informants to detach themselves from their 
personal cultural topoi so their organizations could optimally engage with stakeholders.  
A department director said the members of his 501c(6) organization held conflicting 
personal and professional opinions on some divisive issues: “Deep down most of us feel 
[the issue] is a good idea but we’re not in a position to support it.  So trying to decide 
what to do about those things is difficult but we work through them.”  A president said 
that his 501c(6) organization helped its members to see the big picture: “Sometimes a 
member company can’t see beyond itself.  It sees the issue vis-à-vis itself and not the 
industry.  So it’s difficult for a member to take a broad look at how things impact 
everyone.  We help them do that.”  
The interview data showed that informants gave credit where and when it was 
due, even to people whom they disliked.  The president of a 501c(4) organization 
admitted that he “was not a fan of Glendening” but complimented Glendening’s skill at 
hiring “very professional, very substantive, very responsive, very easily engaged, very 
upfront, very competent” aides.  The department director of a 501c(6) organization 
reported that no love was lost between Ehrlich and her organization.  Yet she conceded 
that Ehrlich had largely done right by her organization’s issues: “I think what’s fair is 
fair.  Knowing what he’s done for [the issue], we have to give him his due and treat him 
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appropriately.”  Her colleague, an assistant executive director, similarly gave Ehrlich his 
due.   
Several informants who identified themselves as Democrats put politics aside 
when they told me that they appreciated having a two-party government in Maryland.  
This comment from the state director of a 501c(6) organization typified others’ 
sentiments: “I think however many years of one-party domination wasn’t good for 
Maryland. . .Personally, I think it’s good to have some divided government.”   
Not surprisingly, many Republican informants liked that two parties now 
controlled the state government, specifically because the Democrats no longer controlled 
both the executive and legislative branches.  One 501c(6) organization’s executive 
director elaborated on the problems Democrats caused when they controlled two 
branches of Maryland’s government.  Knowing he was Republican, I could not resist 
asking what he thought about Republican control of the White House and the U.S. 
Congress.  He asserted that the Republicans’ control of the federal government was 
categorically different than the Democrats’ formerly complete control of the state 
government.  He explained how he reconciled the incongruity of his two opinions.  The 
mental gymnastics this entailed eventually convinced me that he did indeed possess a 
dexterous mind. 
By contrast, I again highlight the partisan Democrat executive director of a 
501c(6) organization.  His doctrinaire attitudes about Republicans leached into the 
thinking and behavior of his organization, as I have discussed.  He was absolutely unable 
to give Ehrlich, a Republican, credit for anything: “I can think of nothing positive that’s 
come out of the Ehrlich administration.  Anything positive I give credit to the legislature 
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for making it happen.”  This informant long ago raised his glass of partisan Kool-Aid to 
toast the idea of “Democrats good, Republicans bad.”  His doctrinaire thinking will not 
allow him to put his glass down.  
Most informants and their organizations demonstrated that they were flexible and 
could successfully handle jolts (like Ehrlich’s election) and the ensuing turbulence and 
uncertainty in the political environment.  Being able to roll with the punches indicates a 
dexterous mind at work.  Indeed, a for-contract GRP concluded, “A good lobbyist 
expects and deals with change.”  The president of a 501c(6) organization elaborated: 
“We’re flexible, we’re nimble, we can move around.  We have to be because of how 
things have been changing since Ehrlich’s election.  You’ve got to change, adapt, deal 
with stuff you’ve never ever had to deal with before.”  The vice president and senior 
vice-president explained how their 501c(6) organization handled going from Ehrlich’s 
good graces to bad.  According to the vice president, “It actually made things easier; we 
didn’t have to work as hard on the Second Floor.”  The senior vice-president added: “The 
sky did not fall in, we got things passed, we got things killed.  Nothing really bad 
happened.  We were able to compensate and work around it.”  The assistant executive 
director of a 501c(6) organization thought that Ehrlich needed to “get over” the fact that 
her organization supported Townsend in the 2002 election.  She was incredulous that 
Ehrlich and his staff were not able to roll with a standard political punch such as an 
organization endorsing one’s opponent. 
An optimistic attitude was one reason why informants, and by association their 
organizations, were able to roll with the political punches.  Their optimism is best 
exemplified by comments from four informants.  A vice president of a 501c(6) 
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organization chalked up what she saw as the Ehrlich administration’s incompetence to a 
grand planned strategy rather than incompetence.  A for-contract GRP attributed his 
overcoming of professional difficulties to his upbeat outlook on life.  The president of a 
501c(6) organization told me: “I’ve been very, very lucky.  Whenever I’ve looked for 
something, something has opened up and kind of fallen in my lap.”  The state director of 
a 501c(4) said, despite having a “bitter taste in my mouth” about some things the Ehrlich 
administration had done: “Still I’m looking for every opportunity to work together with 
them.  You have to hope for future collaboration.”  
Pragmatism was another way informants and their organizations rolled with the 
political punches.  Informants expressed realistic attitudes about politics and its 
machinations.  Informants’ realistic attitudes conveyed to me a sense of nonchalance, of 
dispassion, of political savvy.  As evidence, I present these comments:   
• A for-contract GRP: “It’s just a different scene than it used to be.” 
 
• The department director of a 501c(6) organization: “Antagonism is just a natural 
part of the political process.” 
 
• The executive director of a 501c(6) organization: “I have to build relationships 
with legislators and candidates and that takes some money.  That’s unfortunate 
but that’s the way it is.” 
 
• The president and CEO of a 501c(6) organization: “We haven’t always gotten the 
responses we’re looking for but that’s part of the game.” 
 
• A for-contract lobbyist: “Of the 188 legislators, there are about four or five of 
them who absolutely really, really hate my guts.  They wish me dead; they will 
have no dealings.  That’s okay.  It’s hard to have 188 friends in the same place.” 
 
The co-chair of a 501c(4) organization was the only informant who exhibited 
political naïveté; she did not know how exactly how to roll with the punches of politics.  
She became involved in politics during the first Glendening administration (1995 to 
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1999).  She relayed her excitement to me about being invited to the Glendening 
inauguration in 1999 and lunching with Maryland’s first lady at the Governor’s Mansion.  
Initially idealistic about how politics worked, as soon as Ehrlich was elected  before he 
was even inaugurated  she said her organization got “our first taste of politics.”  She 
recounted how lawmakers and other stakeholder organizations had used, double-crossed, 
and blown off her organization since Ehrlich’s election.  The overused political maxim of 
“no permanent friends, no permanent enemies” was true, she noted.  Her organization had 
been punched around and finally it learned its lessons about how to roll with them.  She 
declared: “We’ve matured; we’re bolder and more politically savvy.  We’re on our guard.  
We know today’s friend can be tomorrow’s opponent.  We’ll call things like we see 
them.  We aren’t afraid to confront people who’ve flip-flopped on the issue.”   
The majority of informants expressed affinity for resolving conflicts through 
compromise and satisficing (when necessary).  These are symmetrically valued ways for 
an organization to roll with the punches.  The assistant executive director of a 501c(6) 
organization said that when the winning candidate is not the candidate the organization 
supported, “You have to reach out and find common ground.”  The committee chair of a 
501c(4) said that his organization too was constantly looking for common ground.  A 
director of a 501c(6) organization reported: “We had our battles with Glendening on the 
specifics of [the issue] but overall we supported the concept of it.  I would say what we 
wound up with was a mixed bag; it wasn’t all bad.”  Compromise sometimes required 
one president’s 501c(6) organization to “dance with the devil, so to speak.”  A for-
contract GRP’s bemoaning of compromise now being equated with capitulation could be  
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inferred as a preference for compromise, a symmetrically valued conflict resolution 
strategy.  
A vice president and senior vice-president recounted how their 501c(6) 
organization decided to support a legislative solution that satisficed their problem.  The 
vice president said: “We thought there wasn’t a choice but to accept [the legislative 
solution].  That was our only chance of anything happening until the next election.  This 
was as good as we could get.  We do sometimes try for more but we’re realistic.”  The 
senior vice-president added, “The legislation wasn’t as meaningful as we would have 
liked; but hey, it was a step in the right direction.” 
In Chapter 2, I discussed how organizations should be flexible — but not too 
flexible — when engaging with environmental stakeholders (Pearce & Robinson, 1982; 
Weick, 1979).  In that discussion I asked: “If an organization is constantly bending to its 
environment, for what is it willing to stand firm?  What does that organization stand for?”  
The question here becomes if organizations are willing to compromise or accept 
outcomes that satisfice, do they not risk becoming too flexible?   Organizations that are 
willing to resolve conflicts (and cede control, consider multiple perspectives, and think 
with dexterous minds) in fact do have ways of standing  
resolutely.  Those ways were revealed in informants’ comments about being tenacious, 
loyal, and principled.   
Informants spoke of their organizations’ tenacity.  Some mentioned working on 
the same bill or issue for years without progress (e.g., securing funds for the 
environmental clean-up of private property that the organizational owners allowed the 
public to use).  Others spoke of long-term efforts to engage in dialogue with stakeholders 
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who either did not want to speak to them or would listen with deaf ears.  Earlier I 
presented the stories of informants who continued to attend unproductive executive 
branch-level meetings of dubious motivations in the hope that something worthwhile 
might result.  The co-chair of a 501c(4) organization, in the face of disappointment, 
betrayal, and growing political support for the opposition, remained committed to its 
goals:  “We’ve changed our focus from educating the governor and the legislature to the 
public.  But our goal has not and will not change.”   
There does come a point when pragmatism has to trump tenacity.  When an ROI 
is no longer worthwhile or potentially forthcoming, organizations must engage with other 
stakeholders or in other ways.  A department director of a 501c(6) organization recounted 
her organization’s ultimately futile attempts at meaningful dialogue: “We had an 
unproductive meeting with Ehrlich’s staff in 2003.  We did the same in 2004.  After that 
we stopped bothering.  They’re not open to listening; they’re not interested.  Why bother 
beating our head into a wall?”  When dialogue becomes futile, organizations may be 
justified in foregoing further futility and employing other means to help realize their self-
interests (J.E. Grunig, 2001). 
Loyalty was another way informants and their organizations stood resolutely in 
the midst of the turbulent field of Annapolis.  One for-contract GRP is a Democrat but is 
good friends with Ehrlich.  When I asked him if he would hedge his bets in the next 
gubernatorial election, he bristled at the mere suggestion: “I’ve never ridden two horses, 
never will.  I go up or down with the person.  Loyalty is a very scarce and highly 
respected commodity in this business and when people know you’re a loyal person, they 
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respect that.”  He is famously loyal around Annapolis, which he believes helps people 
understand why he takes on the clients he does or supports the candidates he does. 
A president of a 501c(6) organization explained that loyalty to the organization 
enables his colleagues and him to stand strong: “The only way to be consistent in this 
business is if your first loyalty is to your organization.  And that’s difficult when you’ve 
got some very personal relationships.”  While we were on this thread, I asked him if he 
was amenable to hiring someone whose views conflicted with those of the organization.  
Citing loyalty to the organization, he said: “It wouldn’t make any difference to me as 
long as they understood they work here now and that their loyalty was to the organization 
and our goals.” 
Being principled in the conduct of their jobs was yet another way that informants 
stood resolute in the political environment.  Several informants, like this president of a 
501c(6) organization, spoke of the paramount importance of keeping one’s word: “For 
any lobbyist, you’re only as good as your word.  So you go out and present the facts. . .If 
you make a promise that you’re going to do something, then you keep that promise.”  A 
for-contract GRP declared: “If you stand up and fight for something, some principle, 
you’re going to ruffle other people.  You’re either a sideliner or you’re in the game.”  
Other informants, some of whom had conflicts with Glendening and some with Ehrlich, 
told me of how they and their organizations strived to never publicly disparage the 
governor.  For example, Ehrlich repeatedly has made snide public comments about an 
assistant executive director’s 501c(6) organization.  But on principle her organization 
does not respond in kind: “We’ve made a calculated decision to not bash Ehrlich.  He  
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won’t talk to us at all but he’s still the governor.  The office is due respect.  Our members 
don’t want to see their organization stooping to that level.” 
A department director said her 501c(6) organization adheres to a guiding 
principle: All decisions are based on whether an issue has a “strong nexus” back to the 
members’ interests.  This nexus enabled the organization to rationalize not getting 
involved in many politically charged issues and to explain to those who wanted them to 
get involved why they were not.  Other informants cited using a guiding principle as a 
litmus test for involvement and to explain for why their organization would or would not 
get involved.  These informants also pointed to their organizations’ guiding principle as 
integral to their ability to remain nonpartisan and withstand the pressure to get embroiled 
in partisan politics. 
Theory Question 2b 
There is my long answer to Theory Question 2a.  For my answer to Theory 
Question 2b (How did the jolt affect the worldviews of their organizations?), I do not
have nearly the scope of interview data to present as for Theory Question 2a.  The short 
answer to Theory Question 2b is: 
 The jolt generally did not precipitate a sea change in organizations’  
worldviews.  Organizations’ worldviews were presupposed more  
symmetrically than asymmetrically both before and after the jolt of Ehrlich’s  
election.  Post-jolt changes of most organizations’ worldviews were negligible  
enough that if this were a quantitative study the changes probably would fall  
within the margin of error.    
 
As readers have surmised from the results for Theory Question 2a, most 
organizations’ worldviews were presupposed more symmetrically than asymmetrically 
both before and after the jolt of Ehrlich’s election.  They seemed to embrace values 
associated with symmetrically presupposed worldviews over asymmetrical values.  But 
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yet, I found that organizations employed symmetrically presupposed behaviors as a 
means to further and achieve organizational ends.  Symmetry is an auspicious, socially 
responsible strategy that is more likely to bring success to organizations than is 
asymmetry (J.E. Grunig, 2001), even though asymmetry comparatively may be more 
efficient and direct.  I come back to this theme in the results for Theory Question 3 about 
gamesmanship in government relations. 
Any post-jolt changes of worldviews were negligible enough that if this were a 
quantitative study the changes probably would fall within the margin of error.  There 
were, however, three exceptions, which I discuss below. 
Examples of Organizations Whose Worldviews Changed 
 
Earlier I presented the experiences of the no-longer politically naïve co-chair 
whose 501c(4) organization got burned by the jolt of Ehrlich’s election.  The jolt and its 
aftershocks changed her organization and its worldview.  Its worldview is less 
symmetrically presupposed than it was when Glendening was governor, although I do not 
believe its worldview would be considered asymmetrically presupposed.  This informant 
was passionate about its mission and was not willing to compromise.  As it looked 
increasingly likely that the opposition would triumph, she and her organization have 
become less willing to deal with and appreciate other viewpoints on the issue.  They are 
no longer so amenable to ceding control to external “others” and having a dexterous mind 
as they once were.  This became more of a black-and-white issue for her organization and 
her than ever before.  As Beyer (1981) predicted would happen, her organization’s now 
less-symmetrically (or more-asymmetrically) presupposed worldview was reflected in 
how she planned to engage with stakeholders in the future.  Here is how she said that her 
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organization would interact with political candidates from now on: “We’ll still be 
proactive and help educate candidates about our issue.  But whereas we used to send 
them questionnaires to see where they stood on our issue, now we’re going to tell them 
where they should stand.” Her organization has a lot at stake; if and when the other side 
wins, her organization will lose big.  So no longer is her organization Mr. Nice Guy. 
Ehrlich’s election has also caused a 501c(6) organization to change its worldview.  
This executive director’s organization and the industry it represents were constantly 
under fire from the Glendening administration.  He said with Ehrlich’s election, “It was 
as if that big target on my back had been removed.”  He insisted that the Glendening 
administration wanted to put his organization’s industry out of business in Maryland.  He 
truly believed this: “It was real.”  As for the General Assembly, he said, “We didn’t ask 
for a whole lot, they didn’t do a whole lot to us.” His statement is telling; it is as if this 
informant felt victimized.  Glendening was an enemy, as were the “radical” organizations 
that worked with Glendening, “his crowd.”   
The organization behaved as if it were under siege; it did not engage in much 
outreach and when it did, it was primarily with familiar, friendly stakeholders.  But upon 
Ehrlich winning the governorship, it was as if his organization blossomed.  It became 
more confident because it was not under constant threat.  It was willing to let itself be 
vulnerable, to be more open, vocal, and proactive than it was when Glendening was in 
office.  The informant predicted that this was a permanent change: “If the next governor 
is not Ehrlich, we would have to do our job and reach out to those folks, introduce 
ourselves, and make sure they know us.  Talk to them.”  His organization was becoming 
more symmetrically presupposed because the jolt turned what he perceived as an 
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unfriendly political environment into a friendly political environment.  He felt more 
comfortable engaging with the Ehrlich administration because of  values-congruency and 
the administration’s demonstrable conference of higher political legitimacy than the 
Glendening administration (as I discussed in the results section for Theory Question 5). 
According to several informants, the outreach efforts of a 501c(3)/501c(4) 
organization of another informant (an executive director) have become more 
symmetrically presupposed since the jolt of Ehrlich’s election.  They attributed these 
changes to the jolt turning what had been a friendly political environment into an 
unfriendly one for the organization (which I will refer to as “Organization W” in this 
discussion).  Three informants mentioned that Organization W became their 
organizations’ strange bedfellow as soon as Ehrlich won the 2002 election.  Two other 
informants mentioned that since Ehrlich’s election, their organizations have enjoyed 
much more positive and productive relationships with Organization W.  Curiously, 
Organization W’s executive director never mentioned any of this, but that five informants 
marveled about its post-jolt worldview change compels me to mention it.  The executive 
director of a 501c(4) organization speculated about the change at this organization: “They 
realize who’s governor and that they’re not running the show anymore.  They’re 
beginning to realize we’re not the enemy.  You can’t be hammering on folks and pointing 
the finger at them all the time.  That’s not productive.”  Organization W evidently had 
learned that it needed to consider multiple and perhaps contrarian perspectives to 
continue to effectively engage with stakeholders newly legitimized and powerful in post-
jolt Annapolis.  It began to embrace (or more closely embrace than pre-jolt) the 
symmetrical values related to functioning as an open system and responsibility to others. 
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Effect of the Jolt on Informants’ Doctrinaire Thinking 
 
As I noted earlier in this section, some informants also espoused doctrinaire 
thoughts about people and issues.  Their organizations’ engagement with the political 
environment reflected this.  But did the informants and their organizations’ remain 
doctrinaire, even given the jolt of Ehrlich’s election?   
Two informants who otherwise functioned effectively, both personally and 
professionally, in the political environment were partisan absolutists on the Democrat 
side.  Neither was willing to entertain the possibility that Republicans could do something 
positive or that their perspective was worthwhile.  I have already written about one of 
these informants.  This executive director of a 501c(6) organization is unwilling to work 
with anybody but a Democrat.  What I did not mention earlier were his disparaging 
characterizations of Republicans.  The committee chair of another 501c(6) organization 
was also an avowed Democrat and his organization is closely associated with the 
Democrat Party.  When I asked him about his organization’s involvement in the 
upcoming 2006 election, he said with a laugh, “I think it goes without saying that my 
organization will support the Democratic candidate.”  My analysis of their interview data 
showed that these informants’ political ideologies became more doctrinaire after 
Ehrlich’s election. 
These are not situations where the jolt completely changed an organization’s 
worldview.  That said, the jolt has changed some of the tangible manifestations of the two 
organizations’ worldviews, such as its outreach efforts, willingness to compromise or 
satisfice, and appreciation for multiple perspectives.  But these changes are not changes 
in these organizations’ basic worldview (i.e., their predisposition toward symmetry or 
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asymmetry).  Worldviews are what makes organizations “tick.”  These organizations 
continued to “tick” in the same way after Ehrlich’s election as before the election.  Their 
ticking now just sounds slightly different. 
Theory Question 3: Models of Public Relations Practice 
Before presenting my findings for this theory question, I will briefly review the 
models of public relations practice. The press agentry/publicity and public information 
models are the cornerstones of traditional media relations programs.  They describe how 
media relations practitioners communicate with their stakeholders via the media (also an 
organizational stakeholder).  Communication in both models flows in one direction: 
outward from the organization, through the media, to stakeholders.  The purpose of the 
one-way communication may be aggrandizement, spin, or positive publicity (press 
agentry/publicity model), or tell truthful, but perhaps incomplete, information (public 
information model). 
The one-way  “craft” models function like transmitters for an organization 
whereas the two-way models function like transmitters and antenna for an organization 
(e.g., see Klein, 2006, para. 6).  The two-way models are more complex and strategic 
than the one-way models.  These “scientific” models involve research, message 
development, and information exchange .   
Communication in the two-way asymmetrical model flows between an 
organization and its stakeholders.  However, influence only flows one way, from the 
organization to its stakeholders.  Although they may not realize it, the purpose of the 
communication is organizational self-interest.  An organization learns of stakeholders’ 
concerns about its behaviors and then uses this information to alter its messages about its 
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behaviors so that they positively resonate with stakeholders.  The organization seeks to 
“persuade publics to behave as the organization wants” (Dozier et al., 1995, p. 13).     
Two-way asymmetrical communication pays lip service to stakeholders’ 
concerns; two-way symmetrical/mixed-motive communication pays attention to them.  
The purposes of communication in the two-way symmetrical/mixed-motive model are to 
listen, engage in dialogue, and employ collaborative processes that allow the 
consideration of interests of the organization and its stakeholders.  Organizational 
messages may evolve, as may organizational behaviors; likewise so may the messages 
and behaviors of stakeholders.  Organizations and stakeholders may exchange influence, 
which is “the ability to affect the outcome of decisions” (Jemison, 1984, p. 133).  As a 
mixed-motive model, organizations are concerned with advocating their interests but not 
at the expense of stakeholders’ interests.  In this model, symmetrical (cooperative) and 
asymmetrical (competitive) tactics are employed within a larger symmetrical 
(cooperative) framework (Dozier et al., 1995).  
The cultural interpreter model describes how some organizations hire public 
relations practitioners who are part of or otherwise familiar with a nation or a culture (and 
its language, customs, mores, and the like) as organizational “ambassadors” (J.E. Grunig 
et al., 1995).  The personal influence model accounts for public relations practitioners’ 
network of personal and professional contacts  their social circles (Kadushin, 1968; 
Weedman, 1992)  in the execution of public relations activities (J.E. Grunig et al., 
1995). 
Theory Question 3a 
TQ3a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their communication  
practices with their organizations’ political stakeholders? 
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Informants engaged in a variety of one-way, two-way, symmetrically 
presupposed, and asymmetrically presupposed communication practices,  
including grassroots member outreach, media advocacy, grasstops member  
outreach, coalition involvement, and lobbying.  The personal influence model,  
typically applied in conjunction with the cultural interpreter model, led to  
dialogue (i.e., the two-way symmetrical/mixed-motive model) with political  
stakeholders.  This practice best described and explained informants’ 
effectiveness and success as boundary-spanning GRPs. 
I found evidence of the six models of public relations practice in informants’ 
descriptions of how they communicated with their organizations’ political stakeholders.  
How could I have found evidence of the press agentry/publicity and public information 
models, which describe media relations practice, in government relations communication 
practices?  The obvious answer is media advocacy (Wallack et al., 1993), which many 
informants noted their organizations engage in as part of their government relations 
programs.  I found the less obvious but more interesting answer in the informants’ 
organizations’ use of one-way communication with political stakeholders for the 
purposes of aggrandizement, positive spin, education, or awareness: grassroots member 
activities.  Activities such as sending a pre-written “form” or originally authored e-mail, 
fax, postcard, or letter, or leaving a telephone message for a lawmaker are one-way 
communication activities, executed for the purposes I have listed.  They are government 
relations’ “equivalents” of traditional media relations tactical activities.   
Grassroots Outreach as One-Way Communication 
 
Grassroots activities at this level are designed by an organization (the behind-the-
scenes sender) to send messages to lawmakers (the receivers) via the organization’s 
grassrooters who are the lawmakers’ constituents.  The grassrooters play the role of 
message conduit, as the media do in the two one-way communication models.  That 
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message, transmitted through the grassrooter at the behest of the organization, may serve 
to register opinions on an issue with a lawmaker or to persuade the lawmaker to support 
or oppose an issue.  In my experience developing and managing grassroots campaigns, I 
often encouraged grassrooters to make clear in their messages that what the lawmaker did 
vis-à-vis the issue in question would affect what they may or may not do come the next 
election or campaign fundraiser (e.g., “If you vote against this bill, I will have to 
reconsider my support for your re-election.”)  These one-way government relations 
communication activities are efforts to change or reinforce a lawmaker’s opinion and to 
influence his or her decision-making.  They are not designed to trigger a meaningful 
transactional dialogue between the grassrooter and lawmaker.  Granted, these activities 
may trigger a thoughtful but standard response from the lawmaker’s office to the 
grassrooter.  This is usually in the form of a “Thank you for contacting me about such-
and-such issue.  I always appreciate hearing from my constituents” letter. 
The value of grassroots activities at this level is not reflected in their quality but 
their quantity.  As an executive director of a 501c(6) organization noted: “Grassroots 
efforts are still measured in inches.  Their impact in a legislator’s office is based on how 
many letters it receives.  They’ll compare stacks: ‘This stack supports it.  This stack 
opposes it.’  Whichever stack is taller, there you go.”  He called this a “simple truth,” 
which I agree with up to a point.  The truth is that the truth about the value of grassroots 
efforts is not that simple: A hierarchy of the relative value of grassroots activities exists. 
A 2005 study, based on quantitative and qualitative research conducted with more 
than 350 congressional aides, revealed a direct relationship between the degree of 
personalization of the grassroots correspondence and the influence of that correspondence 
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on a lawmaker’s decision-making (Fitch & Goldschmidt, 2005).  Generally, an in-person 
visit to a lawmaker from a constituent is more influential than a personalized letter, a 
personalized e-mail, a personalized fax, a telephone call, a form letter, form e-mail, and a 
form fax.  Grassrooters are rank-and-file members of organizations; they are so-called 
“average” citizens.  They typically use letters, e-mail, phone messages, and faxes to 
contact their lawmakers.  The written correspondence may be personalized, meaning that 
they took the time to write it themselves.  Identical form correspondence, which has the 
least value, is a giveaway for contrived “Astroturf” grassroots campaigns.  In these 
campaigns, organizations “stimulate” grassrooters to sign their names and mail the pre-
written letter or postcard, on which the postage probably is paid.  Or they may be asked 
to send a pre-written message from their e-mail accounts or from the organization’s Web 
site.    
The less effort it takes a grassrooter to engage in a grassroots activity, the less 
value that activity has, and thus the less influence it has on the receiver  the lawmaker.  
An executive director said his 501c(6) organization cautions its grassrooters against 
sending e-mails to lawmakers because “e-mails just are not perceived as worth as much” 
as other methods of contact.  E-mail is just too easy; dashing off an e-mail requires little 
effort.  In 2004, members of Congress received more than 182 million e-mail messages 
from constituents, almost 10 times the amount of letter correspondence (Fitch & 
Goldschmidt, 2005).4 Writing a letter or making a phone call is a more “involved” (i.e., 
time-consuming, labor-intensive, cognitively burdensome) activity than sending an e-
mail.  Thus the former two activities count for more with lawmakers and their staffs. 
 
4 I have been unable to find statistics about the volume of constituent correspondence received by the 
Maryland General Assembly. 
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Grasstops Activities as Two-Way Communication 
 
The informants’ organizations also employed grasstops activities, which are 
examples of two-way communication activities.  External members of organizations who 
are in the same social circle as targeted lawmakers engage in grasstops activities when 
they interact with lawmakers on behalf of the organizations.  Lawmakers are more likely 
to take or return phone calls from or meet with grasstoppers than grassrooters.  Face-to-
face meetings and telephone conversations are highly personal and personalized 
transactional communication situations (Berko et al., 2001).  Dialogue, for the purposes 
of education or advocacy or both, is occurring between the grasstopper and the lawmaker. 
These situations are more valued (from an organizational viewpoint) and more influential 
(from a lawmaker’s viewpoint) than many standard grassroots activities. 
The Importance of Dialogue 
 
Informants likewise stressed the importance of and their reliance on dialogue 
between themselves (as agents of their organizations) and lawmakers and other political 
stakeholders (e.g., cabinet secretaries).  Dialogue is evidence of the two-way 
symmetrical/mixed-motive model (Dozier et al., 1995; J.E. Grunig, 1992; L.A. Grunig et 
al., 2002).  In fact, dialogue and the two-way symmetrical/mixed-motive model are the 
same (J.E. Grunig, 2001).   
“Prying loose useful information” may be one motivation for dialogue (“The 
Business of Influence,” 2006, p. 13).  Other motivations for engaging in dialogue include 
the mutual flow of critical information, collaboration, cooperation, and the opportunities 
to work out differences and foster rapport.  As the executive director of a 501c(6) 
organization put it: “The [state agency] obviously has its own ideas about things.  
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Sometimes it agrees with us; sometimes it doesn’t.  But we always sit down together and 
talk about things.”   All informants (with the exception of the partisan Democrat 
executive director of a 501c[6] organization whom I have highlighted repeatedly in this 
chapter) appreciated the opportunity for dialogue.  As the executive director of a 501c(6) 
organization said, “We were happy to join the conversation.”   
Informants also appreciated dialogue with stakeholders with differing (even 
contrarian) cultural topoi and opinions.  Deep understanding of one perspective is good; 
deep understanding of a “breadth of perspective[s]” is better (Culbertson, 1989, p. 3); it 
prevents tunnel-vision thinking.  As this executive director of a 501c(6) organization put 
it, “There are some people in Annapolis who may not agree with me philosophically but I 
appreciate at least having a dialogue with them.”  Informants engaged in dialogue to 
collect a deep and wide pile of critical information, not to indulge their altruistic 
motivations or a desire for their organizations to function as  Habermasian public spheres. 
Uncertainty also motivates dialogue.  The desire for engaging with stakeholders 
using two-way communication (like dialogue) increases when environments are turbulent 
(J.E. Grunig, 1984; L.A. Grunig, 1992) because these environments are uncertain.  
Informants perceived the jolted environment of Annapolis to be turbulent and uncertain; 
my analysis showed that informants desired and appreciated opportunities to engage in 
dialogue with stakeholders in this environment.  Dialogue is a symmetrical tactic used to 
achieve an organization’s asymmetrical ends of self-interest; it is a mixed-motive 
communication process (J.E. Grunig, 2001). 
Similarly, informants were disappointed and frustrated when dialogue with 
political stakeholders did not occur; they lost opportunities to quell uncertainty.   This 
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parallels a trend I discussed in the results for Theory Question 2: informants’ distaste for 
asymmetry seemed to imply a taste for symmetry.  The absence of dialogue means, 
among other things, that useful information was not flowing between these boundary-
spanning GRPs and stakeholders.  Such information could have help to assuage some of 
the uncertainty that all of the organizations perceived to varying degrees given the 
turbulence in the Annapolis political environment.  According to the executive director of 
a 501c(6) organization, the Glendening administration ignored her industry during the 
promulgation of major new industry regulations: They “did not request or receive 
adequate input from the people they were trying to regulate. . .So that program didn’t go 
over very well.  That was kind of Glendening’s legacy [on this issue].”  She found that 
Ehrlich’s administration, by contrast, was eager for industry input on these regulations: 
“They invited all [of us] to say what was wrong with it, what was right with it, what 
would you do different.  Several hundred people from across the state participated,” 
including her association.  Another informant, a department director of a 501c(6) 
organization, was mystified that the Ehrlich administration did not attempt a dialogue (or 
any communication) with her 501c(6) organization on one of the governor’s pet 
initiatives: “I’m not suggesting that had [lawmaker] talked with our president our answer 
would have changed.  But how do you even have a shot at making the answer different if 
you’re not going to pick up the phone and try?”   
Dialogue is a symmetrically presupposed process that parties engage in on the 
assumption they agree to certain normative asymmetrically presupposed expectations: 
One, the dialogic process entails the mutual exchange of information and influence; two, 
parties pursue their self-interests through the dialogic process; and three, both parties are 
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willing to give up something to gain something (Dozier et al., 1995).  This explains 
informants’ disappointment and frustration at being involved in the Ehrlich 
administration’s perceived “disingenuous” attempts at dialogue; the administration 
violated the first and third normative expectations while too tightly embracing the second 
expectation.  A state director questioned the administration’s motives for holding 
meetings with his 501c(4) organization and its sister organizations:  “I feel like [the 
meetings] are as much an attempt for the administration to say we’ve been meeting and 
listening to them as they’re an attempt to really figure out how we can work together.”  
Other informants bristled when they believed that the Ehrlich administration was using 
them.  When I asked a vice president about whether the Glendening or Ehrlich 
administrations had sought out her 501c(6) organization’s input on issues, she replied: 
“No, they only ever solicit what they want, like when they want to hold press conferences 
at our [members’ facilities].  I find that they’ll only solicit our help when it’s something 
they want to do.”   
Notwithstanding the disappointment and frustration the communication practices 
of the Glendening and Ehrlich administration may have caused them, informants and 
their organizations never gave up on trying to effect dialogue.  Their commitment to 
effecting and engaging in dialogue was motivated less by principle and more by self-
interest.  Being frozen out or considered persona non grata by a critical stakeholders 
places constraints on an organization.  Environmental constraints and organizational 
communication practices are curvilinearly related (J.E. Grunig, 1984).  When constraints 
are few, organizations communicate and behave as they want, which is often 
asymmetrically.  There are minimal checks and balances on the organization.  (This may 
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explain part of the concern about when one political party controls both the legislative 
and executive branches of government: Neither branch effectively checks and balances 
— constrains — the other.  It also may explain why the government seeks to break up 
corporate monopolies.)  When constraints are many, organizations may also 
communicate and behave asymmetrically.  They may believe they have nothing to lose 
and communicate and behave accordingly.   
Being frozen out or considered persona non grata by the Ehrlich administration 
obviously constrained some organizations.  They could not engage in dialogue with this 
critical stakeholder, something they lamented on principle but also on the negative 
implications this had for their organizations’ goals.  But the Ehrlich administration was 
not the only critical stakeholder in the political environment, so even these bane 
organizations could not consider Annapolis to be a highly constraining environment.  
(Some boon informants might have considered the pre-Ehrlich era, in which Democrats 
controlled the two critical stakeholder institutions, highly constraining.)  These bane 
organizations thus were only moderately constrained.   
As the curvilinear relationship between constraints and communication had 
suggested, these bane organizations tried to engage stakeholders in symmetrically 
presupposed communication.  The executive director of a 501c(6) organization reported 
having to hire a lobbyist to create new avenues for dialogue after the Glendening 
administration froze out his organization.  His organization continued to reap the benefits 
of this: “Even if Townsend had been elected, I think the progress we have made in 
nurturing legislative relations still would have paid off.”  This informant noted that there 
is no lack of executive dialogue since Ehrlich became governor.  Ehrlich has even invited 
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this informant and his counterparts at other industry groups to working dinners at the 
governor’s mansion.  Conversely, the vice president of a 501c(6) organization frozen out 
by the Ehrlich administration does not expect to receive any dinner invitations to the 
governor’s mansion anytime soon.  However, she said: “That’s not to say that you don’t 
sometimes try things to at least get something on the table for discussion.  But it will be 
what it will be. You have to try to get beyond it.”  Again, this was not because 
organizations were necessarily committed to dialogue on principle.  They were of course; 
but dialogue also is a “sweeter” avenue for pursuing organizational goals than tactics 
such as media advocacy.  
Informants mentioned that upon seeing how the Ehrlich administration has 
publicly ostracized some organizations, they have tempered  softened  some of their 
organizational rhetoric and behavior to stay in the administration’s good graces.  This is 
not to say that the Glendening administration would not act like this too, as many 
informants allowed, but the department director of a 501c(6) offered this hypothesis 
about the differences between Glendening’s and Ehrlich’s ostracism: “I think 
Glendening, because he had the luxury of the governor’s office, the House, and the 
Senate in the same party he could be a little less emphatic about it.”  Informants did not 
want whatever dialogue and rapport they and their organizations enjoyed with the Ehrlich 
administration to vanish; they were “scared symmetrical” (Simone [a.k.a. Tuite], 2003).  
The department director for a 501c(3) organization said: “We don’t want to anger the 
governor.  We need to work with them.  But we can’t be completely silent either.  We 
have to represent our interests.  So we have to carefully balance what we say and do.”  
The Maryland governor’s tremendous power over the state budget squashes disagreement 
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as well, as this department director for a 501c(4) organization noted: “You want to 
maintain good relationships with executive branch because of its budgetary power. This 
discourages people from saying to Ehrlich, ‘You’re not doing things right.’” 
Education was a major purpose of the dialogue so universally valued by 
informants.  The executive director of a 501c(6) organization emphasized to me: 
Our message is that the world doesn’t exist without our product.  And that’s part  
of my thrust, not only on the lobbying end but on the educational end.  I’ll go out  
and talk to anybody, anywhere at anytime about the importance of our product  
and the men and women who go into making it.  
 
Another executive director said that education is his 501c(4) organization’s “first effort”:  
“The first challenge we face with lobbying generally on behalf of the [industry] sector is 
to make sure that legislators understand what the sector is.  They aren’t born with that 
familiarity, so we need to get them familiar.” 
A strong theme emerged from the interview data as to the context of dialogue.  
Dialogue — and the collaboration, cooperation, listening information sharing, and 
influence exchange that it fostered — seemed to occur within the context of advocating 
organizational interests.  It was a symmetrically presupposed tactic in an asymmetrically 
presupposed framework.   
More than anything else, the goal of dialogue in government relations for 
informants was to obtain the result their organization wanted (Wolf, 1976).  That result 
could be to craft, pass, or kill a bill, or to “modify a bill in a way so it’s more palatable,” 
as a department director of a 501c(6) organization explained.  Dialogue included the 
presentation of facts and the making of arguments: the art of persuasion.  Such dialogue 
is an exercise in mutual advocacy, or collaborative advocacy (Spicer, 1997), or 
cooperative antagonism (Raiffa, 1982, as cited in Dozier et al., 1995).   
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Parties involved in dialogue are likely to have their own desired results in mind, 
something they implicitly agree is the case when engaging in dialogue.  No parties are so 
naïve as to believe that altruism motivates the dialogue or that parties are anything but 
primarily concerned with their own interests.  But the process of dialogue is 
symmetrically presupposed even though the parties are asymmetrically motivated or 
desire an asymmetrical outcome.   
Part of what makes the dialogic process symmetrical is that it is an exercise in 
listening.  The process required Party A and Party B to listen to the other’s facts and 
arguments.  By “listen,” I do not mean that A just “heard” B’s perspective and continued 
on with the dialogue process without skipping a beat.  I mean “listen” in the sense that A 
learned from and appreciated B’s perspective and was amenable to rethinking its own 
perspective in light of its understanding of B’s perspective. 
 Advocacy is not necessarily an asymmetrical, zero-sum game endeavor.  Heath 
(1992) argued vigorously that engaging in advocacy and persuasion are ethical 
endeavors.  Lobbying, also known as direct advocacy, is an ethical asymmetrical activity 
(J.E. Grunig, 2001).  Advocacy can be part of a dialogue, out of which conflict resolution 
and mutual understanding may emerge (Plowman et al., 2001).  The use of advocacy 
when dialogue fails is “ethically reasonable” (J.E. Grunig, 2001, p. 16).   
However, a semantic pattern glared at me from the interview data: Informants 
consistently used war metaphors and militaristic terminology when talking about politics 
and their work.  Below are some examples of this verbiage from different informants: 
• “To the victor go the spoils.” 
• “That battle is still going on.” 
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• “So that was probably the most significant opening shot.” 
• “I think it was the shot heard round the world.” 
• “It was like 10 of us got dropped behind enemy lines with a couple of guns and a 
tank and were told, ‘Here, go do it.’” 
 
• “It’s good to have the Ehrlich administration out there beating the drum.” 
• “You have to marshal your armies and employ these logistical maneuvers.” 
• “One of the battles has raged on our front.” 
• “You want to save your bullets — your grasstop guys — for the really important 
stuff.” 
 
• “Our members are our secret weapon and our best possible defense and offense.  I 
will shamelessly use them whenever I need to.” 
 
• “The line was drawn in the sand and then the gauntlet dropped.” 
Because I am not a semiotician, I cannot with confidence say what the exact 
implications are of my informants’ semantic choices.  But I believe these words support 
my contention that the underlying context for dialogue in government relations is 
advocacy, which, like war, is a competitive endeavor.  I expound on this in the next 
section. 
Gamesmanship in Government Relations 
 
Many informants also spoke of, even seemed to relish, the gamesmanship of 
politics and government relations.  Some informants, such as a department director of a 
501c(6) organization, used a chess metaphor: “It’s a huge chess game and the stakes are 
very, very high. . .Now they’re all players, so you’ve got to analyze so many more pieces 
of the chess game.”  Other informants, such as a for-contract GRP, dispensed with 
metaphors altogether: “I mean the whole thing is a big political game.” 
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Informants were players in the game as well and strategically played the 
contention between Democrats and Republicans to their advantage.  Dialogue was the 
most symmetrically presupposed tactic in their arsenal (to adopt the informants’ semantic 
predilections).  One for-contract GRP admitted to trying to stir up fights between 
members of the two parties because “it’s easier to kill a bill that way.”  Another for-
contact GRP said he played the political angles on an issue because “we needed to 
change the dynamics to make it a political issue that Ehrlich couldn’t afford to ignore.”  
As the executive director of a 501c(3)/501c(4) organization owned up: “We’ve used the 
fact that there’s a two-party system to our advantage.  Each party wants to outdo the other 
on [the issue].  We try to capitalize on that.”  She then provided an example: “I told 
Ehrlich’s people: ‘This is politics.  Let the Democrats put their fingerprints on this bill; 
otherwise they’ll kill it.’  They agreed and then the Democrats added some good stuff to 
it.  So we got what we wanted.”   
For some informants, playing the game meant manipulating messages.  The 
executive director of a 501c(6) organization said: “We can structure the appearance of the 
issue to fit our audience.  We’re not impervious to left or right politics.”  The committee 
chair of a 501c(6) organization noted:  “I censored, for lack of a better word, our 
publications with respect to our legislative issues because they’re sensitive issues.  I 
wanted to make sure all of our public messages were on the same page to the extent they 
could be.” 
Hope for Symmetry Yet 
 
Yet in the midst of this asymmetry, this “cult of winning” (Gellman, 2006), 
symmetrical values abound.  Informants placed premiums on ethics and honesty for 
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themselves and those with whom they interacted.  They placed great importance on 
meaningful dialogue with stakeholders. The department director of a 501c(6) 
organization, a former committee staffer in the General Assembly, offered another 
perspective: “I learned rapidly which lobbyists would lie or were no good and those I 
should make time for.  They’d argue from their slant but would tell the truth.  And 
whenever I needed information, I went to those guys.” A for-contract GRP said he is 
careful to “tell everybody up front what you’re doing.  You’re honest with them.”  An 
executive director of a 501c(6) organization said that providing background information 
to elected officials “helps them out and it helps instill some level of trust.”   
Many informants spoke at length about efforts that supported the truisms of 
“Politics make for strange bedfellows” and that in politics, “there are no permanent 
friends, no permanent enemies.”  I have written at length about these efforts in earlier 
sections of this chapter.  The president and CEO of a 501c(3) organization declared: “We 
always try to establish relationships with the members of the General Assembly and the 
administration.  It doesn’t matter who they are.”   
When I was analyzing the data on this point, one story stood out.  It was a long 
story in which the president of a 501c(6) organization detailed assembling a coalition 
comprising the spectrum of players on an issue to develop recommendations and outline 
their collective thoughts for the incoming governor (Ehrlich).  I thought his anecdote 
ended with this line in the interview transcript: “And if we can work together on that, 
then everybody’s better off.”  I thought to myself, “What an excellent example of 
symmetrical values.”  Then I turned the page and laughed; the anecdote had not ended 
with that line.  The next few lines snapped me back to the reality of politics and 
282
government relations.  The informant finished his anecdote with this punch line:  “We’ve 
now got the other side of [the issue] telling our side of the story.  How much better does it 
get than that?  From a political perspective, it doesn’t.”  No matter how symmetrical 
one’s motivations appear, in politics and government relations the asymmetrical ulterior 
motive of self-interest is there, too. 
Normatively, parties engage in dialogue in good faith, by agreeing to disagree, 
listening and thoughtfully considering other views, being amenable to giving and taking.  
But parties do so in pursuit of their interests; for instance, an organization engages in 
dialogue to compete for resources (e.g., funding) those stakeholders have the authority 
and power to allocate.  I believe that politics is an asymmetrically presupposed game 
played using the symmetrically presupposed strategy of dialogue as a strategy of first 
resort.  I explore and dissect this thought in Chapter 5. 
The Two Other Models of Public Relations Practice 
 
There was an abundance of evidence for the four models of public relations (or 
activities and values evocative of the models) exhibited in informants’ communication 
practices with their organizations’ political stakeholders.  However, I had to infer this 
evidence from their interviews.  I did not have to infer the evidence that leads me to write 
this: Based on the raw interview data, by what informants plainly told me, informants 
function as boundary-spanning GRPs more than anything else because they tap into their 
network of contacts and their knowledge bases of politics both general and Annapolitan.  
The personal influence and cultural interpreter models better described informants’ 
communication practices with their political stakeholders than anything else such as the 
four models.  Informants’ networks of contacts and knowledge bases accounted for their 
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effectiveness and success as GRPs.  But as personal influencers and cultural interpreters, 
their preferred way to communicate with stakeholders was through dialogue (i.e., the 
two-way symmetrical/mixed-motive model).   
Personal Influence Model 
 
Earlier in this chapter (“Theory Question 2a”), I detailed the extensive and 
intensive outreach efforts of one for-contract GRP.  To avoid redundancy, I will refrain 
from discussing his efforts again, but readers should understand that he has been 
rewarded with a social circle that is as deep as it wide.  Forgive the datedness of this 
phrase, but his Rolodex runneth over. . .and that is why clients hire him: “They hire me 
because of my relationships, my access, my knowledge.  My primary service to clients is 
access, knowing people.”  As the executive director of a 501c(3)/501c(4) organization 
concluded about relationships: “You know I think that’s the name of the game.”   
The department director for a 501c(6) organization observed that her relationships 
“translate back to my organization,” evidence again of implied third-party endorsement.  
Figuring out who knows whom is “just part of the planning activities for an issue,” 
according to the member of the board of a 501c(3)/501c(4) organization.  She continued, 
“We always work our own relationships on behalf of the organization.”   
Informants work their relationships through the process of dialogue.  
Relationships and dialogue work in tandem.  In politics, one does not have relationships 
purely for purposes of friendship (although that may be a collateral benefit).  One has 
relationships because they offer something useful to that person and reciprocally to the 
other person in the relationship.  These relationships should not be “user” relationships, 
as one for-contract GRP noted.  They should be useful relationships, for all persons 
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involved.  The usefulness of relationships is realized through the dialogue that 
relationships necessitate and opportune. 
Below is a non-exhaustive list of the connections informants had or to where they 
traced their contacts: 
• Worked for a former New York senator in the 1960s, 
• Worked for Baltimore Mayor Martin O’Malley, 
• Worked for former Maryland governor and current Comptroller William 
Schaefer, 
 
• Worked for a former Maryland senator in the 1970s, 
• Worked in Democrat presidential fundraising, 
• Former colleague with current members of the Ehrlich administration, 
• Former president of organization was a member of the Glendening cabinet, 
• A close relative of the organization’s former president works in the Ehrlich 
administration, 
 
• A personal friend from church is an appointee in the Ehrlich administration, 
• The former attorney for an organizational member’s law firm was in the 
Glendening cabinet, 
 
• Long-time personal friend and campaign manager for a former Maryland Senate 
committee chair, 
 
• The wife of the organization’s former president worked for Annapolis lawmakers, 
 
• Long-time personal friends with legislative leaders (from both political parties), 
 
• The organization’s for-contract GRP is personal friends with Ehrlich, 
• Father was good friends with father of current lawmaker,  
• Came from a political family, 
• Well-known operative in state Democrat politics, 
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• Went to law school with a current lawmaker, 
• Active in community groups that some well-connected political people in 
Annapolis are also active in, and 
 
• Founder of the organization was a former Maryland legislator. 
Several informants were former legislators.  Membership in this esteemed club is 
a major advantage as a GRP.  As one former legislator, now a for-contract GRP, said of 
his transition, “There is a carry-over as I say from the good old boy network.”  Another 
member of this club said: “You don’t have a lot of breaking in to do.  You already know 
most of the players.”  There is a reason why so many former members of Congress 
half of them in fact (Kurtz, 2006b)  find lucrative post-Congress careers in lobbying in 
Washington, DC:  They know people and people know them; they have the “right” 
relationships.  But more to the point, they have useful relationships.5 Former members of 
the General Assembly, former House of Delegates’ committee staffers, and people who 
are personal friends with those in high places in Annapolis: They all have useful 
relationships and those relationships are key to their effectiveness and success as 
boundary-spanning GRPs.  It is easier to pry loose useful (and better quality and more 
voluminous) information while engaging in dialogue with members of one’s social circle 
than from non-members (Burt, 2000).    
Some have speculated that the social circles of Haley Barbour, the governor of 
Mississippi, are partly why Mississippi has dealt better with the devastation of Hurricane 
Katrina than has Louisiana (Leibovich, 2005).  Barbour’s Republican credentials date to 
the Reagan administration.  While chair of the Republican National Committee, he 
 
5 I have been unable to find statistics about how many Maryland lawmakers enter the lobbying profession 
in Maryland after leaving public office. 
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oversaw the party’s 1994 ascendancy to the majority in Congress.  He then enjoyed a 
lucrative career as a corporate GRP in Washington, DC.  As governor when Katrina made 
landfall in his home state of Mississippi, he immediately tapped into his social circle of 
Republican Washington, DC, and industry connections — his “drinking buddies” (para. 
5) — to help the state’s recovery and rebuilding efforts.  In many ways, his useful 
relationships enabled the state to bypass FEMA and federal red tape.  Kathleen Blanco, a 
Democrat who rose through Louisiana state politics to that state’s governorship, has no 
comparable connections.  
Cultural Interpreter Model 
 
If the personal influence model is about knowing people, the cultural interpreter 
model is about knowing process.  J.E. Grunig et al. (1995) presented culture in terms of 
national culture.  Following Mack (1997), I have argued that Washington, DC, is its own 
microculture and that former insiders-turned-lobbyists are cultural interpreters:  They 
know “the legislative process, political nuances, the right people to talk to, and how to get 
from the Cannon House Office Building to the Hart Senate Office Building.  They 
understand. . .the ‘customs and folkways’ of the Hill” (Simone [a.k.a. Tuite], 1999, p. 
40).      
Like Washington, DC, Annapolis (or Richmond or any other state capital) is its 
own microculture.  Many of my informants were former Annapolis insiders: ex-
lawmakers, ex-committee staffers, ex-administrative aides, ex-state agency officials, and 
the like.  Current government insiders still consider these informants to be insiders even 
though they are no longer officially “inside” the government.  Why?  Because these 
informants continued to be social-circle insiders.  Their membership in social circles 
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transcended their tenure as government insiders.  One informant, a department director of 
a 501c(6) organization who is a former committee staffer in the General Assembly, 
explained why former insiders are so coveted as GRPs: 
Everybody goes to civics class or watched Schoolhouse Rock and learned how a 
bill becomes a law.  So everyone understands the basic idea that somebody has an  
idea, they write it down, it’s a bill, it’s heard, it’s passed. There’s many more 
levels to the political process that that.  Some of them deal with partisanship, a lot 
of them are about simple process.  But there’s also all sorts of personality issues 
and other stuff.  I can’t think of a better background for the kind of work that I do.  
I got a good sense of how committees work, of how individual legislators tick, 
how votes would fall, what moves people to vote for or against something.  
Beyond just understanding the process of how bill hearings work, I learned a lot 
about what motivates bills to pass and bills to fail.  Hopefully I use all that 
knowledge to our benefit here. 
 
Another former General Assembly committee staffer, now the associate director 
of a 501c(6) organization, concurred.  He noted: “Having the inside knowledge of how 
people think, act, and what they do, and then also knowing the more academic nuts and 
bolts of how the process works, both kinds of knowledge are a big help.”  Being a 
cultural interpreter is not just about interpreting that culture; it is also about knowing and 
understanding the people who belong to that culture.  Such knowledge makes cultural 
interpreters more effective participants in dialogue than people who lack such knowledge. 
Former government insiders are much more politically savvy about Annapolitan 
culture than other organizational members whose knowledge of the political process 
comes from textbooks or the 1970s Schoolhouse Rock educational animation series.  
GRPs with less political savvy (that is, less cultural fluency about Annapolis) might not 
know at first that the pecking order among legislators can be gamed.  The senior vice-
president of a 501c(6) organization and former General Assembly committee staffer 
explained: “Some legislators are more important than others.  So you can get away with 
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not talking to every member of the committee on every single issue and still have things 
work out.”  They would learn this through on-the-job acculturation.  The more politically 
savvy  culturally fluent former insiders  would realize that.  According to a former 
lawmaker who is now a for-contract GRP; those who are politically savvy know that, “To 
pass or kill bills, you don’t need that many votes.”  This informant explained that full 
committees almost always support subcommittees’ reports and that the House of 
Delegates and Senate almost always support the committees’ reports.  He continued, “So 
if you know that this is how it works, you can get bills passed or killed with a relatively 
small amount of people.”  This informant summed up the necessary skill set for 
negotiating the political process: “Getting legislation passed whether you’re a lobbyist or 
a legislator is an art!  You’ve got to know where to go, when to compromise, how to get 
the votes you need.”  
I said earlier in the chapter that informants criticized some Ehrlich aides who 
came from his congressional office for their cultural naïveté about Annapolis politics and 
its “customs and folkways” (Mack, 1997, p. 84).  Informants believed that these aides 
understood politics and political games from the perspective of Capitol Hill’s culture.  
Things got lost in the translation from that culture to Annapolis.  Moreover, several 
informants — of right, left, and neutral political persuasions — attributed the introduction 
of the worst of Capitol Hill’s culture  cutthroat partisan politics  to Annapolis to 
these aides.    
Regardless of the veracity of this observation (accusation?), it is commonly 
voiced.  Ehrlich himself railed against Capitol Hill-style politics in his 2006 State of State 
address, to which Democrats retorted that he brought that style of politics to Annapolis 
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with him from Capitol Hill (Mosk, 2006c).  Perhaps this is what really jolted Annapolis 
after all: going from a rather collegial to a charged partisan atmosphere, rather than the 
event of the governorship going Republican after being Democrat for so long. 
My analysis is that partisanship generally seems to violate normative expectations 
of dialogue, that both parties will talk, listen, and advocate their own interests while 
keeping an open mind about others’ interests.  Further, the polarizing partisanship in 
Annapolis went beyond this, also seeming to violate presuppositions of the symmetrical 
framework of mixed-motive communication.  These presuppositions include that parties 
do not have malevolent intent; they are willing to entertain compromise; and they expect 
that all parties will use their power gracefully (Dozier et al., 1995).  As I have detailed 
elsewhere, parties — in the sense here of the Republican and Democrat parties — did 
have malevolent intent toward the other party and individuals and organizations actually 
or implicitly associated with that party; they often were unwilling to entertain 
compromise; and neither side used their political power gracefully. 
Gravitation Toward Politics and Government Relations 
 
A theme related to the cultural interpreter model emerged from the interview data.  
This theme centered on informants’ gravitation toward the government relations 
profession.  Were they somehow predisposed toward fluency in politics and this made 
them effective cultural interpreters?  Academics consider government relations to be a 
specialized form of public relations, which is a communication management function 
(J.E. Grunig et al., 1992; Dozier et al., 1995; L.A. Grunig et al, 2002).  My entire 
dissertation is predicated on this consideration; the definition of public relations I have 
adopted for this study posits that public relations is a “communication function of 
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management” (Long & Hazleton, 1987, p. 6).  Yet in my conversations with informants, 
they either blatantly told me or implied that they gravitated toward the government 
relations profession because of their love of politics (“Politics is my hobby”) or desire to 
be an agent of change (“Politics is necessary to effect change for my clients”), not 
because of an affinity for communication.   
Several informants told me that they were self-avowed political “junkies.”  As the 
executive director of one 501c(6) organization declared: “I just enjoy the political 
process; I enjoy following and talking about it.  I enjoy what’s going on at the national, 
state, and local levels.”  Others offered their daily cover-to-cover readings of newspapers 
like the Washington Post and the Baltimore Sun and weekly viewings of Sunday morning 
political talk shows such as Meet the Press as proof they were political junkies.  Many 
informants reported they were political science majors as undergraduates.  Several had 
participated in the Washington Semester Program at American University; got bit by the 
political bug; and returned to Washington, DC, after graduation.   
Going to law school provided entrée to the political world for yet other 
informants.  Over half of the members of the U.S. Senate are lawyers, as are 36 percent 
of the members of the U.S. House (YourCongress.com, 2006).6 One for-contract GRP 
said his government relations practice evolved out of his law practice: “I could almost 
always find legislative remedies to clients’ problems.  So I started lobbying sort of by 
happenstance. I didn’t set out to become a lobbyist.  It evolved out of the way I was 
practicing law at the time.” 
 
6 I have been unable to find statistics about the career backgrounds of members of the Maryland General 
Assembly.   
291
Other informants also traced their government relations career paths to a 
combination of happenstance and having a knack for politics.  A managing director of a 
501c(6) organization recounted that around the time her last child headed off to school 
(and she found herself with a lot of spare time), she became friends with a candidate 
running for county office.  Her experiences “working for a guy who was a nobody from 
nowhere but who was an exciting, energetic candidate” helped her acquire the taste for 
politics that she still has today.   
Some others attributed their interest in politics to the 1960s.  The executive 
director of a 501c(6) organization explained: “I am a relic of the 1960s.  I was a campus 
radical at that time, quite involved in the civil rights movement, anti-Vietnam War 
activities, those sort of global issues.”  When I asked the executive director of another 
501c(6) organization about how he got into government relations work, he replied 
simply, “Well, I grew up in the ‘60s.” 
Not one informant was an avowed communication junkie (if there is such a thing), 
although the president and CEO of a 501c(6) organization did point out to me that she 
held a master’s degree in public relations.  I got the impression that this was a source of 
pride for her, in that she understood that government relations (and its sibling programs 
such as member and board relations) are all ultimately grounded in communication.  Only 
one other informant, the department director of a 501c(6) organization, verbalized to me 
any sort of non-atheoretical understanding of the relationship of communication with 
government relations and politics.  He said,  
If you think that you can understand the political process by being a political  
science major really belies the fact that this is more than anything a human  
interaction.  It strikes me that things like communication and psychology play  
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every bit as much of a role in the political process as do what you might strictly 
think of as social sciences like political science.  There’s no question that people, 
human frailties, and human communication play a sizeable role in this process as 
do the simple policy matters and so forth. 
 
He alludes in his last sentence to why the personal influence model seems to “rule” the 
practice of government relations: human communication.  But I believe he also raises 
another issue about communication: Communication is everywhere; you cannot not
communicate.  Communication is easily forgotten because it is everywhere; it is easy to 
take for granted.  Because communication pervades every human endeavor, it is difficult 
to think about (and study) it as a discrete phenomenon (L.W. Porter & Roberts, 1976).  
Communication is the background for government relations whereas politics is in the 
foreground.  Politics functions as a salient tangible whereas communication functions as 
an overlooked intangible in government relations.  And that might explain why most of 
my informants consider themselves political, and not communication, junkies.   
However, as any teacher of an introductory public relations course knows, there is 
always the student who inevitably attributes interest in public relations to being a “people 
person.”  Being a “people person” (that is someone who is extroverted, personable, and 
enjoys communicating) is a personality attribute that many informants mentioned as 
helpful, and indeed necessary, in their lines of work (I have discussed this earlier in the 
chapter).  Schwartzberg (1983) was not able to make a scholarly determination (from her 
anecdotal data) that extroversion was a causal factor of success in public relations.  She 
suspected that it was, however. 
One informant, who attributed her gravitation toward politics to being a people 
person, elaborated on this:   
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I’ve learned that beyond whether or not you like politics you have to have a basic 
ability to be a people person and I am. You have to have an ability to convey your 
message.  You have to be persuasive, but you also have to be polite.  You’ve got 
to be respectful and have enormous amounts of patience.  You have to be able to 
grin and bear it.  If you have those particular personality traits I think that you 
kind of evolve into a government relations professional like I did. 
 
Perhaps avowing oneself as a “people person” is simply another way of saying that  
 
one is a (human) communication junkie.  
 
Theory Question 3b  
Part b of Theory Question 3 asked, “How did the jolt affect their 
[informants’] communication practices with their organizations’ political 
stakeholders?” Put another way, did informants and their organizations communicate 
with stakeholders before Ehrlich’s election using different models than after his election?  
The short answer is: 
With a couple of exceptions, the jolt seemed not to fundamentally affect  
informants’ communication practices with their organizations’ political 
stakeholders.  Informants did tweak strategies and tactics.  For example, some 
reported slight increases in the use of media advocacy, a one-way communication 
practice.  Informants continued to want to engage in dialogue with political 
stakeholders and applied the personal influence model to effect opportunities for 
such.  This required informants and other organizational members to inventory 
and reconfigure their social circles for Republican contacts. 
 
It is important to remember that an executive administration — whether the 
governor is Schaefer, Glendening, Ehrlich, a Democrat, or a Republican — is a critical 
stakeholder in the political environment for my informants’ organizations.  But it is not 
the only critical political stakeholder.  Organizations have many stakeholders in 
Annapolis.  Smart organizations tailor their engagement strategies for their individual 
stakeholders, rather than impose a one-size-fits-all communication strategy on those 
stakeholders just because they populate the same turbulent political environment (J.E. 
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Grunig & L.A. Grunig, 1989; Lauzen & Dozier, 1992).  It is also important to remember 
that organizations may find themselves in a conundrum when critical stakeholders are 
engaged in conflict (i.e., Democrat and Republican lawmakers); engaging with one may 
be seen by the other as taking sides and may cost the organization opportunities to engage 
with the other (J.E. Grunig, 2001). 
The “Exceptional” Informant   
 
I found that Ehrlich’s election fundamentally affected the communication 
practices of only one informant, the co-chair of a 501c(4) organization.  By 
“fundamentally affected” I mean that the jolt completely affected the ways in which her 
organization communicated and engaged with all of its political stakeholders.  The 
changes entailed more than realigning contacts here or hiring a lobbyist there.  The jolt 
shifted asymmetrically the symmetrical presuppositions of her organization’s 
communication. 
Before Ehrlich’s election, this co-chair and her organization enjoyed both positive 
interactions, which were characterized by open and honest dialogue, and high political 
status with political stakeholders such as the Glendening administration and several key 
legislators (of both political parties).  This was logical because they were all on the same 
page on the issue that was her organization’s reason for being.  It was a facilitating (low-
constraint) environment.  After Ehrlich’s election, positive interactions with the 
governor’s office ended, her organization lost political status, and the environment 
became highly constraining.  Again, this was logical now that she and her organization 
and these stakeholders were on different pages about the issue.   
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This informant believed she and the organization were on the receiving end of 
brush-offs from political stakeholders such as the Ehrlich administration and several of 
those same key (and previously supportive) lawmakers.  She told me how soon after 
Ehrlich’s election, representatives of his administration offered her and her co-chair jobs 
in the administration: “We were told that we were ‘just the kind of people they needed in 
a regulatory capacity’. . .The catch was that all we needed to do was stop fighting against 
[issue].”  She characterized the job offers as “bribes.”   
After that, the co-chair and her organization quickly and drastically changed their 
communication practices, to reciprocate these stakeholders’ asymmetrical communication 
and to best engage with this now high-constraint, threatening environment.  They 
emphasized media advocacy over dialogue.  Holding lawmakers feet to the fire was 
emphasized over educating them.  Their reliance on symmetrically presupposed 
communication practices with political stakeholders before Ehrlich’s election gave way 
to asymmetrically presupposed and one-way communication practices after his election.  
When dialogue is no longer feasible, it is prudent to engage in asymmetrical (yet ethical) 
activities such as lobbying and media advocacy (J.E. Grunig, 2001).   
This informant was nonplussed by the jolt and its aftershocks.  She did not roll 
with political punches as well as other bane informants did.  This may be attributable to 
her lack of academic training and professional experience in government relations and 
politics before her involvement with this organization.  At the time of Ehrlich’s election 
in 2002, she was still in the throes of the acculturation process.  She was neither a 
political science major nor a law school graduate nor a lifelong political junkie.  She did 
not know the right people or have useful relationships with this critical stakeholder (thus 
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impeding her ability to implement the personal influence model).  She was not fully 
fluent in the culture of Annapolis, such as knowing how committees in the House of 
Delegates worked as compared with the Senate.  She was an “average” citizen whose 
passionate opposition to an issue motivated her to jump into the political fray.  For all 
these reasons, she was not able to engage in dialogue with the Ehrlich administration, not 
that it was interested in engaging in dialogue with her organization anyway.  But like the 
Ehrlich administration, her organization was neither interested in listening to the merits 
of the other sides of issue nor entertaining compromise.  This had not been a problem for 
her organization during the Glendening administration because it was on the 
organization’s side.  
By the time I spoke to her, she had earned her credentials as a boundary-spanning 
GRP.  Before the jolt, she was a novice GRP.  The jolt threw her acculturation process 
into hyperdrive, “burning” her along the way.  As a seasoned GRP, she was confident in 
her abilities to roll the next time politics punches her organization. 
Bane Informants’ Organizations 
 
As I expected, informants who considered Ehrlich’s election to be a bane reported 
that their organizations’ communication practices with this stakeholder were less 
symmetrically presupposed post-jolt than pre-jolt.  They had fewer opportunities to 
engage in the dialogue they desired.  The jolt also affected their abilities to employ the 
personal influence model.  They still wanted to employ dialogue as a first resort but 
opportunities for dialogue, meaningful or not, diminished for these organizations with 
Ehrlich as governor.  Some were altogether excluded from the Ehrlich administration’s 
policy-making decision forums, as other informants had been under the Glendening 
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administration.  Whereas they enjoyed sincere dialogue and meaningful inclusion under 
the Glendening administration, they now question the sincerity and motivations of 
executive-branch meetings in which they participate.  The committee chair of a 501c(4) 
organization even joked about the “non-dialogue” dialogue that occurs at some such 
meetings: “Governor Ehrlich has his mind made up, so that’s it.”  Pre-jolt: Proactive, 
inclusion, dialogue.  Post-jolt: Reactive, exclusion, no dialogue. 
Boon Informants’ Organizations 
 
Also as I had expected, several informants who considered Ehrlich’s election to 
be a boon thought the opposite.  With Annapolis now a less-constraining environment for 
them, symmetrically presupposed communication, such as dialogue, was an auspicious 
communication strategy.  With Ehrlich in office, there were more opportunities for 
dialogue with this critical stakeholder.  They proactively engaged with the new 
administration, which circularly sought them out for meaningful inclusion in policy 
discussions. 
Boon organizations were able to do this for two reasons: One, the organizations’ 
greater political legitimacy under a Republican governor; and two, the overlapping social 
circles of informants and members of the Ehrlich administration.  The jolt decreased 
constraints in the political environment for boon organizations. 
The changes in boon organizations’ communication practices reflected all these 
factors as well as how the Ehrlich administration communicated with them.  For example, 
under the Glendening administration, these informants reported that their organizations 
were excluded from policy-making decision forums and used as scapegoats.  The 
executive director of a 501c(6) organization said: “We had absolutely no contact with the 
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departments that develop policy for my industry.  They and Glendening weren’t 
interested in doing anything to work cooperatively.  They were always attacking us.”  
Almost immediately after Ehrlich won the election, the informant saw a sea change in 
these departments’ communication practices with his industry: “That attitude has now 
changed.  There’s communication with the executive branch.”  Pre-jolt: Reactive, 
exclusion, no dialogue.  Post-jolt: Proactive, inclusion, dialogue. 
Organizations’ Tweaking of Communication Practices 
 
As for the remaining informants, the jolt seemed not to fundamentally affect their 
communication practices with their organizations’ political stakeholders.  Strategies and 
tactics were tweaked, yes.  But drastic change in the symmetrical presuppositions of their 
communication practices?  No.  Several reported increasing media advocacy and 
grassroots efforts, reflecting an expansion of their existing pre-jolt one-way 
communication practices.  No one reported that his or her organization hired new 
personnel with Republican ties in an effort to create or solidify connections to the new 
Republican administration.  Based on Aldrich’s (1979) thoughts about organizational 
hiring practices and Weick’s (1979) concept of requisite variety, I expected to find at 
least a few instances of organizations’ hiring Republican personal influencers.  But that 
was not the case.  One for-contract GRP did note that he advised some of his clients that: 
“‘Hey, there are some other guys in town who are strictly in line with the Ehrlich folks 
and have set up their shop that way.  You might want to bring them in on this project.’”  
They did follow his advice but continued to retain his GRP services. 
 However, several boon, bane, and neutral informants did re-inventory the 
Republican connections of their organizations’ members of their boards of directors, 
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officers, grasstoppers, grassrooters, for-contract GRPs, and employees.  They tweaked 
their existing pre-jolt application of the personal influence model.  The hope there was to 
create opportunities for dialogue that diminished under the Ehrlich administration.  The 
executive director of a 501c(3)/501c(4) organization said: “We looked at what board 
members had what connections, where our relationships were.  We were pretty well 
postured but we still had a lot of relationship building to do.”  Another informant, an 
executive director, reported that both he and his 501c(6) organization’s for-contract 
lobbyist had to tweak their networks of contacts after Ehrlich’s election: “I had to realign 
some of my contacts and he had to realign some of his contacts so that we had ‘faster’ 
relations if you will with the Republican leadership.” 
The Influence of the Personal Influence Model 
 
Informants, with the exception of the “exceptional” co-chair of a 501c(4) 
organization I wrote about earlier, handled the Ehrlich election with aplomb.  They rolled 
with the punches of the jolt so that it did not effect fundamental change in how they 
engaged with different critical political stakeholders.  For the most part, the jolt affected 
informants’ on-going application of the personal influence model.  Again, based on my 
analysis, I believe this model, which is often applied in tandem with the cultural 
interpreter model, best explains these informants’ practice of government relations 
communication than do any of the four models.  Explanations for why government 
relations is the exception to the “rules” of the Excellence theory typically circle back to 
the dependence of GRPs on their network of contacts in the political environment (Dozier 
et al., 1995).   
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That most informants discussed their communication practices (pre- and post-jolt) 
within the context of whom they know and whom they need to get to know is further 
evidence of this.  The overriding concern for a boundary-spanning GRP in a jolted 
political environment, one for-contract GRP said, is to “know the new people that have 
the power.”  Useful relationships facilitate opportunities for the useful dialogue necessary 
for organizations to effectively pursue their goals and self-interests.  Useful relationships 
and useful dialogue are of paramount importance in a charged partisan political 
environment, a department director of a 501c(6) organization advised: “In an atmosphere 
like this, you have to have a relationship with the governor’s office.”   And for informants 
who were unable to effectively implement the personal influence model, to find and make 
those connections, to exploit useful relationships, for reasons such as being ostracized by 
an administration, life must go on.  A vice president explained her 501c(6) organization’s 
Plan B for communicating with the Ehrlich administration: “We’re doing what we have 
to do; we’re making attempts we need to make to have solid working relationships.  But 
it will be what it will be and we’ll work with it.” 
 Tweaking aside, the communication practices of most informants — boon, bane, 
and neutral alike — with political stakeholders were not fundamentally affected by 
Ehrlich’s election.  As one for-contract GRP said, much of his job continued to involve 
“constant networking within the framework of the legislature and the gubernatorial 
administration and all their departments.”  And this would continue to be much of his job 
regardless of which political party controlled which branch of government and the 
personalities and management styles of political stakeholders.  To reiterate, boundary-
spanning GRPs do not have necessarily have relationships with critical stakeholders for 
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relationships’ sake.  Relationships are for dialogue’s sake.  Regardless of what initially 
sparked the relationship, dialogue nurtures relationships, which turns them into useful 
relationships, which turns dialogue into useful dialogue.  But it is also more than that, as 
another for-contract GRP summed it up: “A lobbyist must expect and anticipate change 
as a regular factor. . .You know and expect change and don’t get thrown off kilter by it.  
You prepare for it.”    
Theory Question 4: Boundary Spanning 
 Boundary spanning is one of the most important functions for organizational 
survival and success.  It facilitates engagement with the environment so the organization 
can make strategic, smart decisions (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989) and establish or 
maintain rapport with critical stakeholders and further organizational goals.  Boundary 
spanning is an integral component of public relations, which I have defined as “a 
communication function of management through which organizations adapt, alter, or 
maintain their environment for the purpose of achieving organizational goals” (Long & 
Hazleton, 1987, p. 6).  Ergo, the success or failure of an organization may pivot on its 
boundary-spanning public relations personnel.  In this section, I specifically explore the 
work activities and responsibilities of 501c organizations’ boundary-spanning GRPs. 
 Much of the data related to Theory Question 4 also informs the results for the 
other four theory questions.  So rather than repeat anecdotes and utterances, in this 
section I frequently refer readers back to findings that have been presented earlier in the 
chapter.   
Theory Question 4a 
TQ4a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their work activities and  
responsibilities? 
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Informants were both jacks and masters of all trades.  They enacted the  
role of manager through their central involvement in their organizations’  
dominant coalition on government relations matters.  They educated other  
members of the dominant coalition about these matters and offered counsel  
and recommendations.  They directly participated in government relations  
decision-making.  But they did not enact the manager and technician roles  
discretely.  Being an effective manager entailed concurrent and skillful  
enactment of the technician role. They enacted the technician role through  
advocacy, environmental-scanning, and information-procurement activities;  
cultivation and nurturance of social circles; application of  the personal  
influence and cultural interpreter models; and tactical implementation of  
government relations strategies.   
My analysis of the interview data leads me to conclude that informants’ work 
activities and responsibilities illustrate the two modes of boundary spanning, the external-
representation and information-processing modes.  This was exactly as the literature 
suggested (i.e., Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Jemison, 1984; Springston & 
Leichty, 1994). 
External-Representation Mode 
I discussed many of informants’ external-representation activities in the Theory 
Question 3 results about grassroots and grasstops outreach, the use of dialogue, direct 
advocacy, and social circles, and in the Theory Question 5 results about organizational 
legitimacy.  The optimization of organizational legitimacy is one of the main 
responsibilities of boundary spanners in this mode. 
Information-Processing Mode 
 
I have also dealt with work activities and responsibilities associated with the 
information-processing mode throughout this chapter.  Informants massaged their social 
circles to pry loose useful information.  Information from stakeholders needs to flow into 
the organization but stakeholders need information to flow reciprocally from the 
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organization.  Boundary spanners broker this exchange from their “unique perch at the 
boundaries of their organization” (Lauzen, 1995b, p. 188).  They are information brokers.  
Informants brokered information in a formal sense by, for instance, providing 
stakeholders with information subsidies such as polling data.  As I discussed in the results 
section for Theory Question 5, this helps engender stakeholders’ good will and approval, 
thus enhancing organizational legitimacy.  Less formally, informants brokered 
information through their routine social and casual interactions with stakeholders, as may 
occur in social circles, for instance.  One-sided conversations are not going to cultivate or 
nurture social circles and other useful relationships with critical stakeholders.  
Information must flow both ways; to do otherwise is to risk the evaporation of the flow of 
information into the organization.  Dialogue is predicated on the mutual exchange of 
information among parties.  This symmetrically presupposed communication process also 




Boundary spanners engage with stakeholders, which facilitates environmental 
scanning.  Circularly, the results of environmental scanning efforts may prompt 
organizational engagement with stakeholders or may reveal newly relevant stakeholders.  
Put another way, boundary-spanning GRPs are specialists in “interpreting the [political] 
environment and its various [stakeholders]” for the organization (Hazleton & Long, 1988, 
p. 79). 
It does not matter if engagement occurs during a regularly scheduled executive-
branch meeting or in the hallway of the downtown Annapolis hotel many lawmakers and 
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boundary-spanning GRPs call home during the legislative session. The result is the same: 
two-way information and influence exchange.  In the interest of eliminating redundant 
findings, I will not rehash informants’ engagement activities here.   
Simply put, environmental-scanning activities are efforts to collect information 
and learn about everything in an organization’s environment that is relevant to it (Lauzen, 
1995b).  This reduces the perception of environmental uncertainty (Lauzen & Dozier, 
1992; Stoffels, 1994).  Environment scanning and information procurement activities 
took on renewed urgency and importance in the highly uncertain (and turbulent) 
environment of Annapolis (Hazleton & Long, 1988; Lauzen & Dozier, 1992).   
Scanning of the political environment fall to boundary-spanning GRPs, who are 
also responsible for deciding what is relevant.  This is an exercise in agenda-setting and 
framing, two media-effects theories (for a review, see McCombs and Estrada, 1997) that 
have application wherever an individual makes choices to select, emphasize, privilege, 
slant, or contextualize information. Boundary spanners may not even be aware that they 
are scanning and learning from the environment.  Humans pick up and process 
information about their environment even when they are not actively seeking  
information.  Such “automatic scanning” (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982) leads to unintentional 
learning.   
Implicit associations are an example of unintentional learning.  Implicit 
associations, as I have demonstrated, are heuristic devices humans use to make inferences 
about — and make sense of — people, traits, events, and the like.  Humans may not even 
realize they are using implicit associations, but they do use them: That is why readers 
likely linked unions and environmental groups with Democrats and Christian groups and 
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tort reform with Republicans in my implicit association test in Chapter 2.  Readers have 
unintentionally learned from their automatic scanning efforts to instantaneously make 
these associations.  These links, or implicit associations, help readers and boundary-
spanning GRPs make sense of the information they collect.   
I found that informants relied on implicit associations in much of their 
information-processing activities.  Implicit associations were the dominant factor in 
informants’ perceptions about whether Ehrlich’s election was a boon or bane for their 
organizations.  This was discussed in the results for Theory Question 1.   
Environmental-scanning activities can also be intentional and goal-directed.  
Informants spoke at length about their successful and failed attempts to engage in 
dialogue with stakeholders and collaborate with like-minded and strange-bedfellow 
coalition partners (see “The Importance of Dialogue” in the results for Theory Question 
3).  These intentionally undertaken dialogue activities are symmetrically presupposed, but 
their goal was organizational self-interest: to scan the environment for as much varied 
and high-quality information as possible for organizations’ strategic decision-making 
purposes.  Thus boundary spanners undertake environmental scanning activities with 
mixed motivations. 
The information collected during environmental-scanning activities, this raw data, 
needs to be processed into organizational intelligence.  Informants discussed how they 
had to cull and contextualize the raw data and transform it into user-friendly packages for 
organizational decision-makers.  This dovetails with Cutlip et al.’s (2000) observation 
that boundary spanners, such as my informants, “work with management to develop 
strategic plans of organizational change and responsiveness” (p. 220). I presented these 
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data as part of  “Theory Question 2: Worldviews.”  Informants reported that members of 
organizational decision-making bodies (e.g., a legislative committee) accepted their 
information packages (as suggested by Aldrich and Herker, 1977) and used them to make 
decisions, develop strategies, and take action.  Further, informants’ wielding of  influence 
within their organizations could be directly traced to their environmental-scanning 
efforts, which in large part could be traced to their social circles.   
In “Theory Question 2: Worldviews,” I also found that informants were integral 
players in organizational decision-making; this is where they wielded  influence within 
their organizations.  Their involvement in organizational decision-making, indicating that 
their organizations value decentralized management,  supported my assertion that the 
worldviews of informants’ organizations defaulted toward symmetry.  I found that 
informants were either members of or had direct access to organizational decision-
making bodies.  (They were close to the corridors of power within their organizations, 
meaning that other organizational members likely conferred high degrees of legitimacy 
on them.)  Further, informants functioned with a high degree of autonomy, testament to 
other organizational members’ trust in them and their work.  This was so even though 
many informants engaged closely — perhaps too closely, as members of the board of 
directors for the president of a 501c(6) organization wondered — with stakeholders and 
coalition members that held cultural topoi different from or even contrary to their 
organizations.  Having a dexterous mind that led them to appreciate and seek such 
“breadth of perspective” did not cause members of organizations to question informants’ 
loyalty, as Aldrich and Herker (1977) and White and Dozier (1992) had suggested.   
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In fact, I believe the opposite was true.  I think having a dexterous mind and 
seeking out different viewpoints garnered informants the respect of organizational 
members and further cemented their positions as influential leaders within their 
organizations.  Lawrence B. Wilkerson, a former chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin 
Powell from 2002 to 2005, although he was speaking of the Bush administration, offered 
his views on the characteristics of good leaders (Wilkerson, 2005).  I quote Wilkerson 
here because he illuminates (and tidily concludes) this discussion: Good leaders are 
people who have “a willingness to listen to dissenting opinions. . .[and] who can analyze, 
synthesize, ponder, and decide” (para. 14).  Using his definition, only one conclusion can 
be drawn from the data about informants’ execution of their work activities and 
responsibilities as boundary-spanning GRPs: that they were good leaders and this served 
their organizations well. 
Boundary Spanners as Technicians or Managers? 
 
Research has affirmed a two-role typology of practitioner role-enactment in 
public relations (Dozier & Broom, 1995).  Technicians engage in the craft of public 
relations, implementing the strategies decided by others.  Managers are involved in 
making those decisions, either because they are part of or have direct access to the 
organization’s dominant coalition (Dozier & Broom, 1995).  Given my findings related to 
informants’ participation in organizational decision-making (as discussed in Theory 
Question 2), I was reasonably sure of which role informants would predominantly enact 
before I analyzed the interview data.  Further, informants’ job titles telegraphed to me 
that in all likelihood the informants enacted the manager role.  The job titles for in-house 
GRPs included committee chair, member of the board of directors, program director, 
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department director, vice president, senior vice-president, executive director, CEO, and 
president.  For-contract GRPs had job titles such as government relations consultant, 
esquire, legislative consultant, managing partner, senior partner, administrative partner, 
principal, and president.  All of these job titles practically shouted that the informants 
were of high organizational status and involved in strategic decision-making processes; 
they were managers.  
I did of course analyze the interview data.  My analysis supported what the earlier 
findings and job titles had hinted at:  Informants, as they described their work activities 
and responsibilities to me, enact the manager role.  They routinely engage in strategic 
planning and, as I discussed in the earlier results section on worldviews (Theory Question 
1), are either directly or indirectly involved in decision-making as related to 
organizations’ government relations efforts. 
Roles researchers (e.g., Broom & G.D. Smith, 1979; Broom, 1982) initially 
conceived the manager role as three “conceptually distinct” roles (L.A. Grunig et al., 
2002, p. 199): the expert prescriber, problem-solving process facilitator, and 
communication facilitator.  These three roles, or what I call “subroles,” were collapsed 
into the one overarching manager role because one person typically engaged in the three 
subroles’ strongly intercorrelated activities (Broom 1982; Dozier, 1983).  As I had 
expected, my informants’ descriptions of their work activities and responsibilities 
reflected this.  However, I teased out evidence of the three subroles, which I surmised 
(correctly) would be useful in my analysis because of their associations with 
communication practices and worldviews. 
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The expert prescriber is the boundary-spanning professional an organization 
depends on for advice and leadership on government relations matters (for example).  
The organization looks so intently to the expert prescriber on government relations 
matters that it may cede decision-making responsibility for those matters to him or her, 
thus diminishing the organization’s active involvement in them (Dozier, 1992).  As 
Dozier (1992) explained, “The expert prescribes and management obeys” (p. 329).  This 
subrole is associated with asymmetrical communication practices (J.E. Grunig & Hunt, 
1984) and thus in turn an asymmetrically presupposed worldview. 
Informants related how other organizational members regarded them as experts in 
government relations and the political environment in Annapolis.  An executive director 
said of his 501c(6) organization’s members: “They rely on me to know about what’s 
going on.  When you dig around into the origins and motivations for an innocent-looking 
bill, you might find that it’s not so innocent.  They expect that leadership and information 
from me.”  An in-house lobbyist for another 501c(6) organization said: “My board 
respects me and the advice I give them.  They know I’ve been around Annapolis for a 
long time and know that I know what it is that they really should do.”  Some, such as one 
for-contract GRP, said being experts was the reason they were hired: “That’s why they 
hire me.  I make it my business to get to know everybody from the governor on down 
who has anything to do with government.”  Another for-contract GRP stated: “My 
stature, presence, visibility, political clout, influence, and relationships with 
governmental officials, that’s not for me.  That’s for my clients.  That’s why they hire 
me.”  Yet another for-contract GRP assessed his role as “to sort of educate the clients and 
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tell then what is doable and what was not and to keep their expectations in line with what 
could realistically be delivered, regardless of the administration.” 
The “expert” part of expert prescriber accurately fit the informants, but not so the 
“prescriber” part.  Being a “prescriber” presumes passive organizational decision-making 
bodies, bodies that accept the solution the expert has prescribed.   The informants’ 
organizational decision-making bodies, whether they were boards of directors, 
committees, or entire memberships, viewed government relations as the informants’ 
purview, or area of expertise.  The bodies depended on, but did not blindly follow or 
rubberstamp, the informants’ advice.  The bodies all were actively involved in 
government relations decisions, with one exception that I discuss in the next paragraph.  
The one exception, a president, remarked that several legislators have joked to 
him that his 501c(6) organization should be renamed after him.  Their implication was 
that he was the de facto organization; in fact his organization has a healthy membership 
roster.  Although he seemed to enjoy the joke, I also found him to be ambivalent about 
the fact that many of his organization’s members were unwilling to become involved in 
government relations and organizational governance matters:  “The fun part for me is that 
basically what happens is whatever I make happen.  The difficult part is that unless I do 
something, nothing happens.”  The members have re-elected him president several times, 
an indication that they approve of their hands-off dynamic with this hands-on president: 
“People are happy to be members but lack the time and commitment to do anything 
beyond that.  I think I’m quite widely supported but leadership is very time consuming so 
members are not prepared to make that time commitment.” 
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Clearly opportunity  temptation?  exists for this informant to use the 
organization for his own purposes given that the membership is largely absent on 
legislative and other matters.  This is a situation ripe for the expert prescriber to run 
amok.  Yet this informant strives to involve the rank-and file membership and 
organizational officers in government relations matters, as he assured me: “I will 
absolutely not commit [the organization] to anything, certainly not public, without 
clearing it through the membership, and for the most part that means the other four 
officers.”  However, beyond assembling the officers for quarterly dinner and occasional 
technology-mediated meetings and sending newsletters and e-mails to the membership, 
his attempts to encourage participation, or “create excitement” as he put it, have fallen 
flat. 
That a practitioner is regarded as knowledgeable and experienced is also implicit 
in the other two managerial subroles, the problem-solving process facilitator (PSPF) and 
communication facilitator (Dozier & Broom, 1995).  The PSPF engages in many of the 
same activities that an expert prescriber does.  However, the PSPF counsels 
organizational decision-makers about engaging in government relations matters.  Unlike 
the passive decision-makers in the expert prescriber scenario, the decision-makers in the 
PSPF scenario are actively involved in government relations matters.  An executive 
director of a 501c(6) organization remarked: “Our board is very actively involved.  
Frankly, I’m disappointed when they slack off.”  The exceptional informant I just 
mentioned was a frustrated PSPF, saddled with passive decision-makers all too content to 
let him single-handedly handle government relations matters.   
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My analysis revealed that informants, when enacting the PSPF subrole, interact 
with organizational decision-makers by recommending, advising, guiding, consulting, 
and collaborating with them, as they should as boundary spanners (Cutlip et al., 2000).  I 
provide a sampling of quotes from informants to illustrate their enactment of the PSPF 
subrole and the active involvement of their organizational decision-makers: 
• A department director for a 501c(6) organization: “I make a lot of presentations to 
our members to help guide them in what positions to take on issues and 
legislation.  Then they’ll have their discussions and they’ll either follow my 
recommendations or not.  They’re ultimately the ones that chart the course.” 
 
• A department director for a 501c(6) organization: “It’s a member association so I 
make recommendations and have a lot of influence.  But it’s the two member 
committees and association officers that make the decisions about what we’re 
doing.” 
 
• The president of a 501c(6) organization: “This organization delegates a lot to me 
but ultimately the members determine our positions on a bill.  I’ll advise them but 
a lot of time they’ll ignore me.  They make decisions based on the issue, not or 
me or the other lobbyists.  They’re pretty savvy.” 
 
• The executive director of a 501c(6) organization: “I’ll circulate the issue or bill 
and feedback I’ve gotten from our experts, provide my recommendations, and ask 
the committee members to take a look and get back to me.  And then based on 
what that feedback is, and consulting with our board and our paid lobbyist, we’ll 
make a decision.” 
 
• A department director for a 501c(6) organization: “The members look to us 
basically for guidance and what we give them is the benefit of the probability of 
passage, what are the impediments, what are we likely to encounter, chances for 
amendments, strategies we should consider, those type of things. But they take it 
from there.” 
 
• A vice president for a 501c(6) organization: “When we develop our agenda or 
have to decide how to react to legislation, we have a process and structure here for 
that.  We seek input from our members before we take positions on things.  
Everything gets discussed.”   
 
• The executive director of a 501c(3) organization: “I guide our policy positions as 
they’re being developed and then help shepherd them through board approval.” 
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Like the names of the other two manager roles, the name of third subrole, 
communication facilitator, doubles as its definition.  The communication facilitator 
facilitates communication between an organization and its stakeholders.  Ergo, the 
communication facilitator is a boundary spanner.  Ergo, my informants, conceptualized 
and realized as boundary-spanning GRPs, are communication facilitators.  As one for-
contract GRP described his typical day: “I’m busy communicating between my clients 
and government people.  This morning we met for two hours with [a cabinet secretary] 
and some of his aides.  That’s what I do every day, all year.”  A department director for a 
501c(6) organization declared, “I am the liaison for the organization, the political, 
legislative, and governmental professional who interacts with my old office.”  This 
subrole is associated with symmetrically presupposed communication practices (J.E. 
Grunig & Hunt, 1984) and thus a symmetrically presupposed worldview. 
As quantitative studies of role enactment have suggested (e.g., Broom & Dozier, 
1986), practitioners often may enact the manager and technician roles concurrently.  
Although practitioners may progress from being technicians to managers, they 
necessarily may not cease engaging in technician activities.  All of my informants, who 
were managers and high-level ones at that, concurrently enacted the technician role.  
Managers decide how to, for example, advocate organizational positions to 
political stakeholders, such as through direct advocacy, grassroots mobilization, or media 
advocacy.  Technicians make that direct advocacy, grassroots mobilization, or media 
advocacy happen; they implement the strategies decided by others, namely managers and 
other organizational decision-makers (Dozier & Broom, 1995).  My informants 
universally were responsible for not only making these strategic decisions (through 
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enacting the manager role) but also implementing them, particularly the direct advocacy 
activities.  Direct advocacy, or lobbying, is a primary tactical activity in government 
relations efforts (Mack, 1997).  Lobbying is an intensely personal form of advocative 
communication, as a for-contract GRP explained: “Lobbying tends to be very personal; 
you almost have to do it yourself.”   
Lobbying is not an activity that a GRP can (or should) delegate to, for example, 
either a subordinate who has not yet progressed beyond the technician role or even a 
lateral colleague.  Another for-contract GRP concurred: “The relationships I’ve 
developed and maintained are not convertible.  They’re very personal.  The nature and 
depth of my relationship with a public official is really just based on me and my 
experiences with that person.  Not someone else.”   
Informants have been able to enact their managerial roles and ascend to their elite 
positions because of their technical expertise in lobbying, both from a procedural 
perspective and a social circle perspective (which as I addressed in the results subsection 
for Theory Question 3).  The care and feeding of these social circles, which happen 
through dialogue and also facilitate lobbying, cannot be abandoned or bequeathed to 
another as a result of the GRP’s enactment of the manager role. An informant’s continued 
enactment of the managerial role  to be experts, problem solvers, and facilitators for all 
things government relations related  requires the continued enactment of a primary 
technician activity in government relations: lobbying.   
I provide the following quotes to show how informants enacted the technician 
role: 
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• The executive director of a 501c(4) organization: “I do a lot of the lobbying and 
fundraising myself.  I’m one of the main advocates that work on our policy 
initiatives.  I also help develop the materials we use in our citizen outreach and 
media outreach.” 
 
• A committee chair for a 501c(6) organization: “It was up to me to run the media 
advocacy campaign for the organization.” 
 
• A for-contract GRP: “I write testimony, I give testimony before committees, I 
meet with them.  I meet with legislators and advocate a position on behalf of my 
clients.” 
 
• A for-contract GRP: “Virtually all the lobbying for my clients is done by me.”     
 
• An associate director for a 501c(6) organization: “I do a lot of advocacy and 
lobbying work when session is in.  I’ll either file written testimony or offer 
testimony at a hearing.  I might draft amendments.  I might do some research for 
legislators.  I’ll prepare reports and papers and attend task force or work group 
meetings.” 
 
• A department director for a 501c(6) organization: “The committee and board 
chart the course.  Then we carry out their wishes in terms of us delivering 
testimony, being there at hearings, meeting with the right people.” 
 
• An assistant executive director of a 501c(6) organization: “Of course management 
is the primary thing, but I also do some hands-on work.  I’ll draft op-ed pieces, 
write speeches, and work on publications.” 
 
Boundary Spanners as Buffers 
 
The organizational literature on buffers (and its near-twin concept, organizational 
slack) explained buffers as “cushions” and stores of reserve resources that protect 
organizations when there are “relatively bad times” (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 138).  Cash 
on hand, machine capacity, and people (in terms of the number of bodies in the labor 
force) are examples of buffers that absorb environmental fluctuations.  Buffers help to 
facilitate organizational “business as usual” in jolted environments.  In addition to 
absorbing jolts, buffers may also provide the latitude for an organization to be 
entrepreneurial (regardless of the state of the environment).   They act as safety nets, 
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emboldening organizations like a shot of courage to take risks.  As such, buffers affect 
how organizations — and their boundary spanners — engage with their environments. 
 The public relations literature suggests that organizational legitimacy, stores of 
political capital, and positive relationships with stakeholders could also act as 
organizational buffers to the environment (i.e., Bruning, 2002; Bruning & Ledingham, 
2000; Coombs, 2001; Heath, 1997; Ledingham, 2003).  Hatch (1997) asserted that 
boundary spanners function as organizational buffers because they run interference 
between the organization and stakeholders in the environment.  Information can also 
serve as a buffer; information (and influence) is one of boundary spanners’ spheres of 
responsibility (Adams, 1980, as cited in Finet, 1993).  The data were thick with examples 
of legitimacy, capital, information, and relationships functioning as organizational 
buffers. . .and boundary-spanning GRPs’ fingerprints were all over the data.  
Some of the results for Theory Question 5 (“Organizational Legitimacy”) inform 
this discussion.  Coalitions can cushion organizations from political punches or even jolts 
in the environment.  Their many members make a coalition strong; members of a 
coalition derive protection from being one of many.  Big-player organizations, which 
presumably have political legitimacy and stores of political capital to spare, provide 
buffers to not-so-big player organization in coalitions.   
Nonpartisanship also buffers organizations because it helps them transcend 
politics (to an extent).  Politics is laden with values, so nonpartisanship helps 
organizations stay out of values-laden political conflicts.  Nonpartisan organizations, 
through their boundary spanners and other organizational members, can claim that they 
work with lawmakers based on records and positions on issues, not political party 
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affiliations.  However, an assistant executive director noted that although her 501c(6) 
organization was officially nonpartisan, it almost always worked out that it worked with 
Democrats.  This was not because these lawmakers were Democrats, but because these 
lawmakers’ natural positions on issues dovetailed with her organization’s positions.   
I also found that the personal legitimacy of boundary-spanning GRPs, which  
affected the legitimacy of their organizations, did indeed act to “buffer the organizations 
from external threats” (Adams, 1980, as quoted in Finet, 1993, p. 42).  External threats 
here would be the jolt or decreased (even withheld) organizational legitimacy.  
Informants derived much of their personal legitimacy from their social  
circles, which leads to my findings about social circles and the personal influence model 
(as discussed in Theory Question 3).  Informants reported having social circles that 
overlapped and intertwined with the social circles of lawmakers and other critical 
stakeholders in Annapolis.  From the laundry list of informants’ connections I presented 
in that results section, readers could see that some of these connections were circuitous.  
Some even had “my aunt’s neighbor’s daughter is married to Senator So-and-So” flavor 
to them.  Implied third-party endorsements help to strengthen the connections among 
members of social circles who are not directly connected. 
Research has found that mock juries are more likely to acquit physically attractive 
defendants of crimes than ugly defendants and to impose more lenient sentences on those 
good-looking defendants they find guilty (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994).  Physical 
attractiveness buffers defendants from guilty verdicts and harsh punishments.  This 
research also illuminates how social circles act as organizational buffers.  Think about 
this question:  Who are people more likely to be forgiving of: a good personal friend, a 
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work acquaintance, or a stranger?  Arguably, people would be more forgiving of the good 
friend than the acquaintance; they perhaps might not be at all forgiving of the stranger.  
Following that logic, lawmakers would be more likely to cut problem-causing 
organizations some slack if the organizations’ boundary-spanning GRPs are in the 
lawmakers’ own social circles.  The relationships between members of social circles 
function as organizational buffers.   
The senior vice-president and vice president of a 501c(6) organization both 
mentioned that their social circles included members of the Ehrlich administration.  They 
had long-time personal and professional connections with these stakeholders.  Because of 
informants’ personal legitimacy and social circles (and numerous other factors as well), 
the Ehrlich administration conferred a high degree of political legitimacy on their 
organization.  But when their organization publicly dissented with the administration on a 
policy issue, neither their social circles, nor their personal legitimacy, nor the 
organization’s political legitimacy could act as a buffer against the Ehrlich 
administration’s swift reaction to the dissension.  It no longer conferred legitimacy on the 
organization; it conferred persona non grata status on it instead.  
This raises an important distinction: Organizations only have legitimacy to the 
extent that a stakeholder confers or withholds legitimacy.  Organizations can control and 
manage the activities and relationships that would cause a stakeholder to confer 
legitimacy; but organizations cannot directly control and manage their organizational 
legitimacy.   
This is similar to the point L.A. Grunig et al. (2002) made about Aldrich and 
Pfeffer’s (1976) assertion that organizations and environments both must be managed.  
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They disagreed with the notion that an organization could manage its environment.  Like 
the legitimacy conferred by a stakeholder, the organization’s environment lies beyond the 
organization’s managerial reach.  Fombrun and Shanley (1990) agreed:  Managers may 
internally control “ingredients” in an organization’s reputation (which is computed into 
organizational legitimacy), an external perception created and held by the public.  But the 
reputation itself cannot be managed internally by the organization.  Reputations are 
created and held by the public, just like an organization’s legitimacy is perceived and 
conferred or withheld by stakeholders.  L.A. Grunig et al. suggested that what is in the 
organization’s managerial reach is the management of organizational responses to its 
legitimacy or its environment.  Thus the only way that an organization could “manage” 
its legitimacy is through its management of its responses to its legitimacy and its 
engagement with the stakeholders that confer legitimacy. 
 I offer one last finding about organizational buffers before turning to the second 
part of this theory question.  Bourgeois (1981) asserted that too much slack (to use his 
semantic alternative to “buffer”) makes organizations complacent and lazy.  One for-
contract GRP intimated such a sentiment as related to relationships in a boundary 
spanner’s social circles: “If a lobbyist becomes sedentary and overly comfortable in 
existing relationships, they can quickly become stale and ineffective.”   
Informants’ boundary-spanning efforts, in both the external-representation and 
information-processing modes, were perpetual.  They never stopped trying to cultivate 
new relationships and nurture existing relationships; their interindividual networks, their 
social circles, were the linchpins to their effective and successful execution of their work 
activities and responsibilities as boundary-spanning GRPs.  In turn, the informants were 
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the linchpins in their organizations’ effective and successful efforts to engage with 
political stakeholders so to establish or maintain rapport with them. 
Theory Question 4b 
Theory Question 4b asked, “How did the jolt affect the informants’ work 
activities and responsibilities?”  The answer is: 
The jolt did not seem to have any discernible macrolevel effect on informants’ 
work activities and responsibilities.  Informants engaged in the same work 
activities (e.g., environmental scanning and lobbying), had the same 
responsibilities (e.g., organizational decision-making), and continued to dually 
enact the manager and technicians roles pre- and post-jolt.  However, at the 
microlevel, the jolt may have affected the exact form of informants’ work 
activities.  For example, most informants added Republicans to their “lawmakers 
to care and feed” lists since Ehrlich’s election. 
I was surprised when my analysis determined that the jolt did not have any 
discernible macrolevel effect on informants’ work activities and responsibilities.  By 
“macrolevel effect,” I mean that informants engaged in the same general work activities 
(e.g., environmental scanning), had the same general responsibilities (e.g., participate in 
organizational decision-making), and continued to dually enact the manager and 
technicians roles pre- and post-jolt.  Witness this exchange with a president and CEO of a 
501c(6) organization, which typified my conversations with informants on this matter:  
Interviewer: Has Ehrlich’s election affected the way you do your job, your  
day-to-day or week-to-week activities? 
 






Interviewer: What about your responsibilities in the organization, have they  
changed? 
 
Informant:  No, that hasn’t changed either. 
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There was the one informant who served as the exception to my determination.  A 
committee chair told me how his 501c(6) organization viewed Ehrlich’s election as a 
bane because it long had worked closely with Democrat public officials.  Before 
Ehrlich’s election, his position entailed occasional grassroots activities and fielding 
media inquiries.  He enacted the technician role.  After his election, Ehrlich catapulted 
what had been a non-issue under Glendening to the top of his political agenda, an issue 
that this organization strongly opposes.  Nearly overnight, this informant’s work 
activities and responsibilities changed; he was thrust into a campaign “war room” whose 
goal was the defeat of this Ehrlich priority initiative.  Turbulent, uncertain environments 
like Annapolis increase boundary spanners’ participation and influence in organizational 
decision-making (Emery & Trist, 1965; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Leblebici & Salancik, 
1981; White & Dozier, 1992).  So as this informant’s technician activities (which now 
entailed member outreach, coalition work, and media advocacy) increased in frequency 
and intensity, his status within the organization grew.  He began to engage with important 
people outside the organization, such as the heads of coalition partners and journalists.  




Based on my analysis, I believe that jolt did not have macrolevel effects on most 
informants’ work activities and responsibilities because their organizations, with one 
exception, were oak-reed hybrids. I have asserted that organizations should be flexible 
when engaging with the environment, but not too flexible.  They also should maintain a 
modicum of resoluteness.  I called this an oak-reed hybrid, having used Aesop’s fable 
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about disparate fates of the mighty oak and the thin reed during a gale.  The organizations 
were flexible (i.e., reedy) enough to contend with the jolt, but not so flexible that they 
abandoned their core principles and missions.  They stood by them but not so rigidly as to 
be uprooted like the mighty oak in Aesop’s fable.  No one reported their organizations 
hurriedly hired Republican GRPs or fired Democrat GRPs in the wake of Ehrlich’s 
election.  No organization underwent an extreme makeover.   
However, at the microlevel effect, the jolt may have affected the exact form of 
informants’ work activities.  Any jolt-induced actions were necessarily cautious and 
deliberate.  Through their boundary-spanning GRPs, organization modified their 
government relations communication strategies and activities, social circles, and 
operational goals so that they could maintain a beneficial level of rapport with the 
stakeholders in the jolted political environment.   For example, most informants have 
added Republicans to their “lawmakers to care and feed” lists since Ehrlich’s election. 
The “Oak” Exception 
 
That said, there was one informant who was an exception.  (Is there not always an 
“exceptional” informant to themes that emerge in qualitative research?)  I have 
consistently highlighted this informant, the executive director of a 501c(6) who is strong 
partisan Democrat, throughout this chapter.  Try though he does at being the oak, his 
organization has managed to not be uprooted by the jolt.  He has steadfastly refused, even 
in his capacity as a boundary-spanning GRP, to engage with Republicans in the General 
Assembly or on the Second Floor.  He refused to give Ehrlich credit on policy matters 
that other informants involved in his industry did without qualification.  He made 
disparaging comments about Republicans (individually and as a group) in his interview.  
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In his view, Ehrlich’s election was an aberration.  So this informant bides his time, 
waiting for a Democrat to recapture the governorship in the 2006 election.  He admitted 
that his organization was never a big player in Annapolis, so not abiding by — being the 
oak — the two-party situation has neither significantly nor irreparably harmed — 
uprooted — his organization.  He has traditionally let his sister big-player organizations 
engage with political stakeholders that lie outside his own social circle and comfort zone.  
I cannot help but wonder if in a strange way his anti-Republican “oakness” endeared him 
to the Democrat lawmakers with whom he continues to closely engage. 
Boundary Spanners as Entrepreneurs 
 
I framed entrepreneurism in Chapter 2 within the context of how increased 
environmental turbulence might encourage it.  This assumes there is a “before” and an 
“after”; I present my findings about entrepreneurism under Theory Question 4b since it is 
framed with the same assumption.   
The literature suggested that organizations, through their boundary spanners,  
might engage with jolted environments using innovative and creative strategies (Young, 
1987).  Dynamic-complex environments and turbulent fields (like Annapolis) spur 
organizations to be entrepreneurial because “business as usual” does not exist.  A jolt is 
an unprecedented and noncomparable event, thus leaving boundary spanners to engage 
with the jolted, turbulent environment without the benefit of the experience of having 
done so before.  They lack blueprints or case studies to follow.  As the saying goes, 
“Desperate times call for desperate measures,” and so boundary spanners may opt for 
entrepreneurism over what is tried and true. 
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I had thought that the jolted political environment would require informants to 
also wear the hat of entrepreneur, someone who is a creative innovator and bold risk-
taker.  The data did not bear this out in terms of conspicuous entrepreneurism, which fits 
with my finding that the jolt had microlevel, not macrolevel, effects on informants’ work 
activities and responsibilities.  The jolt did not stimulate informants’ innovative thinking 
or creativity in terms of their inventing new grassroots mobilization techniques or 
implementing new technologies.  It did stimulate subtle manifestations of entrepreneurial 
thinking that made them able to deftly dispatch the challenges of a newly partisan and 
polarized political environment and parlay them into opportunities that furthered 
organizational self-interest. 
The innovation and creativity of my boundary-spanning GRP informants lay in 
their mental dexterity (as discussed elsewhere in this chapter) and political savvy: their 
abilities to understand and account for the jolted chessboard of Annapolis, new players, 
and a new set of rules for the game.  They may frame an issue in a new or different way; 
collaborate with new or even strange-bedfellow organizations; use the media, 
grassrooters, and grasstoppers; and strategically distribute PAC and other campaign 
donations.  According to several informants whose careers date to the 1970s, the latter 
two activities at one time were considered entrepreneurial, even new-fangled, political 
maneuvers in Annapolis.  Now they’re de rigueur.   
A dexterous mind, which I have found most informants possessed (see “Theory 
Question 2: Worldviews”), is open to innovation and entrepreneurism.  Informants 
indicated that they and their organizations would consider new and risky strategies, and 
in fact had done so.  Organizations with symmetrically presupposed worldviews value 
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innovation (J.E. Grunig, 1989; J.E. Grunig & Repper, 1992), so they arguably value 
entrepreneurism.  Thus entrepreneurism is indicative of a symmetrically presupposed 
worldview.  The committee chair of a 501c(4) organization reported that when deciding 
on candidate endorsements: “Sometimes we will go ahead and take a gamble on 
somebody.  We’ll toss the dice and see how it turns out.”  A for-contract GRP reported 
that one of his clients tried a new approach to effecting political change on an issue.  The 
client, under his guidance, “tried to do something that [this industry] had never actually 
done before.”  Rather than relying on a lobbying-intensive strategy, the client pursued a 
strategy that emphasized member outreach and coalition efforts.  
The department director of a 501c(6) organization recounted the “risky” story of 
her hiring: “I didn’t know anybody, not a soul.  But I knew the process.  I’d been 
lobbying for 15 years, but only I worked in Maryland for four years and hadn’t done any 
upfront work with the General Assembly or the governor’s office.”  Moreover, her pre-
lobbying background was in business and marketing, not the typical informant’s 
background in law or legislative committee work.  Yet her boss decided to take a “leap of 
faith,” as she characterized it, and hired her anyway.  
 A managing director was one of two informants who suggested a government 
relations strategy that was innovative and unprecedented enough to qualify as 
entrepreneurial.  For her 501c(6) organization, if implemented, this strategy would be a 
radical departure from tradition.  The Ehrlich administration has treated her organization 
(and its boundary-spanning GRPs) as persona non grata ever since it endorsed his 
opponent in the 2002 race.  She clued me in that, short of the Ehrlich administration 
doing “something dreadful” related to her organization’s interests in the months leading 
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up to the 2006 election, she planned to recommend to the leadership that it not officially 
endorse any gubernatorial candidate in the 2006 Democrat primary and general elections.  
She will recommend that her organization instead publicize comparisons of the 
candidates’ positions on relevant issues.   
Traditionally this woman’s organization, its siblings in other states, and the 
national parent organization officially endorse gubernatorial candidates, based on  votes 
of their memberships.  She believes that even the suggestion to not endorse a candidate 
will cause a stir.  But she believes non-endorsement is a smart strategy: “It’ll anger the 
candidates but if we endorse one and the other wins, we’ll have the same problem we’ve 
got now with Ehrlich.  We don’t want to back the wrong horse again.”    
To recommend a non-endorsement strategy, which if implemented would be 
unprecedented in her organization’s history, suggests an entrepreneurial thought and a 
symmetrically presupposed worldview.  She was doubtful that her organization’s 
leadership would follow her recommendation but was hopeful that it would at least 
sincerely consider it.  She believed she would be remiss if she did not present non-
endorsement as an option, especially because the 2002 endorsement of Townsend has 
condemned the organization to nearly four years of persona non grata status with the 
state’s chief executive. 
The other informant, the president of a 501c(6) organization, recounted that 
members of his organization’s board were skeptical about the organization’s involvement 
with a coalition of strange bedfellows.  To boot, he was the one who brought the groups 
together: “It was uniquely my idea.  The board thought it was risky business, risky 
behavior.  They suggested maybe I ought to rethink it.”  Did he?  No, he did not: “I 
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definitely stuck my neck out on this but went ahead with it.  And so far, so good!”  This 
anecdote is telling on another level: His organization’s board members, who technically 
function as his boss, despite their trepidation about his “sleeping with the enemy” 
strategy, deferred to this informant.  I infer from this that the board members either trust 
his judgment, their symmetrically presupposed worldview trumped their misgivings, they 
too have an entrepreneurial streak, or some combination of these.   
Outside of these two examples, I did not find other evidence of entrepreneurism 
that even began to approach the level of, for example, 2004 Democrat presidential 
candidate Howard Dean’s unprecedented use of the Internet to recruit volunteers and 
low-dollar donors.  There was no entrepreneurism even slightly reminiscent of the 
introduction of patch-through phone calls in the early 1990s.  At the time, these were 
heralded as an innovative (albeit disingenuous) component of grassroots campaigns 
(Silverstein, 1997).7 Overuse and phoniness have tarnished patch-throughs’ innovative 
luster.  Currently innovative is Internet patch-through phone technology that “allows 
grassroots supporters to type their phone number into a Web page, be called back on their 
phone, and then patched through to the targeted political decision-maker” (Reilly, 2003, 
para. 1).  This innovation even won the 2003 National Conference for Political 
Involvement Innovation Award.   
I believe my informants were entrepreneurs in the sense that they were creative; 
creativity seems to be a hallmark trait in the personalities of successful public relations 
practitioners (Schwartzberg, 1983).  Political savvy also made them entrepreneurs.  For 
example, as I have detailed elsewhere in this chapter, informants were entrepreneurial 
 
7 Patch-through phone calls involve telemarketers calling lawmakers’ constituents, “ril[ing them] up on an 
issue,” asking them to voice their opinions (as just manipulated by the telemarketer) to their lawmakers, 
and then immediately connecting them to their lawmakers’ offices (Silverstein, 1997, para. 9).   
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when they used the two-party dynamic to their organizations’ advantage.  That two-party 
dynamic was born in late 2002 and informants were quick to seize the opportunities that 
dynamic afforded them.  Politics is a chess game, a metaphor many informants used.  A 
masterful (i.e., savvy) chess player may rely less on making bold moves conspicuous to 
the opponent.  Instead, the masterful player analyzes the board, perhaps dozens of 
potential moves, and the opponent’s potential responses; finally opting for a subtle yet 
strategic move that perplexes the opponent.  It is that one seemingly innocuous move that 
may prove brilliantly fatal to the opponent five turns later. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
The outcome of any serious research can only be to make two questions grow where only 
one grew before. 
 Thorstein Veblen (1919), American economist and thinker 
Research is never completed . . . Around the corner lurks another possibility of interview, 
another book to read, a courthouse to explore, a document to verify. 
 Catherine Drinker Bowen (1959), American biographer 
In academic research, learning “what” has value, as my description and analysis 
in Chapter 4 demonstrated.  But that type of learning lacks the theoretical value of 
learning “why,” value doctoral dissertations must have.  In this chapter I further analyze 
and interpret the study’s results in search of answers to the theoretically valuable 
questions of “Why,” “But what does it all mean,” and “So what?” 
 The interpretation process addresses these questions, as well as “explain[s] the  
findings. . .attach[es] significance to particular results, and put[s] patterns into an analytic 
framework” (Patton, 1990, p. 375).  Additionally, interpretation requires “transcend[ing] 
factual data and cautious data and begin[ning] to probe into what is to be made of them” 
(Wolcott, 1994, p. 36).  It is a tall yet imperative order for any doctoral dissertation to rise 
beyond descriptive research to these heights. 
Review of Results  
The purpose of this study is to learn of  and from  the experiences of 
boundary-spanning GRPs, those organizational members who manage organizational 
interdependence with political stakeholders, in organizations enduring a major “jolt” 
(A.D. Meyer, 1982) in their political environment.  The study focused on in-house and 
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for-contract GRPs affiliated with 501c organizations operating in Maryland.  The jolt is 
the election of Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., in November 2002, as Maryland’s first Republican 
governor in nearly four decades.  As Chapter 4 demonstrated, my working assumption, 
that boundary spanners were of crucial significance to organizations throughout and after 
the jolt, regardless of whether their organizations welcomed the jolt or not, was 
supported. 
 Chapter 4 provided answers to five sets of theory questions derived from the 
study’s first central research question (which was derived from the overall research 
purpose): In what ways have the jolt and subsequent changes in the political environment 
in Maryland affected boundary-spanning GRPs and the work they do?  Below is a 
summary of those answers: 
TQ1a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their organizations’  
perceptions of the jolt? 
There was a balance between informants who perceived Ehrlich’s election as a 
boon for their organizations and those who perceived it as a bane.  Their 
perceptions predominantly were based on implicit associations about the relative 
“friendliness” of political parties toward their organizations’ interests and 
issues. 
TQ1b: How did the jolt affect organizations’ perceptions of their political  
environment? 
The jolt ratcheted up the existing dynamism and complexity in the relatively stable 
Annapolitan political environment so that Annapolis became a turbulent field rife 
with uncertainty.  Informants perceived politics as an asymmetrical game of 
competition. 
TQ2a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe the worldviews of their  
organizations? 
 
Organizations held symmetrically presupposed worldviews.  That is, the  
organizations’ worldviews were more symmetrical than asymmetrical.  Further,  
the organizations’ two most critical stakeholders in the political environment  
(viz., the Democrats who controlled the General Assembly and the Republicans  
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who controlled the Office of the Governor) held asymmetrically presupposed  
worldviews. 
 
TQ2b: How did the jolt affect the worldviews of their organizations? 
The jolt generally did not precipitate a sea change in organizations’ worldviews.   
Organizations’ worldviews were presupposed more symmetrically than  
asymmetrically both before and after the jolt of Ehrlich’s election.  Post-jolt  
changes of most organizations’ worldviews were negligible enough that if this  
were a quantitative study the changes probably would fall within the margin of  
error.   
TQ3a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their communication  
practices with their organizations’ political stakeholders? 
 
Informants engaged in a variety of one-way, two-way, symmetrically 
presupposed, and asymmetrically presupposed communication practices,  
including grassroots member outreach, media advocacy, grasstops member  
outreach, coalition involvement, and lobbying.  The personal influence model,  
typically applied in conjunction with the cultural interpreter model, led to  
dialogue (i.e., the two-way symmetrical/mixed-motive model) with political  
stakeholders.  This practice best described and explained informants’ 
effectiveness and success as boundary-spanning GRPs. 
TQ3b: How did the jolt affect their communication practices with their  
organizations’ political stakeholders? 
 
With a couple of exceptions, the jolt seemed not to fundamentally affect 
informants’ communication practices with their organizations’ political 
stakeholders.  Informants did tweak strategies and tactics.  For example, some 
reported slight increases in the use of media advocacy, a one-way communication 
practice.  Informants continued to want to engage in dialogue with political 
stakeholders and applied the personal influence model to effect opportunities for 
such.  This required informants and other organizational members to inventory 
and reconfigure their social circles for Republican contacts. 
 
TQ4a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their work activities and  
responsibilities? 
 
Informants were both jacks and masters of all trades.  They enacted the role of  
manager through their central involvement in their organizations’ dominant  
coalition on government relations matters.  They educated other members of the  
dominant coalition about these matters and offered counsel and 
 recommendations.  They directly participated in government relations decision- 
making.  But they did not enact the manager and technician roles discretely.   
Being an effective manager entailed concurrent and skillful enactment of the  
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technician role. They enacted the technician role through advocacy,  
environmental-scanning, and information-procurement activities; cultivation and  
nurturance of social circles; application of  the personal influence and cultural  
interpreter models; and tactical implementation of government relations  
strategies. 
TQ4b: How did the jolt affect their work activities and responsibilities? 
The jolt did not seem to have any discernible macrolevel effect on informants’ 
work activities and responsibilities.  Informants engaged in the same work 
activities (e.g., environmental scanning and lobbying), had the same 
responsibilities (e.g., organizational decision-making), and continued to dually 
enact the manager and technicians roles pre- and post-jolt.  However, at the 
microlevel, the jolt may have affected the exact form of informants’ work 
activities.  For example, most informants added Republicans to their “lawmakers 
to care and feed” lists since Ehrlich’s election. 
TQ5a: How do boundary-spanning GRPs describe their political stakeholders’  
perceptions of the legitimacy of their organizations? 
 
Informants operationalized organizational legitimacy as political status.  I found 
that congruency of values between an organization and a political stakeholder 
was the major determinant of the organization’s political status.  Congruency of 
values translated to high political status, which translated to inclusion and 
meaningful participation in unofficial and official dialogic and decision-making 
opportunities with the political stakeholder.  The converse was true for values-
incongruent, and thus low political status, organizations. 
 
TQ5b: How did the jolt affect the political stakeholders’ perceptions of the  
legitimacy of the boundary-spanning GRPs’ organizations? 
The jolt negligibly affected the political legitimacy of neutral organizations; this 
was unsurprising given that these organizations were strictly nonpartisan in 
reality and perception.  The jolt significantly affected the political legitimacy of 
boon and bane organizations, organizations that were partisan either in reality or 
perception.  Ehrlich and his predecessor, Glendening, held opposite stances on 
many issues; they did not have congruent values.  What was a values-congruent 
organization for Glendening was a values-incongruent organization for Ehrlich 
and vice versa.  Many organizations saw their political status invert because of 
the transition from the Democrat Glendening to the Republican Ehrlich.  Further, 
expectations about potential changes to an organization’s political legitimacy 
factored into informant’s assessment of whether the jolt portended good or ill for 
the organization. 
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Major Results for Central Research Questions 2 and 3 
In this section, I summarize the major results related to the second and third 
central research questions.  In the next section, I present nuanced interpretations of these 
findings. 
The second central research question asked, “Why did the jolt affect boundary-
spanning GRPs as it did?”  The three main reasons are:  
• The level of partisanship in Annapolis: 
The jolt touched off polarizing partisanship that changed the tenor of politics in 
Annapolis.  This partisanship quickly pervaded the political environment of 
Annapolis and the professional lives of its denizens  lawmakers, staffers, and 
GRPs alike.   
 
• Organizations’ political legitimacy:  
The jolt inverted the political legitimacy, conferred by the holder of the Office of 
the Governor, of nearly all of the informants’ organizations.  This affected 
informants’ access to political decision-makers and opportunities for dialogue 
and advocacy of organizational interests. 
 
• Informants’ social circles: 
Many informants did not know many of the aides in positions of high authority in 
the Ehrlich administration.  Further, these aides did not appear motivated to 
familiarize themselves with informants, other GRPs, or the culture of Annapolis.  
The social circles of many informants thus lacked useful relationships with 
members of the Ehrlich administration.  This affected their access to political 
decision-makers and opportunities for dialogue and advocacy of organizational 
interests. 
 
The biggest surprise to me in the transformed data was that the jolt, which 
informants universally agreed strongly jarred the political environment of Annapolis, the 
tenor of its politics, and organizations’ political legitimacy, did not jar them 
commensurately on an individual level.  I had expected the jolt to have effected stronger 
and more numerous changes in informants’ work-lives than they reported.  There were no 
334
significant changes in informants’ status within their organizations, conduct of their 
routine activities, fulfillment of their responsibilities, and communication and 
engagement practices with political stakeholders.  They dealt with the myriad challenges 
and opportunities of the jolt by modifying  not overhauling  strategies, tactics, 
messages, social circles, alignments, and the like to reflect the new, polarized two-party 
reality of Annapolis.  I believe that this “surprise” finding is explained by one, 
informants’ more-than-capable professional expertise in government relations; two, their 
political savvy; and three, their positive practice of government relations closely 
approximated the normative practice of government relations.    
The third central research question asked, “What can be learned from their 
experiences that informs the theory and practice of the specialized form of public 
relations, government relations?”  My three major results that inform theory are: 
• Social circles, as the all-important cohesive element holding all aspects of GRPs’ 
work-lives together, necessitated that informants practice government relations 
according to the personal influence model of public relations. 
 
• Dialogue (viz., two-way symmetrical/mixed-motive communication) was the 
informants’ communication strategy of first resort. 
 
• Political stakeholders (i.e., Democrats and Republicans) seemed to hold 
asymmetrically presupposed worldviews whereas informants’ organizations 
seemed to hold symmetrically presupposed worldviews. 
 
Based on these three major results, I have developed a theory of government 
relations that describes informants’ positive practice of government relations as well as 
how GRPs should practice government relations.  This theory relates back to my third 
explanation, namely that informants’ positive practice of government relations closely 
approximated the normative practice of government relations, for the surprise finding.  
Thus, I posit the following positive-normative theory of government relations:   
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Government relations should be practiced by employing dialogue within the 
symmetrically presupposed context of the personal influence model of public 
relations.  Such practice should enable organizations to effectively engage and 
maintain rapport with asymmetrically presupposed political stakeholders, even in 
increasingly partisan and polarized political environments.    
 
I believe useful concepts for developing this theory of government relations 
beyond this embryonic form and for researching government relations and public 
relations include organizational justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), interpersonal 
communication, and interpersonal relationships.  I discuss these points in detail later in 
the chapter. 
To summarize my major findings for the practice, they are: 
• Political change, no matter how “jolting,” affects, both positively and negatively, 
the work-lives of boundary-spanning GRPs.  However, factors such as partisan 
conflict between political parties, organizational nonpartisanship, and GRPs’ 
social circles may minimize those impacts.  
 
• Polarized partisan political environments are fraught with peril for organizations 
that are partisan in reality or in perception and their boundary-spanning GRPs.  
Adopting nonpartisanship, minimizing partisanship, or increasing bipartisanship 
are potential strategies for effectively negotiating such political environments. 
 
Further, I achieved the goals related to the study’s potential theoretical 
significance outlined in Chapter 1.  These were to: 
• Contextualize and triangulate the established quantitatively developed body of 
knowledge on boundary spanning with data yielded through qualitative methods. 
 
• Cast a scholarly light on government relations, an academically underexplored 
specialized public relations program. 
 
• Understand, from an individual-level perspective, the work-lives of boundary-
spanning GRPs as they and their organizations contend with a jolted political 
environment. 
 
• Address four voids in the existing literature: 
o Springston and Leichty’s (1994) call for a “fuller understanding of how public 
relations practitioners interact with publics, and collect and use information 
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about publics,” (p. 687), as well as a better understanding of routine 
boundary-spanning activities. 
 
o Jemison’s (1984) call for more research on factors that affect boundary 
spanners’ influence. 
 
o Werder’s (2002) urging for additional positive theories in public relations. 
 
o Baum and Rowley’s (2002) identification of the interactions between 
organizations and their political environment as “an important conceptual 
question” (p. 9). 
 
Central Research Question 2 
The best starting point for a nuanced interpretation of the major findings related to 
the second central research question (Why did the jolt affect boundary-spanning GRPs as 
it did?) is informants’ perceptions of the political environment of Annapolis and of 
politics generally.  Informants perceived Ehrlich’s election as making an already 
dynamic-complex political environment even more so, to the point that Annapolis 
became a turbulent field rife with uncertainty.   
Initial Perceptions of the Jolt’s Implications 
 Depending on an organization’s political status in Annapolis, the jolt of Ehrlich’s 
election had either positive or negative implications.  This is why Ehrlich’s election 
qualified as a jolt: It had the potential to turn “losers” and “winners” during  
Glendening’s administration into “winners” and “losers,” respectively, during Ehrlich’s 
administration.  
Informants perceived the jolt through the prism of the degree of political 
legitimacy they expected the Ehrlich administration would confer on their organizations.  
If Ehrlich shared (or were assumed to share) political interests with an organization, that 
organization’s informant assumed a high degree of friendliness and welcomed his 
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election as a boon.  Boon organizations tended to gain political legitimacy going from 
Glendening to Ehrlich, whereas bane organizations tended to lose political legitimacy.  
Political interests reflect values and thus congruent values were a major determinant of 
how much political legitimacy, if any, Ehrlich conferred on organizations (this was true 
for Glendening and other political stakeholders as well).   
At the root of informants’ jolt perceptions were implicit associations about 
congruency of values between their organizations and the new governor.  Informants 
calculated these implicit associations into the expected loss, gain, or maintenance of their 
organizations’ political legitimacy.  Humans rely on implicit associations as a heuristic 
framework, making instantaneous sub- or unconscious links among people, personality 
traits, and phenomena.  They simplify a confusing and complex world.  Political 
legitimacy is important because with its conference comes opportunities for inclusion, 
dialogue, true voice, influence, and goal realization.  These opportunities were 
diminished or disappeared for organizations with low legitimacy.  The more competitive 
a political environment is, the more important political legitimacy becomes for 
organizations.  With Ehrlich’s election, Annapolis became an extremely competitive two-
party political environment. 
Because Glendening and Ehrlich held such different, even contrary, values, the 
jolt of Ehrlich’s election affected the political legitimacy of nearly all informants’ 
organizations.  This was a good thing for some informants and organizations.  As A.D. 
Meyer (1982), who inspired me to conceptualize Ehrlich’s election as a jolt, reminded, 
jolts do not have to be negative events.  They can be immediately positive events.  
Alternately, their impacts, positive or negative, may be delayed (e.g., a jolt initially may 
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be considered as a negative event, but once the lessons learned are incorporated into 
organizational thinking and planning, it may be reconsidered as a positive event for the 
organization).   
Ehrlich, for instance, conferred less personal political legitimacy on some 
informants on whom Glendening had conferred high personal political legitimacy, 
making the jolt a negative event for them.  The greater an organization’s political 
legitimacy is (i.e., it enjoys high political status), the “closer” it is to those who wield 
political power and conferred that legitimacy.  As compared with organizations with 
lower legitimacy (i.e., bane organizations under Ehrlich), high-status organizations (i.e., 
boon organizations under Ehrlich for which the jolt was a positive event) have better 
access to and opportunities for the exchange of information and influence with certain 
political stakeholders.  An organization with influence has “the ability to affect the 
outcome of decisions” (Jemison, 1984, p. 133) that favor the organization and further its 
self-interests.  An organization’s political fortunes with political stakeholders thus rises 
and falls apace with the degree of political legitimacy conferred on it.   
I compare here the experiences of two informants’ organizations, one a boon, the 
other a bane, to illustrate the implications of jolt-induced changes in organizational 
legitimacy.  Glendening, as all political stakeholders do, bestowed greater political 
legitimacy on organizations with values congruent with his (e.g., environmental 
organizations) and lower legitimacy to those with incongruent values (e.g., animal 
husbandry organizations).  The greater the congruency, the more legitimacy he conferred 
and vice versa.  One informant, a co-chair, reported that Glendening conferred high 
political legitimacy on her 501c(6) organization (for the purposes of this immediate 
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discussion, I will refer to her organization as Organization S).  Organization S’s 
informants engaged in informal and formal dialogue with Glendening, his senior 
administration staff, and many other organizations.  Organizations favored education, 
awareness, and subtle advocacy over overt forms of asymmetrically presupposed 
communication.   
The executive director of another 501c(6) organization (which I will refer to as 
Organization P) reported Glendening barely conferred any political legitimacy on it.  
Organization P’s informant told me he worried throughout the Glendening administration 
about engaging with certain political stakeholders.  He feared making Organization P 
itself and its industry vulnerable to being burned by Glendening and “his crowd.”  He 
tended to engage only with friendly lawmakers and sister organizations, although he 
eventually did hire a for-contract GRP to engage with stakeholders he felt uncomfortable 
doing so himself.  Organization P’s communication practices tended to be reactive and 
defensive.  
Ehrlich happened to hold values opposite of Glendening on these organizations’ 
parochial interests.  When Ehrlich became governor, the organizations’ legitimacy 
situations flip-flopped: Organization S was given the cold shoulder and Organization P 
basked in the warmth of its newly conferred political legitimacy.  The co-chair for 
Organization S, a bane organization, initially attempted to engage in dialogue with the 
Ehrlich administration.  It rebuffed her, telling her it would not cede any ground to her 
side on the issue over which they were at odds.  It would neither entertain nor 
accommodate her organization’s concerns at all; further, it was publicly dismissive of 
them.  Given the futility of this communication situation, Organization S decided to cease 
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trying to engage dialogically with the Ehrlich administration.  She since has focused 
organizational engagement efforts on friendly lawmakers and non-political stakeholders.  
Organization S has not, however, abandoned or lowered its goals as outlined in its 
mission statement; although the informant was concerned about the implications of 
Ehrlich’s governorship on her organization’s ability to ever realize them, even beyond his 
tenure as governor. 
Organization P, a boon organization, bloomed under Ehrlich, engaging with 
critical stakeholders and organizations it had not previously.  Without reason to fear a 
Democrat-occupied Office of the Governor, this executive director indicated that 
Ehrlich’s election immediately empowered him and his organization.  He was hopeful 
about his organization’s abilities to achieve its “mission” goals.  The organization did not 
necessarily re-evaluate or expand its legislative agenda, but the informant believed that 
they were more “in reach” with Ehrlich in office than Glendening.  
The Role of Social Circles in Political Legitimacy 
Besides being a function of congruent values between conferrers and conferees, 
political legitimacy was also a function of the personal political legitimacy of an 
organization’s GRPs.  GRPs’ political legitimacy is a function of whom they knew: their 
personal and professional contacts in their social circles.   
Informants with high personal political status, again that stemmed from their 
social circles, were able to open doors more easily to critical political stakeholders than 
lower-status informants were.  Once that door was opened, informants were able to take 
seats at the table where dialogue and decision-making occur.  Further, informants shared 
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or transferred some of their high political status (i.e. personal legitimacy) to their 
organizations, an example of the implied third-party endorsement effect.   
Political stakeholders confer high political legitimacy on GRPs who share their 
values or whose social circles overlap with theirs or both.  If a GRP shares a social circle 
with a top Senate committee counsel or a senior administration staffer, arguably they 
confer greater legitimacy on this GRP than another GRP who lies outside this social 
circle.  That “insider” GRP’s personal legitimacy transfers to the organization.  This 
could help organizations overcome some of the delegitimization arising from not sharing 
the values of political stakeholders or otherwise not engendering the stakeholders’ “good 
will and approval” (Boyd, 2000, p. 344).   
That informants’ personal legitimacy might help organizations overcome 
organizational delegitimization is related to my finding that informants increasingly 
began to function as organizational buffers upon Ehrlich’s election.  Whether they 
consciously realized it, informants began to wear the hat of organizational buffer after 
Ehrlich’s election and the ensuing partisanship.  They were already wearing hats labeled 
advocate, boundary spanner, communicator, cultural interpreter, decision maker, 
environmental scanner, external representer, information procurer, lobbyist, perceiver, 
personal influencer, and political expert.  They either functioned as buffers themselves or 
they oversaw activities (e.g., coalition work) and reinforced organizational attributes 
(nonpartisanship and organizational legitimacy) that did.   
Social circles figure prominently into my interpretation.  Legitimacy (personal 
and organizational) functions as a buffer and social circles factor into both types of 
legitimacy.  Further, the relationships among members of social circles function as 
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buffers as well: Those relationships may buy a social circle member (e.g., an 
organizational boundary spanner) latitude, empathy, time, and forgiveness. . .to an extent.  
Buffers may cushion an organization from environmental jolts and “relatively bad times” 
(Cyert & March, 1963, p. 138), but buffers are not Kevlar vests.  As several informants 
described, even positive relationships with critical stakeholders and high degrees of 
personal and organizational legitimacy could not buffer organizations against retribution 
for running afoul of the Ehrlich administration. 
Persona Non Grata 
 
Running afoul of the Ehrlich administration resulted in its complete withdrawal of 
political legitimacy from some organizations, rendering them illegitimate “personae non 
grata” in the eyes of this critical stakeholder.  A persona non grata does not get a seat at 
the decision-makers’ table.  These situations impeded informants’ efforts to engage in 
dialogue with the administration and have true voice in the state’s unofficial and official 
policy-making processes.  Many expressed frustration and dismay when this happened, a 
point I will expound upon in the next subsection.  They believed it hinted at the Ehrlich 
administration’s penchant for asymmetrically presupposed communication.  The 
Glendening administration also delegitimized some values-incongruent organizations, 
thus preventing their inclusion in state governmental processes.  Informants noted that 
that administration did this with much less frequency and less vociferousness than the 
Ehrlich administration.   
Partisanship as Spoiler or Savior 
Informants, politically savvy Annapolitan “insiders,” generally viewed Ehrlich’s 
election as unsurprising (given political trends in the state and his opponent’s lackluster 
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campaign).  What did surprise them was the jolt’s triggering of the rapid escalation of 
partisan, ideological, and interpersonal conflicts that were unprecedented in Annapolis.  I 
even wondered if this in fact was the jolt rather than the isolated event of Ehrlich’s 
election. 
This partisanship acted as a spoiler for boon organizations and as a savior for bane 
organizations.  Notwithstanding the two straightforward examples of Organizations S and 
P, partisanship tempered informants’ initial perceptions of his election as a boon or bane.  
The partisanship did not cause informants to consider Ehrlich’s election categorically 
different.  No informants at boon organizations wished for a different outcome of the 
2002 gubernatorial election, although as expected bane informants did.  But all of the 
informants did wish for the post-jolt levels of full-scale partisan polarization in Annapolis 
to recede to pre-jolt levels of relatively good-natured partisan bickering. 
The Ehrlich administration might have smiled upon a boon organization, as 
expected, engaging it in policy promulgation processes.  This organization may have had 
more positive, “true” involvement in these processes under the Ehrlich administration 
than under the Glendening administration.  That is why such an organization considered 
Ehrlich’s election a boon.  But positive experiences in these processes did not necessarily 
mean that his election effected positive outcomes for the organization. 
It was not that informants’ implicit associations were incorrect; Ehrlich did not 
turn out to be a pro-labor union Republican, for instance.  His administration aligned, as 
implicitly associated and anticipated, with business rather than unions.  But rampant 
partisanship intervened between his affect toward organizations with business interests 
(with whom he was implicitly associated) and his ability to effect positive outcomes for 
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them.  This is why modifiers are often used with political labels, to pre-emptively correct 
incorrect implicit associations.  Christine Todd Whitman, a former governor of New 
Jersey who headed the U.S Environmental Protection during the George W. Bush 
presidential administration, is often referred to as a “pro-choice Republican.”  Republican 
and anti-choice are implicitly associated; the modifier “pro-choice” before Republican 
disabuses the implicit association.  That same logic explains why the late former 
governor of Pennsylvania, Robert P. Casey, was referred to as “pro-life Democrat.” 
 However, informants’ implicit associations could not have predicted the desires 
of Democrats and Republicans to “stick it” to each other in post-jolt Annapolis, the rapid 
escalation of partisanship, and the degree of polarization.  For instance, informants whose 
organizations had retail and business interests told me that they initially believed that the 
election of a Republican governor would effect a friendlier business environment than 
under Glendening and previous Democrat governors.  They anticipated that fewer 
burdensome regulations would be enacted on Ehrlich’s watch than on a Democrat’s.  
These boon organizations had their expectations quickly dashed once partisanship spoiled 
the political environment for them.   
Democrats, as the majority party in the House of Delegates and the Senate, could 
pass bills they knew Ehrlich would veto (or would make him look bad if he did not enact 
them).  Their majorities in both houses were so large they could override his vetoes 
without major problems.  Some informants at bane organizations reported that the 
General Assembly moved positively on issues that it would not have under a Democrat 
governor.   
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Partisanship intervened as a savior for bane organizations.  It prevented many of 
their worst fears they implicitly associated with a Republican governor from being 
realized.  As the anecdote below illustrates, partisanship even acted to pleasantly surprise 
bane organizations. 
In 2006, the Democrat General Assembly overrode Ehrlich’s veto of the so-called 
“Wal-Mart bill” that requires corporations employing more than 10,000 people in the 
state to contribute to the employees’ health care plans.  It essentially levies a payroll tax 
on corporations that fit this profile.  Coincidentally, Wal-Mart is the only corporation in 
Maryland that does.  I collected the data right after the 2005 session, during which the 
General Assembly passed this bill and Ehrlich had indicated his veto intentions.  Working 
on the assumption that the General Assembly would override his eventual veto, bane 
informants with stakes in this issue hailed the Wal-Mart bill as a victory.  Boon 
informants viewed it negatively.  However, these boon and bane informants wondered 
how much of the General Assembly’s motivation to enact this law (and others like a 
minimum wage bill) had to do with political posturing and the desire to make Ehrlich 
look bad (i.e., a veto of the Wal-Mart bill would put him on the side of a Goliath against a 
legion of Davids).  Would this controversial bill have seen the light of day under a 
Democrat?  Both boon and bane informants thought not. 
The Game of Politics 
 The Wal-Mart veto override situation is but one of many examples informants 
cited (and media have reported on) as evidence of the partisan conflict in Annapolis.  I 
discussed in Chapter 4 my analysis that informants seemed to understand politics as an 
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asymmetrically presupposed game.  They perceived politics as a game of conflict and 
competition.   
As I have noted, politics is a competition of values.  Political analyst Mark 
Shields (2006) has phrased it more elegantly: “Politics is basically the peaceable 
resolution of conflict among legitimate competing interests” (para. 1).  Politics is also a 
competition to determine the allocation of finite resources — such as power, moral 
primacy, and funding — and to whom.  If Organization A wins funding for its program, 
funding for Organization B’s program may be cut.  If Organization C advocates tax cuts 
and they are enacted, its win may cause A to lose the funding it won at B’s expense.  
Even the general notion of politics as a marketplace of ideas connotes competition; there 
are many ideas — which reflect values — to choose from.  But not all get chosen; some 
win, some lose.  That is why Heath (1992) wrote of the “wrangle in the marketplace” 
(emphasis added).  Wrangling after all does mean to win or obtain by argument. 
I believe that slippery-slope arguments frequently employed in the wrangling over 
social and moral issues (e.g., abortion, gay marriage, and gun ownership) reinforce the 
conceptualization of politics as competition, a zero-sum competition in fact.  For 
example, according to direct-mail literature I receive from pro-choice organizations, 
outlawing partial-birth abortion is a first step toward the eventual undoing of Roe v. 
Wade.  Even slight compromise is fear-mongered as the fast-track to complete 
capitulation. 
Game theorists refer to these sorts of games as games of pure asymmetry 
(Murphy, 1991; Van Dyke, 2005).  Informants widely employed militaristic, war, and 
game metaphors to describe political situations and their activities.  The jolt, which 
347
precipitated severe and overt partisan conflict between Democrat and Republican 
lawmakers, reinforced informants’ thoughts about politics as an asymmetrically 
presupposed game.   
 Raiffa (1982, as cited in Dozier et al., 1995) outlined the symmetrical and 
asymmetrical characteristics of mixed-motive games (i.e., games where parties try to 
further their own interests but not at the expense of others’ interests).  Symmetrically 
presupposed games are characterized by a lack of malevolent intent, a willingness to 
compromise, and the expectation that power will be wielded gracefully.  I believe that 
upon Ehrlich’s election, organizations’ critical stakeholders — the Democrats and 
Republicans in the executive and legislative branches — significantly loosened their 
embrace of these symmetrical characteristics.  As I have touched upon throughout 
chapters 2 and 4 and through informants’ utterances and my background research, the 
Democrat and Republican parties did act toward each other with malevolent intent, in the 
sense the parties wanted to do political harm to the other party and individuals and 
organizations aligned with it.  The parties became less interested in compromise; they 
desired absolute wins, meaning that a zero-sum game was being played.  And finally, 
neither party was using its power gracefully.  Ehrlich routinely used the bully pulpit of 
the governorship to publicly deride individual Democrats and organizations (both values-
congruent and values-incongruent).  The Democrat leadership in the General Assembly 
was no better, exploiting parliamentary processes to impede the Ehrlich administration’s 
ability to realize its major initiatives.  To wit, in the 2006 legislative session, the General 
Assembly tried to pass legislation requiring cabinet secretaries from Ehrlich’s first term 
who wanted to continue in their posts (should Ehrlich win a second term) to go through 
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the full confirmation process again (Wagner, 2006).  This is unheard of at any level of 
government anywhere in the United States.  (As an aside, this does demonstrate my 
contention that turbulence and uncertainty will spur entrepreneurial thinking [but not in 
the positive way that I thought].) 
The two critical stakeholders for informants’ organizations were so consumed by 
partisanship after Ehrlich’s election that they no longer had any rapport.  Having rapport 
means that two parties understand and respect each other, but that they also have an 
understanding (e.g., persons A and B agree to disagree; A will excuse B’s actions as “B is 
just doing B’s job).  For instance, after months of testy interactions between NBC White 
House correspondent David Gregory and White House press secretary Scott McClellan, 
the tension erupted at an off-camera briefing on February 13, 2006 (Kurtz, 2006a).  
Gregory offered an apology, which McClellan accepted, explaining: “We both have a job 
to do and both have respect for one another” (para. 12).  Despite the professional tension 
inherent in their relationship, Gregory and McClellan can understand and appreciate the 
other’s motivations.  They have “an understanding” that allows them to separate the 
personal and the professional so they can both continue to effectively do their jobs.  They 
have rapport. 
Robinson’s (2006) op-ed about his ambivalence toward the chumminess between 
journalists and politicians at the 2006 Gridiron Club dinner also illustrates this point.  The 
purpose of this “Washington ritual” is for “the nation’s leading journalists to get together 
with the people they are supposed to hold accountable  
. . . .Reporters wouldn’t be doing their jobs if they didn’t get to know the people they 
cover” (paras. 6 & 10).  The lesson Robinson took away from the dinner, and that 
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informs this study, is that “[A]dversaries don’t have to be enemies” (para. 10).  
Adversaries are able to work together, even in pursuit of their self-interests (even if they 
are conflicting) because they to some degree share understanding, respect, and “an 
understanding.”  Adversaries have rapport; enemies do not.   
The relevant question for Annapolis; for Washington, DC; and other states and 
localities then raised is: “Does partisanship turn adversaries into enemies, and if so, at 
what point?”  This is not a rhetorical question; it is an extremely valid question 
particularly in light of recent research on partisan polarization in the political science 
literature (e.g., Hetherington, 2001; Layman & Carsey, 2002).  Americans’ positive 
feelings for one political party (and negative feelings for the other) are stronger than in 
nearly a generation.  Americans have become more loyal partisans; they “hold their 
partisan ties more intensely” (Hetherington, 2001, p. 629).  This affects their voting 
choices (e.g., increased tendency to vote along straight-party lines [Hetherington, 2001]).  
The trend is that the candidates who win elections tend to appeal to these likely voters, 
the ones who reliably turn out for primary and general elections  the “base.”  Thus 
many of the lawmakers who populate legislative and administrative bodies likely are 
themselves strong, loyal partisans.  This causes interparty partisan conflict, which leads 
to polarization in government, politics, and  the electorate (Layman & Carsey, 2002).  
Lawmakers in Maryland  who likely are strong, loyal partisans  happen to be the 
critical stakeholders who granted or withheld political legitimacy from informants’ 
organizations.  
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Stakeholders’ Conference of Political Legitimacy 
The Glendening and Ehrlich administrations’ conference of political legitimacy 
on organizations was demonstrated by the degree of their GRPs’ involvement, if any, in 
administrative-level decision-making processes.  High political legitimacy was evidenced 
by an administration seeking outside input and opinions, listening and giving thoughtful 
consideration to them, demonstrating empathy, and giving the informants (on behalf of 
their organizations) “true” voice in those processes.  Low legitimacy was evidenced by an 
administration not seeking input and opinions, outright dismissing or paying lip service to 
them when offered, demonstrating disdain, and providing “false” voice opportunities 
where the administration seemed to be listening to informants’ opinions (making 
informants feel positively about the process) but only to benefit its own ends.  I have 
interpreted an administration’s conference of low legitimacy on an organization as an 
indication that the administration likely engaged with it using asymmetrically 
presupposed communication.  Conversely, administrations likely engaged with high-
legitimacy organizations using symmetrically presupposed communication.  
The Implications of Worldview Presuppositions 
Congressional scholar Norman Ornstein might diagnose the Ehrlich 
administration’s vociferousness in dealing with those “afoul” organizations as 
symptomatic of a Maryland-specific form of “battered Congress syndrome” (Marcus, 
2006).  This syndrome may explain why a group suddenly vents its frustration and anger 
after years of disenfranchisement, powerlessness, or suppression (externally or self-
imposed [VandeHei, 2006]).  Ornstein diagnosed congressional Republicans as afflicted 
with the syndrome (as evidenced by their public defiance of President Bush on issues 
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such as Social Security reform and the Dubai ports deal midway through his second 
term).  Their self-suppression is traceable to Republican loyalty to this Republican 
president and to wanting to present to the public a united front (façade?) with a 
Republican president renowned for his dislike of disloyalty and dissent.  The Republican 
governor of Maryland’s penchant for excommunicating otherwise politically (and 
publicly) legitimate organizations may have reflected Maryland Republicans’ palpably 
explosive frustration at having been without any significant power or true voice in the 
state’s governmental process for nearly 40 years.  Once Republicans got power and 
voice, via the 2002 election, the Ehrlich administration was going to use them.  They 
were not particularly interested in extending political graces toward those who perhaps 
had not extended such graces toward Republicans before the jolt. 
What I have discussed in the preceding paragraphs are informants’ perceptions 
about their two most critical stakeholders in the political environment: Democrats (who 
controlled the legislative branch) and Republicans (who controlled the executive branch).  
I did not conduct interviews with members of these stakeholder organizations and so my 
contentions are based on informants’ perceptions and my interpretations of their 
perceptions.  But informants’ perceptions were their and their organizations’ reality.  The 
reality was that informants had to negotiate their organizations through a competitive 
political environment explosive with partisan conflict between Democrats, who were 
used to having near absolute political power in Maryland, and Republicans, whose glee at 
finally having some power led them to do things their way and turn a deaf ear to 
constructive criticism and advice. 
The presuppositions of an organization’s communication practices reflect the 
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presuppositions of its worldview.  The Glendening and Ehrlich administrations reserved 
one communication strategy for engaging with values-congruent organizations and a 
starkly different strategy for values-incongruent organizations.  It was almost like each 
administration held two different, or situational, worldviews.  That they would employ 
different communication strategies depending on the stakeholder is logical because smart 
organizations tailor their communication strategies (and messages) to their stakeholders 
(J.E. Grunig & L.A. Grunig, 1989; Lauzen & Dozier, 1992).  Universal, one-size-fits-all-
stakeholders communication strategies are ineffective.  The Glendening and Ehrlich 
administrations both tailored their communication strategies for 501c organizations based 
on many factors, a primary one of which was the degree of conferred political legitimacy. 
The Mixed-Motive Worldviews of Political Stakeholders 
 
The Glendening and Ehrlich administrations did not each hold two opposite 
worldviews; each possessed one mixed-motive worldview.  A symmetrically presupposed 
worldview is characterized by open-mindedness; respect for others and their viewpoints, 
even those that are different or contrary to the organization’s; functioning as a open 
system in the environment; an appreciation for interdependency; dialogue and 
collaboration as engagement strategies of first resort; and participatory decision-making 
processes.  Much like how J.E. Grunig (2001) and L.A. Grunig et al. (2002) clarified that 
the two-way symmetrical model is in fact a mixed-motive model (and had been all 
along), a symmetrically presupposed worldview realistically is a mixed-motive 
worldview.  The notion of mixed motives comes from this: In the course of pursuing self-
interest — always of paramount consideration — symmetrically worldviewed 
organizations also consider and help others pursue their interests.  On the surface, this 
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seems generous and altruistic of these organizations; but dig a bit deeper and the 
organization’s mixed motivations are unearthed.  Symmetrical presuppositions offer a 
better, albeit less direct, route to achieving organizational self-interest than asymmetrical 
presuppositions (J.E. Grunig, 2001).  
A mixed-motive worldview is characterized by symmetrical and asymmetrical 
values, with the symmetrical values predominating.  I have inferred that symmetry 
predominates over asymmetry in mixed-motive schemas from how J.E. Grunig (2001) 
and L.A. Grunig et al. (2002) have explained that it is the two-way symmetrical model — 
not the two-way asymmetrical model — that is a mixed-motive model.  Additionally, 
Dozier et al. (1995) explained that organizations with mixed motives use asymmetrical 
and symmetrical tactics within a larger symmetrical framework.  A mixed-motive 
worldview allowed the Glendening and Ehrlich administrations to engage with some 
501c organizations in one manner and others in an opposite manner.  My analysis of the 
data causes me to question whether a symmetrically predominant mixed-motive 
worldview would “allow” the administrations to engage so asymmetrically as to shun, 
ostracize, or marginalize 501c organizations based on an incongruency of values.  I also 
began to wonder if an asymmetrically predominant mixed-motive worldview would have 
allowed them to engage like this.  
A Reverse Mixed-Motive Worldview? 
 
This relates to what I proposed in my first graduate school paper (Simone [a.k.a. 
Tuite], 1999) to explain why government relations did not jibe with the Excellence theory 
as well as other specialized public relations programs did (Dozier et al., 1995; J.E. 
Grunig, 1992).  I asserted that in government relations, organizations engaged with 
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political stakeholders using symmetrical communication strategies within an 
asymmetrical framework, to obtain the results they want (Wolf, 1976).  This reverse 
mixed-motive model (as I called it) I believed best described the excellent practice of 
government relations and could explain the government relations anomaly, whereas the 
regular mixed-motive (i.e., two-way symmetrical) model explained the excellence of 
other specialized public relations programs (Dozier et al., 1995). 
Although I now cringe at how I could have possibly made such a bold assertion in 
my first paper in the master’s program, in retrospect perhaps I was onto something.  I do 
not think that organizations, like 501c organizations, that engage in government relations 
have asymmetrically predominant mixed-motive worldviews (I discuss these 
organizations’ worldviews shortly).  Rather, I think the political entities (e.g., Democrats 
and Republicans) that function as these organizations’ critical political stakeholders have 
asymmetrically predominant mixed-motive worldviews.  The larger framework of this 
worldview is rooted in competition (asymmetry) instead of cooperation (symmetry); 
mixed-motive worldviews and communication are conceptualized with a larger 
cooperative framework (Dozier et al., 1995; J.E. Grunig, 2001).  I believe the reason 
these stakeholders hold asymmetrically predominant mixed-motive worldviews is 
because of the asymmetrical presuppositions of the political environment.   
Politics is an asymmetrical game, as I have discussed, that practically mandates 
that it be played asymmetrically.  This seems to be even more of the case in political 
environments polarized by partisanship, such as Annapolis and the ultimate exemplar, 
Washington, DC.  Given the presuppositions, realities, and constraints of these 
environments, political entities do use symmetrical and asymmetrical communication and 
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strategies but they must do so within an asymmetrically presupposed framework that 
reflects the nature of the game that is modern-day politics. 
Mixed-Motive Worldviews of Informants’ Organizations 
 
Informants’ descriptions of the ways they engaged with their critical stakeholders 
in this environment led me to conclude that their organizations’ worldviews had mixed 
motives but defaulted toward symmetry.  They had symmetrically presupposed mixed-
motive worldviews, as Dozier et al. (2005) and others conceptualized the mixed-motive 
worldview. 
I found that organization’s worldviews were manifested in many ways.  These 
manifestations could be described by two themes: the organization’s willingness to cede 
some control to others and dexterity of organizational thought and action as realized 
through the informants and other organizational members.  These two themes reflected 
the symmetrical values woven throughout the data.  However, informants were also 
committed to furthering their organizations’ interests, which reflects their embracing of 
asymmetrical values.  Informants also agreed that their organizations’ two most important 
critical stakeholders “ticked” according to asymmetrically presupposed mixed-motive 
worldviews.  Further, informants agreed that these stakeholders were embroiled in 
partisan conflict, which exacerbated the competition inherent in the asymmetrical game 
of politics. 
An Auspicious Communication Strategy 
 
When the two critical stakeholders in the political environment are polarized and 
an organization must engage with both them, their conflict will affect organizational 
engagement.  Think of this as a circle of three friends: If two of them have a falling out, 
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that will indubitably affect how the third friend interacts with them.  One even may 
become angry with the third friend for continuing to be friends with the other.  
Sensitivities are heightened and the “neutral” friend (e.g., a 501c organization) must learn 
how to negotiate this charged environment.  As J.E. Grunig (2001) noted, conflict 
situations such as dueling stakeholders or soured relationships require “more 
sophisticated means of symmetrical communication and conflict resolution” (p. 16).  This 
then raises another question: Is there a more sophisticated means of symmetrical 
communication than dialogue, which is an auspicious communication strategy for 
contending with multiparty conflict?   
Dialogue is a sophisticated means of symmetrical communication and an 
auspicious strategy for contending with multiparty conflict.  However, I think that GRPs 
have developed a more auspicious and sophisticated communication strategy for 
contending with political stakeholders who are adversarial or hostile toward each other.  
This strategy is to employ dialogue in the course of employing the personal influence 
model in conjunction with the cultural interpreter model.  I believe this strategy ups the 
sophistication quotient of dialogue enough so GRPs can engage auspiciously with these 
stakeholders, which have asymmetrically presupposed mixed-motive worldviews.  I 
determined from the data that this strategy best described and explained the effectiveness 
and success of GRPs.  Further, many researchers have speculated the Excellence theory 
did not explain the practice of government relations as well as other public relations 
because of GRPs’ reliance on their network of contacts (Dozier et al., 1995).  This 
strategy would support that speculation while explaining how organizations with 
symmetrically presupposed worldviews, which drive their desire and use of dialogue, are 
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able to negotiate with asymmetrically presupposed stakeholders in an increasingly 
asymmetrical game of politics. 
The prevalence of the personal influence model in government relations likely  
comes as no surprise to readers even without my pointing it out.  It is widely assumed by 
laypeople and scholars (e.g., Dozier et al. 1995) that government relations, and 
specifically lobbying, is done through one’s network of contacts.  Anecdotal support for 
this assumption is found in Simone’s ([a.k.a. Tuite] 1999) analysis of Eisler’s (1998) 
article revealing that 47 of Washington, DC’s, (then) top-50 lobbyists had worked for or 
were related (biologically or by marriage) to critical political stakeholders for their 
organizations (and clients) or were former critical political stakeholders themselves.  
More support comes from Birnbaum (2005), who reported on the revolving door between 
government and the lobbying industry in Washington, DC, and the large salaries that 
await on the lobbying side of the revolving door.  More support also is seen in the 
Washington Post’s quarter-page-sized feature column, “Special Interests,” located in the 
“A” section of the paper  valuable real estate in newspapers.  This regular column 
details Washington insiders’ job-hopping between the White House and Congress, 
lobbying firms, corporate government relations offices, and special interest groups (e.g., 
see Sarasohn, 2006b).  Haug and Koppang (1997), Johnson (1992), and Simone (a.k.a. 
Tuite, 1999) provided theoretical support for this assumption. 
The personal influence model, applied in conjunction with the cultural interpreter 
model, explained informants’ effectiveness and success as boundary-spanning GRPs.  So 
much about informants’ work lives could be explained (e.g., their roles in organizational 
decision-making; their personal legitimacy; organizations’ political legitimacy; and their 
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and their organizations’ ability to effectively engage with a jolted and perhaps unfriendly 
political environment) because they implemented these models.   
Social circles, central to the model, explained why the jolt affected informants as 
it did and how their organizations coped with the abundant asymmetry that defined the 
political environment and their political stakeholders.  Organizations whose GRPs shared 
social circles with Republicans or the Ehrlich administration did seem to enjoy higher 
political legitimacy than those organizations whose GRPs were not members of those 
social circles.  GRPs in the former category functioned as implied third-party endorsers 
and organizational buffers for their organizations.  This is part of the reason why 
Annapolitan organizations (and clients) hired GRPs who are “big names” or well 
connected, such as former lawmakers.   
I had fully expected to find that organizations that perceived that the Ehrlich 
administration conferred low political legitimacy (even illegitimacy) on them would have 
hired GRPs with Republican connections.  If their own GRPs did not have the “useful 
relationships” to “pry loose useful information” — meaning they could not implement the 
personal influence model — I assumed that organizations would hire people who did.  
Republican-valued (and -connected) personal influencers would calm the turbulence and 
quell the uncertainty that low and no political legitimacy exacerbates.   
I assumed incorrectly.  I found that organizations without Republican GRPs on 
hand (typically bane organizations) mined the connections of internal and external 
members of the organization for Republicans rather than immediately hired some.  They 
also signaled their willingness to establish connections to and a dialogue with the new 
administration.  That Democrats still controlled the Maryland General Assembly allowed 
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these organizations to take a considered approach and not rush out and hire new GRPs.  
This may also be a function of the presence of available Republican GRPs in Annapolis. 
However, my original assumption may yet prove accurate.  Mosk (2006a) noted 
the influx of unabashedly Republican lobbyists into Annapolis since Ehrlich’s election: 
“The seeds have been planted for a local version of Capitol Hill’s ‘K Street Project,’ in 
which GOP lawmakers insisted on dealing with GOP lobbyists” (p. B8).  If those seeds 
take root and if Ehrlich wins a second term or if Republicans build more red inroads into 
the blue General Assembly (or both), organizations may have no choice but to hire 
Republican GRPs if they want to engage with Republican stakeholders.   
To reiterate, my findings have led me to conclude, successful government 
relations is accomplished through the application of the personal influence and cultural 
interpreter models.  These models facilitate dialogue and the mutual exchange of 
information and influence despite the vagaries of asymmetrically presupposed 
stakeholders that operate in an asymmetrical framework.   
Implications of Social Circles 
In Annapolis, the introduction of so many new people — who were unknown 
“outsiders” to many in the Annapolis GRP community — into powerful positions in the 
Ehrlich administration was a major source of uncertainty.  These positions were 
boundary-spanning positions that liaised the Office of the Governor to the General 
Assembly and other stakeholders like 501c organizations.   
Their recent arrival to and unfamiliarity with Annapolis severely limited some 
Ehrlich aides’ abilities to implement either the personal influence or cultural interpreter 
models, and informants’ abilities in turn.  Aides’ Annapolitan social circles, if they had 
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them, in many instances did not overlap with the informants’ social circles (or other 
established Annapolitan social circles).  Not knowing the people who wield influence in a 
political environment means missing out on the dialogue and exchange of information 
and influence that social circles would otherwise opportune.  Social circles theoretically 
provide stable, unofficial channels for exchanging valuable resources and furthering 
organizational interests when jolts in the political environment upend official exchange 
channels.  Members share privileged “inside” information because they know and trust 
each other; they do not just pass around widely known “talking point” information that is 
gained from official communication channels.  But this jolt was such that it upended 
everything, formal channels and social circles alike. 
Many informants were dismayed that some members of the Ehrlich administration 
who were new to Annapolis did not, would not, or could not employ the personal 
influence and cultural interpreter models in engaging with their critical stakeholders (i.e., 
these informants and their organizations and Democrat lawmakers and General Assembly 
staffers).  To make matters worse, informants believed that some Ehrlich administration 
aides did not make significant efforts to get to know them (and other members of the 
Annapolitan GRP community), to become part of established social circles in Annapolis, 
or at least develop rapport with members of these circles.  As one informant said: “You 
have to get to know [the new people who have the power]; they have to get to know you.  
So we have to get to know each other.  That’s what we do.”  But that is not what some of 
Ehrlich’s aides seemed to be doing.   
That many Ehrlich aides did not attempt to “court” people and acculturate to 
Annapolis also revealed them to be ineffective interpreters of that cliquish culture of 
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Annapolis.  They either did not know or did not want to abide by the traditional process 
of politics in Annapolis; and their closed-off “introverted” process was alternately viewed 
as ineffective, unfair, or indecipherable.  Informants were not miffed because they were 
not being properly courted; they were miffed because this interfered with the proper 
functioning of social circles.  Boundary-spanning GRPs could not do their jobs to the best 
of their abilities if boundary spanners for their critical stakeholders were not effectively 
doing their jobs.  These failures in relationships and communication at the interpersonal 
level began to poison them at the organizational level.  The Ehrlich administration’s 
lashing out at supportive boon organizations, even turning some of them into personae 
non grata, was evidence of this. 
This was more than about not breaking into “Maryland’s cliquish political 
culture” (Mosk & Rich, 2006, para. 5).  The new people, for reasons not readily clear to 
informants (although they had their theories), were either ignoring or abdicating their 
interpersonal relationship responsibilities.  It is stating the obvious to say relationships 
take work, but they do; a laissez-faire approach to useful relationships is not smart.  As 
one for-contract GRP observed, if a GRP is lazy, relationships “can quickly become stale 
and ineffective.”  One party may perceive that the “lazy” party either holds it in low 
regard or feels a low level of commitment to it or both.  In turn, the “spurned” party will 
feel a low level of satisfaction with the relationship. (Commitment and satisfaction are 
two dimensions of interpersonal and organization-public relationships [J.E. Grunig, 
2001].)  Without healthy information and influence exchange and dialogue, none of the 
other positive implications of social circles for any members — Ehrlich aides and 
boundary-spanning GRPs alike — will be realized.  Ehrlich aides’ not cultivating or 
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nurturing social circles or other useful relations disrupted the traditional Annapolitan 
political process.  
Membership in a social circle, which facilitates implementation of the personal 
influence model, does lead to access to other well-positioned, in-the-know members.  
Although access is a “highly perishable commodity, it is no guarantor of success” (Gray, 
1989, p. 143) in government relations.  This is not to diminish its importance though.  
Access is a prelude to dialogue.   
Informants had multiple reasons for wanting to engage in dialogue (i.e., the two-
way symmetrical/mixed-motive model) with stakeholders: to make stakeholders aware of 
their organizations’ stances; educate stakeholders about issues of interest; learn about 
stakeholders’ stances and issues of interest; and learn information that would help the 
organization make smart, politically prudent decisions and maintain (or heighten) its 
political legitimacy in a volatile, partisan political environment.   
Of course, informants’ greatest motivations for dialogue were advocacy and the 
opportunity to influence stakeholders’ thought and decision-making processes.  Other 
motivations included the desire to constructively engage with an administration that did 
not suffer dissenters gladly and the turbulent, uncertain, polarized political environment.  
Dialogue, which is opportuned through implementing the personal influence and cultural 
interpreter models, was the most auspicious communication strategy given the situation.   
Dialogue is a symmetrically presupposed communication strategy that is 
motivated by symmetrical and asymmetrical values.  The process of dialogue evinces 
symmetry although parties may hope that their participation in this process leads to an 
asymmetrical outcome (i.e., one that satisfies organizational self-interest).  But the value 
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of dialogue lies in its process, not necessarily its outcomes.  Having seats at the table is 
always a priority for GRPs and their organizations because with those seats come the 
opportunity for dialogue.  And the GRPs who have seats at the table are personal 
influencers and cultural interpreters.  
GRPs in Annapolis faced a major challenge in post-jolt Annapolis: Opportunities 
for access, information flow, meaningful dialogic communication, and to be of 
consequence were not occurring as they had historically under other administrations, 
even for informants at big-player boon organizations.  The jolt of Ehrlich’s election 
undermined the social circle system of famously cliquish and collegial Annapolis, which 
snowballed into the undermining of the long-standing usual process of politics.   
Social circles represent opportunities for information exchange (Aldrich, 1979; 
Terreberry, 1968), a symmetrically presupposed dialogic activity.  In a sense, 
symmetrically presupposed communication depends on opportunity.  An organization 
may want to engage in dialogue with a stakeholder, but its follow-through will be 
stymied if that stakeholder does not want to engage in that dialogue.  This can be an acute 
problem for organizations when their political stakeholders are governmental entities.  
They are interdependent and are of mutual consequence; but the government, as the 
organizations’ “ultimate legislative authority” (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 44), is probably of 
greater consequence to organizations than organizations are to it.  The government (e.g., 
the Office of the Governor) calls the shots: The dialogue a 501c organization desires with 
the government occurs only if the government desires it too.  If not, no dialogue.  Ergo, 
symmetry depends on, or rather is constrained by, opportunity. 
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Opportunities for symmetry — in other words, dialogue — under the Ehrlich 
administration were limited compared with expectations based on opportunities under 
other administrations.  The Ehrlich administration functioned as a less open (or more 
closed) system in the political environment of Annapolis.  This constrained GRPs’ 
abilities to implement the personal influence model with the critical stakeholder of the 
Ehrlich administration.  Diminished access, compounded by the weakened power of 
social circles, diminished GRPs’ opportunities for dialogue.  Informants were concerned 
about the implications of the new process of Annapolitan politics ushered in by Ehrlich’s 
elections on their organizations.  Some bane informants wondered if they would continue 
to get a “fair shake.”  Some boon informants wondered if they would at last be able to get 
a fair shake.  Informants were concerned about process first and outcomes second. 
A New Framework for Understanding Government Relations? 
This directly relates to a particularly noteworthy finding: Informants 
communicated an affinity for symmetrical values.  However, their words and deeds 
likewise communicated a disdain for attitudes and behaviors that were disingenuous, 
uncommunicative, secretive, purposely unproductive, biased, closed minded, strident, 
dogmatic, partisan, and even mean.  In other words, they decried attitudes and behaviors 
that evinced asymmetrical values.  This theme emerged repeatedly in the data, such as 
with regard to the worldviews and communication practices of the Ehrlich and 
Glendening administrations and of informants’ organizations.   
I believe that this comes down to dialogic processes.  Informants were specifically 
concerned that one, opportunities for dialogic processes had diminished under the Ehrlich  
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administration; and two, its perceived and demonstrable asymmetrical presuppositions 
seemed to supersede the inherent symmetrical presuppositions of those processes.   
I recently contributed to a research article that explored procedural justice in 
public meetings  (McComas, Tuite, Waks, & Sherman, in press).  In fact, I regret not 
being familiar with procedural justice when I conceptualized this public relations study. 8 
From what I since have learned about this concept, I believe that it (along with the other 
component of organizational justice, distributive justice) provides a useful framework for 
interpreting many of this study’s findings.  Indeed, I believe this framework is so useful 
that public relations scholars should consider it for conceptualizing and understanding 
government relations and its “parent” function, public relations.   
To those ends, I provide this overview, albeit cursory, of the literature on 
procedural justice and its potential implications for and application to government 
relations and public relations.  I situate some of the study’s results throughout. 
Making the Case for Justice as a Framework for Public Relations 
 
Organizational justice is a concept that social psychologists and organizational 
theorists have used for years to explain individuals’ perceptions of fairness and 
satisfaction in situations that involve decision-making, resource allocation, and 
uncertainty.  Much of this initial research was conducted in legal settings like courtrooms 
(e.g., Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal et al., 1980) but researchers have explored the concept 
in workplaces (e.g., McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997) and in 
medical settings (e.g., Kulik & Holbrook, 2002).  It has been applied using a systems-
 
8 I would like to acknowledge the role of Dr. Katherine A. McComas in introducing me to the concept of 
organizational justice.  It is unlikely that I would have stumbled across the concept without her.  I am 
indebted to her for this as well as her insights and encouragement to pursue this concept as a framework for 
public relations. 
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theory approach (e.g., Bussman, 1997).  Lauber and Knuth (1999) explored it in public-
policy processes.  They noted that research on justice in policy making was lacking, even 
though more than a decade earlier Lind and Tyler (1988) pointed out the obvious fact that 
the concept of justice could lend insight to decisions made by political authorities.   
Arguably, justice would be useful in exploring organizations’ government 
relations efforts because these efforts are usually motivated by their self-interested 
desires to participate and wield influence in governmental decision-making processes.  
Additionally, justice may be a useful framework for exploring organizational publics’ 
(e.g., employees or community members) participation and influence in organizational 
decision-making processes.   
Some justice scholars have come close to exploring justice within contexts that 
certainly smack of public relations.  Saxby, Tat, and Johansen (2000) explored justice in 
consumer relations, using it as a framework for understanding consumers’ perceptions of 
fair treatment in organizations’ resolution of their complaints.  Elsbach (2001) studied 
justice in crisis and reputation management, using it to explore organizations’ 
explanations and apologia related to internal decision-making processes that led to 
legitimacy-threatening events.   
The entire notion of “voice” in decision-making processes — which affects the 
perceived fairness or justness of those processes — de facto is about communication 
(Bies & Moag, 1986).  This further hints at the nexus of justice and public relations, 
because public relations is a communication function of management (as per Long and 
Hazleton’s [1987] definition).  Justice scholars have teased out the communication 
implicit in many aspects of procedural justice.  For instance, communication figures 
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largely in the informational component of procedural justice.  One of Leventhal’s (1980) 
widely accepted criteria of procedural justice is that decision-making authorities make 
available accurate, transparent, truthful, candid, and timely information about the 
decisional process (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt et al., 2001; McComas et al., in press).  
Such information effects informational justice.   
Communication scholars are just starting to study communication as a discrete 
aspect of justice, realizing it is a fruitful framework for studying communication and vice 
versa.  McComas, whose research focuses on communication procedures and participant 
satisfaction in public participation processes (e.g., the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration advisory committees), believed that communication scholars, until now, 
largely have ignored the concept of procedural justice (McComas, personal 
communication, March 3, 2006).  Besley and McComas (2005) and McComas et al. (in 
press) signal that this is changing.   
As much as public relations scholars are public relations scholars, they are also 
communication scholars.  Kim’s (2005) dissertation quantitatively explored the role of 
organizational justice in employee-organization relationships.  This was the first major 
effort to integrate the concept of organizational justice into the public relations body of 
knowledge.  My review of several major theoretical works in public relations (e.g., J.E. 
Grunig 1992; L.A. Grunig et al., 2002; Heath, 2001), scholarly public relations journals, 
and repositories of scholarly papers (e.g., the conference papers database of the 
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication [AEJMC]) for 
instances of public relations scholars’ using justice research came up empty.  I am 
following Kim’s (2005) lead to bring the “outside” concept of organizational justice — 
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whose subtexts of communication and participatory decision-making are the two essences 
of public relations — into public relations. 
Justice’s parallels with many public relations theories and concepts are nearly 
uncanny.9 Example 1: I found at least three justice scholars who described concepts 
equivalent to J.E. Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) two-way asymmetrical model, which 
organizations employ to influence, even manipulate, stakeholders, giving them “false” 
voice.  Sampson’s (1993) “accommodative justice” is exemplified by organizational 
participatory mechanisms that accommodate participants’ voices but not their influence.  
The organization is neither influenced by those voiced concerns, nor was that their 
motivation for letting participants voice concerns.  Cohen (1985) described 
“pseudoparticipation” efforts wherein an authority intentionally misleads people into 
believing they wield influence a decision while using those efforts to persuade people to 
accept a decision that the authority already made.  (Public relations scholars Hung [2005] 
and Kim [2005] used the term “pseudo-symmetrical” to describe such efforts.)  Pateman 
(1970) wrote of participatory mechanisms whose goal is persuasion of participants rather 
than consensual decisions: The organization “has a particular goal in mind and uses the 
group discussion as a means of inducing acceptance of the goal” (p. 69). 
Example 2: I found much in the justice literature that is reminiscent of more 
affirming public relations concepts than the two-way asymmetrical model.  Folger (1986) 
said that justice “stems from recognition of a principle that decision-makers should allow 
people who will be affected by a decision to have some voice in the decision-making 
 
9 Simone (a.k.a. Tuite) and McComas (2001) found that many public participation concepts parallel public 
relations concepts, yet the two bodies of literature rarely, if ever, draw from each other.  That justice would 
inform both these literatures and is used by public participation scholars but not public relations scholars is 
not surprising.  
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process” (p. 152).  Folger’s statement embodies the rationale for the two-way 
symmetrical model, whose use is a major determinant of public relations excellence, 
excellence as explained by the dominant metatheory of public relations, the Excellence 
theory (Dozier et al., 1995; J.E. Grunig, 1992; L.A. Grunig et al., 2002).  This model 
fosters excellence because its dialogic, deliberative, consultative process brings outside 
voices into organizations’ internal decision-making.  It gives stakeholders “true” voice by 
offering opportunities for organizations and stakeholders to influence each other to affect 
the outcome of organizational decisions (Jemison, 1984).    
J.E. Grunig, the main architect of the two-way symmetrical model, has 
emphasized that what makes this model an ideal, ethical, and effective model of public 
relations practice is its process, not its outcomes (L.A. Grunig et al., 2002).  Process is 
why J.E. Grunig (2001) stated that it is ethical to talk with “morally repugnant groups” 
(p. 15) — giving them procedural justice — but it is unethical to accommodate their 
desired outcomes — giving them distributive justice.  Spicer (1997), a public relations 
scholar whose collaborative advocacy model is essentially the two-way symmetrical 
model, noted that symmetry is less about achieving consensual outcomes than it is about 
the dialogic, collaborative process that brings parties to that outcome.  The essence of 
procedural justice is symmetry and the essence of symmetry is procedural justice. 
What Is Justice? 
 
Justice, as an academic concept, is rooted in ethical philosopher John Rawls’ 
conceptions of fairness and justice in the allocation of societal resources (e.g., see 
Beauchamp, 1980; Hillier, 1998; Rawls, 1958).10 Humans have an innate sense of 
 
10 I believe future exploration of a philosophy of public relations based on Rawlsian ethics would be 
worthwhile.  Although I did not realize at the time, I inadvertently asserted a Rawlsian philosophy of public 
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fairness and justice; even young children will engage in games such as “Rock, Paper, 
Scissors” to arrive at decisions fairly.  Justice results from the fairness of authorities, 
procedures, and structures in a society (e.g., the legal system, political system, 
organizations, and even families.)11 Their fairness provides opportunities for people to 
get what they are due or owed, or what they deserve or “can legitimately claim” 
(Beauchamp, 1980, p. 133). 
Justice is socially constructed.  It is constructed from a sense of how things ought 
to be, or “oughtness” (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, C.O.L.H. Porter, & Ng, 2001).  It is 
constructed from subjective perceptions that may be rooted in cultural topoi and religious 
and philosophical systems (e.g., An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; Hiller [1998] 
suggested justice was based in part on the “golden rule” of “do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you” [p. 16]).  It is constructed from counterfactual thinking, those 
“what might have beens” (Colquitt, 2004; Folger, 1986) and “if onlys” (Folger, 1986, 
1993; van den Bos, 2001) that allow people to distinguish the normative from the 
positive.  Counterfactuals are based on social comparisons about, for example, how much 
justice one person gets compared with another, speculations, experiences, and norms 
(Colquitt, 2004).  Informants used counterfactual thinking in their judgments of various 
aspects of the Ehrlich administration and their and other organizations’ legitimacy and 
 
relations in a paper written for a graduate course in public relations ethics in 2001.  My philosophy was that 
public relations should strive to ensure that those who are affected by another’s decisions are given true 
“voice” — voice that is not just heard but listened to — in decision-making processes.  Unfortunately, I lost 
all copies of this paper in Hurricane Katrina. 
11 I have explained the concept of symmetry within a familial context to undergraduate students in public 
relations.  First, I asked them how their high-school curfews were decided.  They typically answered that 
their parents had set curfews without any before-the-fact input from them.  Second, I then asked them what 
they thought of their curfews.  Again, the refrain was familiar: They felt their curfews were about one hour 
earlier than they would have preferred.  Finally, I asked, “Would you have felt better about your curfew if 
your parents had asked for and listened to your opinion and even haggled with you over the time?”  Even if 
their curfew time had been the same, students generally said they would have felt better about their curfews 
if parents had included them in the decisional process.   
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inclusion.  They compared the contemporary reality to the past (i.e., the Glendening 
administration) and the imaginable (e.g., how things would have been if not for all of the 
post-jolt partisan polarization). 
Organizational justice has two primary dimensions (Colquitt, 2001).  Distributive 
justice relates to the fairness of the outcome of an interactional decision-making process.  
Procedural justice relates to the fairness of that process (Bies & Moag. 1986).  Most 
justice researchers focus on this latter dimension because it is the predominant predictor 
of organizational justice.  A participant’s perceived fairness of a process is causally 
related to the perceived fairness of the outcome and his or her acceptance of and 
satisfaction with that outcome (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 
Tyler, 1994; Weiner, J.A. Alexander, & Shortell, 2002).   
Procedural justice determines the commitment a participant feels toward the 
group of which he or she is a part (e.g., a political system or an organization; Fuller & 
Hester, 2001; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992).  Procedural justice also determines a 
participant’s voluntary behaviors on the group’s behalf (e.g., voting or buying products; 
Colquitt, 2001).  Further, a participant will be more accepting of outcomes, even if they 
are unfavorable, if he or she perceives that the decision-making procedures and 
authorities were fair.  These last two points would explain why customers who engaged 
with human customer-service agents (as compared to automated call systems) were more 
likely to volunteer constructive advice and accept unsatisfactory outcomes (W.C. Taylor, 
2006).  Dealing with humans gives customers a higher sense of procedural justice than 
automated systems.  It also explains many informants’ feelings about decisions rendered  
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by the Glendening and Ehrlich administration without their organizations’ true voices.  A 
higher sense of procedural justice compensates for a lowered sense of distributive justice.   
People seek procedural justice because it provides them process control, which is 
the ability to voice their views and arguments, and decision control, which is the ability 
to influence the outcome of allocation decisions that affect them (Thibaut & Walker, 
1975).  Thus there is an implicit element of self-interest in procedural justice (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992).  The general scenario of procedural justice — a 
decision-making authority allocating resources for which “selfish” participants compete 
— echoes my general scenario of politics as an asymmetrically presupposed game in 
which organizations compete, through dialogic processes, for resources political 
stakeholders may allocate to it.  My general scenario of politics, I have asserted, may lend 
insight into why government relations is an anomaly to the Excellence theory.  Given the 
similarity of the scenarios, procedural justice may offer new insights from which to 
explore the government relations anomaly. 
Tyler and colleagues (Tyler, 1989; Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Bies, 1990; Tyler, 
Degoey, & Smith, 1996) have developed a group-value, or relational, model of 
procedural justice.  This model has particular relevance for my findings, as I will 
illustrate.  Fair procedures symbolize that the decision-making authority respects and 
values participants (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Tyler, 1994).  This may explain why 
informants assessed their organizations’ political status based on their inclusion (and the 
quality thereof) in official dialogic opportunities with political stakeholders.  It may also 
explain why informants were frustrated by Ehrlich administration aides’ perceived non-
interest in social circles.  Social circles represent unofficial dialogic opportunities.   
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Participation in fair procedures validates participants’ status vis-à-vis the 
authority and within the larger group.  Tyler (1994) noted that people want this 
information because they want to know their status, which provides them clues about 
their legitimacy and their interdependence with others in the group.  This information is 
telegraphed by whether decision-makers treated them with respect, propriety, dignity, 
sensitivity, honesty, and objectivity during the procedures (Bies & Moag, 1986; Lind, 
MacCoun, Ebener, Felstiner, Hensler, Resnik, & Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 1989, 1994; Tyler et 
al., 1996; van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997).  Decision-makers’ “morally 
appropriate conduct” in these processes means that they care about participants’ interests, 
not just their own (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, p. 49).  Their motives are mixed, a 
characteristic that the group-value model of procedural justice shares with the two-way 
symmetrical model and symmetrically presupposed worldviews.  Finally, morally 
appropriate interpersonal treatment effects interpersonal justice.  A necessary component 
of interpersonal justice, another dimension of procedural justice, is communication 
(Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg, 1993). 
The group-value model of procedural justice is useful for exploring the justice in 
procedures involving interdependent members of a group (Tyler, 1989; Tyler et al. 1996).  
A group could be comprised of the entities in a political environment or the members of 
an organization.  Thus, this model may be useful for exploring phenomena — like public 
relations — studied using systems-based organizational theory because interdependence 
is central in systems theory.  The model’s “robustness” varies with the degree of 
interdependence (and frequency of interaction) between group members (Tyler et al., 
1996): The greater the interdependence or the more frequent the interaction, the more 
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robust the model.  It is also a particularly useful model when uncertainty abounds (Besley 
& McComas, 2005; van den Bos et al., 1997; van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998; van den 
Bos et al., 2001) — as it did in the Annapolitan political environment.  This uncertainty 
could stem from a group member’s status; its relationship with the decision-making 
authority; and the trustworthiness, objectivity, and motivations of the authority.  These 
were all sources of uncertainty perceived by informants.  Fair processes provide 
information that quells these uncertainties, which ameliorates concerns that a decision-
making authority will use the procedures to exploit participants (van den Bos et al., 
1997).  Again, this reflects my findings about the importance informants placed on social 
circles and participation in official dialogic processes. 
 Tyler’s (1989; Tyler et al., 1996; Tyler & Folger, 1980) research on the group-
value model of procedural justice in the political and legal systems is particularly 
illustrative given the political context of this study.  People have expectations about their 
relationships with and treatment received from public officials (e.g., politicians and 
police officers).  Expectations are based on normative ideals, implicit associations, and 
experiences.  Tyler and his colleagues found that interpersonal treatment and 
relationships mattered more than anything else, including control in the process or 
outcome favorability, in a person’s judgment of his or her experiences in the political and 
legal systems.  This may also explain why social circles figured so prominently 
throughout my findings.  The interpersonal treatment GRPs did or did not receive from 
political stakeholders, as opportuned through social circles, were salient aspects of their 
work lives.   
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Tyler and his colleagues (1989; Tyler et al., 1996; Tyler & Folger, 1980) have 
repeatedly interpreted this as people care about procedural justice because they care about 
having voice and respect even when those do not translate to process or decision control.  
Participants evidently want something more valuable than the opportunity and ability to 
influence outcomes (Tyler, 1994); they want interpersonal justice.  This is a departure 
from Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) original instrumental conceptualization of procedural 
justice.  This all echoes themes that emerged in my findings: Informants desired 
constructive relationships with decision-makers and opportunities to participate in 
dialogic processes (e.g., as would occur in social circles); they would worry about the 
outcomes later.  This is also why lobbying ethics laws tend to target social circles and 
“good old boy” networks.  These unofficial dialogic opportunities are not opportuned for 
everyone; they effect interpersonal and procedural justice only for members.  Conversely, 
they may also undermine the procedural justice potential of the official dialogic processes 
that non-members are “limited” to participating in. 
 Perceptions of procedural justice in the political system affect participants’ 
perceptions of decision-making authorities in that system (e.g., the Maryland General 
Assembly or the U.S. Congress [Tyler, 1994]).  Again, this was the case with my 
informants, regardless of their ideological leanings or affects toward the Glendening or 
Ehrlich administrations.  Stronger perceived fairness of political decision-making 
procedures translates to greater satisfaction with and stronger support for decision-
making authorities (Colquitt, 2001; Lauber & Knuth, 1999; Phillips, 2002; Tyler & 
Caine, 1981; Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985).  This would apply to organizations, 
enacting the participant role, that interact with the government, as the decision-making 
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authority.  This insight also informs situations where stakeholders (e.g., employees) enact 
the role of participant and organizations enact the role of decision-making authority.   
Fuller and Hester (2001) wrote about how the “appearance of justice” in politics 
is important.  Political authorities may engage in appearances to mitigate citizens’ 
dissatisfaction, or even “hostility” (p. 282), with decisional outcomes (Tyler & Folger, 
1980).  But this raises the question of whether political authorities — or really any 
decision-making authority such as an organization — are concerned with the appearance 
of justice (as accommodative justice, pseudoparticipation, or the two-way asymmetrical 
model would accomplish) or with truly doing what is fair by people in terms of 
interpersonal, information, and procedural and distributional justice (as the two-way 
symmetrical/mixed-motive model would accomplish).   
Participants’ anger, resentment, discontent, and frustration with perceived 
unfairness and injustice — being dealt with asymmetrically — may fuel their desire to 
seek retributive justice against decision-making authorities (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & 
Corkran, 1979; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).  They want to reply in kind.  They have 
nothing to gain; thus they have nothing to lose, as the curvilinear constraint-symmetry 
relationship predicts (J.E. Grunig, 1984).  In fact, research has shown that people who 
unwittingly participate under falsely pretensed decision-making processes (e.g., 
pseudoparticipation mechanisms) often see outcomes as less fair than people who did not 
participate at all in the processes.  “False” voice heightens procedural and distributive 
injustice more than “no” voice — being a persona non grata.  Their frustrations at having 
their time and effort wasted, being exploited and disrespected, and having their raised 
expectations dashed may lead to a primitive desire to punish those who are the sources of 
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frustration (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).  Folger et al. (1979) called this the “frustration 
effect” (p. 2254).   
Frustration caused by procedural and distributional injustice (and arguably 
interpersonal injustice) may even lead to antisocial behaviors such as rioting (Tyler & 
Caine, 1981).  More mildly, the frustration effect may lead to (and may lend social 
scientific support to) Ornstein’s battered Congress syndrome (Marcus, 2006) or activism 
such as strikes, boycotts, and the punitive exploitation of legal loopholes to punish 
organizations (Simone [a.k.a. Tuite], 2003).  The frustration effect may also have some 
interplay with J.E. Grunig’s (1997a) situational theory of publics, specifically regarding 
the evolution of active publics into activist publics and the constraint recognition 
variable.  S. Alexander, Sinclair, and Tetrick (1995) called for more research on this 
visceral form of justice within the justice body of knowledge.  I agree, but with the caveat 
that both justice and public relations scholars should conduct such research because 
retributive justice appears to be a useful framework for exploring activism against 
organizations. 
To conclude, I realize I have not done justice to the concept of justice here, but 
that was not my intent.  My intent was to share my epiphany  that eureka moment 
about the concept of justice’s applicability to another specialized from of public relations, 
namely government relations, and to public relations generally.  I hope, one, to further 
explore this nexus in my academic career and, two, that other public relations 
researchers’ curiosity will be sufficiently piqued to explore the same. 
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Central Research Question 3 
In this section, I present a nuanced interpretation of the major findings related to 
the final central research question: What can be learned from this study that informs the 
theory and practice of the specialized form of public relations, government relations?  My 
one-word answer: Plenty.  My multiple-word answer began in the preceding subsection 
about organizational justice as a framework for understanding government relations.  I 
continue here within the context of the significance of the study I outlined in Chapter 1. 
Significance of the Study 
Studying, from an individual-level perspective, the impact of major political 
change on the work “lives” of boundary-spanning GRPs has applied and theoretical 
significance.  In terms of the former, I believe that this study provides insight into what 
boundary-spanning GRPs and other organizational members could reasonably expect to 
happen to them, their organizations, and the political environment when major political 
change occurs.  This is another potential benefit of using organizational justice as a 
framework for public relations, because it helps inform their expectations.  People 
innately understand the notion of fairness, both in terms of process and outcomes.  In 
fact, many informants’ concerns about how Ehrlich’s election would affect their 
organizations’ political status were expressed to me in terms of gaining or giving up a 
seat at the governor’s table or getting (or not) a fair shake from the governor.  Both of 
these evoke the notion of fairness. 
The rift between Democrats and Republicans in the United States is narrow, 
meaning that only a small percentage of votes determines which party controls an elected 
office or entire governmental body.  The rift between Democrats and Republicans in 
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Maryland and around the country is also deep; political parties and the electorate are 
more intensely partisan, ideological, adversarial, divisive, and antagonistic than ever.  
One informant likened the partisan shenanigans in Annapolis to being back in seventh 
grade.  That may be a generous characterization if this anecdote is any indication of the 
emotional quotient of Annapolitan lawmakers: In a recent debate over the Democrats’ 
latest legislative attempt to antagonize a potential second-term Ehrlich administration, a 
Republican lawmaker asked, “Why?”  A Democrat retorted, “Why not?” (as quoted in 
Wagner, 2006).  So when an election wrests control over an elected office from one party 
and hands it to the other, that deep rift practically ensures the transition will jolt the 
political environment with partisan resentment; with newly powerful stakeholders who 
may or may not be effective boundary spanners, personal influencers, or cultural 
interpreters; and with other challenges and opportunities for GRPs and their 
organizations. 
Given the current state of narrowly but deeply rifted politics at the state and 
federal levels, major political change, either in the form of a jolt like Ehrlich’s election or 
increasing partisan polarization, will occur.  This dovetails with Finet’s (1993) more-
relevant-than-ever observation that more research is needed to help organizations deal 
with a “far more complex and turbulent sociopolitical environment” (p. 58).  Finet’s 
observation was one of the four voids in the theoretical literature I asserted in Chapter 1 
that my study would help fill. 
In Chapter 1, I contended that government relations, a specialized form of public 
relations, was academically underexplored, and further, that my study would be a  
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springboard for remedying that.  In this section, I demonstrate how this study has indeed 
functioned as such a springboard.  
Implications of the Academic Underexploration of Government Relations 
Lobbying is an oft-maligned and suspect activity, spurring the president of the 
American League of Lobbyists (ALL) to defend it before a U.S. Senate committee in 
2006: “Effective lobbying is not about access. . .It’s about forthright, ethical 
communications on issues” (P.A. Miller, 2006, para. 34).  Others have asserted that 
lobbying, when conducted normatively, “plays an essential role in the functions of 
Congress, representation, lawmaking, deliberation, oversight, and education of the 
American public” (Thurber, 2006, para. 5; see also McGrath, 1979; P.A. Miller, 2006).  
Sometimes the positive practice of lobbying is perceived as subverting the normative 
processes of democratic government.   
In the language of organizational justice, lobbying may undermine average 
citizens’ procedural and distributive justice in the political system.  Lobbying’s “visible 
trappings of special pleading” (Birnbaum, 2006a, para. 2) are viewed as means of buying 
votes or bribing lawmakers.  As French philosopher Michel de Montaigne once said, 
“There is no more expensive thing than a free gift” (as quoted in “Talking Points,” 2006,
p. 19).  Lawmakers pay for those free gifts with their integrity, lobbyists pay with their 
profession’s reputation, and citizens pay with their tax dollars and confidence in 
governmental institutions. 
Concerns about lobbying activities will periodically reach a tipping point and 
legislation designed to reform or regulate these activities will be enacted.  This tipping 
point was reached in Maryland in the early 2000s and in Washington, DC, in the mid-
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1990s.  The federal Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), which was amended in 
1998, restricts lawmakers, other officials, and staff from accepting gifts and meals from 
registered lobbyists. 
Unfortunately, the LDA is lousy with loopholes, is largely unenforced, and lacks 
much-needed transparency and sunshine (Baran, 2006; Sarasohn, 2006; Thurber, 2006).  
Here is how organizations can get around restrictions on accepting meals from registered 
lobbyists: An organizational executive can pick up the tab for an expensive dinner with 
the organization’s registered lobbyist and a member of Congress without any worries 
about violating the LDA.  Why?  Because the executive is not a registered lobbyist 
(Birnbaum, 2006a).  The LDA also restricts privately sponsored travel except for 
education purposes.  In reality, this frequently — and infamously — has resulted in 
“boondoggle” junkets, heavy on socializing and recreation and light on education (i.e., a 
one-hour “fact-finding” tour during a week-long golf outing).  Disingenuous skirting of 
the LDA’s rules happen with alarming frequency (Graham, 2006; Thurber, 2006).   
The LDA also targeted the revolving door between the federal government and 
the private sector by imposing a one-year moratorium on lobbying one’s former 
workplace after leaving the federal government.  This restriction is often skirted as well.  
For example: The former U.S. attorney general during the George W. Bush 
administration, John Ashcroft, opened his own lobbying consulting firm in 2005.  Under 
the LDA, he is barred from lobbying employees of the Department of Justice for one year 
(Sarasohn, 2006).  However, Ashcroft is free to lobby members of the U.S. Senate, to 
which Ashcroft belonged until losing his re-election bid in 2000.   
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These fatal flaws of the LDA enabled a powerful lobbyist named Jack Abramoff 
to flourish nearly unchecked until his activities began to receive media attention in early 
2004.  As of spring 2006, the Abramoff lobbying corruption scandal has besmirched 
powerful members of Congress; congressional staffers; and appointed officials, aides, and 
elected officials in the George W. Bush administration.  Abramoff accepted a plea 
bargain and was sentenced to nearly six years in jail (Whoriskey & Branigin, 2006).  This 
scandal has engulfed innocent-bystanders GRPs, some of whom follow the spirit (not just 
the exact letter) of the LDA and perhaps even abide by the ethics code of the ALL.  Some 
of them are corporate K Street-“Gucci Gulch” lobbyists whereas others are “cause-based 
lobbyists” (Copple, 2006).   
The Abramoff scandal “could become the biggest congressional corruption 
scandal in generations” (Schmidt & Grimaldi, 2006, para. 3; see this article for an “inside 
account” [para. 4] of it).  Members of Congress were shocked — just shocked (sarcasm 
intended) — and immediately began efforts to enact reform legislation.  But will “the 
egregious actions of a few. . .provoke a knee-jerk reaction?” (P.A. Miller, 2006, para. 
36).  The former president of the ALL has previously defended members of the lobbying 
community: “The vast majority of lobbyists here are honest, hard-working people 
performing functions that no one has any questions about.  They aren’t sleazy or 
improper” (as quoted in Eisler, 1998, p. 80).  Organizations such as the ALL, the 
American Association of Association Executives, the LobbySense Coalition, and 
individual GRPs (e.g., Copple, 2006) have publicly pleaded with lawmakers to not enact 
reform legislation rashly that may do more harm than good.  Some proposals would 
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extend the cooling-off period, ban all privately sponsored travel, and bar former members 
from accessing the chamber floors of the U.S. House and Senate.   
The purpose of these reform efforts are “to correct lobbying abuses [and] 
strengthen the relative voice of citizens” (Hoerstring & B.A. Smith, 2006) and to quell 
public disgust with the perceived unsavory, quasi-incestuous relationships between 
lobbyists and members of Congress.  Lobbying is a First Amendment-protected activity; 
citizens have the right to petition to their government for a redress of grievances (Baran, 
2006; Gray, 1989).  This is but one reason why Congress is being urged to tread carefully 
with reform even though polls show that citizens overwhelmingly favor massive reform 
(Hoerstring & B.A. Smith, 2006, para. 1).   
Another reform target is grassroots advocacy.  Hoerstring and B.A. Smith (2006) 
outlined the argument that grassroots lobbying, like direct lobbying, also is a 
constitutionally protected activity: “The Supreme Court has recognized that ‘there is 
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to 
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs’” (sec. “Grassroots Lobbying 
Disclosure Provision may be Unconstitutional,” para. 1).  This argument was successful 
in exempting grassroots advocacy from the 1995 LDA. 
Thanks to the Abramoff and Cunningham scandals, two of the major activities of 
government relations, direct lobbying and grassroots lobbying, have bulls’ eyes on them 
and Congress just may have an itchy trigger finger.  I believe that this renews the urgency 
and highlights the importance of conducting research on government relations — and 
makes this study all the more theoretically significant and practically applicable.  From 
research such as this study, a more accurate and representative understanding of 
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government relations will emerge.  Lawmakers from all levels of government could look 
to this study to make thoughtful, considered decisions about advocacy reform rather than 
a common scandal-pockmarked (mis)understanding of it.   
In the absence of such research on government relations, resulting reform may do 
little to restore public confidence in governmental institutions and elected officials.  It 
may be ridden with loopholes (like the LDA) or overzealous (as ALL and others have 
intimated may happen).  At the time of this writing (in April 2006), the U.S. Senate has 
passed lobbying reform legislation that has underwhelmed senators who were eager to 
see significant change, including Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama 
(Birnbaum, 2006b).  In an effort to not pass the “rushed” reform that many in the 
lobbying industry (and fellow lawmakers) feared and that the ALL and others cautioned 
against, the Senate perhaps overcompensated. 
Not having an accurate understanding of a problem before leaping to fix it may 
have unintended consequences.  Maryland provides an example of the unintended 
consequences of lobbying reform rules.  Maryland reformed its Public Ethics Law in the 
2001 and 2002 legislative sessions to address improprieties among some GRPs and 
lawmakers.  One of the new rules forbade GRPs from paying for meals and beverages of 
individual lawmakers.  However, they can pick up the tab for receptions to which “all 
members of a designated legislative unit are invited” (State of Maryland Ethics 
Commission, n.d.).  One informant, a former lawmaker and current for-contract GRP, 
said this rule has had  “unintended consequences,” one of the pitfalls of too-quickly 
enacted or not well-considered lobbying reform, or reform not informed by good 
research.  The intended consequence of this new rule was to dismantle the overly cozy 
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“good old boy network” between some GRPs and lawmakers.  The unintended 
consequence was that the opposite happened: The rule has actually hindered new GRPs 
from getting established in Annapolis while buttressing the positions of already-
established GRPs who either had deep pockets to pay for receptions (or clients with deep 
pockets) or with whom lawmakers would be willing to “go Dutch.”  This informant 
believed this rule diminished opportunities for many new self-employed GRPs to get to 
know lawmakers on a personal level to cultivate and nurture those all-important social 
circles.  If a new GRP is not affiliated with an organization or lobbying firm that has deep 
pockets, then hosting a reception may be cost-prohibitive.  This informant believed that 
these rules favor the GRPs who are well established — those who can rely on their social 
circles (instead of contrived social events) for opportunities to interact with lawmakers — 
and who have deep pockets.  In fact, Mosk (2006b) dissected the growing concerns in 
Annapolis about this very issue.   
This may portend yet another attempt at reforming the state’s Public Ethics Laws 
to get it “right.”  The findings of my study, if I am able to get them into the right hands, 
may be useful in those efforts. 
Implications of the Academic Exploration of Government Relations 
Government relations lacks positive theories that would explain the actualities of 
“what people do” (Lave & March, 1993, p. 108) in its practice.  Werder (2002) noted this 
was a problem for public relations generally.  Springston and Leichty (1994) called for a 
“fuller understanding of how public relations practitioners interact with publics, and 
collect and use information about publics” (p. 687), as well as for a better understanding 
of routine boundary-spanning activities.  I inferred from Werder (2002) and Springston  
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and Leichty (1994) that these were two of the four voids in the literature I identified in 
Chapter 1. 
I believe that this study, which explored the work lives of boundary-spanning 
GRPs, helps fill those voids.  From this study positive insights about the actualities of 
government relations and how boundary-spanning GRPs interact with organizational 
stakeholders have emerged.  These insights, which contribute to the body of knowledge 
of government relations, could be extrapolated to public relations as well. 
Boundary-spanning GRPs in Annapolis engage in direct advocacy; oversee 
member outreach, media advocacy, and PAC activities; facilitate organizational 
involvement in coalitions; attend formal meetings with stakeholders; participate in state 
task forces; cultivate and nurture social circles; attend social events during the 90-day 
legislative session and fundraisers outside of the session; duck partisan crossfire; and 
seek opportunities for dialogue and collaboration while also trying to optimize 
organizational self-interest.  Through these activities (this list is by no means exhaustive), 
they work in the external-representation mode.  Through this mode, they also procure 
valuable informational resources from the political environment, which enables them to 
work in the information-processing mode.  In this mode they analyze, contextualize, and 
package this information for organizational members (some of whom may lack the 
political savvy to see the “big picture”); and they inject this processed information into 
the organization’s government relations decision-making process.  They seek 
organizational members’ input on issues and potential courses of action and educate them 
about issues, challenges and opportunities, organizational strengths and weaknesses, and  
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viable courses of action.  They help decide courses of action to take and implement them.  
Like the previous list, this list is not exhaustive.   
GRPs were able to effectively execute and complete these activities and 
responsibilities through their implementation of the personal influence and cultural 
interpreter models of public relations practice, which facilitated dialogic engagement.  As 
I have noted in elsewhere, the use of two models in combination with dialogue explained 
many aspects of these informants’ work lives as boundary-spanning GRPs.   
It is logical with a dearth of positive theories about government relations there 
would be a corresponding dearth of government relations-specific normative theories.  To 
be able to provide advice or offer idealized representations of how things should be — as 
normative theories do — a positive baseline of what is going on needs to be established.  
Baselines emerge from positive theory.  I have determined from the informants’ 
experiences that what they are doing as boundary-spanning GRPs negotiating 
organizational engagement with a jolted political environment is largely what I believe 
they should be doing.  I offer the following normative insights about government 
relations based on an area where what they were doing was not exactly what I believe 
they should be doing.   
Normative Insights 
 
I believe informants and their organizations should pay closer attention to their 
perceived and actual partisan alignments than they do.  These alignments were already 
salient aspects of their work lives.  In a polarized political environment, an organization’s 
partisan alignments are salient to its critical stakeholders as well.  Being perceived as a 
party’s “stalking horse” or a pawn (to borrow informants’ chess metaphor), whether 
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justified or not, could cause the other party to consider the organization fair game in the 
party’s partisan conflicts.    
This relates to the role of values congruency in personal and organizational 
political legitimacy.  Values congruency is of paramount consideration in political 
environments, particularly in those marred by partisanship, as Annapolis has been.  A 
political stakeholder confers higher degrees of political legitimacy on those whose values 
are congruent than those whose values are incongruent.  Political legitimacy has far-
reaching ramifications for informants and organizations in terms of meaningful 
participation in governmental policy decision-making processes.  It is in these processes 
where information and influence are exchanged (where procedural justice is sought) and 
where organizations advocate their interests (where distributive justice is sought). 
I contend that organizations that traditionally have engaged in intentional 
partisanship should try to minimize doing so.  As one informant observed about 
partisanship in Maryland, “The genie is out of the bottle.”  Even if Ehrlich loses his re-
election bid in 2006, the number of Republicans in the General Assembly is on an 
upward trajectory; and Republicans like the taste of political power.  Thus they may not 
be so easily dominated as they had been before Ehrlich’s election.   
For instance, many organizations endorse candidates in elections.  Even though 
endorsements are based on a candidate’s record of support for the organization’s issues 
— not necessarily the candidate’s party affiliation — endorsement likely will be 
interpreted as aligning with one political party.  Organizations may protest against being 
labeled.  Endorsement may work in the organization’s favor if that candidate wins, but 
what if the candidate loses? Maryland is a polarized “you’re with me or you’re against 
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me” political environment.  Intentionally or inadvertently aligning the organization with 
one or the other political party has diminishing returns.   
The result of endorsing the eventual losing candidate can be the situation that at 
least one informant’s organization found itself in: persona non grata for endorsing 
Ehrlich’s opponent in 2002.  Readers may recall that this informant’s plan was to suggest 
an entrepreneurial strategy for the 2006 gubernatorial election: Rather than endorsing a 
candidate, she would recommend that the organization publicize the candidates’ stances 
and records on relevant issues.  The organizations could then sidestep the pitfalls of 
taking sides in a polarized environment.  Of course, taking sides may be exactly what an 
organization wants to do and that of course is its prerogative.  It must realize, however, 
that the strategy of purposely aligning with one political party is risky given a polarized 
political environment.  This is an increasingly risky strategy in Maryland. 
But even an officially nonpartisan organization may not avoid political labels in 
polarized political environments.  That organization might work with lawmakers based 
on their affinity for issues, not their party affiliations.  But what if most of the lawmakers 
with an affinity for the organization’s issues are members of the same political party?  
Avowing nonpartisanship provides partisan deniability but what counts is perceptions.  
These situations create perceptions about that organization; those perceptions form that 
organization’s reality.  Informants could plead to lawmakers that their organizations were 
officially nonpartisan; but if the lawmakers perceived them as partisan or as “stalking 
horses” for the other party, that is the reality with which informants had to deal.   
The normative way for informants to engage with stakeholders in a polarized 
political environment would be to minimize their and the organizations’ alignments with 
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either political party to avoid getting caught in the partisan crossfire.  Nonpartisanship 
can buffer organizations from that crossfire (but as I have noted, buffers are cushions not 
Kevlar vests).  Given the realities of politics in Maryland and elsewhere, this normative 
suggestion is all it will like ever be: normative.  First, most GRPs come up through 
politics — which allowed them to be the personal influencers and cultural interpreters 
that allowed them to be effective, successful GRPs — which means that they likely held 
party-aligned jobs.  It is of course possible to hold neutral jobs in politics, such as 
working for a nonpartisan state agency such as the Department of Legislative Services,  
and still be personal influencers and cultural interpreters.  Second, the temptation to 
capitalize on “your guys” having political power may be too great.   
Organizations will be tempted to maximize their self-interests in the short term, 
even though this may be problematic in the long term, when “the other guys” come into 
power and delegitimize organizations associated and aligned with their political 
adversaries (or enemies, if the partisan conflict is that bitter).  Third, a nonpartisan entity 
is essentially a logical impossibility in a polarized political environment where political 
meaning is attached to every message and action.   
I offer this normative recommendation that organizations are more likely to 
consider and implement: Be bipartisan.  Even if an organization does not see an 
immediate need to do so, it should pre-emptively hire GRPs with affiliations to the party 
with which the organization and its current GRPs are not affiliated or implicitly 
associated.   
Alternately, it may be possible to hire a GRP who is a true political animal, a 
person who loves either the game of politics or American democratic principles so much 
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that labels of Democrat and Republicans are of minimal concern.  These are people like 
Dick Morris and David Gergen, political consultants who have worked for Democrat and 
Republican presidents and who have been criticized from the left and right for doing so.  
They are beyond nonpartisan; they are apartisan.  However, if the Maryland K Street 
project is successful, organizations without Republican GRPs on staff may have no 
choice but to hire Republicans.   
The strategy of being nonpartisan, bipartisan, or apartisan to avoid partisan 
crossfire in a polarized political environment relates to this noteworthy finding: I found 
that informants’ importance and influence in organizational decision-making did increase 
post-jolt (as extant research predicted) but not to the degree that would be expected given 
the amount of turbulence and uncertainty in post-jolt Annapolis.  Ehrlich’s election 
heralded a new but not necessarily improved era of extreme partisanship and polarization 
that required organizations (even those that perceived his election as a boon) to tread 
carefully.   
The Learning Curve of a Two-Party Political Environment 
 
But I have interpreted informants’ importance and influence not increasing 
commensurately with the environment’s increased turbulence and certainty as good news: 
Informants already occupied elite positions within their organizations, enjoyed high 
degrees of personal political legitimacy, and wielded great influence within their 
organizations, pre-jolt. I believe this is because pre-jolt Annapolis was already a 
dynamic-complex political environment, even though Democrats controlled both the 
legislative and executive branches.  Dynamism and complexity are standard dimensional 
baselines in political environments (DeHoog & Racanska, 2003).   
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After the jolt, despite the increased turbulence and uncertainty, there was not 
much “room” left for informants to grow in importance and influence within their 
organizations.  This benefited organizations post-jolt because they already had people in 
positions of power who were accustomed to wielding influence within the organization 
and negotiating the organization’s decision-making processes, namely the informants.  
The informants had already mastered the learning curve for negotiating the organization’s 
internal processes, freeing them to master the learning curve of engaging with 
stakeholders in a partisan, two-party political environment. 
I believe that informants at boon organizations might have had an easier time 
mastering this learning curve than bane informants.  Boon organizations under Ehrlich 
were bane organizations under Glendening (and vice versa).  Before the election of 
Republican governor, these organizations (political legitimacy considerations aside) had 
to engage with two Democrat critical stakeholders: the governor and the Democrat-
dominated General Assembly.  These organizations for more or less a generation have 
had no choice but to engage with the political party (Democrat) with which its value are 
less congruent because of that party’s dominance of the state government.  Engaging with 
the minority Republican Party was relatively easier, as values congruency existed.  Thus, 
Ehrlich boon organizations have effectively been dealing with engaging with an 
“unfriendly” critical stakeholder (viz., Democrats) for years.  This was an experience that 
Ehrlich bane (but Glendening boon) organizations did not have: They have focused on 
engaging with Democrats, with whom they have values congruency, because Democrats 
have been all whom they needed to engage with to effect their goals.  They did not have 
to engage with Republican lawmakers because Republicans could not make a significant 
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difference (positive or negative) in organizations’ goal achievement.  Ehrlich’s election, 
along with some Republican gains in the legislature, forced these bane organizations to 
confront an unprecedented situation: They had to engage with values-incongruent 
stakeholders  Republicans  who for the first time in decades wielded real power in 
Annapolis. 
In reviewing the transcripts, it appear that informants’ at bane organizations were 
highly concerned about establishing connections to and engage with Republican 
stakeholders both in the General Assembly and Office of the Governor.  Informants at 
boon organizations were more concerned about connecting with the Office of the 
Governor than the General Assembly, mainly because many of the people in the Ehrlich 
administration were new to Annapolis.  These boon informants were relatively relaxed 
about engaging with newly empowered — but not “new” — Republican lawmakers.  
However, boon informants’ were not as worried about making Republican connections as 
bane informants were.  This is because they had existing connections with Republicans or 
because they anticipated that their personal and organizational political legitimacy would 
increase under a Republican governor. 
I have one final normative insight gained from exploring the positive practice of 
government relations.  My analysis did not reveal that informants conducted formal 
research about their critical political stakeholders or the political environment.  Such 
information was typically gleaned through informal methods, such as environmental 
scanning and interactions with members of social circles.  Some informants reported their 
organizations engaged in formal research activities not necessarily germane to their  
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government relations programs.  A few informants also reported occasionally using 
polling data from lawmakers’ constituents for persuasive purposes with lawmakers. 
I have to wonder if in a political environment like Annapolis, when there is so 
much familiarity among people and so much information exchange, how much better or 
more accurate information about critical stakeholders formal research would have yielded 
as compared to what informal research had yielded.  Some informants did report 
conducting formal research during the 2002 election on the two candidates for these same 
purposes.  This included sending questionnaires to the candidates; bringing them in for 
interview meetings with organizational officials; and investigating their vote histories 
(this applied only to Ehrlich; the lieutenant governorship was Townsend’s first elected 
office and she did not cast a vote during her tenure), policy positions, and past media 
interviews.  Such formal research supported informants’ accurate implicit associations: 
that Ehrlich, as a Republican, would be friendly toward certain interests and issues (e.g., 
business, agricultural and animal husbandry, and development) and less friendly than 
Democrats or unfriendly toward others (environmental and public education).  Research 
also largely supported informants’ implicit associations about Townsend (except on the 
matter of the Intercounty Connector).   
Once Ehrlich became governor, informants’ implicit associations largely held up; 
that they did not work out as hoped (or dreaded) was because of the partisanship that 
polluted the political environment.  I think informants expected that there would be some 
partisan rumblings after Ehrlich’s election but never imagined Annapolis would become 
as polarized as it has.  Also much of the partisan conflict was rooted in the interpersonal 
conflicts among Ehrlich and the two Democrat leaders of the General Assembly (Busch 
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and Miller, who themselves were at odds).  What if the previous speaker of the House, 
Casper Taylor, had not lost his seat in the 2000 election?  He and the Senate President 
Miller enjoyed a much friendlier relationship than current Speaker Busch and Miller.   
I also have to wonder how and what type of formal research could feasibly  have 
been done that might have predicted the eventual polarization in Annapolis.  Surveys of 
lawmakers about how they would react to the two-party situation in Maryland?  I 
question the feasibility of such research.  One, Annapolis is too small a community to be 
asking charged, personal questions that conceivably might have yielded useful 
information that informants could not have procured elsewhere through informal means.  
And two, questions like this have too much potential for socially desirable answers.  I 
believe that given the realities and constraints of conducting formal research of critical 
stakeholders in Annapolis, informal research such as talking among social circles and 
keeping one’s ears to the ground worked well and was informants’ best option for 
information procurement.  This research strategy did not work perfectly but it satisficed. 
Implications of Conducting Qualitative Research on Boundary Spanning 
 This qualitative study provides a deep understanding of the individual, lived 
experiences of boundary-spanning GRPs.  I believe my findings have helped to 
contextualize and triangulate knowledge already known about boundary spanners, their 
work activities, responsibilities, and areas of influence (further filling Springston and 
Leichty’s [1994] and Jemison’s [1984] voids).  I believe that there is theoretical and 
applied value in having engaged in this qualitative endeavor.  Those values 
notwithstanding, I believe that seeking knowledge for knowledge’s sake is a worthwhile 
and admirable endeavor. 
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My findings did not reveal any trends in my informants’ lived experiences as 
boundary spanners that suggested they experienced anything significantly different than 
what the extant, largely quantitative-established research on boundary spanning 
predicted.  They worked in the external-representation and information-processing 
modes; engaged in environmental scanning; participated in their organizations’ strategic 
decision-making processes; and enacted the managerial and technician roles concurrently.  
The informants did seem to function (by virtue of their personal legitimacy and social 
circles) as organizational buffers, which I believe deepens the existing public relations 
literature about boundary spanning.  
As I noted in Chapter 1, for various reasons, I was perplexed that I did not find 
more research on boundary spanning in the public relations literature given the centrality 
of boundary spanning.  After all, I am not alone in concluding that public relations is a 
boundary-spanning function (e.g., see Everett, 1993; J.E. Grunig, 1991; J.E. Grunig & 
Hunt, 1984; L.A. Grunig, 1987; Huang, 2004; Lauzen, 1994; Lauzen & Dozier, 1994; 
Mayhew, 1997; Newsom, A. Scott, & Turk, 1989; Philbin, 2005; Wyatt, S.S. Smith, & 
Andsager, 1996).  Springston and Leichty (1994) must have been as perplexed as I was 
(although a decade before me), which prompted their call for more research on boundary-
spanning activities and practitioners’ interactions with publics (to use their term).   
Like L.W. Porter and Roberts (1976) speculated about communication being 
difficult to study discretely because it pervades every human endeavor, perhaps boundary 
spanning is difficult to study discretely within public relations because it pervades every 
public relations endeavor.  I believe there is much, much more that public relations 
researchers could add to this concept.  I believe this dissertation is a good start. 
397
Limitations and Strengths 
As all studies do, this study has limitations; I discuss the two that are unique to 
this project.  First, some scholars may find that this study is handicapped because I 
conducted the interviews with informants via telephone.  I believe my geographical 
whereabouts (which were understandable and personally unavoidable) during the time of 
the data collection justified this approach.  I do recognize that the best scenario for 
conducting qualitative interviews may be in person.  However, given the successful 
process and outcomes of the telephone interviews, I daresay that conducting the 
interviews in-person would not have resulted in even marginally more success.  Thus I do 
not believe that my study’s data, findings, or implications need an asterisk cautioning: 
“Take this study with a grain of salt: Data collected via telephone.”   
Second, this was a Maryland-specific qualitative study, the findings of which 
were not intended to be generalized to boundary-spanning GRPs who operate in political 
environments elsewhere.  However, Maryland does not have a monopoly on  polarized 
partisan political environments; unfortunately these adjectives are increasingly accurate 
descriptions of other states’ political environments, as well as of  localities and Capitol 
Hill.  This study’s results may not be generalizable, but they may provide boundary-
spanning GRPs beyond Maryland’s borders with useful insights about what they have 
experienced in their respective polarized, partisan political environments and why. 
 I believe that the strengths of this study more than compensate for its limitations.  
One of these strengths is the counterpart to the last limitation, about this being a 
Maryland-specific study.  Maryland served as a near-perfect contemporary laboratory for 
exploring the impacts of major political change and polarization on denizens of a political 
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environment.  I conducted the interviews three years after Ehrlich was elected while the 
impacts of his election were on-going.  I did not ask informants to recall long-ago events.  
I asked them about events fresh in their minds and their recent and on-going experiences.  
The study’s timing minimized the potential for recall bias.  
Another of the study’s strengths comes from the quantity and quality of the 
informants’ interviews.  I collected data from 40 boundary-spanning GRPs.  This is a 
significant number of interviews for a study, well beyond what Warren (2002) said was 
sufficient for a publishable study but on par with the “gold standards” established by the 
University of Maryland dissertations of Hon (1992) and Hung (2002).  As I noted in 
Chapter 3, I reached informational sufficiency well before the 40th interview; but I 
continued to interview informants because of the breadth of perspective that was gained 
from the “extra” interviews.  These interviews facilitated the deep understanding I sought 
of the individual lived experiences of boundary-spanning GRPs enduring a major jolt in 
their organizations’ political environment.   
I was fortunate with respect to three aspects of the data collection.  One, my 
attempt to effect a stratified purposeful sample (Miles & Huberman, 1994) of boon and 
bane informants worked out better than I could have hoped: Seventeen informants 
worked for boon organizations, 17 worked for bane organizations, and six worked for 
organizations that perceived Ehrlich’s election neutrally.  This achieved a balance of 
views about Ehrlich, a Republican, becoming governor in a state where Democrats had 
dominated politics for decades.  This also achieved an ideological balance across the 
spectrum of informants.  Two, although I had solicited interviews with GRPs who, from 
their job titles, appeared to occupy senior, junior, and even entry-level positions, all of the 
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GRPs who participated in my study occupied senior-level positions.  All of the in-house 
GRP informants occupied upper-echelon (i.e., not below the second row on the 
organizational chart) management positions in their organizations.  The for-contract GRP 
informants held senior-level positions at their direct employers (i.e., lobbying consulting 
firms) or owned their own consulting firms.  They also functioned as members of the 
clients’ dominant coalition on government relations matters. Three, I did not have a 
“bad” interview in the bunch.  All of the interviews were active, flowed naturally, and 
were conversational.  As a result the data I collected were of very high quality and there 
were copious amounts of them.   
The last strength unique to this study is the researcher, namely me.  I have taken 
meticulous care over the nearly three years I have worked on this study to develop a 
richly conceptualized framework from the literatures in public relations and 
organizational theory.  I was rigorous and disciplined and compartmentalized my  
political biases and cultural topoi throughout the data collection, description, analysis, 
and interpretation phases of the study.  I have strived to clearly articulate that framework, 
as well as the research design, the findings, and my analyses and interpretations thereof.  
I hope that the study’s readability, thoroughness, interestingness, and  most importantly 
 its theoretical insights and practical applicability offset its lack of brevity.   
Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation has uncovered real theoretical and practical needs for research 
on the interpersonal communication and networks of organizational boundary spanners in 
government relations specifically and public relations generally. Weedman (1992) used 
the concept of social circles to study the interpersonal communication channels between 
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boundary spanners.  Drawing on the work of Kadushin (1968), she defined a social circle 
as “a set of individuals connected to one another by some form of social choice” (p. 258).  
“Social circles” has been my shorthand term for one’s network of personal and 
professional contacts.  It logically can be assumed that members of social circles discuss 
their jobs and thus exchange work-related knowledge, insights, and gossip and that 
exchange occurs more quickly, frequently, and readily among members than non-
members (Burt, 2000).   
As I learned from my informants, social circles were important in many other 
aspects of their work activities and responsibilities beyond information and influence 
exchange.  I have traced many of the study’s major findings about organizational 
legitimacy and the prevalence of the personal influence model and dialogue to 
informants’ social circles.  Informants’ social circles were in the background of every 
other finding; they were subtly ubiquitous but extremely important.  They factored into 
organizations’ political legitimacy; they functioned as unofficial forums for dialogue, 
deliberation, and decision-making; they provided entrée; they served as buffers; they 
helped organizations play the asymmetrical game of politics; they facilitated the effective 
execution of nearly all boundary-spanning activities; and they enabled informants to be 
personal influencers and to enact the manager role within their organizations.  Social 
circles were cohesive elements that held all aspects of informants’ work-lives together.  
Informants realized this, which is why they were so concerned about the breakdown and 
slow rebuilding of social circles after the jolt of Ehrlich’s election.  In fact, I think my 
insights about social circles help fulfill the research void about factors that affect 
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boundary spanners’ influence (Jemison, 1984).  This is the last of the four voids in the 
public relations literature I asserted my study would help to fill. 
However, I do believe my findings about the centrality of informants’ social 
circles in their work activities and responsibilities, participation in organizational 
decision-making, influence in their organizations, and the legitimacy conferred on their 
organizations by stakeholders highlights the importance of interpersonal communication 
and interpersonal networks in government relations (as well as other specialized forms of 
public relations).  Interpersonal communication and networks are often explored within 
the context of interpersonal relationships; this is logical because communication 
comprises and influences relationships (Rogers & Escudero, 2004), as do social bonds.   
The idea of exploring the concept of relationships in public relations is not new.  
Public relations scholars began to give serious attention to the concept of relationship 
management when Ferguson (1984) suggested that relationships — instead of 
communication, organizations, or stakeholders — should be the unit of study for public 
relations.  In the ensuing years, many scholars have ruminated about what relationships 
are; whether they can be measured and if so, how; and their implications for public 
relations theory and practice.  One of the other most pressing research priorities is 
relationship management in public relations.  Much of this research is at the 
organizational level, focusing on organization-public relationships (OPRs; see Broom, 
Casey, & Ritchey, 1997; J.E. Grunig & Hon, 1999; Hung, 2002; Ledingham & Bruning, 
2000).12 I am calling for research on communication and networks at the level of 
interpersonal relationships.  In fact, research on OPRs borrowed concepts (e.g., the four 
 
12 I have purposely delimited this literature from my study.  There is a “flood” of research on OPRs.  Fully 
incorporating it into my study might have drowned it.  Further, the relationships of interest to me for this 
study are found at the individual, interpersonal level. 
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dimensions of trust, commitment, control mutuality, and satisfaction) from the research 
literature on interpersonal relationships (J.E. Grunig, 2001; see Canary & Stafford, 1992; 
Huang, 1997; Stafford & Canary, 1991).   
Coombs (2001) called the intersection of interpersonal theory with public 
relations “an idea whose time has arrived” (p. 105).  As I have discussed, individual-level 
relationships between informants and the people who functioned as boundary spanners 
for critical stakeholders (e.g., staff members in the governor’s Legislative Policy Office 
or lawmakers themselves) had significant implications for organizations.  My research 
substantiated that these interpersonal relationships were the major factor in how politics 
and governance were accomplished (or not) in cliquish, small-town Annapolis.  Research 
attention should be paid to interpersonal relationships and communication in public 
relations.  I also believe that related concepts such as social circles and networks (e.g., 
see Borgatti & Everett, 1992; Kadushin, 1968; Milgram, 1967; Weedman, 1992) and 
social capital (e.g., see Burt, 2000; Lin, 1999) provide fertile ground for future public 
relations research in government relations that would also benefit the general body of 
knowledge in public relations.  Additionally, interpersonal justice is a major component 
in the group-value model of procedural justice, a concept which I assert holds much 
promise for public relations. 
Research involving any of these topics also would have tremendous positive 
implications for the public relations body of knowledge and real-world organizational 
outcomes.  Such research would be useful for nourishing the somewhat lean body of 
positive knowledge of government relations as well.  I believe results related to social 
circles and the personal influence models are positive steps toward understanding why 
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the Excellence theory does not explain government relations as well as other specialized 
programs in public relations.  Further, I believe those positive steps are in the direction of 
social networks and social capital. 
I offer this story about manned versus automated customer-service call centers to 
illustrate my point about why research should focus on the interpersonal level.  The story 
also illustrates the positive impact of interpersonal communication on customer 
satisfaction, loyalty, organization reputation, and organizational effectiveness.  These 
translate into measurable outcomes such as sales and market share.  This story also 
illustrates some of my points about the potential utility of organizational justice in public 
relations research.   
Russ et al. (1998) suggested that customer-service agents could function as 
organizational boundary spanners; they function as points of contact for customer 
stakeholders, listening to (and perhaps resolving) their concerns, and bringing 
information gleaned from these stakeholders to the attention of other organizational 
members.  Public relations professionals should take notice of  W.C. Taylor’s (2006) plea 
to corporations with automated customer-service call centers: “Answer the phone! How 
can companies listen to their customers if those customers have such a hard time reaching 
a human being when they call?” (para. 7).  W.C. Taylor interviewed the president of an 
organization that conducts research of customers’ evaluations of interactions with 
customer-service call centers.  Customer service-related interactions with live people 
generate more positive outcomes, such as customers’ volunteering useful information and 
heightening their sense of loyalty, than automated interactions (e.g., “Press one if you 
have questions about your bill”).  This is true even when the agent is unable to resolve the 
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situation that generated the customer’s call. Even this is about justice: Talking with a live 
customer-service agent is more procedurally just than contending with an automated 
system.  Human interaction enhances the interpersonal justice factor of procedural 
justice, as well as  customers’ control over the process and their true voice in it.  And a 
more-just process more than compensates for less-just outcomes.  This president said: 
“You create more value through dialogue with a live agent.  A call is an opportunity to 
build a relationship, to encourage customers to stay with the brand.  There can be a real 
return on this investment” (as quoted in W.C. Taylor, 2006, para. 10).  Brand and 
company loyalty are difficult to muster in competitive, saturated markets.  As a result,  
engaging in engaging activities can pay big dividends for corporations.   
W.C. Taylor’s (2006) article illustrates my point that interpersonal interaction, 
whether between a customer service agent and customer or a GRP and a lawmaker, can 
have significant implications for the organization.  More generally, this is why political 
campaigners canvass neighborhoods and stand post at high-foot-traffic areas (like Metro 
stations or neighborhood meeting spots) in their legislative districts: They want to meet 
people, look them in the eye, shake their hands, and make them feel as if there is a 
connection between them.  These efforts heighten perceptions of interpersonal and 
procedural justice. 
More anecdotally, Al Kamen, the political quasi-gossip columnist for the 
Washington Post, recounted this tale of how interpersonal communication with a 
Democrat has changed the party loyalties of ardent “life-long conservative” Jeffrey Volk. 
Hurricane Katrina trapped this well-connected Republican high-dollar donor and his 
family in New Orleans.  His many calls to the White House and FEMA yielded no results 
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and little satisfaction but many excuses.  He then called the office of his U.S. senator, 
Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton, whom he had never met, to see if her office could in 
any way assist the group of New Yorkers who had banded together to ride out the storm 
and ensuing flooding of the city.  Clinton’s office kept in constant contact with him 
throughout the ordeal; he said: “I can’t begin to tell you how much that meant to us” 
(Kamen, 2006, para. 11).  After this ordeal, Volk and Clinton met in person, finding that 
they although they disagreed about some things, they agreed on much more than either of 
them expected.  He now says he will seriously consider supporting her as yet-
hypothetical bid for president in 2008.  The lesson of all this, Kamen noted, is to never 
forget or ignore constituent service.  But this anecdote again goes to show that the time 
and effort an organizational boundary spanner invests in simple interpersonal 
communication may have an exponential ROI.  To paraphrase a 1990s political 
admonishment: It’s about the interpersonal communication, stupid!   
To conclude, I encourage future research on communication, social networks and 
circles, social capital, and shorter-term (e.g., between a customer and customer-service 
agent) and longer-term interactions (e.g., between a GRP and a critical stakeholder) at the 
interpersonal level.  Such research would benefit the comprehensive body of knowledge 













<<City>>, <<State>>  <<Zip>> 
 
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>: 
 
By virtue of your position at <<Organization Name>>, you function as a “boundary 
spanner” between your organization and Maryland’s political environment.  This puts 
you in the unique position of being attuned to and affected by changes in that 
environment.  That is why I am contacting you: to invite you to participate in a research 
project about how and why major political change affects boundary-spanning 
communication professionals at nonprofit organizations that, to some degree, engage in 
political advocacy.  The backdrop for this project is the election of Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. 
in 2002 as Maryland’s first Republican governor in nearly 40 years.  I am hoping that you 
would share your insights with me for this important project.  To that end, please 
consider participating in two telephone interviews with me. 
I am a doctoral student of public relations in the Department of Communication at the 
University of Maryland.  Maryland is widely considered to have the nation’s top graduate 
program in public relations.  I also have several years of experience in political public 
relations.  This dissertation project, “How Boundary Spanners Experience Organizational 
Recalibration to ‘Jolted’ Political Environments,” melds my academic and professional 
interests.  One of my goals for the project is to develop an “expectations framework” that 
boundary-spanning professionals can use to understand what may happen to them during 
times of major political change and why. 
 
As you consider participating in this important project, I encourage you to both read the 
enclosed Informed Consent Form and visit www.geocities.com/simoneterp/ 
LSTwebsite.html.  My Web site offers more details about: 
 
• the study,  
• why you were contacted, 
• who I am,  
• the Informed Consent Form and how you can attest to your informed consent,  
• why the interviews need to be conducted by telephone,  
• the participants’ raffle, and 
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• how you can pick the date and time for your first interview using an on-line 
scheduling program. 
 
Please note that each interview may take up to 90 minutes of your time (or more or less—
it’s up to you) and if you grant me permission to do so, I would like to audiotape the 
interviews.  You will never be identified by name in any reports emerging from the 
project; I will keep your identity strictly confidential, meaning that only you and I would 
know that your answers are in fact yours. If you are interested, once the project is 
complete, I will be happy to send an executive summary of my dissertation to you. 
 
Should you decide you’d like to participate, please visit my Web site to (1) determine 
how you would like to attest to your informed consent and (2) access the on-line 
interview scheduler.  Everyone who participates will be entered into a raffle for a 
$100 American Express gift card. 
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have about this project or your 
participation in it.  Please feel free to contact me at (228) 875-7587 or 
leahtuite@bellsouth.net. 
 
Your assistance on this project is greatly appreciated. Thank you, <<Title>> <<Last 
Name>>, for your time and consideration. 
 
Very truly yours, 
 
Leah Simone Tuite 
Doctoral Student 
 
P.S.—As you consider assisting me in completing this important research project, please 




Informed Consent Form 
 
This project was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Maryland, 




How Boundary Spanners Experience Organizational Recalibration to “Jolted” 
Political Environments 
Statement of Age of 
Participant (parental 
consent needed for 
minors) 
I state that I am 18 years of age or older and wish to participate in a program of 
research being conducted by Dr. Larissa A. Grunig and Leah Simone Tuite in the 
Department of Communication at the University of Maryland College Park, 
Maryland 20742-7635. 
Purpose The purpose of the research is to explore the experiences of public relations, 
communication, media relations, and/or government relations professionals 
(“boundary spanners”) who work for nonprofit organizations or for-profit 
corporations during major external political change.  
Procedures The procedures involve participating in two telephone interviews, each envisioned to last 
no more than 90 minutes, with Leah Simone Tuite, about my experiences as a boundary 
spanner for a nonprofit organization.  With my consent (indicated in a box at the end of this 
form), the interviews will be audiotaped.   
 
Some likely questions include: How did your work activities change once Robert Ehrlich, 
Maryland’s 1st Republican governor in nearly 40 years, took office in January 2003?  How 
did your organization assess his election?  Did his election affect your position within your 
organization’s power structure? If so, how? 
 
Confidentiality All information collected in the study will remain confidential, and my name and the 
name of my organization will not be identified at any time unless I give my express 
consent to reveal these identities.  The data I provide will not be linked to my name 
or organization; the data will be grouped with data others provide for reporting and 
presentation.  All data will be securely stored and kept in the possession of the 
Student Investigator in her home office in Mississippi.  Further, all data will be 
destroyed (i.e., shredded or erased) when their use is no longer needed but not 
before a minimum of five years after data collection, as is standard academic 
practice. 
 
Risks I understand that there may be a minimal personal risk associated with my 
participation if I consent to have the interview audiotaped.  That the source of the 
data could be identified presents another potential minimal risk. 
Benefits I understand that this research project is not designed to help me personally, but 
that the investigators hope to learn more about how major changes in an 
organization’s external political environment may affect an organizational boundary 
spanner’s work activities, responsibilities, and organizational position. 
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Freedom to Withdraw, 
& Ability to Ask 
Questions 
I understand that I am free to ask questions and/or to withdraw from participation at 
any time without penalty and/or decline to answer certain questions. 
 
Contact Information of 
Investigator(s) 
Dr. Larissa Grunig (Principal Investigator) and Leah Simone Tuite (Student 
Investigator) 
University of Maryland Department of Communication 
2130 Skinner Building 
College Park, MD 20742-7635 
Phones: 301-405-6532 (Grunig), 228-875-7587 (Tuite) 
E-mails: lgrunig@umd.edu, leahtuite@bellsouth.net 
Contact Information of 
Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report a 
research-related injury, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, 
University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742; (e-mail) 
irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 301-405-4212 
 
Obtaining a copy of 
the research results 
I understand that I may obtain a copy of the results of this research after July 1, 
2005 by contacting Leah Simone Tuite at leahtuite@bellsouth.net. 
 
Printed Name of Participant ___________________________________________________ 
 




PERMISSION FOR MY INTERVIEW TO BE AUDIOTAPED
___  YES, I grant permission for my interviews to be audiotaped.   
___  NO, I do not want my interviews to be audiotaped. 
 













<<City>>, <<State>>  <<Zip>> 
 
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>: 
 
As you may remember, I contacted you in late December about participating in my 
dissertation research project, “How Boundary Spanners Experience Organizational 
Recalibration to ‘Jolted’ Political Environments.”  This project is looking at how and way 
major political change affects boundary-spanning communication professionals at 
nonprofit organizations that, to some degree, engage in political advocacy.  The backdrop 
for this project is the election of Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. in 2002 as Maryland’s first 
Republican governor in nearly 40 years.  
 
Since I sent you and others that letter, it has become clear to me that my project was 
flawed.  One, I was asking for too much and two, the timing was terrible.  It was 
unrealistic to ask working professionals to do two 90-minute (or so) telephone interviews 
with me, let alone to ask for these interviews during what is their busiest time of the year, 
namely the state’s legislative session. 
 
To address the study’s (fortunately) not-quite-fatal flaws, I have developed a “Version 
2.0: of the project, which I hope you will mull over being a participant in.  Specifically, 
please consider participating in one 60- to 90-minute telephone interview with me 
sometime during the next several months.  Even if you can spare only 30 or 45 
minutes, I would still value your contributions to the project. 
 
As you consider participating in my Project Version 2.0, I have taken the liberty of 
enclosing a printout of my Web site (http://www.geocities.com/simoneterp/ 
LSTwebsite.html). The Web site offers more details about the project and participation.  
It also explains how you can either go ahead and schedule your interview or postpone 
your interview to a less-busy time of the year (see the enclosed “Delayed” Interview 
Preference form).  You can use the enclosed stamped, pre-addressed envelope to send 
this form and/or the University-required Informed Consent Form to me. 
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Again, I would be happy to answer any questions you might have about my project or 
your participation.  Please feel free to contact me at 228-875-7587 or 
leahtuite@bellsouth.net.  Thank you, <<Title>> <<Last Name>>, for thinking about 
giving my dissertation project a shot. 
 
Very truly yours, 
 










Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>: 
 
Now that the 2005 Maryland legislative session has ended, I am undertaking one last 
attempt to drum up participants for my dissertation research project, “How 
Boundary Spanners Experience Organizational Recalibration to ‘Jolted’ Political 
Environments.” 
 
As you may remember from my previous communications to you, I am seeking to talk to 
people about their experiences working in government relations, public relations and 
communications for nonprofit organizations and trade associations that operate in 
Maryland and, to some degree, engage in political advocacy. 
 
Only about 30 people are needed to participate in my study for it to be “dissertation 
worthy,” and truth be told, I am rather short of this goal.  I am hopeful that with the 
legislative session now over, people would have the time to spare for my study.  All that 
participation entails is a one-hour or so telephone interview with me sometime 
before the end of September.  Thus I am contacting you againthe last time I will do 
soto ask if you would please participate in my study. Everyone who participates will 
be entered into a drawing for a $100 American Express gift card. 
 
For more details about my study, please visit www.geocities.com/simoneterp/ 
LSTwebsite.html.  You can self-schedule an interview through this site, or you may 
contact me at leahtuite@bellsouth.net or 228-875-7587 to do so. 
 
Thank you so much for reconsidering being a participant in my dissertation project and 




Leah Simone Tuite, Doctoral Candidate 














<<City>>, <<State>>  <<Zip>> 
 
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>: 
 
My name is Leah Simone Tuite; I am a doctoral candidate in communication at the 
University of Maryland.  I am writing to you today to ask for your assistance in my 
dissertation research project. 
 
Despite its overly academic title (“How Boundary Spanners Experience Organizational 
Recalibration to ‘Jolted’ Political Environments”), the project itself is quite rooted in the 
“real world.”  The project is exploring the work lives of government relations and 
communication professionals in Maryland against the backdrop of the election of the 
state’s first Republican governor after nearly 40 years of Democrat governors. 
 
I am seeking to talk to people about their experiences working in government relations, 
public relations and communications for 501(c) organization that operate in Maryland 
and that also, to some degree, engage in political advocacy.  All that participation 
entails is a one-hour or so telephone interview with me sometime before the end of 
September. Even if you could spare only 30 or 45 minutes, I would still value your 
input on the project.  Everyone who participates will be entered into a drawing for a $100 
American Express gift card and will receive an executive summary of the project once it 
is completed.  (In case you are wondering, I am conducing the interviews by telephone 
because I live in Mississippi due to my husband’s job as an officer in the U.S. Navy.) 
 
As you consider participating in my project, I have taken the liberty of enclosing a 
printout of my Web site (http://www.geocities.com/simoneterp/LSTwebsite.html).  On 
this site, you can find more details about the project, the University-required Informed 
Consent Form (also enclosed), and me. 
 
Should you like to assist me in the completion of my dissertation by doing an interview, 
you can self-schedule your interview through the Web site, fill out and return the 
enclosed “Please Contact Me” form (also enclosed is a stamped, pre-addressed return 
envelope), or simply contact me at leahtuite@bellsouth.net or 228-875-7587. 
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I am happy to answer any questions you might have about my project or your 
participation in it.  Please feel free to contact me at leahtuite@bellsouth.net or 228-875-
7587.  Thank you so much for considering being a participant in my dissertation project 




Leah Simone Tuite 
Doctoral Candidate 
 
P.S.Your participation in my study would not cause you to disclose any proprietary or 
confidential information to me.  I am purely interested in your individual experiences and 
insights from your perspective as a participant in the Maryland political process.
Further, all information collected in the study will remain confidential, and neither your 
name nor the names of your organization or clients will be identified at any time unless 
you give your express consent to reveal these identities.  The data you provide will not be 
linked to your name or organization or clients; the date will be grouped with data others 







Name of Informant: 
Title: 
Organization/Client(s): 






______ Engage in small talk with the informant. 
______    Thank the informant for agreeing to be a part of the study. 
______    Reintroduce the study. 
______    Remind the informant of rights, confidentiality considerations, etc. 
______    Answer questions he or she may have about the study, me, etc.  
______    Reconfirm audiotape decision.  Then explain that he or she will be  
placed on speakerphone to facilitate the audiotaping and to let you  
know when/if they want taping to stop. 
 
Always ask the first question set first.  Then ask 
these questions/cover these topics in no particular 
order.  Use probes and follow-up questions!!! 
 
Notes and Impressions 
______ Professional background.   
 
______ How did you come to work for your  
 organization? 
 
______ Connections to Ehrlich administration? 
 
______ To Glendening administration?   
 
______ To the General Assembly?   
 
______ Democrats or Republicans? 
 
______ How do you know them?  
 
______ Benefits/implications of connections? 
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______ Benefits of knowing the “ropes”? 
 
______ Effect of Ehrlich’s election on connections? 
 
______ Organization’s views of Ehrlich winning the  
 2002 gubernatorial election?   
 
______ Views based on what? 
 
______ His election was good or bad for  
 organization? 
 
______ Organization’s views now, two plus years  
 into the Ehrlich administration? 
 
______ Effects of Ehrlich’s election on Annapolis? 
 
______ What do you think the Ehrlich  
 administration thinks of your organization? 
 
______ How does this compare to Glendening’s  
 views? 
 
______ Reasons for their views?   
 
______ Implications of good or bad graces? 
 
______ How often does the Ehrlich administration 
 include (or consult with) your organization? 
 
______ How does this compare to Glendening? 
 
______ Reasons for their inclusion or exclusion?  
 
______ Describe interactions. 
 




______ Tell me about your job.  Describe a typical  
 workday/workweek (if there is such a thing!). 
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______What government relations activities does  
 your organization engage in?   
 








______ Coalition work 
 
______ Task forces 
 




______ Social activities 
 




______ Involvement in elections 
 
______ Differences pre- and post-Ehrlich election? 
 
______ Management structure – Where do you fit in? 
 
______ Answer to whom? 
 
______ Work with whom? 
 
______ Who makes government relations decisions? 
 
______ Your involvement in such decision-making?  
 
______ Describe organizational decision-making  
 process(es). 
 
______ How much autonomy in your job? 
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______ Latitude to make strategic/tactical decisions? 
 




______ What’s different for you since Ehrlich’s  
 election? 
 
______ What’s different for organization since  
 Ehrlich’s election? 
 
______ What’s different for Annapolis since  
 Ehrlich’s election?   
 
______ Implications for you? 
 
______ Anything else you like to mention that we  
 have not touched upon but is relevant to what  




______ Thank the informant again. 
 
______ Ask if it would be OK to contact for follow-up if necessary. 
 
______ Confirm that he or she wants a copy of the executive summary. 
 




Information About Informants 
 




1 Executive director 501c(6) • Local government 
• Legal work 
2 Member, board of directors 501c(3)/501c(4) • Historic preservation 
• Fundraising 
• Legal work 
3 In-house GRP 501c(6) Law enforcement 
4 For-contract GRP 501c(4) and 
501c(6) clients 
• State legislative work 
• Legal work 
• Military 
5 Executive director 501c(6) • Journalism 
6 State director 501c(4) • Journalism 
• Policy research 
7 For-contract GRP 501c(4) and 
501c(6) clients 
• Federal legislative and 
political experience 
• State legislative and 
political experience 
• Legal work 
8 Department director  501c(6) • Association 
management 
9 Committee chair (volunteer) 501c(4) • Federal government 
• Legal work 
10 President 501c(6) • Business management 
• Federal-level trade 
association government 
relations 
11 For-contract GRP 501c(4) and 
501c(6) clients 
• Federal-level campaign 
management and 
fundraising 
• State-level campaign 
management and 
fundraising 
• Corporate government 
relations 
12 Regional director 501c(3) • Banking 
• Business development 
• Fundraising 
13 Vice president 501c(6) • Rose up through 
organization 
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14 Committee chair (volunteer) 501c(6) • Legal work 
15 Managing director  501c(6) • Education 
16 For-contract GRP 501c(4) and 
501c(6) clients 
• Former elected official 
• State government 
agency GRP 
17 For-contract GRP 501c(4) and 
501c(6) clients 
• Corporate legal and 
legislative counsel 
18 Department director  501c(6) • Federal legislative 
experience 
• County legislative 
experience 
19 Department director  501c(4) • City government GRP 
• Legal work 
20 President and CEO 501c(3) • Social work 
21 Department director 501c(6) • Federal government 
agency experience 
• Former appointed 
official 
• Campaign management 
22 Executive director 501c(6) • Association 
management 
• Corporate government 
affairs 
23 Executive director 501c(6) • Education 
• Public school 
administration 
24 President and CEO 501c(6) • Association 
management 
• Higher education 
25 President and CEO 501c(6) • Association 
management 
• Corporate public 
relations 
• Public information for 
city government 
26 Executive director 501c(3)/501c(4) • Higher education 
• Local government 
• Science 
27 Co-chair 501c(4) • Military 
• Computer and software 
testing 
28 For-contract GRP 501c(4) and 
501c(6) clients 
• Former elected official 
• Legal work 
29 For-contract GRP 501c(4) clients • Higher education 
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• Former appointed 
official 
• GRP 
30 Associate director 501c(6) • State government 
experience 
• Legal Work 
31 Assistant executive director 501c(6) • Education 
• Political public 
relations 
32 Department director  501c(6) • Federal-level legislative 
and campaign experience 
• State-level legislative 
and campaign experience 
• Legal work 
• Former appointed 
official 
33 Department director 501c(6) • State government 
experience 
34 Department director 501c(6) • Business management 
• Volunteer work 
35 Senior vice-president  501c(6) • State-level legislative 
experience 
36 Executive director 501c(4) • State government 
experience 
• Legal work 
37 President 501c(6) • Medical doctor 
38 Department director  501c(3) • Policy research 
• Government agency 
experience 
• Lobbying 
39 President 501c(6) • State agency GRP 
40 Executive director 501c(6) • Health care finance 
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